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2017 DIGILAW 965 (RAJ)

Phool Kanwar v. Union of India

2017-04-12

PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI

body2017
JUDGMENT : Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J. 1. The petitioners have preferred this writ petition making the following prayers:- "(i) declaring observation/interpretation by Respondent No. 1 vide press note non-complaint with the RFCLARR Act and is unconstitutional being discriminatory, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (ii) to declare to the effect that the section 105 RFCLARR Act is ambiguous, vague, against the principle of reasonable classification inasmuch as it irrationally differentiates/denies solatium to the cases of land acquisition under Act of 1956 inter alia enactments specified in Fourth Schedule for want of discharge of mandatory obligation by Executive/Respondents; (iii) to declare to the effect that the Section 105 RFCLARR Act is ambiguous, vague, against the principle of reasonable classification inasmuch as it irrationally differentiates/denies solatium to the cases of land acquisition under Act of 1956 inter alia enactments specified in Fourth Schedule for want of accidental omission of the objectives guidelines/words "from the date of commencement of the RFCLARR Act' or 'with effect to 01.01.2014' after the word 'Fourth Schedule" of Section 105(3); (iv) to quash the Award No. 70/2014 dated 07.07.2014 in respect of the petitioners No. 1 & 2's land comprised in Khasra Nos. 253 measuring 0.0811 Hec(acquired land) in village Mujras, Teh & Distt. Bhilwara, and Award No. 82/2014 dated 07.07.2014 in respect of the petitioners No.1's land comprised in Khasra Nos.212 measuring 0.0150 Hec (acquired land) in village Mujras, The Distt. Bhilwara, and Award No. 85/2014 dated 07.07.2014 in respect of the petitioners No.1, 2 & 3's land comprised in Khasra Nos. 176, 173 & 172 measuring 0.0468+0.1075+0.0760 Hec (acquired land) in village Mujras, Teh & Distt. Bhilwara inasmuch as impugned awards denies solatium @ 100% to the petitioners. (v) to declare that the provisions of the RFCLARR Act relating to determination of compensation in accordance with First Schedule would be applicable to the acquisition proceedings initiated under section 3A of the Act of 1956, in respect of which Award No.70/2014 dated 07.07.2014 was made, inter alia, in respect of the petitioners No. 1 & 2's land comprised in Khasra Nos.253 measuring 0.0811 Hec (acquired land) in village Mujras, Teh & Dist. Bhilwara, and in respect of which Award No. 82/2014 dated 07.07.2014 was made, inter alia, in respect of the petitioners No. 1's land comprised in Khasra No. 212 measuring 0.0150 Hec (acquired land) in village Mujras, Teh & Distt. Bhilwara, and in respect of which Award No. 82/2014 dated 07.07.2014 was made, inter alia, in respect of the petitioners No. 1's land comprised in Khasra No. 212 measuring 0.0150 Hec (acquired land) in village Mujras, Teh & Distt. Bhilwara, and in respect of which Award No. 85/2014 dated 07.07.2014 was made, inter alia, in respect of the petitioners No. 1, 2 & 3's land comprised in Khasra No. 176, 173 & 172 measuring 0.0468+0.1075+0.0760 Hec(acquired land) in village Mujras, Teh & Distt. Bhilwara. and consequently, modifying the Award No.70/2014 dated 07.07.2014 in respect of the petitioners No.1 & 2's land comprised in Khasra Nos.253 measuring 0.0811 Hec(acquired land) in village Mujras, Teh & Distt. Bhilwara, and Award No.82/2014 dated 07.07.2014 in respect of the petitioners No.1's land comprised in Khasra Nos. 212 measuring 0.0150 Hec (acquired land) in village Mujras, Teh & Distt. Bhilwara, and Award No. 85/2014 dated 07.07.2014 in respect of the petitioners No. 1, 2 & 3's land comprised in Khasra Nos.176, 173 & 172 measuring 0.0468+0.1075+0.0760 Hec (acquired land) in village Mujras, Teh & Distt. Bhilwara be modified to the extent of imposing a solatium at the rate of hundred per centum of the amount determined as compensation; (vi) any other writ, order or direction as may be deemed fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case in favour of the Petitioners. (vii) award costs to the Petitioners from the contesting respondents." 2. Brief facts of this case, as noticed by this Court, are that the petitioners are tenants/owners of the land comprised in khasra No. 253, 176, 173, 172 and 212 in the vicinity of National Highway No.758 passing through Rajsamand and Bhilwara at Village Mujras, Tehsil and District Bhilwara. The respondents made a publication of intention to acquire the land under Section 3A of the National Highways Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1956') and subsequent declaration under Section 3D of the Act of 1956 in the year 2013 in order to determine the compensation payable. The claims from the affected owners were invited under sub-section (3) of Section 3G of the Act of 1956. 