ORDER : B.S. Patil, J. 1. A Division Bench of this Court has referred this Regular First Appeal to the Full Bench stating that opinion expressed by a co-ordinate bench in the case of Sri Chandrashekhar and Others Vs. The Tuheed Co-operative Housing Society (Regd.) and Others (2008 (5) KCCR SN 632) : ILR 2008 Kar 2003) that no relief of specific performance could be granted in respect of agricultural land due to the prohibition in law for purchase of the same by a non-agriculturist as per Section 79B and Section 80 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, (for short 'the Act') was contrary to four Division Bench judgments of this Court rendered earlier. The order of reference states that after considering the effect of the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act including Section 132 thereof which enacts a bar on the Civil Court to decide the issue, four Division Benches of this Court considered the question whether an intending purchaser of an agricultural land was an agriculturist and specific performance of such agreement of sale could be ordered in the light of the prohibition enacted under Section 79B and Section 80 of the Land Reforms Act in favour of such intending purchaser and have held that such a question would not arise and the same could not be gone into, but, without considering these judgments a different view was expressed in Tuheed Co-operative Housing Society's case. Material part of the order of reference extracted hereunder: "The primary ground on which the Court below has negated the agreement of sale was that the appellants/plaintiffs were non-agriculturists and the property sought to be purchased was agricultural land and hence following a decision of this Court in the case of Sri Chandrashekhar and Others Vs. The Tuheed Cooperative Housing Society (Regd.) and Others, ILR 2008 Kar 2003, wherein it has been laid down that no relief of specific performance could have been granted in respect of property which was agricultural land if there was a prohibition in law for purchase of the same by a non-agriculturist in terms of the prohibition contained under Section 79-B of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 ('the Act' for brevity). It is pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellants that the view expressed in the aforesaid judgment by a Division Bench of this Court is without reference to four judgments of Benches of co-ordinate jurisdiction of this Court which have held otherwise. In that, the decisions in Shivannappa Sidramappa Prantur Vs. Virupaxappa Allappa Bagi, ILR 1980 Kar 702, KM. Jose and Others Vs. D. Anantha Bhat, AIR 1987 Kar 173 , Manasa Housing Co-operative Society Ltd. Vs. Marikellaiah and Others, AIR 2006 Kar 273 and Parvatagouda Ninganagouda Patil and Others Vs. Guddappa and Another, 2009 (1) KLJ 547 having consistently expressed that notwithstanding Section 79B of the Act, which prohibits the holding of agricultural land by a person who is not an agriculturist and personally cultivating the land, so also Section 80 of the Act which bars the transfer of agricultural land in favour of a person who is not an agriculturist and with reference to Section 132 of the Act which confers a bar on the Civil Court to decided an issue which is required to be decided under the Act and therefore, it has laid down in those decisions that an agreement of sale in respect of agricultural land, in a suit for specific performance would not give rise to an issue whether the intending purchaser is an agriculturist or not." 2. It is clear that there are four judgments of the Division Bench in the cases of Shivannappa Sidramappa Prantur Vs. Virupaxappa Allappa Bagi, ILR 1980 Kar 702, KM. Jose and Others Vs. D. Anantha Bhat, AIR 1987 Kar 173 , Manasa Housing Co-operative Society Ltd. Vs. Marikellaiah and Others, AIR 2006 Kar 273 and Parvatagouda Ninganagouda Patil and Others Vs. Guddappa and Another, 2009 (1) KLJ 547 which have consistently held that notwithstanding Section 79-B of the Act which prohibits a person other than a person, cultivating the land (non-agriculturist) personally to hold any land and the bar contained in Section 80 of the Act which bars transfer of agricultural laid in favour of a person who is not an agriculturist, in a suit filed for specific performance based on an agreement of sale in respect of agricultural land, the issue whether the intending purchaser is or is not an agriculturist would not arise and cannot be decided in view of the bar contained in Section 132 of the Act. Section 132 enacts that no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to decide or deal with any question which is required to be decided or dealt with by the prescribed authority under Section 83 of the Act. 3. Incidentally, it is necessary to notice here that Section 83 of the Act clothes the prescribed authority with the power to determine whether the transaction reported to it under Section 82 in respect of any land was done in contravention of the provisions of Act and was therefore, unlawful or invalid. The prescribed authority is enjoined with the function, of declaring the said transaction as illegal or one done in contravention of the provisions of the Act. Thereupon, the transaction so declared shall be null and void and the land, as a penalty, be forfeited to the State Government so as to vest in the State free from all encumbrances. 