ORDER : Sanjeev Prakash Sharma, J. All these writ petitions are being decided commonly by a common order. 2. All the Counsel agree that the issue involved in the present petitions is common and the only issue before this Court is "whether the labour Court after arriving at a finding that the retrenchment of the workman was not in consonance with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act of 1947') and there had been a violation of the provisions thereto, still the reference has been answered against the workman on the ground that workman has raised the dispute after a delay." 3. This issue is no more res integra in view of the judgment rendered by this Court in Gopal Lal Parashar v. The Presiding Officer and Anr. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 175/2003) pronounced on 14.02.2017 wherein it was held as under:- "16. The provisions of the Act deliberately excluded the law of limitation and there is no limitation provided for raising a dispute, apparently for the reason that the workman may not be able to bring himself up to the fact that he may be able to fight with the management immediately and may be having a ray of hope that he would be reinstated as and when work would be available for him. However, it is when he finds that all the doors are closed and other persons are being employed and taken up for work, leaving him aside, that he may knock doors of justice. In such circumstances, to oust him on the ground of delay would be amounting to adding certain provisions in the Act of 1947 and legislating into which the Legislature never intended to add. 17. So far as establishment of Industrial Tribunals and Labour Courts is concerned, they are creature of the statute, the Act of 1947 and hence, they are governed by provisions of the Act of 1947. They can not deny relief on account of applying a provision which is in violation to the Act of 1947 once the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal reach to conclusion that the retrenchment is illegal and contrary to the provisions of the Act of 1947. 22. In the case of Nedungadi Bank (supra), the facts were different from the present case. 22. In the case of Nedungadi Bank (supra), the facts were different from the present case. While in the said case the respondent's dismissal was not found to be in any way illegal or there was any irregularity in the disciplinary proceedings, the facts of the present case show that the Tribunal has reached to a positive finding that there has been non-compliance of the provisions of the Act of 1947. Similarly, in Indian Iron and Steel (supra), the Tribunal not only considered the delay but gave a finding that even without considering the question of delay, the respondent has lost his lien in light of the standing orders. 23. Thus, the question of relief is directly proportionate to the findings on the facts before the Tribunal. If the findings and conclusion are found to be against the workmen, the question of delay is taken as additional ground to deny the relief. However, once the Tribunal reaches to a conclusion that there has been a violation of the provisions of the Act, it has no discretion available to it to deny the relief. Of course, relief, can be moulded in terms of section 11-A of the Act if the same is applicable. Otherwise, as held by the Apex Court reinstatement is the natural relief to which a workman would be entitled. 24. Taking into consideration all the aspects and also taking into consideration that the management can not take advantage of its own fault and no one can benefit of its own error, this Court findings that the order passed by the learned Tribunal denying relief to the petitioner deserves to be set aside and it is, therefore, directed that the petitioner shall be reinstated in service. However, on account of delay in putting up the claim, the petitioner shall not be entitled to any back wages but he shall be given benefit of continuity of service." 4. In view of the above, the writ petitions are required to be allowed. However, Mr. Anurag Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General has brought to the notice of the Court judgment passed by the Apex Court in Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department and Ors. : AIR 2016 SC 2984, wherein the Apex Court has observed and summarised the law in para 28, 34, 40 and 41 as under:- "28. However, Mr. Anurag Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General has brought to the notice of the Court judgment passed by the Apex Court in Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department and Ors. : AIR 2016 SC 2984, wherein the Apex Court has observed and summarised the law in para 28, 34, 40 and 41 as under:- "28. In this process, let us first examine as to what would constitute 'industrial dispute' because of the simple reason that the appropriate Government has power to refer what is known as an 'industrial dispute' and likewise the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide if there is an industrial dispute. We are not going into the entire gamut of what constitutes 'industrial dispute' within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act. Our focus is only on the aspect that what can be referred should be the dispute which is existing and in prasesenti when the reference is sought. To put it otherwise, if it no longer remains an industrial dispute or industrial dispute 'does not exist' at that time, there would not be any question on making reference or adjudicating the matter as it is not an industrial dispute. 