3. The claims from the affected owners were invited under sub-section (3) of Section 3G of the Act of 1956. 3. While the proceedings of the land acquisition were going on, new legislation namely, Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 2013') was enacted by the Parliament of India. The Act of 2013 was brought into force with effect from January 01, 2014, and thus, the benefit/compensation was accordingly being accorded to the sufferers of the land acquisition. 4. The provision Section 30 and the First Schedule of the Act of 2013, was promulgated for providing additional compensation in consideration of compulsory nature of compensation equivalent to one hundred percent of the determined amount of compensation so as to arrive at final award amount to be paid as compensation. 5. Furthermore, the Act of 2013 integrated the compensation law in land acquisition for various facets, as in existence before and brought in sub-section (3) of Section 105 of the Act of 2013 alongwith Schedule IV, whereby the compensation law was applied uniformly to all kinds of acquisition for public purposes bringing framework of integrating thirteen enactments. 6. Section 30 of the Act of 2013, which deals with award of solatium is reproduced as under:- "Section 30 : Award of solatium 1. The Collector having determined the total compensation to be paid shall, to arrive at the final award, impose a "Solatium" amount equivalent to one hundred percent of the compensation amount. Explanation.- For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that solatium amount shall be in addition to the compensation payable to any person whose land has been acquired. 2. The Collector shall issue individual awards detailing the particulars of compensation payable and the details of payment of the compensation as specified in the First Schedule. 3. Explanation.- For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that solatium amount shall be in addition to the compensation payable to any person whose land has been acquired. 2. The Collector shall issue individual awards detailing the particulars of compensation payable and the details of payment of the compensation as specified in the First Schedule. 3. In addition to the market value of the land provided under section 26, the Collector shall, in every case, award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per cent per annum on such market value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification of the Social Impact Assessment study under sub-section (2) of section 4, in respect of such land, till the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier." 7. Section 105 of the Act of 2013 alongwith Fourth Schedule, which is pertaining to application of the compensation law is also reproduced as under:- "Section 105: Provisions of this Act not to apply in certain cases or to apply with certain modifications.- 1. Subject to sub-section (3), the provisions of this Act shall not apply to the enactments relating to land acquisition specified in the Fourth Schedule. 2. Subject to sub-section (2) of section 106, the Central Government may, by notification, omit or add to any of the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule. 3. The Central Government shall, by notification, within one year from the date of commencement of this Act, direct that any of the provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation in accordance with the First Schedule and rehabilitation and resettlement specified in the Second and Third Schedules, being beneficial to the affected families, shall apply to the cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule or shall apply with such exceptions or modifications that do not reduce the compensation or dilute the provisions of this Act relating to compensation or rehabilitation and resettlement as may be specified in the notification, as the case may be. 4. 4. A copy of every notification proposed to be issued under sub-section (3), shall be laid in draft before each House of Parliament, while it is in session, for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised of one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, or both Houses agree in making any modification in the notification, the notification shall not be issued or, as the case may be, shall be issued only in such modified form as may be agreed upon by both the Houses of Parliament. The Fourth Schedules (See Section 105) List of Enactments Regulating Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation and Resettlement 1. The Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958 (24 of 1958). 2. The Atomic Energy Act, 1962 (33 of 1962). 3. The Damodar Valley Corporation Act, 1948 (14 of 1948). 4. The Indian Tramways Act, 1886 (11 of 1886). 5. The Land Acquisition (Mines) Act, 1885 (18 of 1885). 6. The Metro Railways (Construction of Works) Act, 1978 (33 of 1978). 