4. Right' from the judgment rendered in the case of Shivannappa Sidramappa Prantur Vs. Virupaxappa Allappa Bagi, ILR 1980 Kar 702, it has been consistently held by the successive Division Benches of this Court that in a suit for specific performance, the issue whether the intending purchaser is an agriculturist or not would not arise for consideration because as per Section 83 of the Act it is for the competent authority to declare such sale as null and void; that such declaration could be made in respect of completed transaction and not as regards an agreement to sell any agricultural land and that there was no bar in the Act for entering into such agreement to sell agricultural land. The successive Division Benches have also held that it was not for the Civil Court to decide whether there was contravention of provisions of Section 79B or Section 80 of the Act when such power was exclusively conferred on the prescribed authority under Section 83 of the Act. 5. This position in law as declared by the successive Division Benches after considering the effect of the provisions contained in Sections 79-B, 80 and 83 and as also Section 132 which is evident from the four decisions referred to in the order of reference has not been doubted by the learned Judges who have referred the instant case to the Full Bench. The reference to Full Bench is not made for laying down the correct position in law due to any confusion with regard to the legal position on the point. The Division Bench has persuaded itself to make this reference to the Full Bench as it has noticed that in Tuheed Co-operative Housing Society's case, it has been held that relief of specific performance could not be granted in respect of agricultural land if there was prohibition in law for purchase of the same by a non-agriculturist as per Section 79B of the Act. The Division Bench which has referred the matter has noticed the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the appellants that the view expressed by the Division Bench in Tuheed Co-operative Housing Society's case was without reference to four judgments of the benches of co-ordinate jurisdiction which have laid down the law. The Division Bench has indeed referred to all the four decisions which have held the field and laid down the law. The tenor of order of reference makes it very clear that the learned Judges who referred the matter to the Full Bench were of the view that the earlier four decisions of the Division Benches had not been referred nor they were distinguished and therefore the different view expressed by the bench in Tuheed Co-operative Housing Society's case was an 'aberration' and that they (referring Judges) were not in a position to accept the opinion expressed in Tuheed Co-operative Housing Society's case. Thus, what emerges is that even in the order of reference, the Division Bench has made it clear that they were not in a position to accept the opinion expressed in Tuheed Cooperative Housing Society's case as it was not rendered by considering the effect of the earlier four decisions of the Division Benches. It is under such circumstance, this reference made to the Full Bench is required to be considered. 6. Sri M.G. Naganuri, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants and Sri V.P. Kulkarni, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents submit that there is no confusion with regard to the legal position and that nobody has disputed the legal position as laid down in the four decisions of the Division Benches. 6. Sri M.G. Naganuri, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants and Sri V.P. Kulkarni, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents submit that there is no confusion with regard to the legal position and that nobody has disputed the legal position as laid down in the four decisions of the Division Benches. Both the learned Counsel unanimously expressed that reference made to the Full Bench does not fall within the ambit of sub-clause (1) of Section 7 of the Karnataka High Courts Act, 1961, inasmuch as, no question of law having the force of law had arisen before the Division Bench nor the Division Bench had differed from the view taken by a similar bench of the High Court on the question in issue so as to refer the matter to the Full Bench. Hence, they contend that reference to the Full Bench itself was uncalled for. 7. In this regard, we have perused the provisions contained in Section 7 of the Karnataka High Court Act, which deals with 'reference to the Full Bench'. It reads as under: "7. Reference to Full Bench.--(1) Where in any proceeding pending before it, any question of law or usage having the force of law arises, a Bench consisting of not less than two Judges of the High Court may, if it thinks fit, and shall, if it differs from the view taken by a similar Bench of the High Court on the said question, refer to a Full Bench of the High Court the question of law or usage having the force of law. (2) The decision of the majority of Judges comprising a Full Bench of the High Court shall be the decision of the High Court." 