JUDGMENT : Abdullah Gulamahmed Uraizee, J. 1. The present First Appeal is arising out of the judgment and order dated 12.08.2008 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Aux.), Fast Track Court No. 6, Kheda at Nadiad in Misc. MACP No. 310/2005. 2. The Respondent No. 1 herein and his friend were returning to Piplag on motorcycle bearing registration No. GJ-7-AL-5557 on 13.07.2005. The Respondent No. 1 was plying the motorcycle which was of the ownership of Respondent No. 2 herein, who was pillion rider. The motorcycle met with an accident as the Respondent No. 1 had to apply sudden breaks owing to ditches on the road. The Respondent No. 1 suffered fracture injuries and resultant disability. He therefore filed Misc. MACP No. 310/2005 in Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Nadidad under section 140 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 to recover Rs. 25,000/- from the appellant and Respondent No. 2 being insured of the offending motorcycle. 3. The Tribunal overruling the objections of the appellant -Insurance Company, fastened liability on it on the ground that the Respondent No. 1 having stepped into the shoes of the owner of the motorcycle, cannot receive compensation from himself, who directed the Appellant and Respondent No. 2 herein to pay sum of Rs. 25,000/- with 9% interest jointly and severely by the impugned judgment and award. The appellant-Insurance Company thereafter preferred Review Application No. 13 of 2009, to review its judgment and award and exonerated from its liability to pay compensation. The Tribunal relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of K. Nandakumar v. Managing Director, Thanthal Periyar Transport Corporation, reported in AIR 1996 1217, dismissed the Review application. The appellant-Insurance Company has therefore preferred present appeal under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 4. I have heard Ms. Aditi Raol learned Advocate on behalf of Ms. Vidhi Bhatt, learned Advocate for the Appellant and Mr. Paresh Darji learned Advocate for Respondent No. 1. Though served, there is no representation on behalf of Respondent No. 2. 5. Ms. Raol learned Advocate for the appellant relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Yallwwa (Smt) and Ors. v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., reported in (2007) 6 SCC 657 submits that the present appeal to question the order passed under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act is maintainable. Ms. 5. Ms. Raol learned Advocate for the appellant relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Yallwwa (Smt) and Ors. v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., reported in (2007) 6 SCC 657 submits that the present appeal to question the order passed under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act is maintainable. Ms. Raol submits that insurer entitled to raise defense in terms of section 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. She submits that the appellant had set to fasten the liability on the ground that the Respondent No. 1 himself having stepped into the shoes of the owner, cannot receive compensation from himself, is wrongly not believed by the Tribunal on the ground that the motorcycle is not covered under comprehensive policy. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ningamma and Anr. v. United India Insurance Company Ltd. reported in (2009) 13 SCC 710 she submits that the victim who has stepped into the shoes of the owner, cannot receive compensation from himself and therefore, the Tribunal has committed an error in directing the appellant to pay compensation on the ground that the vehicle was insured under comprehensive policy and therefore, the claim application preferred by the Respondent No. 1 was maintainable. She therefore urges that the appeal may be allowed. 6. Mr. Paresh Darji learned Advocate for the Respondent No. 1 supported the impugned judgment and order of the Tribunal. He vehemently submits that the policy of the vehicle was comprehensive policy and the appellant had accepted premium for personal accident and the owner of the vehicle. He therefore submits that the Tribunal has not committed any error in directing the appellant Insurance Company to pay compensation. He therefore submits that the appeal may be dismissed. 7. The issue involved in the present appeal is no longer res integra in view of the decision of the Ningamma and Ors. (supra), wherein it is held as under: "20. It was held in Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. case that Section 163-A of the MVA cannot be said to have any application in respect of an accident wherein the owner of the motor vehicle himself is involved. The decision further held that the question is no longer res integra. The liability under section 163-A of the MVA is on the owner of the vehicle. The decision further held that the question is no longer res integra. The liability under section 163-A of the MVA is on the owner of the vehicle. So a person cannot be both, a claimant as also a recipient, with respect to claim. Therefore, the heirs of the deceased could not have maintained a claim in terms of Section 163-A of the MVA. 21. In our considered opinion, the ratio of the decision in Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. case is clearly applicable to the facts of the present case. In the present case, the deceased was not the owner of the motorbike in question. He borrowed the said motorbike from its real owner. The deceased cannot be held to be employee of the owner of the motorbike although he was authorised to drive the said vehicle by its owner, and therefore, he would step into the shoes of the owner of the motorbike. We have already extracted Section 163-A of the MVA hereinbefore. A bare perusal of the said provision would make it explicitly clear that persons like the deceased in the present case would step into the shoes of the owner of the vehicle. 