ORDER : SANJAY YADAV, J. Order dated 19-12-2014 passed by Divisional Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Tax, Gwalior Division No. 1 is being challenged. The order is passed under sub-section (1) of section 21 of the Madhya Pradesh Vanijya Kar Adhiniyam (for brevity “M.P. VAT Act”) in respect of assessment year 2006–07 (local) (VAT). 2. Engaged in the manufacture and sale of leaf springs within the State of Madhya Pradesh and inter-state sale outside the State of Madhya Pradesh, the petitioner is registered under M.P. VAT Act and Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 vide Tin No. 23655302986. That during the period 2006-07 the petitioner procured iron and steel bars from various suppliers and used the same in making of leaf springs. Petitioner, during said period, sold leaf springs worth Rs. 56,18,17,106/- in the State of Madhya Pradesh. That on the basis of earlier determination order dated 3-6-2003 petitioner paid M.P. VAT @ 4% on the sale of leaf spring and also filed returns during the relevant period. That in a suo motu proceedings drawn in exercise of powers under section 70 of M.P. VAT Act Commissioner, Commercial Taxes vide order dated 5-6-2007 reviewed the earlier order dated 3-6-2003 and 19-11-2003 which were passed under section 68 classifying leaf spring as iron and steel under Entry 30(v) of Part II of Schedule II. However, by order dated 5-6-2007 it was held that the leaf spring being part of motor vehicles it was classified under Entry 1 of Part IV of Schedule II which is a residuary clause as it is existed at relevant time (Part IV of Schedule II now stand substituted by notification No. 44 dated 17-12-2015 with effect from 18-12-2015) and subjected the leaf spring to 12.5 % tax under M.P. VAT Act. Evidently as the order dated 5-6-2007 was passed in purported exercise of powers under section 70 the same was to effective from a prospective date as per sub-section (3) of section 70 which envisages “(3) Any order passed by the Commissioner under sub-section (1) and (2) shall have a prospective effect and shall be binding on the authorities referred to in section 3 in all proceedings under this Act except appeals.” 3. That the return filed by the petitioner for the year 2006-07 were assessed and the assessment order was passed on 26-5-2009 by the Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax, Gwalior Circle-3, whereby it was held that the leaf springs are taxable @ 4% being declared goods under section 14 of the CSI Act. 4. That show cause notice was issued to petitioner on 9-12-2011 for reassessment of the year 2006-07 under sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 21 of M.P. VAT Act, whereby the petitioner was called upon to show cause as to why on the sales turnover of Rs. 56,18,17,840/- pertaining to leaf springs whereon sales tax @ 4% has been paid whereas the leaf springs being part of motor vehicle being covered under Part IV of Schedule II and taxable @ 12.5% the difference i.e. 8.5% amounting to Rs. 4,77,54,454/- be not recovered. The show cause notice also proposed to impose penalty on the petitioner under section 21(2) of MP VAT Act. 5. The show-cause notice dated 9-12-2011 was challenged by the petitioner vide Writ Petition No. 6062/2012 primarily on the ground that the issuance of show-cause notice for re-assessment on the basis of change in opinion of the department is illegal in the eyes of law and beyond jurisdiction. That by interim order dated 29-8-2012, the operation of said show-cause notice was stayed. 6. The said Writ Petition was finally disposed of on 2-4-2014 with a liberty to the petitioner to file reply to show-cause within two weeks and direction to the Authorities to pass appropriate order in accordance with law. 7. Petitioner filed his reply on 15-4-2014. And as borne out from the return filed by respondents that the notice for hearing was issued on 16-5-2014, petitioner's representative appeared on 28-5-2014 and sought time. The case was taken up on adjourned date i.e. 9-8-2014 but no one appeared for the petitioner. On the next date, i.e., 24-9-2014 the petitioner again sought time. Thereafter the matter was posted for 15-10-2014. On said date also, no one appeared for the petitioner. 