8. We have also perused the Full Bench judgment of the Mysore High Court in the case of Shivadeviamma and Others Vs. Sumanji and Others, AIR 1973 Mysore 87 (Full Bench) and the judgment in Shivadeviamma and Others Vs. Sumanji and Other, AIR 1973 Mysore 296 rendered by the bench consisting of five Hon'ble Judges of the Mysore High Court. 9. As held by the Full Bench consisting of five Hon'ble Judges in the case reported in Shivadeviamma and Others Vs. Sumanji and Other, AIR 1973 Mysore 296 and as is apparent from Section 7 of the Karnataka High Courts Act, 1961, sub-section (1) of Section 7 consists of two parts. 9. As held by the Full Bench consisting of five Hon'ble Judges in the case reported in Shivadeviamma and Others Vs. Sumanji and Other, AIR 1973 Mysore 296 and as is apparent from Section 7 of the Karnataka High Courts Act, 1961, sub-section (1) of Section 7 consists of two parts. The first part provides that if in any pending proceeding before a bench of not less than two Judges any question of law or usage having the force of law arises, such bench, may if it, thinks fit, refer such question to a Full Bench. The second part of the said sub-section provides that if in any proceeding pending before it, a bench consisting of not less than two Judges differs from the view taken by a similar bench of this Court on such question, such question shall be referred to a Full Bench. It is indeed evident that there is nothing in Section 7(1) of the Karnataka High Court Act which expressly provides as to what an order of reference to a Full Bench shall contain. It is also not stated in Section 7 that the Full Bench shall hear and decide the question referred to it by a Division Bench. Nothing is also stated whether the Full Bench can send back the case to a referring bench. 10. Having noticed the language employed in Section 7, in paragraph 11 of the judgment the Full Bench (consisting of five Hon'ble Judges) has observed as under: "11. However, the necessary implication from the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 7 is, in our opinion, that when a question is referred to a Full Bench, it (the Full Bench) should hear and decide such question so that the referring Bench may decide the case in accordance with the decision of the Full Bench on that question." 11. In paragraphs 12 and 13 the five Hon'ble Judges proceed to observe as under: "12. If a Division Bench refers to a Full Bench a question of law on which there is an earlier decision of a similar Bench, can it be said that there is, by necessary implication from the provisions of Section 7, a duty cast on the referring Bench to formulate in its order of reference to the Full Bench a reasoned criticism of the view taken by the other Bench or to offer an alternative to that view? Nextly, does the power of the Full Bench to hear and decide the questions referred to it, carry with it an implied or ancillary power to send back a case to the referring Bench if the order of reference does not contain such reasoned criticism or an alternative to the view of the earlier Bench? 13. Where there is already a decision of a Division Bench of this Court on a question of law and a similar Bench doubts its correctness and refers such question to a Full Bench, there can be no doubt that it is desirable that the order of reference should contain the reasons which persuaded the referring Bench to doubt the correctness of the other similar Bench. The following observations of Hidayatullah, J., (as he then was), who spoke for the Division Bench in Gourishanker Vs. Raja Azamshah, which have been quoted by Govinda Bhat, J., who delivered the majority opinion of the Full Bench in this case are apposite. "It is hardly fair to the Bench called upon to consider the correctness of a decision that they should not be made aware of the reasons which impelled the referring Judge, to doubt its correctness. We venture to state, with all due respect, that, 'in the absence of conflict of authority, a reference, casting a doubt on the correctness of a reported decision of the Court, but not formulating a reasoned criticism of the view accepted therein or offering an alternative to it, disturbs the comity of the Court. This would only lead to uncertainty of the law and with all due respect should be avoided." 