22. In a case wherein the victim died or where he was permanently disabled due to an accident arising out of the aforesaid motor vehicle in that event the liability to make payment of the compensation is on the insurance company or the owner, as the case may be as provided under Section 163-A. But if it is proved that the driver is the owner of the motor vehicle, in that case the owner could not himself be a recipient of compensation as the liability to pay the same is on him. This proposition is absolutely clear on a reading of Section 163-A of the MVA. Accordingly, the legal representatives of the deceased who have stepped into the shoes of the owner of the motor vehicle could not have claimed compensation under Section 163-A of the MVA." 8. To better appreciate provision of Section 140 of the Motor Vehicle Act, it is necessary to reproduce the same, which reads as under: "140. Accordingly, the legal representatives of the deceased who have stepped into the shoes of the owner of the motor vehicle could not have claimed compensation under Section 163-A of the MVA." 8. To better appreciate provision of Section 140 of the Motor Vehicle Act, it is necessary to reproduce the same, which reads as under: "140. Liability to pay compensation in certain cases on the principle of no fault.:-(1) Where death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally, be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement in accordance with the provisions of this section. 9. To better appreciate provision of Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicle Act, it is necessary to reproduce the same, which reads as under: "163-A. Special provisions as to payment of compensation on structured formula basis.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or instrument having the force of law, the owner of the motor vehicle or the authorised insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle, compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule, to the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be." 10. It is manifestly clear from the above that provisions of Section 140 and Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act are more or less pari materia inasmuch as it is provided therein that the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally, liable to pay compensation to the victim of the motor vehicular accident. It is thus clear that these provisions cast duty on the owner of the vehicle to pay compensation to third party and accordingly, the owner himself cannot receive compensation from his own insurance company. 11. Section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act is also relevant provision, which requires to be considered for deciding the issue involved in the present appeal. It is thus clear that these provisions cast duty on the owner of the vehicle to pay compensation to third party and accordingly, the owner himself cannot receive compensation from his own insurance company. 11. Section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act is also relevant provision, which requires to be considered for deciding the issue involved in the present appeal. Section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act relates to the duty of the insurer to satisfy the judgment and award against the insured in respect of third party risk. The provision of section 149 thus makes very clear that owner of the vehicle cannot claim compensation from his own insurer as he cannot be considered as third party. 12. It is admitted fact that the Respondent No. 1 was plying offending motorcycle of the ownership of the Respondent No. 2 herein. It is not the case of the Respondent No. 1 that he was going on the offending motorcycle in connection with some work assigned to him by Respondent No. 2. Thus, the Respondent No. 1-original claimant had stepped into the shoes of Respondent No. 2 and for the purpose of Motor Vehicles Act, he become the owner of the offending vehicle. If that be so, as per the settled legal preposition of law, he cannot claim compensation from himself. 13. The Tribunal have fastened the liability of payment of the compensation on the appellant-Insurance Company solely on the ground that the motorcycle involved in the accident was covered under comprehensive policy and the appellant-Insurance Company had received the premium towards the personal accident and the owner of the vehicle. The reasoning adopted by the Tribunal to fasten the liability of the appellant- Insurance Company cannot be countenance. Even if the Respondent No. 1 who has stepped into the shoes of the owner (Respondent No. 2) of the offending motorcycle and is considered entitled to receive the same compensation on the basis of the appellant-insurance company having accepted extra premium to cover the risk of owner/driver of the vehicle, the remedy to claim such compensation surely does not lie either under section 140 or section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. In my opinion, the remedy rests in some other Forum. I am therefore of the view that the claim application preferred by the Respondent No. 1 in Claims Tribunal was not maintainable. 14. In my opinion, the remedy rests in some other Forum. I am therefore of the view that the claim application preferred by the Respondent No. 1 in Claims Tribunal was not maintainable. 14. For the forgoing reasons, the appeal succeeds and the appeal is hereby allowed. The impugned judgment and order passed by the Tribunal is hereby quashed and set aside. 15. By virtue of the order dated 05.12.2011 the Tribunal has deposited the said amount of award, which is invested in the FDR and the Respondent No. 1 is permitted to enjoy the accrued interest thereon. The Tribunal is directed to return the deposited amount to the appellant. 16. It is clarified that the Respondent No. 1 shall be at liberty to initiate appropriate proceedings against the appellant-Insurance Company in accordance with law to recover compensation under comprehensive insurance policy. 17. Needless to say that the Forum in which the said proceedings shall be initiated, would decide the same in accordance with law independently without being influenced by this judgment. The parties are left to bear their own costs. 18. R&P be remitted to the trial court forthwith.