JUDGMENT & ORDER : T. Vaiphei, J. This case is now taken up by us in a Division Bench on the reference made by the learned Single Judge (one of us) in his order dated 29-8-2016 to answer the following question: “Whether an engaged counsel (Advocate) himself/herself has the authority to prefer an application for restoration/re-admission of an appeal and/or condonation of delay, etc. where the ground is for the fault of the lawyer?” 2. The controversy arose on the following facts and circumstances:- Guna Sindhu Choudhury, Karuna Sindhu Choudhury and Kripa Sindhu Choudhury, as plaintiffs, had instituted Title Suit No. 35 of 2005 before the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Kailasahar against the defendants i.e. the respondents herein seeking declaration and perpetual injunction in respect of the suit land. The suit was, however, dismissed by the trial court on 20-6-2006. The applicants thereupon challenged the dismissal of their suit by filing Title Appeal No. 36 of 2006 before the learned Additional District Judge, Kailasahar, but their appeal was dismissed by the order dated 23-4-2007. A second appeal being RSA No. 55 of 2007 was thereafter filed before this Court and the same was admitted for hearing. However, on 28-3-2014, when the appeal was called on for hearing, none appeared for the applicants whereupon the appeal was dismissed in default. As there was a delay of 457 days the applicants filed this application for condonation of delay. 3. Though in the cause title of the application, it is the applicants, whose names found a place, but the application is signed by Mrs. S. Deb (Gupta), who happened to be the lawyer of the applicants; she also signed the affidavit in support of the application for condonation of delay. In the grounds for condonation of delay, it was stated that on the date so fixed for hearing of the appeal, the counsel was out of State for the major surgery of her son and could not, therefore, represent the applicants. According to the applicants, their counsel came to know about the dismissal of their appeal only on 27-7-2015 when another L.A. Appeal between the same parties were listed for hearing whereupon their counsel filed the application for re-admission of the appeal on behalf of the applicants for condoning the delay. 4. The respondents opposed the application for condonation of the delay by filing their written objection. 4. The respondents opposed the application for condonation of the delay by filing their written objection. In opposing the application, it is stated by the respondents that the son of the learned counsel was discharged from the hospital before the date was fixed for hearing and that no document was filed by her to show that she was away from Agartala on the fateful day. It is also contended by the respondents that the counsel for the applicants is incompetent to file or present the application for condonation of delay as she is not a party to the case. This apparently led the applicant No. 1 to file a supplementary affidavit on 15-2-2016 supporting the petition filed on their behalf by their counsel. The applicant No. 1 again filed another affidavit on 6-4-2016 said to be a better statement wherein it is stated that the applicant No. 2 died on 31-3-2009 leaving behind no other legal heir. Another plaintiff, namely, Kripa Sindhu Choudhury had expired on 28-10-2007 leaving behind his wife, namely, Radha Rani Choudhury, who is not inclined to pursue this appeal. 5. Mrs. S. Deb Gupta, the learned counsel for the applicants and who filed the application for condonation of delay, referring to the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Binata Das & ors v. Panchadeep Travels and ors., (2016) 1 TLR 968, contends that for re-admitting an appeal, which has been dismissed due to the fault of the conducting lawyer, it should be this lawyer, who should be competent person to file the application. According to her, it is the lawyer alone who knows the real facts and circumstances leading to the dismissal of the appeal and not the litigant concerned, who do not normally come to Court and entrust their lawyer to represent them and conduct their appeal, and to insist that the litigant concerned, who is not aware of the happening in Court on the fateful day, should even then file such an application is somewhat irrational. She, therefore, submits that the conducting counsel should be allowed to file the application so long as the reason for dismissal of the appeal is attributable to the act of omission or commission on the part of the conducting counsel. Per contra, Mr. She, therefore, submits that the conducting counsel should be allowed to file the application so long as the reason for dismissal of the appeal is attributable to the act of omission or commission on the part of the conducting counsel. Per contra, Mr. P.R. Barman, the learned counsel for the respondents submits that when the counsel is only representing the litigants and is not a party to the proceedings, to allow the conducting counsel to file the application