12. Having said so, the Full Bench has held that the omission by the referring bench to formulate reasons or to indicate an alternative view cannot invalidate the reference made to the Full Bench and that the Full Bench cannot decline to hear and answer the question so referred. It is useful to refer to the conclusion reached by the Full Bench of the five Hon'ble Judges in paragraphs 15 and 16 which reads as under: "15. In spite of the omission by a referring Bench to formulate such reasons or to indicate such alternative view, the order of reference made by such Bench to a Full Bench, is, in our opinion, a valid reference. In spite of the omission by a referring Bench to formulate such reasons or to indicate such alternative view, the order of reference made by such Bench to a Full Bench, is, in our opinion, a valid reference. It follows that the Full Bench cannot decline to hear and answer the questions so referred to it by a Division Bench merely on the ground that the order of reference does not contain such reasons or indicate an alternative view. It also follows that the Full Bench cannot send back the case to the referring Bench, with a direction to give the reasons for doubting the correctness of an earlier decision of a similar Bench or for saying that a question decided by a similar Bench requires reexamination. 16. For the purpose of this reference, it is not necessary to express any opinion on the question whether a Full Bench has or has no power to send back a case to the referring Bench without answering the questions referred to it (Full Bench), where such question is not a question of law or usage having the force of law at all or where such question is not intelligible or suffers from ambiguity and requires clarification by the referring Bench. For the reasons stated above, our answer to the question referred to us is as follows: On the ground that no reasons are stated in support of the order of reference, it is not open to a Full Bench to decline to answer the questions referred to it by a Division Bench under Section 7 of the Mysore High Court Act, 1961, and to send back the case to the referring Bench without answering the questions referred to it (Full Bench) and to direct the referring Bench to state reasons in support of the order, of reference." 13. In the light of the above decision, we are of the view that we cannot agree with the contention urged by Sri V.P. Kulkarni, learned Counsel for the respondents that the reference made itself is bad as the Division Bench had not framed any question of law nor it had dissented from the view expressed in the previous four judgments of the four coordinate benches. It would be no doubt, desirable to formulate reasons to dissent from the view or to doubt the existing view which has held the field but not everything that is desirable to be done or to be refrained from being done, necessarily creates a legal obligation to do it or to refrain from doing it. Indeed, this aspect has been very lucidly stated in paragraph 14 of the aforementioned judgment. We are inclined to extract the same which reads as under: "14. As stated earlier, even Venkataramiah, J., has not, in his minority opinion, doubted the desirability of formulation of such reasoned criticism or offering an alternative to the view the correctness of which has been doubted by the referring Bench. But the question is whether there is legal obligation on the referring Bench, to do so. It is well known that not everything that is desirable to be done or to be refrained from being done, necessarily creates a legal obligation to do it or to refrain from doing it. There are many things which are merely in the region of desirability, expediency or propriety, but outside the sphere of legal rights and obligations. We find it difficult to say that where a Bench doubts the correctness of an earlier decision of a similar Bench or feels that it is desirable that the question decided in such earlier decision, should be re-examined and refers such question to a Full Bench, the referring Bench is under a legal obligation to formulate the reasons for doubting the correctness of the earlier decision or for saying that a question decided earlier by a similar Bench required re-examination. As stated earlier, sub-section (1) of Section 7 does not expressly state that the referring Bench should do so; nor can such an obligation be, in our opinion, said to be necessarily implied from the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 7." 14. Therefore, merely because there is some procedural irregularity in referring the dispute to the Full Bench, we will not refer it back. Therefore, merely because there is some procedural irregularity in referring the dispute to the Full Bench, we will not refer it back. However, in the facts of the present case, we are constrained to observe that there was no need for the Division Bench to refer this matter for the opinion of the Full Bench, inasmuch as, there are already four judgments of the Division Benches which have laid down the law clearly and categorically after considering the effect of the relevant provision contained in the Karnataka Land Reforms Act including the bar enacted under Section 132 of the said Act for the Civil Court to decide the question as to whether a transaction regarding sale of agricultural land in favour of a non-agriculturist was illegal and null and void. 15. The reason for referring the matter to the Full Bench is the contrary view expressed in Tuheed Co-operative Housing Society's case. In this case, the Division Bench has not considered the effect of the provisions contained in the Karnataka Land Reforms Act particularly Section 132 which bars the Civil Court from exercising any power that is vested with the prescribed authority under Section 83 to decide regarding the validity of the transaction. The Division Bench in this case has not referred to the four other decisions of the co-ordinate benches which have consistently laid down the law to the effect that such question cannot be examined and does not arise for consideration in a suit for specific performance when a separate forum was constituted clothing exclusive jurisdiction in it as per the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. 