JUDGMENT : V.K. SHUKLA, MAHESH CHANDRA TRIPATHI, JJ. 1. Ref: Civil Misc. Delay Condonation Application For the reasons stated in the affidavit filed in support of delay condonation application, as the same constitutes sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing of present special appeal, the delay condonation application is allowed. 2. Special Appeal is treated to have been filed well within time. Ref: Special Appeal 3. Yogendra Kumar Tripathi is before this Court assailing the validity of order dated 24.01.2017 passed by learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.41040 of 1998 (Yogendra Kumar Tripathi v. U.P.S.R.T.C. and another). As per the record this much is reflected that petitioner-appellant had preferred the aforementioned writ petition for quashing the order dated 21.03.1998 by which the representation of the petitioner was rejected and also to quash the selection and appointment in pursuance of the selection held in the year 1989 of the reserved category candidates in excess of 50% quota. 4. Brief background of the case is that in the year 1989, the respondent-corporation had advertised vacancies for making direct recruitment to the post of Mechanics in western zone. The petitioner-appellant being general candidate along with others had participated in the aforesaid selection and he was placed at serial no.9 in the merit list but finally the petitioner appellant was not accorded any appointment letter. Such inaction of the respondents has impelled the petitioner-appellant to approach this Court by preferring Writ Petition No.35904/1997 and the same was disposed on 28.10.1997 asking the respondents to consider the claim of petitioner-appellant. Pursuant to the said directives, the order dated 21.03.1998 was passed whereby the representation of petitioner-appellant was rejected on the ground that after the selection process was initiated, a ban was imposed by the State Government on the appointments, which were circulated by Circular dated 22.01.1990 and as such no further appointment could be made and during the selection process only 8 vacancies of general category were available and till serial no.8 appointments were granted before the imposition of ban and once the State Government as per his own wisdom has proceeded to ban the appointments through circular dated 22.01.1990, the appointment of petitioner-appellant could not be ensured. 5. 5. Before Learned Single Judge first ground of contention on behalf of petitioner has been that on account of imposition of ban by the State Government, the selection process, which has already commenced, could not have been stopped. Secondly it has been contended that quota of reservation has wrongly been applied and more than 50% posts were filled up by reserved category, which is impermissible in law. Thirdly, on the ground that candidature of petitioner-appellant had been denied only on account of imposition of ban and wrong calculation of posts for reserved category. It has also been urged before learned Single Judge that appointment of reserved category were made even after lifting of ban and also during the ban and, therefore, petitioner-appellant has been discriminated and in this backdrop, learned Counsel for the petitioner-appellant has placed reliance on various judgments. For ready reference, the operative portion of the judgments passed by learned Single Judge is being quoted below:- "Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of A.P.Aggarwal v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and another reported in (2000) 1 SCC 600 and also in the case of Virender S. Hooda and others v. State of Haryana and another, reported in (1999) 3 SCC 696 . The aforesaid decisions have been relied to impress upon the Court that if a candidate was wrongfully denied appointment, the Court must consider directing the authorities to appoint. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon a decision in the case of N.T.Bevin Katti v. Karnataka Public Service Commission reported in 1990 (3) SCC 157 to contend that the rules and regulations at the time of initiation of selection process must be applied and not subsequent rules that may have been passed with regard to on going selection process with regard to reservation. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri S.K.Misra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. The issue for consideration in this writ petition at this juncture is that the posts were advertised in the year 1989 and the selection process was initiated in 1990. A ban of the State Government was imposed immediately after the select list was prepared and the petitioner's name finds place at serial no.9. The issue for consideration in this writ petition at this juncture is that the posts were advertised in the year 1989 and the selection process was initiated in 1990. A ban of the State Government was imposed immediately after the select list was prepared and the petitioner's name finds place at serial no.9. It is not disputed by the parties that a ban was imposed by Circulation Letter dated 22.1.1990, which is filed as Annexure-CA2 to the counter affidavit. In the said order it has clearly been mentioned that the ban would be applicable even in such selection process where the select list has been prepared. An exception is carved out in the said ban order that the selection of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and other reserved categories would not be affected by the said ban. In the counter affidavit a clear stand that has been taken is that the appointments till serial no.8 in the select list of general category have been made and the other appointments could