for condonation of delay is not one envisaged by the Code of Civil Procedure. Allowing the counsel to file such an application, according to the learned counsel, would amount to converting the counsel into a litigant, which is impermissible in law. He, therefore, strenuously urges that the application is incompetent and is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed. 6. Both Ms. S. Deb Gupta, the learned counsel for the applicants, and Mr. P.R. Barman, the learned counsel for the respondents, were heard at some considerable length. Before proceeding further, we may straightaway reproduce below the relevant provisions of the Code relating to the appearance by a pleader, etc. adumbrated in Order 3, Rule 1 and Rule 4 of the Code and the provisions relating to pleading and the verification thereof engrafted in Order 6, Rules 14 and 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure: “1. Appearances, etc., may be in person, by recognised agent or by pleader.— Any appearance, application or act in or to any Court, required or authorised by law to be made or done by a party in such Court, may, except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognised agent, or by a pleader 1[appearing, applying or acting, as the case may be,] on his behalf: Provided that any such appearance shall, if the Court so directs, be made by the party in person. * * * 4. Appointment of pleader.—(1) No pleader shall act for any person in any Court, unless he has been appointed for the purpose by such person by a document in writing signed by such person or by his recognised agent or by some other person duly authorised by or under a power-of-attorney to make such appointment. * * * 4. Appointment of pleader.—(1) No pleader shall act for any person in any Court, unless he has been appointed for the purpose by such person by a document in writing signed by such person or by his recognised agent or by some other person duly authorised by or under a power-of-attorney to make such appointment. (2) Every such appointment shall be filed in Court and shall, for the purposes of sub-rule (1), be] deemed to be in force until determined with the leave of the Court by a writing signed by the client or the pleader, as the case may be, and filed in Court, or until the client or the pleader dies, or until all proceedings in the suit are ended so far as regards the client. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-rule, the following shall be deemed to be proceedings in the suit,— (a) an application for the review of decree or order in the suit, (b) an application under Section 144 or under Section 152 of this Code, in relation to any decree or order made in the suit, (c) an appeal from any decree or order in the suit, and (d) any application or act for the purpose of obtaining copies of documents or return of documents produced or filed in the suit or of obtaining refund of moneys paid into the Court in connection with the suit.] (3) Nothing in sub-rule (2) shall be construed— (a) as extending, as between the pleader and his client, the duration for which the pleader is engaged, or (b) as authorising service on the pleader of any notice or document issued by any Court other than the Court for which the pleader was engaged, except where such service was expressly agreed to by the client in the document referred to in sub-rule (1).] (4) The High Court may, by general order, direct that, where the person by whom a pleader is appointed is unable to write his name, his mark upon the document appointing the pleader shall be attested by such person and in such manner as may be specified by the order. (5) No pleader who has been engaged for the purpose of pleading only shall plead on behalf of any party, unless he has filed in Court a memorandum of appearance signed by himself and stating— (a) the names of the parties to the suit, (b) the name of the party for whom he appears, and (c) the name of the person by whom he is authorised to appear: Provided that nothing in this sub-rule shall apply to any pleader engaged to plead on behalf of any party by any other pleader who has been duly appointed to act in Court on behalf of such party.” Then, there are Order 6, Rule 14 and 15, CPC which may be referred to and which are in the following terms: “14. Pleading to be signed.— Every pleading shall be signed by the party and his pleader (if any): Provided that where a party pleading is, by reason of absence or for other good cause, unable to sign the pleading, it may be signed by any person duly authorised by him to sign the same or to sue or defend on his behalf. * * * 15. Verification of pleadings.— (1) Save as otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, every pleading shall be verified at the foot by the party or by one of the parties pleading or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case. (2) The person verifying shall specify, by reference to the numbered paragraphs of the pleading, what he verifies of his own knowledge and what he verifies upon information received and believed to be true. (3) The verification shall be signed by the person making it and shall state the date on which and the place at which it was signed. (4) The person verifying the pleading shall also furnish an affidavit in support of his pleadings.” 