34. Thus, a dispute or difference arises when demand is made by one side (i.e. workmen) and rejected by the other side (i.e. the employer) and vice versa. Hence an 'industrial dispute' cannot be said to exist until and unless the demand is made by the workmen and it has been rejected by the employer. How such demand should be raised and at what stage may also be relevant but we are not concerned with this aspect in the instant case. Therefore, what would happen if no demand is made at all at the time when the cause of action arises ? In other words, like in the instant case, what would be the consequence if after the termination of the services of Petitioner on April 01, 1985, the Petitioner does not dispute his termination as wrongful and does not make any demand for reinstatement for number of years ? Can it still be said that there is a dispute ? Or can it be said that workmen can make such demand after lapse of several years and on making such demand dispute would come into existence at that time. Can it still be said that there is a dispute ? Or can it be said that workmen can make such demand after lapse of several years and on making such demand dispute would come into existence at that time. It can always be pleaded by the employer in such a case that after the termination of the services when the workmen did not raise any protest and did not demand his reinstatement, the employer presumed that the workmen has accepted his termination and, therefore, he did not raise any dispute about his termination. It can be said that workmen, in such a case, acquiesced into the act of the employer in terminating his services and, therefore, accepted his termination. He cannot after a lapse of several years make a demand and then convert it into a 'dispute' what had otherwise become a buried issue. 40. On the basis of aforesaid discussion, we summarise the legal position as under: An industrial dispute has to be referred by the appropriate Government for adjudication and the workman cannot approach the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal directly, except in those cases which are covered by Section 2A of the Act. Reference is made under Section 10 of the Act in those cases where the appropriate Government forms an opinion that 'any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended.' The words 'industrial dispute exists' are of paramount importance unless there is an existence of an industrial dispute (or the dispute is apprehended or it is apprehended such a dispute may arise in near future), no reference is to be made. Thus, existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute is a sine qua non for making the reference. No doubt, at the time of taking a decision whether a reference is to be made or not, the appropriate Government is not to go into the merits of the dispute. Making of reference is only an administrative function. At the same time, on the basis of material on record, satisfaction of the existence of the industrial dispute or the apprehension of an industrial dispute is necessary. Such existence/apprehension of industrial dispute, thus, becomes a condition precedent, though it will be only subjective satisfaction based on material on record. Since, we are not concerned with the satisfaction dealing with cases where there is apprehended industrial dispute, discussion that follows would confine to existence of an industrial dispute. Such existence/apprehension of industrial dispute, thus, becomes a condition precedent, though it will be only subjective satisfaction based on material on record. Since, we are not concerned with the satisfaction dealing with cases where there is apprehended industrial dispute, discussion that follows would confine to existence of an industrial dispute. Dispute or difference arises when one party make a demand and other party rejects the same. It is held by this Court in number of cases that before raising the industrial dispute making of demand is a necessary pre-condition. In such a scenario, if the services of a workman are terminated and he does not make the demand and/or raise the issue alleging wrongful termination immediately thereafter or within reasonable time and raises the same after considerable lapse of period, whether it can be said that industrial dispute still exist. Since there is no period of limitation, it gives right to the workman to raise the dispute even belatedly. However, if the dispute is raised after a long period, it has to be seen as to whether such a dispute still exists ? Thus, notwithstanding the fact that law of limitation does not apply, it is to be shown by the workman that there is a dispute in praesenti. For this purpose, he has to demonstrate that even if considerable period has lapsed and there are laches and delays, such delay has not resulted into making the industrial dispute seized to exist. Therefore, if the workman is able to give satisfactory explanation for these laches and delays and demonstrate that the circumstances discloses that issue is still alive, delay would not come in his way because of the reason that law of limitation has no application. On the other hand, if because of such delay dispute no longer remains alive and is to be treated as "dead", then it would be non-existent dispute which cannot be referred. Take, for example, a case where the workman issues notice after his termination, questioning the termination and demanding reinstatement. He is able to show that there were discussions from time to time and the parties were trying to sort out the matter