7. The National Highways Act, 1956 (48 of 1956). 8. The Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962 (50 of 1962). 9. The Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 (30 of 1952). 10. The Resettlement of Displaced persons (Land Acquisition) Act, 1948 (60 of 1948). 11. The Coal Bearing Areas Acquisition and Development Act, 1957 (20 of 1957). 12. The Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003). 13. The Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989)." 8. The petitioners have raised the issue of applicability of sub-section (3) Section 105 of the Act of 2013 as a mandatory obligation arising out of the Act of 2013 for determination of compensation. The requirement of Section 105 was that the Central Government was to issue notification within one year from the date of commencement of the Act regarding the provisions of the Act of 2013 relating to compensation in accordance with the First Schedule. The requirement of Section 105 was that the Central Government was to issue notification within one year from the date of commencement of the Act regarding the provisions of the Act of 2013 relating to compensation in accordance with the First Schedule. The petitioners have alleged that the respondents failed in their legislative performance by not issuing the mandatory notification, as mandated under sub-section (3) of Section 105 of the Act of 2013 within the stipulated period, which resulted into deprivation of the petitioners, in terms of the compensation, in light of the provisions of the Act of 2013. 9. As far as the acquisition of the petitioners' land is concerned, the amount payable was determined under sub-section (7) of Section 3G of the Act of 1956 and award was passed on July 07, 2014. The additional compensation in consideration of compulsory nature of acquisition, solatium was to be considered at the time of determination of compensation, and thus, the award dated July 07, 2014 in favour of the petitioners under Section 3G of the Act of 1956 could not give the petitioners the benefits accruing out of application of the Act of 2013. 10. As per the petitioners, the respondents ought to have issued a notification in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 105 of the Act of 2013, and as a consequence of such notification, the petitioners could have been benefited out of the new Act of 2013. The petitioners were aggrieved by the fact that despite the objective of unified and integrated legislation, namely, the Act of 2013 in respect of acquisition and to provide just and fair compensation to the affected persons and families, the affected families were being deprived by the inaction on the part of the respondents to have issued the notification, as required for the application of sub-section (3) of Section 105 of the Act of 2013. 11. The petitioners have also submitted that there was a reasonable expectation, as the National Highways Authority of India is one of the bodies, which made frequent acquisitions and was required to pass on the benefits thereof to the affected persons and families in accordance with the Act of 2013. 11. The petitioners have also submitted that there was a reasonable expectation, as the National Highways Authority of India is one of the bodies, which made frequent acquisitions and was required to pass on the benefits thereof to the affected persons and families in accordance with the Act of 2013. The petitioners have raised the issue that sub-section (3) of Section 105 of the Act of 2013 is arbitrary, discriminatory and ambiguous, as it had omitted to provide objective guidelines to the respondents with respect to the date of applicability of the determination of compensation, as per the new law, and thus, while some of the affected persons and families in the land acquisition process under the same law shall be benefited, whereas the petitioners, who are entitled as per the timing, were deprived of the same for lack of such notification of application of the new law. 12. The special law in the form of the Act of 1956 made provisions away from the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the purpose of providing a speedy acquisition for public purposes of National Highway and its ancillary projects. 13. The petitioners, in their submissions, have referred to the preamble and objects of the Act of 2013 and have emphasized upon the spirit of providing just and fair compensation to the affected persons and families, whose land has been acquired or proposed to be acquired, or who were affected by the land acquisition. 14. According to the petitioners, sub-section (3) of Section 105 of the Act of 2013, in its phraseology, uses the word "shall", and thus, there was a clear intention of the legislature to notify the affect of the new Act of 2013 to cause larger benefit to the affected persons and families. The petitioners thus, harped upon and failure and omission on the part of the respondents to bring a notification in accordance with sub-section (3) of Section 105 of the Act of 2013 and to make it applicable for the purposes of the Act of 1956. 