not have been made from the general category due to imposition of ban by the State Government. Since the relaxation was given in the ban order, the appointments of reserved category can be made as large number of vacancies were lying vacant in that category. After considering the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the selection is of the year 1989 pursuant to the advertisement. Advertisement clearly indicates that the said selection are for temporary posts. It is not disputed that the ban was imposed in the year 1990. It is also not disputed that none of the candidates of the general category were appointed after imposition of ban beyond serial no.8, which in the counter affidavit is stated to be the vacancies available the appointments were made from the reserved category. Such appointments were made on account of relaxation in the ban order itself. The life of select list was stated to be only one year or till the next selection is held. It is nobody's case that after the said selection no further selection were ever held. That being the case, the life of select list being only one year, now no relief can be granted to the petitioner for being considered for appointment upon a selection process held in the year 1989. It is nobody's case that after the said selection no further selection were ever held. That being the case, the life of select list being only one year, now no relief can be granted to the petitioner for being considered for appointment upon a selection process held in the year 1989. The case laws relied upon by the petitioner, namely, A.P. Aggarwal v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and another (supra) and Virender S. Hooda and others v. State of Haryana and another (supra), in my view, are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case to demonstrates that the petitioner was wrongfully denied appointment. The petitioner's name merely being in the select list, itself does not confer any right to be considered for appointment. As such, his claim was not proceeded with only because of imposition of ban, which is admitted by both the parties and said ban order has not been challenged. So far as the case of N.T. Bevin Katti v. Karnataka Public Service Commission(supra) is concerned that will also not be applicable in the facts of the present case as in the ban order itself it is provided that so far as the reserved category candidates are concerned, the ban would not be applicable. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the appointments to the extent of 11 in number in the reserved category were wrongly done as in the general category only 8 appointments were made and, therefore, out of seats advertised more than 50% reservation was granted, which is not permissible in law. From the advertisement it appears that 50 temporary posts were advertised and, therefore, considering 50% 11 posts being given to the reserved category, does not exceed 50% of the total seats. There is no merit in the writ petition. It is, accordingly, dismissed." 6. From the advertisement it appears that 50 temporary posts were advertised and, therefore, considering 50% 11 posts being given to the reserved category, does not exceed 50% of the total seats. There is no merit in the writ petition. It is, accordingly, dismissed." 6. In this backdrop learned Counsel for the petitioner-appellant has vehemently contended that even after on lifting of ban, the exercise to make appointment was not undertaken by the respondents despite existence of various vacancies and even he had also indicated that ban was lifted only in respect to reserved category candidates, the same is impermissible being arbitrary and discriminatory and as such, petitioner-appellant was wrongfully denied to appointment for no fault of him and he is diligently pursuing the case since 1998 and at this juncture his rightful claim cannot be denied in arbitrary manner and as such, this Court should come to the rescue and reprieve of the petitioner-appellant. 7. On the other hand, counsel for the respondents countered the said submission by contending that mere inclusion of name in the select list does not confer any right and on account of ban being imposed by the State Government petitioner-appellant has been deprived of appointment and the same is dehors to the circular/directives issued by the State Government as such no interference is required, and Special Appeal is liable to be dismissed. 8. In this backdrop, the Court has proceeded to examine the record in question and this is an admitted position that the post of Mechanic 50% temporary post were advertised in the year 1989. This much is also admitted situation that petitioner appellant had participated in the said selection process and eventually in the merit list his name has found place at serial no.9. The entire objection has been raised by the respondents for not according appointment letter in favour of petitioner appellant to the extent is that a ban was imposed by the State Government merely after select list was prepared. The Circular letter dated 22.01.1990 by which the ban was imposed had also been brought on record by the respondents through their counter affidavit in the aforementioned Writ Petition. 9. The Circular letter dated 22.01.1990 by which the ban was imposed had also been brought on record by the respondents through their counter affidavit in the aforementioned Writ Petition. 