7. A comparative reading of Order 3, Rule 4 shows that while in R. 1 a pleader can appear, apply or act on behalf of his client, he is precluded under R. 4 from 'acting' unless he is authorised by a document in writing signed by such person. A comparative reading of Order 3, Rule 4 shows that while in R. 1 a pleader can appear, apply or act on behalf of his client, he is precluded under R. 4 from 'acting' unless he is authorised by a document in writing signed by such person. It has been argued that while in R. 1 a clear distinction has been made between appearance, application and act, in R. 4 it is with regard to 'acting' alone that a document in writing is made obligatory. The Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Nadella Satyanarayana v. Yamanoori Venkata Subbiah, AIR 1957 AP 172 explained the term “act” in the following manner: “………. To 'act' for a client in Court is to take on his behalf in the Court, or in the offices of the Court, the necessary steps that must be taken in the course of the litigation in order that his case may be properly laid before the Court. Thus 'acting' includes 'applying' so that a pleader who makes an application on behalf of a litigant acts for him and cannot do so unless he is authorised in writing under R.4, of O. 3. This is the view taken by a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court consisting of Addison and Din Mohammad, JJ., in Bashir Ahmed v. Mary Minck, AIR 1938 Lah 698 (L), at p. 700 it was observed: “It is true that, while R. 1of O. 3 mentions three functions of a pleader, viz., 'appearing', 'applying' or 'acting', sub-r. (1) and sub-r. (5) of R. 4 merely deal with 'acting' and 'pleading' respectively but that does not indicate that 'applying' is not covered by 'acting'. To 'apply' is to do something more than 'to appear' or 'to plead'. It is to take some active step on behalf of a person and thus to act for him. 'Applying' therefore is included in 'acting' and this is why no separate provision has been made by the Legislature in relation to this function of a pleader. To hold otherwise would lead to absurd results. Rule 4 of O. 3 being silent on the point of applying any pleader without any authority from a litigant and without putting in any memorandum of appearance would be in a position to present any application on his behalf. This obviously could not be the intention of the Legislature." 42. To hold otherwise would lead to absurd results. Rule 4 of O. 3 being silent on the point of applying any pleader without any authority from a litigant and without putting in any memorandum of appearance would be in a position to present any application on his behalf. This obviously could not be the intention of the Legislature." 42. The word 'apply' according to the Concise Oxford Dictionary means 'the making of a request' while the word 'act' has been held to mean 'doing something'. It is possible to argue that the word 'apply' refers to the initiation of a proceeding by means of an application, in other words, making a request to the Court to do something and the word 'act' refers to all the necessary steps that must subsequently be taken in the course; of the litigation on behalf of a party. The difficulty in so construing the words 'applying' and 'acting' is that while R. 1 mentions the three-fold functions of a pleader, viz., appearing, applying or acting, R. 4 merely deals with 'acting' and 'pleading' and no separate provision has been made by the Legislature in relation to the function of a pleader with regard to 'applying'. Could it be that this was the result of an oversight on the part of the Legislature? As a result of the recommendations made by the Bar Committee, the Legislature undertook the amendment of O. 3, Rules 1 and 4. In R. 1 the Legislature substituted the words 'applying, appearing, acting' for the words 'duly appointed to act'. In R. 4 the Legislature provided only for 'acting' and 'pleading' respectively and did not make any specific provision for the function of a pleader with regard to 'applying', with the result that R. 4 is silent on the point of 'applying'. It is therefore not unreasonable to assume that the Legislature thought that 'applying' was included in 'acting', and that is the reason why it made no separate provision with regard to 'applying'. It may therefore be held that 'applying' is included in the meaning of the word 'acting' and a pleader who files an application on behalf of a party 'acts' for him and cannot therefore do so unless he is duly authorised in that behalf. It may therefore be held that 'applying' is included in the meaning of the word 'acting' and a pleader who files an application on behalf of a party 'acts' for him and cannot therefore do so unless he is duly authorised in that behalf. It follows that unless a pleader is duly authorised in that behalf, he cannot 'act' for a party in Court, in the sense that he cannot present an application on his behalf.” 