amicably. Take, for example, a case where the workman issues notice after his termination, questioning the termination and demanding reinstatement. He is able to show that there were discussions from time to time and the parties were trying to sort out the matter amicably. Or he is able to show that there were assurances by the Management to the effect that he would be taken back in service and because of these reasons, he did not immediately raise the dispute by approaching the labour authorities seeking reference or did not invoke the remedy under Section 2A of the Act. In such a scenario, it can be treated that the dispute was live and existing as the workman never abandoned his right. However, in this very example, even if the notice of demand was sent but it did not evoke any positive response or there was specific rejection by the Management of his demand contained in the notice and thereafter he sleeps over the matter for number of years, it can be treated that he accepted the factum of his termination and rejection thereof by the Management and acquiesced into the said rejection. Take another example. A workman approaches the Civil Court by filing a suit against his termination which was pending for number of years and was ultimately dismissed on the ground that Civil Court did not have jurisdiction to enforce the contract of personal service and does not grant any reinstatement. At that stage, when the suit is dismissed or he withdraws that suit and then involves the machinery under the Act, it can lead to the conclusion that dispute is still alive as the workman had not accepted the termination but was agitating the same; albeit in a wrong forum. In contrast, in those cases where there was no agitation by the workman against his termination and the dispute is raised belatedly and the delay or laches remain unexplained, it would be presumed that he had waived his right or acquiesced into the act of termination and, therefore, at the time when the dispute is raised it had become stale and was not an 'existing dispute'. In such circumstances, the appropriate Government can refuse to make reference. In the alternative, the Labour Court/Industrial Court can also hold that there is no "industrial dispute" within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act and, therefore, no relief can be granted. In such circumstances, the appropriate Government can refuse to make reference. In the alternative, the Labour Court/Industrial Court can also hold that there is no "industrial dispute" within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act and, therefore, no relief can be granted. 41. We may hasten to clarify that In those cases where the Court finds that dispute still existed, though raised belatedly, It Is always permissible for the Court to take the aspect of delay Into consideration and mould the relief. In such cases, It Is still open for the Court to either grant reinstatement without back wages or lesser back wages or grant compensation instead of reinstatement. We are of the opinion that the law on this issue has to be applied in the aforesaid perspective in such matters." 5. On the basis of the aforesaid judgment, the learned Additional Advocate General submits that the reference itself could not have been made by the appropriate Government at a belated stage. 6. Considering the submissions of the learned Additional Advocate General, this Court finds that the appropriate Government has been defined as the State Government or the Central Government as the case may be, in relation to the dispute which has been submitted. Thus, the State Government appearing before this Court was the appropriate Government which made the reference in all these cases and not it cannot challenge its own reference which it had made before the labour Court referring the dispute at that relevant time and turn around and say that the reference itself was wrong. It would have been a different issue that the reference when made would have been challenged by the aggrieved party before this Court or even before the labour Court but in none of the cases, this Court finds that the Government representative or the aggrieved Management has challenged the reference which was made to the labour Court. 7. In the circumstances, the law of acquiescence which has been applied by the Apex Court in the case of Prabhakar (supra) principally would be equally applicable on the State Government which made their reference and proceeded with the dispute before the labour Court without any further ado. 8. 7. In the circumstances, the law of acquiescence which has been applied by the Apex Court in the case of Prabhakar (supra) principally would be equally applicable on the State Government which made their reference and proceeded with the dispute before the labour Court without any further ado. 8. In view of the above, and the position of law which has been decided by this Court in the judgment of Gopal Lal Parashar (supra), all these writ petitions are allowed and the order passed by the Labour Court is set aside. However, all the matters are referred back to the respective Labour Courts to pass appropriate order in light of the judgment passed In Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. and Anr., 1999(6) SCC 82 with regard to back wages and reinstatement. 9. The labour Court shall now pass appropriate orders relating to the relief part within a period of three months from the date of submission of certified copy of the order. Writ Petition Allowed - Dispute Referred Back To Labour Court For Appropriate Order.