8. This factual aspect is not disputed by the petitioner. Be that as it may. The Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Tax, passed the re-assessment order on 19-12-2014 holding leaf spring sold by the petitioner classifiable under Schedule- II Part-IV of the M.P. VAT Act liable to tax @ 12.5% raising the demand of Rs. 4,77,54,454/-. 8. This factual aspect is not disputed by the petitioner. Be that as it may. The Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Tax, passed the re-assessment order on 19-12-2014 holding leaf spring sold by the petitioner classifiable under Schedule- II Part-IV of the M.P. VAT Act liable to tax @ 12.5% raising the demand of Rs. 4,77,54,454/-. The demand for penalty proposed with show cause notice was however dropped. This order is under challenge in this writ petition. 9. The challenge is on two grounds; firstly, that it is beyond the jurisdiction of the authority concerned to reassess merely on the basis of change of opinion, which in turn is on the basis of a judgment and secondly, that being obligatory on the part of Assessing Authority to pass an order within one year from the date of initiation of proceedings, as contemplated under sub-section (3) of section 21 of M.P. VAT Act. The order having been passed beyond one year is non-est in the eyes of law as it was beyond the jurisdiction of the authority to pass order after expiry of one year. 10. Though it is contended on behalf of the petitioner that impugned order passed after a period of one year from the date of initiation of proceedings, even after calculating the period during which the operation of the show-cause notice was stayed is non-est in view of the stipulation contained under section 21(3) read with section 22 of the M.P. VAT Act, we are not impressed with the contention for the reasons that after the disposal of the Writ Petition No. 6062/2012 on 2-4-2014, though the petitioner filed the reply on 15-4-2014; however, the matter was adjourned repeatedly at the instance of the petitioner and since the Authority concern was under an obligation to decide after affording reasonable opportunity, the order passed after one year cannot be faulted with because of the repeated adjournments sought by the petitioner. For delay, if any, in passing the final order, it is the petitioner who has to be accounted for and not the Authority concern. For delay, if any, in passing the final order, it is the petitioner who has to be accounted for and not the Authority concern. Even otherwise joint reading of the provisions contained in sub-section (3) of section 21 and section 22 of M.P. VAT Act does not lend the support to the contentions on behalf of the petitioner that the Authority concern had no jurisdiction to pass an order after expiry of one year from the date of issuance of notice. Had it been so, the legislature should have definitely made such important provision. In this context, reference can be had of the decision by the Supreme Court in Sales Tax Officer, Special Circle, Emakulam v. Sudarsanam Iyengar and Sons, (1969) 2 SCC 396 : AIR 1970 SC 311 , wherein it is held: “4.…………………Now in view of the previous decisions the principle is firmly established that assessment proceedings under the Sales Tax Act must be held to be pending from the time the proceedings are initiated until they are terminated by a final order of assessment. The distinguishing feature on which emphasis has been laid by the counsel for the respondent is that the language employed in Rule 33 is such as to lead to only one conclusion that the final determination of the turnover which has escaped assessment and the assessment of the tax have to be done within three years. It is pointed out that in the other Sales tax provisions which came up for consideration in the cases mentioned above the words employed were “proceed to assess” e.g., sub-section (4) and (5) of section 11 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act. Our attention has been invited to the appropriate dictionary meaning of the word “determine” which is “to settle or decide”—to come to a judicial decision—(Shorter Oxford English Dictionary). It is suggested that the word “determine” was employed in Rule 33 with a definite intention to set the limit within which the final order in the matter of assessment should be made, the limit being three years. We find it difficult to accept that in the context of sales tax legislation the use of the words “proceed to assess” and “determine” would lead to different consequences or result. In this connection the words which follow the word “determine” in Rule 33 must be accorded their due signification. We find it difficult to accept that in the context of sales tax legislation the use of the words “proceed to assess” and “determine” would lead to different consequences or result. In this connection the words which follow the word “determine” in Rule 33 must be accorded their due signification. The words “assess the tax payable” cannot be ignored and it is clearly meant that the assessment has to be made within the period prescribed. Assessment is a comprehensive word and can denote the entirety of proceedings which are taken with regard to it. It cannot and does not mean a final order of assessment alone unless there is some thing in the context of a particular provision which compels such a meaning being attributed to it. In our judgment despite the phraseology employed in Rule 33 the principle which has been laid in other cases relating to analogous provisions in sales tax statutes must be followed as otherwise the purpose of a provision like Rule 33 can be completely defeated by taking certain collateral proceedings and obtaining a stay order as was done in the present case or by unduly delaying assessment proceedings beyond a period of three years. 5. It is undoubtedly open to the legislature or the rule making authority to make its intention quite clear that on the expiry of a specified period no final order of assessment can be made. Then the taxing authorities would certainly be debarred from completing the assessment beyond the period prescribed as was the case in sub-section (3) of section 34 of the Income tax Act, 1922; but such is not the case here and we would hold that the assessment proceedings relating to the year 1962-63 were within time.” 11. Applying the principle of law laid down in Sudarsanam Iyengar and Sons (supra) and the given facts of present case and the provision contained under sub-section (3) of section 21 of M.P. VAT Act which envisages that: “(3) The assessment or reassessment under sub-section (1) shall be made within a period of one calendar year from the date of commencement of the proceedings under the said sub-section”, we are of the considered opinion that impugned order of re-assessment does not get invalidated even if it is passed beyond the period of one year from the date of initiation of proceedings with the issuance of show cause notice. The decision in State of Punjab v. Shreyans Industries Ltd., (2016) 29 STJ 1 (S.C.) is distinguishable on facts as in this case the assessment proceedings were started after expiry of three years limitation prescribed under section 11(3) of Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1998 and exercise of powers of extension by the Commissioner under section 11(10) was found to be after the period had expired. Present case is different. The initiation of proceedings is within time, the order as alleged is passed after one year. First contention made on behalf of the petitioner that it was beyond jurisdiction of the Assessing Authority to have passed the order of re-assessment after expiry of one year from the date of issuance of show cause notice is answered in the negative. 12. Coming to next contention as to whether the change of opinion can be the basis for re-assessment. Catena of decisions have been relied upon on behalf of the petitioner. 13. In Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax v. Simplex Concrete Piles (India) Limited, (2013) 11 SCC 373, which was a case under section 147, 149(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 it was held: “2.………………… In any event, at the relevant time, when the assessment order got completed, the law as declared by the jurisdictional High Court, was that the civil construction work carried out by the assessee would be entitled to the benefit of section 80-HH of the Act, which view was squarely reversed in CIT v. N.C. Budharaja and Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 280. The subsequent reversal of the legal position by the judgment of the Supreme Court does not authorise the Department to reopen the assessment, which stood closed on the basis of the law, as it stood at the relevant time.” 14. In Binani Industries Limited, Kerala v. Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, VI Circle, Bangalore, (2007) 15 SCC 435 , it is held: “24. The issues can be looked at from a different angle. Undisputedly, the 1996 Circular was binding on the revenue authorities as is spelt out in the case of 12-4-1996 and 23-10-1999 Circulars. The assessments were completed on the basis of 12th April, 1996 Circular. Merely because the Commissioner changes his view/opinion and according to him it was review of the earlier decision that cannot have any effect on any assessment which has been completed on the basis of the 1996 Circular. The assessments were completed on the basis of 12th April, 1996 Circular. Merely because the Commissioner changes his view/opinion and according to him it was review of the earlier decision that cannot have any effect on any assessment which has been completed on the basis of the 1996 Circular. 25. That being so, the question of re-opening the assessment by mere change of opinion is entirely impermissible. 26. Though these aspects need not be taken note of in view of the conclusion that the proviso was clarificatory in nature and operated with effect from the date section 5-C was amended i.e. 1-4-1986 yet this is an additional factor to set aside the High Court's judgment. 27. It is stated by a long line of decisions that reopening of assessment is not permissible by mere change of the opinion in the assessing officer. Here it has not been disputed that the Circular dated 23-10-1999 was on account of change of opinion of the Commissioner that too while reviewing the earlier Circular. It could not be brought to our notice as to which provision permitted the review.” 15. In Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi v. Kelvinator of India Limited, (2010) 2 SCC 723 , it is held: “5. On going through the changes, quoted above, made to section 147 of the Act, we find that, prior to Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, re-opening could be done under the above two conditions and fulfillment of the said conditions alone conferred jurisdiction on the Assessing Officer to make a back assessment, but in section 147 of the Act (with effect from 1st April, 1989), they are given a go-by and only one condition has remained, viz., that where the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment, confers jurisdiction to reopen the assessment. Therefore, post-lst April, 1989, power to re-open is much wider. However, one needs to give a schematic interpretation to the words “reason to believe” failing which, we are afraid, section 147 would give arbitrary powers to the Assessing Officer to re-open assessments on the basis of “mere change of opinion”, which cannot be per se reason to re-open. 6. We must also keep in mind the conceptual difference between power to review and power to re-assess. The Assessing Officer has no power to review; he has the power to re-assess. 6. We must also keep in mind the conceptual difference between power to review and power to re-assess. The Assessing Officer has no power to review; he has the power to re-assess. But reassessment has to be based on fulfillment of certain pre-condition and if the concept of “change of opinion” is removed, as contended on behalf of the Department, then, in the garb of re-opening the assessment, review would take place. 7. One must treat the concept of “change of opinion” as an in-built test to check abuse of power by the Assessing Officer. Hence, after 1st April, 1989, Assessing Officer has power to re-open, provided there is “tangible material” to come to the conclusion that there is escapement of income from assessment. Reasons must have a live link with the formation of the belief. Our view gets support from the changes made to section 147 of the Act, as quoted hereinabove. Under the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, Parliament not only deleted the words “reason to believe” but also inserted the word “opinion” in section 147 of the Act. However, on receipt of representations from the Companies against omission of the words “reason to believe”, Parliament reintroduced the said expression and deleted the word “opinion” on the ground that it would vest arbitrary powers in the Assessing Officer.” 