JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Sri Manish Goyal assisted by Sri Rohan Gupta, counsel for the appellants, Sri Ravi Krishan Chandra and Sri Saurabh Srivastava, counsel for the respondents. 2. This Intra-Court Appeal has been filed under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules against the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 20.2.2014 passed in Company Appeal No. 2 of 2013 (Iqbal Leathers Ltd. and another v. M/s. Unnao Tanneries Pollution Control Company and others). 3. A preliminary objection has been raised on behalf of the respondents to the present Special Appeal to the effect that in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in the Case of Kamal Kumar Dutta and another v. Ruby General Hospital Ltd. and others, 2006 (7) SCC 613 , as also in view of the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of U.P. Cement Vetanbhogi Sahkari Rin Samiti Ltd v. Official Liquidator, the present Special Appeal would not be maintainable. It is argued that from a simple reading of Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, an appeal against an order of the learned Single Judge made in exercise of Appellate Jurisdiction in respect of decree or order made by a Court subject to the superintendence of the Court would be barred. It is further contended that in view of the amendment introduced by adding Section 100-A to the Civil Procedure Code in the Year 2002, no further appeal after the order of the learned Single Judge made in exercise of Appellate Jurisdiction would be maintainable before the same Court. 4. The counsel for the appellants, opposed the preliminary objection so made and submitted that the Division Bench of this Court in the Case of Prakash Timbers Pvt. Ltd v. Smt. Sushma Shingla and another, AIR 1996 Alld. 262, has explained that the appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules would be maintainable in as much as the order passed by the Company Law Board cannot be said to be an order made by a Court. For this purpose, reliance is placed upon the Paragraphs 5, 31 and 32 of the said judgment. Further reliance has been placed upon the Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Salem Advocates Bar Association v. Union of India, especially para-15 of the judgment. For this purpose, reliance is placed upon the Paragraphs 5, 31 and 32 of the said judgment. Further reliance has been placed upon the Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Salem Advocates Bar Association v. Union of India, especially para-15 of the judgment. It is lastly contended that Chapter VIII Rule 5 is a special provision and therefore, the provision contained in Section 100-A of the Civil Procedure Code would not control statutory right to appeal provided for under Chapter VIII Rule 5, as Letters Patent Appeal has been abolished in the State of U.P and has been replaced by the provision of Special Appeal in Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and examined the record of the present appeal for appreciating the controversy raised by means of preliminary objection. It is worthwhile to reproduce Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules. “5. Special appeal : An appeal shall lie to the Court from a judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction) in respect of a decree or order made by a Court subject to the superintendence of the Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction or in the exercise of its power of superintendence or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction or in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution in respect of any judgment, order or award—(a) of a tribunal, Court or statutory arbitrator made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, or (b) of the Government or any officer or authority, made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any such Act of one Judge.” 6. The said Rule had been subject-matter of consideration before a Full Bench of this Court in the Case of Sheet Gupta v. State of U.P. and others, 2010(1) ADJ 1 (FB) : 2010(1) ESC 273 (All)(FB) and the Full Bench after referring to the judgment in the case of Vajara Yojna Seed Farm, Kalyanpur v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, (2003) 1 UPLBEC 496 , in paragraph 14 held that no Special Appeal shall lie in the following circumstances enumerated as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. It is relevant to reproduce paragraph-14 of the said judgment of the Full Bench. “14. Having given our anxious consideration to the various plea raised by the learned counsel for the parties, we find that from the perusal of Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules a special appeal shall lie before this Court from the judgment passed by one Judge of the Court. However, such special appeal will not lie in the following circumstances: 1. The judgment passed by one Judge in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made by a Court subject to the Superintendence of the Court; 2. the order made by one Judge in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction; 3. the order made by one Judge in the exercise of the power of Superintendence of the High Court; 4. the order made by one Judge in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction; 5. the order made by one Judge in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution of India in respect of any judgment, order or award by (i) the tribunal, (ii) Court or (iii) statutory arbitrator made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central Act. With respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India; 6. With respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India; 6. the order made by one Judge in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India in respect of any judgment, order or award of (i) the Government or (ii) any officer or (iii) authority, made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any such Act, i.e. under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India.” 7. From a simple reading of the aforesaid judgments of the Full Bench, it is apparently clear that Special Appeal before the two Judges under Chapter VIII Rule 5 would be barred if it arises out of a judgment passed by one Judge in exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made by the Court subject to superintendence of the Court. 8. A Division Bench of this Court in the Case of Prakash Timbers Pvt. Ltd (supra) had gone on to hold that the order passed by the Company Law Board cannot be treated to be an order passed by the Court and therefore a special appeal arising out of the order of Single Judge made in exercise of powers under Section 10F of the Act against the order of the Company Law Board order under Section 10E of the Act was held to be maintainable. 