8. Then, again, under Order 16, Rule 6 of the Code, it is provided that every pleading shall have to be signed by the party and his pleader (if any) unless- (a) Such signing is not possible by reason of absence; or (b) There is other good cause for inability to sign. The object of requiring every pleading to be signed by the party is to prevent, as far as possible, disputes as to whether a suit was instituted with the plaintiff’s knowledge and authority. On the other hand, the object of verifying a pleading is to fix, on the party verifying, responsibility for the statements that it contains. In this case, the application was signed and verified by the counsel for the applicants. In so far as verification of pleadings is concerned, unlike signing of pleading, it can be verified by (i) a party where there is only one party, or (ii) by one of the parties, where there are several parties; or (iii) by some other person who is proved to the satisfaction of the court to be acquainted with the facts of the case. Thus, there can be two opinions that even a lawyer, who is proved to the satisfaction of the court to be acquainted with the facts of the case, can prepare, sign and present an application on behalf of the party represented by him. In the instant case, the suit was admittedly dismissed due to the absence of the counsel for the applicants when the suit was called on for hearing. It is nobody’s case that the applicants were personally attending the Court on that fateful day; they must have thought that as they were engaging a counsel, their case was taken care of by their counsel. It is nobody’s case that the applicants were personally attending the Court on that fateful day; they must have thought that as they were engaging a counsel, their case was taken care of by their counsel. In any case, in civil cases, either in the original or in the appellate proceedings, parties hardly appear in court if they are represented by counsel or unless their personal appearance is insisted upon by a court. More so, in a case such as the one herein, i.e. a second appeal, their presence was not at all necessary on the fateful day. Therefore, it is their counsel alone who is acquainted with the facts leading to the dismissal of their appeal. Under the circumstances, the signing and verification of the application by the counsel for the applicants with respect to the facts and circumstances under which the appeal was dismissed cannot suffer from any infirmity. 9. In this case, the application for re-admission of the second appeal was made, signed and filed by the counsel for the applicants. However, as there was a delay of 457 days in presenting the application for re-admitting the appeal, another application for condoning the delay was made, signed and filed by the same counsel though in the name of the applicants. At this stage, it may be instructive to refer to some of the case laws having a bearing on this case. In Abdul Aziz v. Punjab National Bank, AIR 1929 Lahore 96, an application for restoration of the suit was made by the counsel for the plaintiff. One of the grounds for objecting the application was that the application was not made by an authorized person; it was not signed by the plaintiff but by the counsel who had been originally appointed by the plaintiff to conduct the suit. It was contended that the duties of the counsel ended as soon as the suit had been dismissed by default and the counsel was not competent to file the application for restoration without a fresh power of attorney from his client. Para 11, 12 and 13 of the judgment are important and are reproduced hereunder: “11. This case in my opinion, does not decide the precise point that is involved in the present case. On the other hand another case is to be found in Raghunath Singh v. Rughubir Sahai 1892. 15 All. Para 11, 12 and 13 of the judgment are important and are reproduced hereunder: “11. This case in my opinion, does not decide the precise point that is involved in the present case. On the other hand another case is to be found in Raghunath Singh v. Rughubir Sahai 1892. 15 All. 55 in which it was held that where a vakil had been duly empowered by a vakalatnamah drawn in the customary form to file and conduct an appeal in the High Court and that appeal had been dismissed for default, the vakil was competent without filing a fresh vakalatnamah to present an application for the restoration of the said appeal to the list of pending appeals. 