16. In Eisher Motors Ltd. v. State of M.P., 2005 (1) M.P.L.J. 408 , learned Single Judge of this Court after relying on the decision by Supreme Court held: “7. A careful reading of provision reveals that expression ‘escape’ serves as a key and foundation of the jurisdiction to reopen an assessment is that of ‘turnover’ and not, be it noted, an assessment. A turnover escapes assessment when it is not noticed by the officer either because it is not before him by reason of inadvertence omission or deliberate concealment on the part of the assessee or because of want of care on the part of officer the turnover though shown in returns was not taken notice of. This would be the natural and normal meaning of expression ‘turnover which has escaped’. In the present case, petitioner had filed the returns disclosing turnover. It was not the case of ex parte assessment or discovery of new material. Perusal of reassessment order reveals that show-cause notice was issued on the basis of flying squad report. This would be the natural and normal meaning of expression ‘turnover which has escaped’. In the present case, petitioner had filed the returns disclosing turnover. It was not the case of ex parte assessment or discovery of new material. Perusal of reassessment order reveals that show-cause notice was issued on the basis of flying squad report. Now the question is whether said report would come within the ambit of expression ‘for any reason’ occurring in section 19 the Act of 1958. In (1996) 29 VKN 430 a Division Bench of this Court has already held reopening of assessment on the basis of audit report is not permissible under section 19 of the Act of 1958. Same can safely be held in respect of Flying Squad Report. In Indian and Eastern News Paper Society v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1979) 119 ITR 996 , Supreme Court held that opinion of an internal audit party on point of law could not be regarded as ‘information’ enabling the income tax officer to initiate reassessment proceedings under section 147(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Same view was taken in A.L.A. Firm v. CIT, (1991) 189 ITR 285 wherein 119 ITR 996 has been explained and approved. Except the report, there was no other material before the assessing authority in the present case to initiate the reassessment proceedings. There must exit a live link between the material coming to notice of assessing officer and the formation of his belief that there has been escapement of turnover because of concealment of true and material facts by the assessee. The power conferred by section 19 reopen the assessment though very wide but is not plenary and certainly can not be invoked on mere change of opinion to rectify the mistake committed earlier. In the present case, during the assessment proceedings, it was noticed that Rs. 15,80,10,349/- pertaining to inter-State sales of LCV was exempted from payment of tax, hence deduction was allowed. If the deductions were wrongly allowed then for correction of mistake section 19 of the Act of 1958 can not be invoked as held by the Division Bench of this Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Filterco Neemuch, (1996) 29 VKN 162. In that case assessee, a registered dealer was manufacturing compressed woolen felts which were sold in State as well in the course of inter-State trade and Commerce. In that case assessee, a registered dealer was manufacturing compressed woolen felts which were sold in State as well in the course of inter-State trade and Commerce. Assessee requested the Commissioner of Sales Tax to treat the merchandise covered under Entry No. 6 of Schedule I. The said request after due consideration was allowed and the sale turnover of woolen felts manufactured by assessee was not subjected to tax during the period 1971 onwards and no tax was levied. However, in Union of India v. Gujarat Woolen Felt Mill, (1977) 2 SCC 870 : AIR 1997 SC 1548 it was held that non woven felts manufactured from woolen fibers by machine pressing and used for filtration in heavy industries were ‘woolen fabrics’ covered by Entry 21. Based upon that decision, Commissioner issued show-cause notice for reopening of assessment. Division Bench while answering the reference held in no uncertain terms that turnover considered exempted can not be treated as escaped assessment and in doing so authorities exceeded jurisdiction by resorting to section 19(1) of the Act of 1958. The view