9. From bare perusal of the said Circular, this much is clearly reflected that the ban was also applicable even in such selection process where there select list has been prepared but an exception was carved out in the said circular that the selection of SC, ST and OBC category that the same would not be affected by such ban. It has also been brought on record that appointments were accorded in favour of incumbents in the select list of general category from serial no.1 to 8 and the other appointments were not made by the department concerned on account of Circular dated 22.01.1990. The Learned Single Judge has also proceeded to observe that the life of select list was stated to be only one year or till the next selection was held but it was nobody's case that after the said selection, no further selection would ever held and once such is the factual situation that the life of select list was being only one year, then the Learned Single Judge has rightly proceeded to observe that no reprieve can be granted to the petitioner-appellant for being considered for appointment upon a selection process held in the year 1989. It is also well settled law that mere participation in the selection process or even finding place in the select list does not confer any indefeasible right to be considered for appointment to any candidate. 10. Right of successful candidate to be offered appointment has been subject matter of consideration by the Apex Court, time and again. In the case of Shankarsan Das v. Union of India and others (1991) 3 SCC 47 Apex Court held as follows:- Paragraph 7 of the case of Shankarsan Das (supra) is quoted as under: "7. It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed which cannot be legitimately denied. Ordinarily the notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire any right to the post. Ordinarily the notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire any right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bona fide for appropriate reasons. And if the vacancies or any of them are filled up, the State is bound to respect the comparative merit of the candidates, as reflected at the recruitment test, and no discrimination can be permitted. This correct position has been consistently followed by this Court, and we do not find any discordant note in the decisions in State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwaha, (1974) 1 SCR 165 , Neelima Shangla v. State of Haryana, (1986) 4 SCC 268 or Jatendra Kumar v. State of Punjab, (1985) 1 SCR 899." 11. View to the similar effect has been expressed in the case of Asha Kaul v. State of Jammu & Kashmir and others (1993) 2 SCC 573 , Directors SCTI for Medical Sciences v. M. Pushkaran (2008) 1 SCC 448 , Manoj Manu and another v. Union of India and others (2013) 12 SCC 171 ; Vijay Kumar Pandey v. Arvind Kumar Rai (2013) 11 SCC 611 . Lastly Apex Court in the case of Kulwinder Pal Singh and another v. State of Punjab and others (2016) 6 SCC 532 has summed up the law as follows:- "10. It is fairly well settled that merely because the name of a candidate finds place in the select list, it would not given him indefeasible right to get an appointment as well. The name of a candidate may appear in the merit list but he has no indefeasible right to an appointment (vide Food Corporation of India v. Bhanu Lodh, (2005) 3 SCC 618 , All India SC & ST Employees' Assn. v. A. Arthur Jeen, (2001) 6 SCC 380 and UPSC v. Gaurav Dwivedi, (1999) 5 SCC 180 . 11. This Court again in State of Orissa v. Rajkishore Nanda, (2010) 6 SCC 777 , held as under: "14. A person whose name appears in the select list does not acquire any indefeasible right of appointment. v. A. Arthur Jeen, (2001) 6 SCC 380 and UPSC v. Gaurav Dwivedi, (1999) 5 SCC 180 . 11. This Court again in State of Orissa v. Rajkishore Nanda, (2010) 6 SCC 777 , held as under: "14. A person whose name appears in the select list does not acquire any indefeasible right of appointment. Empanelment at best is a condition of eligibility for the purpose of appointment and by itself does not amount to selection or create a vested right to be appointed. The vacancies have to be filled up as per the statutory rules and in conformity with the constitutional mandate. 16. A select list cannot be treated as a reservoir for the purpose of appointments that vacancy can be filled up taking the names from that list as and when it is so required." In Manoj Manu v. Union of India, (2013) 12 SCC 171 , it was held that merely because the name of a candidate finds place in the select list, it would not give the candidate an indefeasible right to get an appointment as well. It is always open to the Government not to fill up the vacancies, however such decision should not be arbitrary or unreasonable. Once the decision is found to be based on some valid reason, the Court would not issue any mandamus to the Government to fill up the vacancies. AS noticed earlier, because twenty two other candidates were declared successfully by the Supreme Court pertaining to the selection of the years 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2011 as Civil Judges (Junior Division), they were to be accommodated, as rightly resolved by the Administrative Committee in the meeting dated 6-7-2011. The three resultant vacancies of the year 2007-2008 stood consumed with the joining of the said seventeen candidates and the same could not be filled up from the select list of that year. The decision of the Administrative Committee observing that the three resultant vacancies stood consumed is based on factual situation arising there and cannot be said to be arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)". 12. Once such is the factual situation and as the matter relates to the advertisement of the year 1989, then at this belated stage no relief can be accorded in favour of petitioner-appellant. 13. Special Appeal sans merit and the same is dismissed accordingly.