12. The following remark made in that case by learned Judges materially bears on the question before me: It is also manifest that if we set aside the decree of dismissal and 'reinstate the appeal, it will not be a fresh appeal, but will be an appeal to which the vakalatnamah already filed applies and it would seem strange if under these circumstances it were necessary to file a special vakalatnamah for the simple purpose of enabling the appellant to have, not a new appeal entered, but his original appeal reinstated and proceeded with. In our opinion, no fresh vakalatnamah was necessary. This authority fully covers the present case. Reference may also be made to Order 3, Rule 4(2), Civil P.C., which provides that: every such appointment, when accepted by pleader,* * * * shall be considered to be in force * * * until all proceedings in the-suit are ended so far as regards the client. 13. In my opinion these words are wide enough to cover the case of an application for restoration of a suit dismissed in default, as all proceedings in the suit are not ended so far as regards the client, merely by its dismissal in default or by an ex-parte decree, which part of the proceedings is liable to be set aside on an application and the case restored to its original number. Mr. Amin Chand's power-of-attorney authorizes him generally to do all acts necessary for the prosecution of the suit and the general practice in this province is not to produce a fresh vakalatnamah in similar circumstances I hold, therefore, that a fresh power-of-attorney was not necessary in this case.” 10. In Mt. Mr. Amin Chand's power-of-attorney authorizes him generally to do all acts necessary for the prosecution of the suit and the general practice in this province is not to produce a fresh vakalatnamah in similar circumstances I hold, therefore, that a fresh power-of-attorney was not necessary in this case.” 10. In Mt. Boro Bai v. Ramsunder Prayagduit Brahmin, AIR 1938 Nagpur 272, a case of somewhat similar nature came up for consideration before the Nagpur High Court. That was a case where on the dismissal of a civil suit on default, the counsel for the plaintiff applied for its being restored to file on the plea that he had noted a wrong date in his diary and did not appear in the case due to misunderstanding that it was not fixed for hearing on that date. The trial Court refused to restore the suit by making a remark that the application made by the plaintiff’s counsel was an irregularity. The lower appellate court took a different view and remanded the proceeding to the original court for enquiry into merit. It was urged on behalf of the defendant that in view of the provisions of O. 3, R. 4(2) and (3), CPC, it was not permissible for a pleader to apply under O. 9, R. 13 for restoration of a suit which was dismissed for default. The High Court held: “Sub-r. 3 of R. 4 of O. 3, Civil Procedure Code, specifies certain proceedings wherein the appointment of a pleader shall be deemed to be in force. That sub-rule does not impose any restraint on the generality of the meaning of the expression "all proceedings in the suit" occurring at the end of sub-r. 2 of R. 4, and cannot be regarded as exhaustive. The maxim expressia uniusest exclusio alterius cannot be applied in the interpretation of the terms of sub-r, 3 of R. 4, as R. 1 of O. 3 authorizes a pleader to make any application on behalf of the party he represents. As a suit terminates only by a decree, an application for restoration of a suit dismissed for default must be regarded as a proceeding in the suit. Consequently, a pleader is entitled to present such an application without fresh appointment: see Abdul Aziz v. Punjab National Bank Ltd., AIR (1929) 16 Lah 96=114 IC 76=10 Lah 570=30 PLR 628. As a suit terminates only by a decree, an application for restoration of a suit dismissed for default must be regarded as a proceeding in the suit. Consequently, a pleader is entitled to present such an application without fresh appointment: see Abdul Aziz v. Punjab National Bank Ltd., AIR (1929) 16 Lah 96=114 IC 76=10 Lah 570=30 PLR 628. I therefore agree with the view taken by the lower Appellate Court.” 11. We may also refer to another case, namely, Mt. Jwala Devi v. Bhrigunath Sahai, reported in AIR 1944 All 238. In that case, the plaintiff had filed a suit for recovery of certain money alleged to be due from the defendant. The suit was decreed ex-parte under the circumstances with which we are not concerned here. The defendant filed an application for setting aside the ex-parte decree. The application was, however, signed by the counsel who had been appearing for the defendant in the suit. The learned Judge of the Court of Small Cause at Cawnpore held that the application was not signed or presented by a vakil who had been properly authorized and therefore the application could not be considered at all. According to the Court, with the decision of the suit, the authority of the counsel also came to an end and in case it was found necessary to file such an application, a fresh vakalatnama was necessary inasmuch as an application for setting aside the ex-parte decree must be deemed to be an independent proceeding. The Court accordingly dismissed the application and refused to consider it on merits. Relying on the decision of the Lahore High Court in Abdul Aziz case (supra), the Allahabad High Court held: “4. The Court accordingly dismissed the application and refused to consider it on merits. Relying