15. The petitioners have also referred to Section 113 of the Act of 2013, wherein power to remove difficulties have been incorporated. 15. The petitioners have also referred to Section 113 of the Act of 2013, wherein power to remove difficulties have been incorporated. The petitioners also drew the attention of this Court to the notification in furtherance of sub-section (3) of Section 105 of the Act of 2013 being brought in by the respondents with effect from January 01, 2015, being Ordinance 9 of 2014, and six weeks thereafter, the Ordinance expired and Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Amendment) Bill, 2015 was introduced on February 02, 2015 before the Parliament to replace the said Ordinance 9 of 2014. The Bill was passed on March 10, 2015, and thus, the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Amendment) Bill, 2015 came into force. 16. Since the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Amendment) Second Bill, 2015 in the Act of 2013 was introduced on May 11, 2015 and was referred by the Parliament to a Joint Committee, therefore, another Ordinance was brought in, namely, Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2014 (5 of 2015). 17. The case of the petitioners is that since the impugned award was passed on July 07, 2014, which was prior to promulgation of the Ordinances, therefore, the petitioners could not get the relief, as per the new Act of 2013. The petitioners have also stated that the Ordinances were discriminatory, as they discriminated between the acquisition proceedings finalized upto the year 2014 and the proceedings, which carried on thereafter, for enjoying the beneficial legislation, namely, the Act of 2013. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioners made an argument that the provision of sub-section (3) of Section 105 of the Act of 2013 read with Schedule IV was not made applicable in its right perspective and despite the fact that the respondents were under a legal obligation to make the promulgation applicable, the petitioners were deprived due to inaction on the part of the respondents. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioners also argued that the Section 105 of the Act of 2013 should go, being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India as it is creating a distinction between the families, which are likely to be compensated out of the Act of 2013. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioners also argued that the Section 105 of the Act of 2013 should go, being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India as it is creating a distinction between the families, which are likely to be compensated out of the Act of 2013. Thus, if the benefit/compensation arising out of the purpose, for which the acquisition is being made, was uniformly and universally applied in accordance with the Act of 2013 without waiting for any notification, then the petitioners would also be entitled for such compensation. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued on both the sides, as he stated that if Section 105 was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, as it is creating inequality amongst the persons entitled to enjoy the new compensation law arising out of the Act of 2013, then it should go, and if Section 105 does not go, then the inaction on the part of the respondents as they failed to issue a notification within the stipulated time, causing discrimination between the persons to enjoy the benefits of the beneficial legislation for better compensation. Thus, the Act of 2013, which came into force with effect from January 01, 2014 should have become applicable, as per learned counsel for the petitioners and the benefit accruing at the time of passing of the award impugned in this writ petition should have been given accordingly. 21. Section 105 of the Act of 2013 created classes within a class, and certain persons were rendered excluded from enjoying the benefits of the Act, which came into effect from January 01, 2014, until the notification of the Ordinance and the Bill came into existence. As per learned counsel for the petitioners, the new parameters of compensation law ought to have been uniformly applied with effect from January 01, 2014 without waiting for the notification under sub-section (3) of Section 105 of the Act of 2013, which had caused deprivation to the petitioners. 22. Learned counsel for the petitioners has referred to the judgment reported as AIR 1954 SC 493 , State of Madhya Pradesh v. G.C. Mandawar. 23. 22. Learned counsel for the petitioners has referred to the judgment reported as AIR 1954 SC 493 , State of Madhya Pradesh v. G.C. Mandawar. 