9. We may record that in paragraph 5 of the said judgment, the Division Bench itself has opined that the Company Law Board, in case it is treated as Court, Special Appeal shall not lie against its order under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the CPC. The relevant part of paragraph 5 is being quoted herein below: “5. This Rule broadly speaking is in two distinctive parts. One in respect of order passed by a learned single Judge against (i) Orders of a Court, and the other (ii) in respect of orders passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. This Rule broadly speaking is in two distinctive parts. One in respect of order passed by a learned single Judge against (i) Orders of a Court, and the other (ii) in respect of orders passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The special appeal does not lie against these orders but with certain exceptions, It is not necessary to analyse these exceptions here. In the present case, the learned single Judge has passed the order in an appeal preferred under Section 10-F of the Act against the order of Company Law Board passed under Section 10-E of the Act. The question is whether the Company Law Board can be treated as Court. In case it is treated as Court, special appeal shall not lie against its order under Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court.” 10. The Apex Court has answered the issue as to whether the Company Law Board can be treated to be a Court or not in the case of Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra). It has been held in paragraph 23 as under: “Therefore, where appeal has been decided from an original order by a single Judge, no further appeal has been provided and that power which used to be there under the Letters Patent of the High Court has been subsequently withdrawn. The present order which has been passed by the CLB and against that appeal has been provided before the High Court under Section 10 F of the Act, that is an appeal from the original order. Then in that case no further Letters patent appeal shall lie to the Division Bench of the same High Court. This amendment has taken away the power of the Letters Patent in the matter where learned single Judge hears an appeal from the original order. Original order in the present case was passed by the CLB exercising the power under Sections 397 and 398 of the Act and appeal has been preferred under Section 10 F of the Act before the High Court. Learned single Judge having passed an order, no further appeal will lie as the Parliament in its wisdom has taken away its power - - - - - - - - -. The words speak for itself. It does not require any further interpretation by any statement made in any manner. Learned single Judge having passed an order, no further appeal will lie as the Parliament in its wisdom has taken away its power - - - - - - - - -. The words speak for itself. It does not require any further interpretation by any statement made in any manner. Therefore, the power of the High Court in exercising Letters patent in a matter where a single Judge has decided the appeal from original order, has been taken away and it cannot be invoked in the present context. There is no two opinion in the matter that when the CLB exercises its power under Sections 397 and 398 of the Act, it exercised its quasi-judicial power as original authority. It may not be a Court but it has all the trapping of a Court. Therefore, the CLB while exercising its original jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 398 of the Act passed the order and against that order appeal lies to the learned single Judge of the High Court and thereafter no further appeal could be filed.” 11. It is, therefore, apparently clear that the Apex Court has specifically gone on to hold that the Company Law Board while exercising its power under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies acts as a Court for it has all the trappings of a Court. In view of the above the finding that CLB is not a Court in the case of Prakash Timbers Pvt. Ltd (supra) stands diluted and cannot be said to be good law any longer in view of judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra). 12. In view of the above the finding that CLB is not a Court in the case of Prakash Timbers Pvt. Ltd (supra) stands diluted and cannot be said to be good law any longer in view of judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra). 12. Reference may also be had to the judgement of Division Bench of this Court in the case of U.P. Cement Vetanbhogi Sahkari Rin Samiti Ltd (supra), wherein the Division Bench after taking note of the amendment which had been introduced by way of Section 100-A to the CPC as well as in view of law which has been laid down in the case of Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra) has held that an order of the learned Single Judge made in exercise of power under Section 10-F of the Companies Act arising out of an order of the Company Law Board made in petition under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act cannot be subjected to challenge by way of Special Appeal and the preliminary objection in that regard has been upheld. 13. The relevant paragraph of the jdugment of the Division Bench contained in paragraph - 14.3 and paragraph 16 read as under: “14.3 In view of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that even if under Section 483, there was no condition prohibiting an appeal against an order of the learned Single Judge passed in appellate exercise of jurisdiction, the said exclusion has been now specifically provided in by the Legislature under Section 100-A C.P.C. The judgment of the Apex Court in Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra) applies with full force in the facts of the present case.” “16. The application moved for correction in the order passed in the appellate exercise of jurisdiction by the learned Single Judge clearly bars further appeal under Section 483 of the Companies Act, as well as Letters Patent as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra).” 14. We see no reason to take any different view than the one which has been taken by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of U.P. Cement Vetanbhogi Sahkari Rin Samiti Ltd (supra) which in turn is based upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra). 15. We see no reason to take any different view than the one which has been taken by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of U.P. Cement Vetanbhogi Sahkari Rin Samiti Ltd (supra) which in turn is based upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra). 15. For all the aforesaid reasons, it is held that the present appeal which is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Section 10-F of the Companies Act is legally not maintainable. The special appeal is accordingly dismissed.