on the decision of the Lahore High Court in Abdul Aziz case (supra), the Allahabad High Court held: “4. In this particular case I have looked into the language of the vakalatnama filed by the learned vakil for the defendant and it is in the usual terms giving the vakil the power to apply for execution of the decree which would necessarily be a stage after the decision of the case, and in the absence of any expression indicating limitation on his powers I must hold that it was necessarily implied that the vakil would have the right to do everything that was necessary for the proper conduct of the case, and if the case had been decided ex parte it must be held that there was an implied authority given to the vakil to have that order set aside and the case heard on the merits. 5. In the view that I have taken I think the application for restoration was wrongly dismissed by the learned Judge of the Court of Small Causes. I, therefore, set aside his order and direct that the application be heard on the merits. The costs of this application will abide the result.” 12. We may also refer to a reverse case decided by the Rajasthan High court in Pannalal and Anr. v. Firm Ballaram Basia reported in AIR 1957 Raj 391 . That was a case in which the plaintiff, after dismissal of his suit, made an application for its restoration accompanied by two affidavits in support of the grounds mentioned in the application. Notice was issued to the counsel for the defendant, who, however, wrote back on the notice that his power to represent the defendant had come to an end by the order of dismissal of the suit. The Court disagreed with the contention of the counsel for the defendant and restored the suit to file. Before the High Court, it was contended that the order of dismissal of the suit amounted to a termination of the proceedings, and as the authority granted to a lawyer terminates with the termination of the proceedings, as mentioned in Order III, Rule 4(2), CPC, the notice served on the counsel for the defendant was not a good service on the defendants. Holding the contention was without force, the High Court held: “3. …… An application for restoration of a suit dismissed for default is a part of the proceedings in the suit, and on the same reasoning the advocate of the defendant does not require a fresh power to contest the application. A direct authority is to be found in U Oak v. Ma Khim. AIR 1941 Rang 314 (A), where it has been held that an application to set aside an ex parte decree or dismissal order is part of the proceeding in a suit and so in the same way to oppose or consent to such an application being also a part of the proceeding in a suit, a counsel need not have fresh authority for that purpose. The view of Mr. Umrao Lal that his authority had terminated by order of dismissal of the suit was not correct. The Court was, therefore, right that the service on Mr. Umrao Lal was a valid service en the defendants. 4. It was next contended that the note of Mr. Umrao Lal should be deemed to be a prayer for withdrawal from the suit, and that prayer also terminated his authority. It may be mentioned that under Order III, Rule 4(2) the determination of the power can only be done with the leave of the Court. In the present case, the notice was served on the 4th of May and the case came on for hearing on the 9th of May, and on that day the Court did not permit Mr. Umrao Lal to withdraw from the suit. On the other hand the Court considered the service on Mr. Umrao Lal to be sufficient. 5. It was argued that even if the lawyer had appeared and stated that he had no instructions, his personal presence would not have amounted to an appearance on behalf of the defendants. This may be true, 'and his non-appearance in the present case or, as suggested, his statement after [appearing in Court that he had no instructions, only amounted to a non-appearance of the defendants. The law does not require the defendants to appear. What is required is that the defendant should have notice of the application. The 'service on Mr. Umrao Lal, as stated above, is a due service on the defendants.” 13. The law does not require the defendants to appear. What is required is that the defendant should have notice of the application. The 'service on Mr. Umrao Lal, as stated above, is a due service on the defendants.” 