23. The relevant portion of para 9 of the aforesaid judgment is as follows: "On these provisions, the position is that when a law is impugned under Article 13, what the Court has to decide is whether 'that' law contravenes any of the provisions of Part III. If it decides that it does, it has to declare it void; if it decides that it does not, it has to uphold it. The power of the Court to declare a law under Article 13 has to be exercised with reference to the specific legislation which is impugned. It is conceivable that when the same legislature enacts two different laws, but in substance they form one legislation, it might be open to the Court to disregard the form and treat them as one law and strike it down, if in their conjunction they result in discrimination...... " 24. The respondents filed a detailed reply stating therein that there was a well settled Doctrine of Reasonable Classification in the Constitutional Jurisprudence, wherein the equality had to operate within the realms of such classification. As per the respondents, the basic Act of 2013 was applied, and then other laws were also included in the ambit of the Act of 2013 under a well defined parameter, and therefore, it was the discretion of the legislature to make the Act of 2013 applicable to other bodies. But such timing was left to the discretion of the State policy, and thus, the same ought not to be questioned by the petitioners. The respondents also harped upon the precedent law, whereby the judicial restrainment, while judging the constitutional validity of the statute was always prevailing in the mind of the Court at the time of adjudication of such issues. 25. Learned counsel for the respondents went on to argue that even if there are two possible views regarding the statute in question, then just because there are two views, no intervention ought to be made by the Court. The legislative framework was explained by the learned counsel for the respondents by stating that the extension of the benefits of the Act of 2013 through Schedule IV and also the Ordinances passed thereafter. The Ordinances were in continuity of the legislative intention. The legislative framework was explained by the learned counsel for the respondents by stating that the extension of the benefits of the Act of 2013 through Schedule IV and also the Ordinances passed thereafter. The Ordinances were in continuity of the legislative intention. But the continuity should be as per the discretion given by the legislature by virtue of Section 105 of the Act of 2013. 26. As per learned counsel for the respondents, there was no violation of any mandate by the answering respondents and every principle of law or legislation had to be applied on a particular date and in a particular time-frame fixed by the legislature for the implementing organs, and therefore, any retrospectivity could not be claimed as a matter of right by any person. 27. Learned counsel for the respondents also states that the petitioners have miserably failed to point out the reasons why this Hon'ble Court should interfere in the legislative exercise, particularly Section 105 of the Act of 2013. As per learned counsel for the respondents, the averments made by the petitioners are vague and baseless, as the challenge is bereft of any merit and legality. 28. The Ordinances and the Bills were brought by the respondents, as per the framework of time and the separate laws, including the Act of 1956, which was brought within the purview of the Act of 2013 with a conscious decision taken by the legislature to separately integrate the thirteen enactments within the broader scheme of the compensation law in the Act of 2013. 29. As per learned counsel for the respondents, the petitioners have miserably failed to point out as to why the notification could not have been brought or stipulated under subsection (3) Section 105 of the Act of 2013, and therefore, the same were rightly brought within the purview of the broader scheme of land acquisition compensation law. 30. The thirteen enactments separately made for the land acquisition in existence provide for a separate class, and had there not been Section 105 of the Act of 2013, which is causing a grievance to the petitioners, then the thirteen enactments, including the Act of 1956, under which the petitioners are claiming the compensation would automatically fall out of the Act of 2013, and thus, the basic beneficial legislation would not even become operative in the cases of land acquisition for the purpose of National Highways. 