taken by the Division Bench is based upon the decision of Supreme Court in Ghanshyamdas v. Regional Assistant Commissioner of Sale Tax, Nagpur, reported in 1964 M.P.L.J. (S.C.) 782 : AIR 1964 SC 766 . In view of the aforesaid discussion, I have no hesitation to hold it was not case of escaped assessment. In the present case there was no concealment of taxable turnover relating to inter-State sale of LCV. It was shown in returns and assessing authority exempted it from payment of tax by permitting deduction. Except for change of opinion based upon the report of the flying squad, there was no material to initiate proceedings under section 19 of the Act of 1958. Thus authorities clearly acted beyond their jurisdiction by initiating reassessment proceedings and passing the order of reassessment. This is unsustainable in law. Accordingly, the impugned order of reassessment is quashed. Since the writ petition is allowed on this ground there is no need to touch the other contentions raised by Counsel for petitioner.” 17. Thus the law is settled that mere change of opinion in absence of any other material will not be sufficient for reassessment. 18. This is unsustainable in law. Accordingly, the impugned order of reassessment is quashed. Since the writ petition is allowed on this ground there is no need to touch the other contentions raised by Counsel for petitioner.” 17. Thus the law is settled that mere change of opinion in absence of any other material will not be sufficient for reassessment. 18. Sub-section (1) of section 21 of M.P. VAT Act which has been involved for re-assessment envisages that: “(1) Where an assessment or re-assessment of a dealer has been made under this Act or the Act repealed by this Act and for any reason any sale or purchase of goods liable to tax under this Act or the Act repealed by this Act during any period,— (a) has been under assessed or has escaped assessment, or (b) has been assessed at a lower rate, or (c) any wrong deduction has been made while making the assessment, or (d) a rebate of input tax has incorrectly been allowed while making the assessment, (e) is rendered erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue consequent to or in the light of any judgment or order of any Court or Appellate Board, which has become final, the Commissioner may, at any time within a period of five calendar years from the date of order of assessment or reassessment in cases falling under clauses (a) to (d) and within a period of three calendar years from the date of judgment or order of any Court or Appellate Board in cases falling under clause (e), proceed in such manner as may be prescribed, by issue a notice in the prescribed form appointing a place which may be the business premises or at such place specified in the notice to assess or reassess, as the 35 case may be the tax payable by such dealer after making such enquiry as he considers necessary, and assess or re-assess to tax.” 19. Thus re-assessment of tax is permissible only when it has been under assessed or has escaped assessment, or has been assessed at a lower rate, or any wrong deduction has been made while making the assessment or a rebate of input tax has incorrectly been allowed, while making the assessment or is rendered erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue. Consequent to or in the light of any judgment or order of any Court or Appellate Board, which has become final. Thus, except these circumstances no other grounds available for the Commissioner to reassess the tax. 20. In the present case evidently on the basis of earlier determination order dated 3-6-3003 the petitioner filed the return for the year 2006-07 and the assessment order was passed on 26-5-2009 accepting tax @ 4% on the leaf springs being declared goods under section 14 of CST Act. However, it was on the basis of the opinion formulated by order dated 5-6-2007, which as evident, is on the basis of the decision by Rajasthan High Court in Commercial Tax Officer v. Mach Springs Pvt. Ltd.; Sales Tax Revision Petition No. 297/2005 decided on 10-3-2006. 