13. Finally, we may have a look at the decision of Judicial Commissioner’s Court of Goa, Daman and Diu in Indian Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Phoenix Assurance Co., AIR 1975 Goa 26 wherein a suit for recovery damages was proceeded against the defendant ex-parte as their counsel did not appear on the date of hearing. The suit was decreed ex-parte. The defendants applied under Order 9, Rule 13, CPC for setting aside the ex-parte decree. However, the application was not filed by the defendants themselves, and was filed by their advocate. The application was not accompanied by affidavit nor were the contents verified. The ground given in the application was that the advocate was under the impression that the case was adjourned to some date in 1974 and was not aware of the date for which the case was posted i.e. 20-11-1973. He, therefore, did not inform the defendants and the non-appearance of the defendants was due to the advocate’s bona fide mistake. The application was opposed by the plaintiffs on merit. The lower court in the impugned order, among others, doubted the maintainability of the application. The learned Judicial Commissioner held that the technical objection about the maintainability of the application filed by the advocate should not detain the Court and that the Vakalatnama filed by the defendants in favour of the defendants empowered him to plead and act on their behalf. The Court further held that Order 3, Rule 1, CPC permits filing of an application by a pleader on behalf of a party if the pleader has been duly authorised under Order 3, Rule 4 CPC, and as there was such authorization, the application was quite in order. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the learned Judicial Commissioner of Goa. 14. From the case-laws extracted in the foregoing, the following principles can be culled out: (a) The term “applying” appearing in Order 3, Rule (4)(i) is included in the meaning of the word “acting” and a pleader who files an application on behalf of a party “acts” for him, but he cannot do so unless he is duly authorized in that behalf. It follows that unless a pleader is duly authorized in that behalf, he cannot “act” for a party in Court in the sense that he cannot present an application in that behalf. (b) Thus, a pleader, who is duly authorized to represent a party by means of Vakalatnama, and who is proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case, can prepare, sign, verify and present an application on behalf of the party represented by him. (c) Where a pleader was duly authorized by Vakalatnama drawn in the customary form to file and conduct an appeal in the High Court and that appeal was dismissed for default, the pleader is competent, without filing a fresh Vakalatnama, to present an application for re-admission of the appeal. (d) If the appellate court set aside the order of dismissal and re-admit the appeal, it will not be a fresh appeal, but will be an appeal to which the Vakalatnama already filed applies; no fresh Vakalatnama is required. (e) The words in Order 3, Rule 4(2) are wide enough to cover the case of an application for restoration of a suit or application for re-admitting an appeal, which were dismissed for default, as all proceedings in the suit or appeal are not ended so far as regards the client, merely by their dismissal in default. (f) As a suit terminates only by a decree, an application for restoration of a suit dismissed or for re-admitting an appeal dismissed for default must be regarded as a proceeding in the suit or appeal. Consequently, a pleader is entitled to present such an application without fresh appointment. (g) An application for condonation of delay is a part of an application for restoration of a suit or for re-admitting an appeal and a pleader is entitled to prepare, sign, verify and present an application for condonation of delay if he or she is personally well-acquainted with the facts leading to the dismissal of the suit or appeal provided that a Vakalatnama is drawn in the customary form to authorise him/her to file and conduct a suit or an appeal in the High Court and if that suit or appeal had been dismissed for default. 15. 15. Thus, in our considered view, on a parity of reasoning, the application for condoning a delay in presenting an application for re-admitting the appeal dismissed in default filed by the learned counsel for the applicants, who is responsible for the dismissal of the appeal and who is duly authorised by the party by executing a Vakalatnama drawn in the customary form authorize to file the appeal is, therefore, maintainable. In the instant case, as already noticed, the appeal was dismissed by this Court due to the absence of the counsel for the appellant when the appeal was called on for hearing. The applicants were admittedly nowhere near the Court on the fateful day. Nor were their presence in Court necessary as they were represented by their counsel. Thus, the applicants had no way of knowing as to how their appeal came to be dismissed on that day; it was their counsel who knew about the fact of dismissal of the appeal as it was due to her absence that the appeal was dismissed. The Vakalatnama drawn in the customary form to file suit, appeal or an application for execution or miscellaneous cases, etc. was duly executed by the applicants in favor of their counsel who signed and filed the application. In this view of the matter, we have no hesitation to hold that the application for condonation of delay so filed by the learned counsel for the applicants is maintainable. We, therefore, answer the question in the reference in the affirmative. The application for condonation of delay shall now be placed before the learned Single Judge for consideration on merit.