31. In fact, it is Section 105 of the Act of 2013, which has integrated these thirteen enactments, and if the same is struck down then automatically the benefit goes away from the petitioner as these thirteen enactments shall separately operate and the much needed legislation of integrated compensation shall remain unattained for the purpose of benefiting the masses of this country. Thus, as per learned counsel for the petitioners, the basic application of Section 105 of the Act of 2013 itself has created a right in favour of the petitioners to stand in case of future acquisition to gain the benefits of the Act of 2013, as it is Section 105 only, which is acting as a bridge, which is to be crossed by the thirteen enactments before coming within the larger umbrella of the compensation law arising out of the Act of 2013 causing benefits to the millions of persons suffering the rigours of the land acquisition. 32. As per learned counsel for the respondents, it is a well defined position that these thirteen enactments were outside the purview of the original land acquisition law, namely, the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and thus, the scheme of integrating them with the basic beneficial legislation, namely, the Act of 2013 was for the larger benefit. Therefore, while framing the basic Act of 2013, the thirteen enactments were sought to be brought under the umbrella of the Act of 2013 by Section 105 within a stipulated time-frame. 33. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the following judgments:- "(a) S. Surjit Singh Kalra Etc. v. Union of India & Anr., reported in 1991 SCR (1) 364. (b) Surjit Singh v. Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. [Appeal (Civil) No. 5354/2002 decided by the Apex Court on April 21, 2008]. (c) Gujarat Urja Vikash Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd., [Appeal (Civil) No. 1940/2008 decided by the Apex Court on March 13, 2008]. (d) T. Chakrapani v. Union of India (W.P. No. 15699/2010 decided by the Madras High Court on March 04, 2011)." 34. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon the following judgments:- "(a) CST v. Radhakrishan, reported in (1979) 2 SCC 249 . (b) Greater Bombay Cooperative Bank v. United, reported in (2007) 6 SCC 236 . (c) State of Bihar V. Bihar Distillery, reported in (1997) 2 SCC 453 . On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon the following judgments:- "(a) CST v. Radhakrishan, reported in (1979) 2 SCC 249 . (b) Greater Bombay Cooperative Bank v. United, reported in (2007) 6 SCC 236 . (c) State of Bihar V. Bihar Distillery, reported in (1997) 2 SCC 453 . (d) Bhavesh D. Parish v. Union of India, reported in (2000) 5 SCC 471 . (e) Dharmendra Kirthal v. State of U.P., reported in (2013) 8 SCC 368 . (f) Balco Employees Union v. Union of India, reported in (2002) 2 SCC 333 . (g) Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, reported in (2014) 8 SCC 682 ." 35. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties as well as perusing the record of the case alongwith the precedent laws cited at the Bar, we are of the opinion that the Act of 2013 was a beneficial legislation, which was meant to replace the original Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 36. We have also carefully perused the precedent laws cited by learned counsel for the petitioners. It is no doubt true that such precedent laws shall operate in terms of Article 13 of the Constitution of India, where a challenge to the statute is laid. But the petitioners' case do not warrant any intervention as parameters of judicial intervention has been pointed out in the shape granting indulgence in the various statutes, but the petitioners could not show as to how these were made applicable in the present facts and circumstances of the case. 37. The precedent laws regarding Section 3G of the Act of 1956 being held unconstitutional as it is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India and other precedent laws cited by learned counsel for the petitioners would not apply to the facts of the present case, as the transformation of the compensation law under the one umbrella with the application of the Act of 2013 is totally a different perspective and such perspective where combination of the enactments is being made after the basic law has been brought within the framework of the statute itself, the present case cannot be held to be having any similarity with the case law cited. 38. 38. The case laws cited by learned counsel for the respondents are cardinal principles of law and need not be considered at this stage, as this Court is satisfied on the merits of the case that the statute in question is in conformity with the basic parameters of Article 13 of the Constitution of India and therefore, the classification contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution of India has not been made out by the petitioners, so as to qualify the merits of the case to grant indulgence in the form of intervention with the enactment of Section 105 of the Act of 2013. 