JUDGMENT : G.S. Ahluwalia, J. 1. This petition under Section 482 of CrPC has been filed for quashing the further proceedings in Criminal Case No.639/2012 which was instituted by the respondent under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. 2. The undisputed necessary facts for the disposal of this petition are that on 21.05.2012, a statutory notice informing the applicant with regard to the return of the cheque was issued by the complainant/respondent. However, without waiting for completion of statutory period of fifteen days, a complaint under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act was filed on 31.05.2012. 3. It is submitted by the counsel for the applicant that the Supreme Court in the case of Yogendra Pratap Singh v. Savitri Pandey and Anr., reported in (2014) 10 SCC 713 has held as under:- "35. Can an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act be said to have been committed when the period provided in clause (c) of the proviso has not expired? Section 2(d) of the Code defines 'complaint'. According to this definition, complaint means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate with a view to taking his action against a person who has committed an offence. Commission of an offence is a sine qua non for filing a complaint and for taking cognizance of such offence. A bare reading of the provision contained in clause (c) of the proviso makes it clear that no complaint can be filed for an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act unless the period of 15 days has elapsed. Any complaint before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which the notice has been served on the drawer/accused is no complaint at all in the eye of law. It is not the question of prematurity of the complaint where it is filed before expiry of 15 days from the date on which notice has been served on him, it is no complaint at all under law. As a matter of fact, Section 142 of the NI Act, inter alia, creates a legal bar on the Court from taking cognizance of an offence under Section 138 except upon a written complaint. As a matter of fact, Section 142 of the NI Act, inter alia, creates a legal bar on the Court from taking cognizance of an offence under Section 138 except upon a written complaint. Since a complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI Act before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which the notice has been served on the drawer/accused is no complaint in the eye of law, obviously, no cognizance of an offence can be taken on the basis of such complaint. Merely because at the time of taking cognizance by the Court, the period of 15 days has expired from the date on which notice has been served on the drawer/accused, the Court is not clothed with the jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence under Section 138 on a complaint filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of notice by the drawer of the cheque. 36. A complaint filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which notice has been served on drawer/accused cannot be said to disclose the cause of action in terms of clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 and upon such complaint which does not disclose the cause of action the Court is not competent to take cognizance. A conjoint reading of Section 138, which defines as to when and under what circumstances an offence can be said to have been committed, with Section 142(b) of the NI Act, that reiterates the position of the point of time when the cause of action has arisen, leaves no manner of doubt that no offence can be said to have been committed unless and until the period of 15 days, as prescribed under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138, has, in fact, elapsed. Therefore, a Court is barred in law from taking cognizance of such complaint. It is not open to the Court to take cognizance of such a complaint merely because on the date of consideration or taking cognizance thereof a period of 15 days from the date on which the notice has been served on the drawer/accused has elapsed. Therefore, a Court is barred in law from taking cognizance of such complaint. It is not open to the Court to take cognizance of such a complaint merely because on the date of consideration or taking cognizance thereof a period of 15 days from the date on which the notice has been served on the drawer/accused has elapsed. We have no doubt that all the five essential features of Section 138 of the NI Act, as noted in the judgment of this Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. (2000) 2 SCC 745 and which we have approved, must be satisfied for a complaint to be filed under Section 138. If the period prescribed in clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 has not expired, there is no commission of an offence nor accrual of cause of action for filing of complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act. 37. We, therefore, do not approve the view taken by this Court in Narsingh Das Tapadia (2000) 7 SCC 183 and so also the judgments of various High Courts following Narsingh Das Tapadia (2000) 7 SCC 183 , that if the complaint under Section 138 is filed before expiry of 15 days from the date on which notice has been served on the drawer/accused the same is premature and if on the date of taking cognizance a period of 15 days from the date of service of notice on the drawer/accused has expired, such complaint was legally maintainable and, hence, the same is overruled. 38. Rather, the view taken by this Court in Sarav Investment & Financial Consultancy (2007) 14 SCC 753 wherein this Court held that service of notice in terms of Section 138 proviso (b) of the NI Act was a part of the cause of action for lodging the complaint and communication to the accused about the fact of dishonouring of the cheque and calling upon to pay the amount within 15 days was imperative in character, commends itself to us. As noticed by us earlier, no complaint can be maintained against the drawer of the cheque before the expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of notice because the drawer/accused cannot be said to have committed any offence until then. As noticed by us earlier, no complaint can be maintained against the drawer of the cheque before the expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of notice because the drawer/accused cannot be said to have committed any offence until then. We approve the decision of this Court in Sarav Investment & Financial Consultancy, (2007) 14 SCC 753 and also the judgments of the High Courts which have taken the view following this judgment that the complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act filed before the expiry of 15 days of service of notice could not be treated as a complaint in the eye of law and criminal proceedings initiated on such complaint are liable to be quashed. 39. Our answer to question (i) is, therefore, in the negative." 4. As undisputedly, the complaint under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act was filed prior to expiry of the statutory period of 15 days, therefore, the same could not have been entertained in the light of the judgment passed in the case of Yogendra Pratap Singh (supra). 5. It is contended by the counsel for the respondent that in the case of Yogendra Pratap Singh (supra), the Supreme Court had also given a liberty to the complainant that under these circumstances, the remedy available to the complainant is to file a fresh complaint and if the same could not be filed within the time prescribed under Section 142 (b) of Negotiable Instruments Act then his recourse is to seek the benefit of the proviso satisfying the court of sufficient cause. It is further submitted by the counsel for the complainant/respondent that undisputedly the complaint under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act was not filed beyond the period of limitation and, therefore, he may be given remedy to file a fresh complaint along with an application seeking condonation of delay in filing the second complaint. 6. In the light of the observations made in Paragraph 41 by the Supreme Court in the case of Yogendra Pratap Singh (supra), in the considered view of this Court, since, the liberty has already been granted by the Supreme Court, therefore, no fresh liberty is required. 7. 6. In the light of the observations made in Paragraph 41 by the Supreme Court in the case of Yogendra Pratap Singh (supra), in the considered view of this Court, since, the liberty has already been granted by the Supreme Court, therefore, no fresh liberty is required. 7. Under these circumstances, this petition succeeds and the further proceedings under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act pending before the Court of J.M.F.C., in Criminal Case No.639/2012 are quashed with the liberty as granted by the Supreme Court in the case of Yogendra Pratap Singh (supra) in paragraph 41.