Regional Transport Officer, Ganjam v. Ambika Prasad Parida
2017-08-30
D.P.CHOUDHURY
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER 30.8.2017. Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner and learned Counsel for the Opp. Parties. 2. It is submitted by learned Counsel for the petitioner that Opp. Party No.1 filed a Consumer Complaint bearing No.44 of 2012 against the order passed by the petitioner on the ground that without assigning any valid reason it rejected the issuance of the Driving Licence of Opp. Party No.1. According to him, against the order of the R.T.O. the complainant could have filed appeal under Section 17 of the Motor Vehicles Act, but he filed Consumer Disputes case before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter called as “the Act”). He further submits that the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum (in short “District Forum”) without appreciating the jurisdictional issue disposed of the case directing the R.T.O. to issue Driving License to Opp. Party No.1. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further submits that against the order of the District Forum, the petitioner filed First Appeal No.481 of 2014 before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (hereinafter called as “the Commission”) with a petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act vide Misc. Case No.875 of 2014. The State Commission heard the matter, but no speaking order was passed. It is simply observed by the State Commission that the grounds taken in para-4 of the Limitation Petition are not sufficient to condone the delay and rejected the petition for condonation of delay. Not only this, but also the State Commission dismissed the appeal without hearing same on merit. 4. Mr. Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioner further submits that the Commission, while disposing of the petition filed for condonation of delay, also disposed of the appeal, which is otherwise illegal and improper. The impugned order does not disclose that the Commission has heard the petitioner on merit of the appeal. No reason has been assigned for rejecting the same. According to him, the Commission could have examined the jurisdictional issue as to whether in such facts, the consumer dispute lies. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that since there is no provision for filing appeal against the impugned order and the consumer forum has passed order without having jurisdiction.
No reason has been assigned for rejecting the same. According to him, the Commission could have examined the jurisdictional issue as to whether in such facts, the consumer dispute lies. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that since there is no provision for filing appeal against the impugned order and the consumer forum has passed order without having jurisdiction. As complainant has not hired or availed the service to bring it within the definition of “service” as per Consumer Protection Act, 1986, the present writ petition is filed to quash also such order. Apart from this, the State Commission has not considered the grounds of filing appeal in delay with proper prospective as 150 days delay was caused due to official transactions, being not connected with deliberate intention to cause the delay by the appellant. For that, the impugned order is illegal and improper and the same should be set aside. 6. Learned Counsel for the Opp. Parties submits that there is no bar for the Consumer Court to award relief because the Consumer Forum is created to award speedy and cost free justice in addition to the forums available under common law. So, he submits that instead of filing appeal, the Opp. Party No.1 filed consumer dispute for quick remedy. He also submits that rightly the State Commission has rejected the appeal as there is no sufficient reason to condone the delay. 7. Considered the submissions of learned Counsels for the respective parties. Annexure-3 shows that the District Forum has passed a detailed order by observing that the dispute of the Opp. Party no.1 is a Consumer dispute as he has availed the service on payment of required fees. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bihar School Examination Board v. Suresh Prasad Sinha, JT 2009 (11) SC 541, have held that the Board being the statutory authority, neither engaged in any commercial, professional or service orientated activity nor provides any benefit or facility for consideration. It discharges a statutory non-commercial function of conducting examinations and does not offer its services to any candidate and as such that was not a service rendered by the Board. 8.
It discharges a statutory non-commercial function of conducting examinations and does not offer its services to any candidate and as such that was not a service rendered by the Board. 8. On going through the order dated 18.12.2014 it appears that the Commission has passed the impugned order in the following manner :- “At this stage, it would be apposite to quote para-4 of the Limitation Petition which reads as follows : “That the order was passed on 21.2.2014. The aforesaid order was received by the Advocate for the petitioner on 24.3.2014. Accordingly, the appellant handed over the file to his local Counsel to prefer this appeal but due to the fact the matter has to be entrusted to the Standing Counsel at Cuttack, the matter along with the connected documents could not be collected from the local Counsel at Berhampur in time to present his appeal and the present appeal could not be preferred within the stipulated period of 30 days. Therefore, the delay in filing the appeal may kindly be condoned.” Learned Counsel for opposite party vehemently opposes the Misc .Case to condone the delay. The grounds taken in para-4 of the Limitation Petition are not sufficient to condone the delay. So, the Misc. Case is dismissed and consequently, First Appeal No.481 of 2014 stands dismissed. 9. From the aforesaid order, there is nothing available to show that the Commission has passed a speaking order while rejecting the petition for condonation of delay except quoting paragraph 4 of the said petition. It is not revealed from the order of the Commission that the Commission has given its opinion or reasons conspicuously to hold that there is no sufficient reason to condone the delay. Besides, the appeal has been also disposed of while refusing to condone the delay. If the limitation petition is not allowed, the question of entertaining appeal does not arise. Appeal is admitted only after the delay is condoned to receive the appeal. The impugned order also shows that the appeal has been dismissed as if the same has been heard on merit although the appellant has not been heard on merit. It would have been better for the Commission to hear the condonation of delay petition along with appeal together and dispose of the case to maintain propriety of the order. 10.
The impugned order also shows that the appeal has been dismissed as if the same has been heard on merit although the appellant has not been heard on merit. It would have been better for the Commission to hear the condonation of delay petition along with appeal together and dispose of the case to maintain propriety of the order. 10. Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 states that the Commission may entertain appeal after expiry of the thirty days period, if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing within that period. So, the appeal would be admitted only after the condonation of delay in filing the appeal. In the instant case, the procedure has not been followed as it is reiterated that the appeal has been disposed of after refusing to condone the delay by the Commission. 11. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the complainant is not a consumer is also a debatable point because the word “service” as per the definition under the Act has not been allegedly rendered by the petitioner to the opposite party. When there is no appeal against the order of the appeal disposed of by the Commission and the jurisdictional issue is raised, it would have been appropriate with proper prospective so as to award even justice. 12. In terms of the above discussion, the Court is of the view that the impugned order dated 18.12.2014 passed in Misc. Case No.875 of 2014 arising out of First Appeal No.481 of 2014 dismissing the petition for condonation of delay and consequently appeal is improper and not sustainable in law. Hence, the same is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the State Commission to reconsider the petition for condonation of delay and de novo hearing of First Appeal No.481 of 2014 after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and the opposite parties and dispose of the same in accordance with law preferably within a period of three months from today after condoning the delay. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly. Issue urgent certified copy on proper application. Requisites for communication of this order be filed within three working days. Petition disposed of.