39. The thirteen enactments of land acquisition were existing apart from the original Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and under the legislative framework, the intention of the legislature was apparent that the Act of 2013 has to act as an umbrella for the original law of land acquisition alongwith the thirteen enactments, which were kept separately, until then were to be integrated in the scheme of law so provided. 40. The Act of 1956, which is applicable in the present case was amongst the thirteen enactments that were holding the field of land acquisition and compensation, apart from the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Act of 2013 was enacted with the specific intention of reducing the misery of the sufferers of the land acquisition by providing them a better compensation. But every beneficial legislation has to have a time-frame when it is to be given effect to. The Act of 2013 would not include the thirteen independent enactments, unless Section 105 of the Act of 2013 was there, which sought to apply the Act of 2013 upon the thirteen enactments by notification in the stipulated manner for the separate enactments. 41. It is not in dispute between the parties that such Ordinances and Bills followed as a consequence of giving effect to the Act of 2013 and the bridge was crossed in its own scheme and framework strictly in accordance with law. 42. 41. It is not in dispute between the parties that such Ordinances and Bills followed as a consequence of giving effect to the Act of 2013 and the bridge was crossed in its own scheme and framework strictly in accordance with law. 42. The arguments of learned counsel for the petitioners were self contradictory, as on one side, it is stated that Section 105 of the Act of 2013 was bad in the eye of law, as it created a difference amongst the original beneficiaries of the Act of 2013 and the thirteen separate enactments being brought under the purview as per Section 105 of the Act of 2013. 43. The answer to the questions raised by the petitioners lies in themselves, as it is not disputed by them that these thirteen enactments had to be described independently as legislation, and thus, if they would have prevailed and Section 105 of the Act of 2013 would not have been there, then the petitioners and other beneficiaries would have been entitled only for the benefit under the Act of 1956. 44. The inclusive ambit of the beneficial legislation, namely, the Act of 2013 in fact had a bridge in the shape of Section 105 of the Act of 2013, which was waiting to be crossed for more than half a century. Thus, the combination of the thirteen enactments for the purpose of expanding the scope of the beneficial legislation had to be done within the stipulated framework of Section 105 of the Act of 2013 and without such framework, the original existence of the Act of 2013 would render the benefits only to the constituency of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Thus, the classification was not amongst one class, but was between different schools of legislation, which was operating for different subjects, as the thirteen enactments were having a separate entity in law, until they were consciously brought into the purview of the Act of 2013. The legislative intention was that the framework ought to be fixed in the shape of Section 105 of the Act of 2013 to ensure a lawful merger of the thirteen enactments in the broad perspective and purview of the compensation law, which gained significance, in light of the Act of 2013. 45. The legislative intention was that the framework ought to be fixed in the shape of Section 105 of the Act of 2013 to ensure a lawful merger of the thirteen enactments in the broad perspective and purview of the compensation law, which gained significance, in light of the Act of 2013. 45. The impugned award dated July 07, 2014 has no doubt attained finality, which is after coming into force of the Act of 2013 with effect from January 01, 2014, but until then, the Act of 1956 was independently in existence. The Act of 1956 was waiting to be integrated with the Act of 2013 under the umbrella of the broader compensation law with a statutory mechanism provided under Section 105 of the Act of 2013. 46. The statutory mechanism of the Act of 2013 was to operate in a particular manner, as mandated by the legislature, and such integration has taken place, but on a subsequent date, than the one when the award impugned was passed. The date of integration of the laws is strictly in accordance with the statutory framework intended by the legislature, and therefore, cannot be questioned merely because there are some beneficiaries, who fall before the date when the benefit was accrued as per the law prevailed before that date and some shall enjoy better benefits as the new law has come into vogue. 47. In light of the aforesaid discussions, the present writ petition laying challenge to Section 105 of the Act of 2013 is dismissed, and the other consequential prayers sought by the petitioners are also dismissed for want of merits.