16. In the said case, the Division Bench while considering the discretion of the Civil Court to decree the suit for specific performance has made a passing observation in paragraph 20(j) as follows: "20(j). Under Section 79B of Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, a Co-operative Society is not eligible to possess agricultural land. Therefore the very transaction in question is forbidden under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872." 17. These observations in Tuheed Co-operative Housing Society's case cannot be regarded as laying down any law with regard to the question in issue. Under Section 79B of Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, a Co-operative Society is not eligible to possess agricultural land. Therefore the very transaction in question is forbidden under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872." 17. These observations in Tuheed Co-operative Housing Society's case cannot be regarded as laying down any law with regard to the question in issue. The observation made in paragraph 20(j) of Tuheed Co-operative Housing Society's case is not the result of any discussion on the effect of the various provisions contained in the Karnataka Land Reforms Act as interpreted by four Division Benches of this Court. Therefore, the Division Bench which has referred the matter to the Full Bench was not bound by the observations made in Tuheed Co-operative Housing Society's case as it had no precedential value and binding effect. Indeed, the law laid down in the four cases by the successive Division Benches had binding effect on the referring Judges. It was only out of judicial propriety the learned Judges have thought it fit to refer the matter to the Full Bench. In the order of reference, the Division Bench has indeed expressed that they were not in a position to accept the opinion expressed in Tuheed Co-operative Housing Society's case. In the above circumstance, we are of the view that as the law has been already laid down by the four Division Benches of this Court in terms referred to hereinabove, the judgment in Tuheed Co-operative Housing Society's case cannot be treated as laying down a different proposition having binding effect. The observations made in the said judgment in paragraph 20(j) cannot be treated as a ratio laid down having, binding effect. In the wake of four pronouncements by successive Division Benches in Shivannappa Sidramappa Prantur Vs. Virupaxappa Allappa Bagi, ILR 1980 Kar 702, KM. Jose and Others Vs. D. Anantha Bhat, AIR 1987 Kar 173 , Manasa Housing Co-operative Society Ltd. Vs. Marikellaiah and Others, AIR 2006 Kar 273 and Parvatagouda Ninganagouda Patil and Others Vs. Guddappa and Another, 2009 (1) KLJ 547, it has to be held that there was no occasion for the learned Judges who have rendered the judgment in Tuheed Co-operative Housing Society's case or for the Division Bench in the present case to express any contrary view in the matter. Indeed, no such contrary view is expressed by the referring Judges. Guddappa and Another, 2009 (1) KLJ 547, it has to be held that there was no occasion for the learned Judges who have rendered the judgment in Tuheed Co-operative Housing Society's case or for the Division Bench in the present case to express any contrary view in the matter. Indeed, no such contrary view is expressed by the referring Judges. We may make it clear that our decision is not to enter into this reference, as the same, in our opinion, does not meet the requirements of Section 7(1) of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961 and therefore, we are not pronouncing upon the correctness or otherwise of any of the previous Division Bench decisions on the issue involved in aforesaid RFA. What we have held is that since there is no conflict of opinion expressed by subsequent Division Benches either in the case of Tuheed Co-operative Housing Society's or in the Reference Order, the reference to Full Bench does not arise or gives rise to a question of law as required under Section 7(1) of the Act. Therefore, any observations made above should not be treated as our approval or otherwise of the views expressed by the earlier Division Benches in four decisions cited in the Reference order. The observations made in paragraph 20(j) by the Division Bench in Tuheed Co-operative Housing Society quoted above is only an obiter, given without any discussion of the earlier decisions, or relevant statutory provisions and therefore, that cannot be treated as a dissent or conflict of opinion by a subsequent Bench of same strength. We, thus, leave the consideration of issues by the larger Bench open in an appropriate case. Ordered accordingly.