21. The Rajasthan High Court as evident from the decision was dealing with specific entry No. 9 of the Notification dated 26-3-1999 (S. No. 1218) under 6% tax which read as “Motor Parts and Accessories for all types of Motor- Vehicles (including auto-parts for two wheelers); and affirmed the view of the Tax Board which held that leaf springs sold by the assessee as Auto Vehicle parts and charged to tax at the rate of 6% were taxable @6% and could not be taxed in residuary or general category @ 10%. In the case at hand till an order is passed on 5-6-2007 the leaf springs were classified as “iron and steel” under Entry 30(v) of Part II of Schedule II and it is only after the decision on 5-6-2007, it is being subjected to tax under Entry 1 of Part IV of Schedule II which is at relevant time was a residuary clause attracting 12.5% tax. No material has been commended at except the opinion formulated by order dated 5-6-2007 to justify the re-assessment. No material has been commended at except the opinion formulated by order dated 5-6-2007 to justify the re-assessment. This would be evident from the impugned order, the operative portion whereof is reproduced: ^^O;olkbZ }kjk ÁLrqr fyf[kr i{k leFkZu dk voyksdu fd;k x;kA ik;k x;k] fd ewy dj fu/kkZj.k ds le; vk;qDr egksn; ds }kjk esllZ teuk vkWVks b.MLVªht fyfeVsM] ekyuiqj] ¼2004½ 3 ,lŒVhŒtsŒ 69 ¼lhŒlhŒVhŒ,eŒihŒ½ esa fnukad 3 twu 2003 dks fuEukuqlkj fuf.kZr fd;k x;k gS fd %& “Interpretation of entries — Determination of disputed questions - loose leaf springs are covered in iron and steel but assembled leaf springs are covered in the entry relating to parts and accessories of motor vehicles. vk;qDr ds }kjk esllZ vkKk vkWVks fyfeVsM bUnkSj] ¼2004½ 3 ,lŒVhŒtsŒ 71 ¼lhŒlhŒVhŒ,eŒihŒ½ esa fnukad 19 uoEcj 2003 dks fuEukuqlkj fuf.kZr fd;k x;k gS fd %& “Interpretation of entries — Determination of disputed questions-loose leaf springs as well as assembled leaf springs are covered in iron and steel” vk;qDr }kjk ikfjr fd;s x;s bu fu.kZ;ksa ds ifjÁs{; esa 4 Áfr'kr nj ls djkjksi.k dj fn;k x;k FkkA i'pkrorhZ U;kf;d fu.kZ;ksa esa yhQ fLÁax ds lEca/k esa fHkUu O;k[;k;sa dh xbZ gSA vr% vkyksP; oLrq ds lEca/k esa djnkrkvksa dks iwoZ ikfjr vkns'kksa ds dkj.k dksbZ Hkzkafr u jgsa] bl gsrq Lo&Ásj.kk ls vk;qDr ds }kjk Ádj.k fy;k tkdj esllZ teuk vkWVks b.MLVªht ,oa vU; ds Ádj.k esa fnukad 5 twu 2007 dks iqu% vkns'k ikfjr fd;k x;kA esllZ eSi fLÁax ÁkŒ fyŒ ds Ádj.k esa ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky;] jktLFkku ds }kjk vkns'k fnukad 10 ekpZ 2006 dks ikfjr fd;k x;k RkFkk fuf.kZr fd;k x;k fd yhQ fLÁax dk mi;ksx fofHkUu Ádkj ds okguksa rFkk VkVk] VsYdksa] efgUnzk ,.M efgUnzk vkfn esa gksrk gSA O;olkbZ bls dsoy vkWVks MhylZ dks eksVj okgu esa mi;ksx ds fy;s csprs gSA yhQ fLÁax dk vU;Fkk mi;ksx djus bldk vFkZ eksVj Oghdy ikV~Zl ,.M ,slslfjt ds lanHkZ esa cny ugha tk;sxkA bl fu.kZ; ds va'k bl Ádkj gS %& M/s. Jamna Auto Industries Ltd. Gulmohar Garden, City Centre, Gwalior State 2006-07 “Interpretation of entries — The appellant was manufacturing and selling automobile leaf springs for use in various types of motor vehicles like Tata, Telco, Mahindra and Mahindra etc. The appellant was registered with the Govt, of Maharashtra and was also granted ISO certificate as a manufacturer of automobile leaf springs and assemblies. The appellant was registered with the Govt, of Maharashtra and was also granted ISO certificate as a manufacturer of automobile leaf springs and assemblies. The appellant was selling these leaf springs only to auto dealers for use in motor vehicles. Their published price list also indicated that they were for various auto vehicles only. All these facts predominantly established that leaf springs manufactured and marketed by the appellant were for motor vehicles only. Merely because someone puts these leaf springs to any other use can not take them out of the scope of specific entry relating to motor vehicles parts and accessories. All these facts predominantly established that leaf springs manufactured and marketed by the appellant were for motor vehicles only. Merely because someone puts these leaf springs to any other use can not take them out of the scope of specific entry relating to motor vehicles parts and accessories. It is well settled law that a particulars use to which an article is put cannot decide the real nature or character of that article.” ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; us vius fu.kZ; esa VSDl cksMZ }kjk esllZ vrqy Xykl b.MLVªht] ¼1986½ 63 ,lŒVhŒVhŒ 322 ds Ádj.k esa esllZ ekuuh; mPpre U;k;ky; }kjk fn;s x;s fu.kZ; dks Áklafxd ekuuk Hkh mfpr Bgjk;k gSA bl fu.kZ; esa ekuuh; mPpre U;k;ky; us foM LØhu] fj;j LØhu vkSj Mksu LØhu] tks fd fofHkUu okguksa dh vko';drk ds vuq:i cuk;s tkrs gS] dks Xykl ;k Xyklosvj dh Áfof"V esa u ekudj eksVj ikVZl ds varxZr dh vkuk fu/kkZfjr fd;k gSA djk/kku vf/kfu;eksa esa dkWeu ikjysal dh n`f"V ls fdl oLrq dks] fdl vFkZ esa fy;k tkrk gS] ;g vR;Ur egRoiw.kZ gS] u fd rduhdh vFkksZ esa ;g oLrq D;k gSA dkWeu ikjysal ds laca/k esa DysDVj vkWQ lsUVªy ,DlkbZt fo:} ikysZ ,DliksV~Zl ÁkŒ fyŒ ¼1989½ 75 ,lŒVhŒlhŒ 102 ¼,lŒlhŒ½ ds Ádj.k esa dkWeu ikjysal dk 'kkfCnd vFkZ fuEukuqlkj fuf.kZr gqvk %& “Common Parlance — Words used in a provision imposing tax or granting tax or granting exemption should be understood in the same way in which they are understood in ordinary parlance in the area in which the law in force or by the people who ordinary deal with them.” mDr U;kf;d fu.kZ;ksa esa dh xbZ foospuk ls Li"V gS fd fookfnr oLrq eksVj Oghdy dk ,d ikVZ gksus ds dkj.k rFkk dkWeu ikjysal esa eksVj Oghdy ikVZ~l gksus ,oa vk;ju ,.M LVhy dh Js.kh esa u vkus ds dkj.k osV vf/kfu;e dh vuqlwph&2 ds Hkkx&4 dh Áfof"V 1 ds varxZr vkdj 12-5 Áfr'kr dh nj ls dj ;ksX; gksxhA esllZ eSi fLÁax ÁkŒ fyŒ ds Ádj.k esa ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky;] jktLFkku ds }kjk ikfjr vkns'k lh/ks&lh/ks fLÁax ls lacaf/kr gSA ;g fu.kZ; fnukad 10 ekpZ 2008 dks fu.khZr gqvk gSA bl fu.kZ; ds ifjÁs{; esa O;olkbZ ds Åij 12-5 Áfr'kr dh nj ls dj pqdkus dk nkf;Ro vkrk gSA vr% yhQ fLÁax eksVj Oghdy ikVZ~l gksus ds dkj.k osV vf/kfu;e dh vuqlwph&2 ds Hkkx&4 dh Áfof"V 1 ds rgr 12-5 Áfr'kr dh nj ls dj ;ksX; gksus ls dj ;ksX; foØ; jkf'k :i;s 56]18]17]106@& ij varj nj ¼125-4½ 8-5 Áfr'kr dh nj ls :i;s 4]77]54]454@& vfrfjDr djkjksi.k fd;k tkrk gSA e/; Áns'k osV vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 21¼2½ ds varxZr %& O;olkbZ dk dFku gS fd mudh dksbZ nwf"kr ea'kk ugha FkhA muds }kjk vk;qDr ds }kjk tks nj fu/kkZfjr dh xbZ Fkh] mlh nj ij muds }kjk dj laxzg fd;k x;k gS ,oa dj dh jkf'k dh tek djkbZ xbZA dj fu/kkZj.k ds le; Hkh muds }kjk dj fu/kkZjd vf/kdkjh ds le{k lkjs rF; j[ks x;s FksA vr% 'kkfLr dk dksbZ Á'u gh ugha mBrk gSA O;olkbZ dk dFku ekU; fd;k tkrk gSA vr% e/; Áns'k osV vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 21¼2½ ds varxZr 'kkfLr dh dk;Zokgh ugha dh tkrh gSA bl Ádkj ns;dj dh jkf'k :i;s 4]77]54]454@& jgrh gSA tek jkf'k fujad gSA bl uohu vkns'k }kjk fudkyh xbZ ekax ewy dj fu/kkZj.k vkns'k esa fudkyh xbZ ekax ds vfrfjDr gSA vr% djnkrk ekax i= ,oa vkns'k ÁkfIr ds 30 fnol ds Hkhrj jkf'k pkyku ls dks"kky; esa tekdj ikorh ÁLrqr djsA 22. Thus it was only on the basis of opinion formulated by order dated 5-6-2007 the Commissioner has re-assessed the tax of the period 2006-07 which cannot be upheld. Therefore, the demand raised for additional sum being the difference i.e. 8.5% amounting to Rs. 47754454/- is set aside. Consequently the demand carried for said amount is also quashed. 23. There is one more reason as to why the difference cannot be recovered. That the order dated 5-6-2007 was passed by Commissioner exercising the powers under section 70 of M.P. VAT Act, Sub-section (1) whereof provides: (1) The Commissioner,— (i) either on his own motion on any question in respect of the rate of tax on any goods may, at any time, or (ii) if any question is raised by a dealer in respect of the rate of tax on any goods shall, as early as possible, not later than twelve calendar months from the date of receipt of the application made by the dealer for this purpose in the prescribed manner and on payment of such fee as may be prescribed, make an order determining the rate of tax on such goods in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed. 24. That sub section (3) stipulates that any order passed by the Commissioner under sub-section (1) and (2) shall have a prospective effect and shall be binding on the authorities referred to in section 3 in all proceedings under this Act except appeals. 25. In view whereof, the order passed on 5-6-2007 was applicable for next financial year i.e. 2007–2008 and not 2006–2007. For this reason also the impugned order cannot be upheld. 26. In view whereof, the consequential order passed under section 13 of the M.P. Entry Tax in respect of assessment year 2006–2007 read with section 21(2) of M.P. VAT Act is also set aside. 27. In the result, petitions are allowed to the extent above. There shall be no costs.