JUDGMENT : Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J. The present application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed against an order dated August 16, 2017 passed by the Municipal Building Tribunal of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation. Upon a demolition order being passed under Section 400 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 against the opposite party no. 1 by the Municipal Commissioner, Kolkata Municipal Corporation, the opposite party no. 1 preferred an appeal, bearing Building Tribunal Appeal no. 39 of 2011, before the Municipal Building Tribunal. In such appeal, the opposite party no. 4 sought to be impleaded as a co-appellant on the strength of his purchase of the disputed flat from the appellant/opposite party no. 1 on February 18, 2014. Such prayer was initially refused but, upon such refusal order being challenged in W.P. No. 2222(W) of 2016, this Court permitted the opposite party no. 4 vide Order dated February 25, 2016 to participate in the appeal and the Tribunal was directed to entertain such prayer of the opposite party no. 4. Thereafter, the opposite party no. 4 renewed his prayer for being impleaded in the appeal upon which, vide order dated May 5, 2016, the Tribunal added the opposite party no. 4 as respondent no. 4. The opposite party no. 4 thereafter prayed for transposition to the category of appellant, which was turned down. 2. It appears from the records that the opposite party no. 4 not only participated in the hearing of the appeal, albeit in the capacity of a respondent, but also filed written notes of arguments in the appeal. Subsequently, only after the conclusion of the hearing of the appeal, the opposite party filed a petition on July 28, 2017 for leave to file cross-objection, along with a memorandum of cross-objection. The primary premise of such cross-objection was that the officer, who passed the order of demolition, although designated as a Special Officer (Building), did not have the authority to discharge the function as a delegate of the Municipal Commissioner as contemplated under Section 48 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980. As such, the opposite party no. 4 contended, such Officer did not have the power, authority or jurisdiction to dispose of the proceeding under Section 400 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 and to pass an order of demolition. As such, the opposite party no. 4 contended, such Officer did not have the power, authority or jurisdiction to dispose of the proceeding under Section 400 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 and to pass an order of demolition. The Tribunal, vide the impugned order dated August 16, 2017, allowed such prayer and granted the opposite party no. 4 leave to file cross-objection upon imposition of costs. The principal ground for granting such leave was that the question of lack of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of the proceeding. This, despite the specific finding of the Tribunal that the opposite party no. 4 did not canvass such grievance either at the argument stage or in the lengthy written argument, comprised of 17 pages and annexures, filed by the opposite party no. 4. It was further found by the Tribunal that the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the Special Officer (Building) was an afterthought. 3. Upon service being completed, the present Revisional application is taken up for hearing. Learned counsel for the petitioner, who was the complainant before the Municipal Commissioner, argues that even if the question of lack of jurisdiction could have been urged at the inception of the proceeding, such issue could not be raised by the opposite party no. 4 at the fag end of the appeal, more so when both the opposite party no. 4 and his predecessor-in-interest, the opposite party no.1- appellant, participated throughout in the appeal and in the entire proceeding respectively. Learned Counsel for the petitioner cites two judgments, reported respectively at AIR 1956 Cal 470 (Jupiter General Insce. Co. Ltd. Vs. Corporation of Calcutta) and at AIR 1988 SC 205 (Prasun Roy Vs. The Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority) which lay down the proposition that where the applicant participates in arbitration proceedings without protest and avails the proceedings, he cannot be heard, when he sees that the award has gone against him, to make an objection that the whole of the proceedings are without jurisdiction on the ground of a known disability of the other party. 4. The petitioner submits that not only did the opposite party no. 4 participate in the appeal upon being added in the appeal, the opposite party no. 1, being the predecessor-in-interest of the opposite party no. 4 had participated in the proceedings from the lowest forum upwards. The opposite party no. 4. The petitioner submits that not only did the opposite party no. 4 participate in the appeal upon being added in the appeal, the opposite party no. 1, being the predecessor-in-interest of the opposite party no. 4 had participated in the proceedings from the lowest forum upwards. The opposite party no. 4 adopted several dilatory tactics, including taking out frivolous applications – once for addition as appellant, again for impleadment, a third time for being transposed to the category of appellant, and also several writ petitions before this Court. Thus it was submitted that the opposite party no. 4 filed the cross objection also with the mala fide intention of further protracting litigation. As such, no opportunity ought to have been given to the said recalcitrant litigant to file cross-objection after arguments were over. 5. The Kolkata Municipal Corporation virtually supported the petitioner’s stand and submitted in support of the demolition order. 6. Learned Counsel for the opposite party no. 4 argued that the Special Officer (Building) who had passed the demolition order had no authority to do so. A demolition order under Section 400 (1) of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 could be passed by a Municipal Commissioner. Under Section 48 (3) (b) of the said Act, the Municipal Commissioner may by order delegate such power to any other officer or any employee of the Corporation. However, the Special Officer (Building) who passed the demolition order in the present case was not an officer or employee of the Corporation and as such did not have any authority or jurisdiction to pass such order. In support of such view, learned Counsel cited a judgment reported at 2015 (5) CHN (Cal) 309 (Susama Saha Vs. Kolkata Municipal Corporation), where a co-ordinate Bench of this Court held inter alia that the post of Special Officer, created for the purpose of delegation of power by the Municipal Commissioner, is not recognized in the said Act or in the Regulations and such delegation was illegal. 7. Learned Counsel submits that such decision, rendered on December 2, 2015, escaped the notice of the opposite party no. 4 initially but was discovered after arguments, when the proposition therein was sought to be brought in by way of the cross-objection. 8. Opposite Party no. 7. Learned Counsel submits that such decision, rendered on December 2, 2015, escaped the notice of the opposite party no. 4 initially but was discovered after arguments, when the proposition therein was sought to be brought in by way of the cross-objection. 8. Opposite Party no. 4 further argues that since the lack of authority amounts to inherent lack of jurisdiction of the Special Officer (Building) to pass the demolition order, such point can be urged at any point of time, even at the post-argument stage of an appeal. Since such point can even be taken before a superior forum in a challenge to the Tribunal’s appellate decision, there cannot be any bar to take it at a belated stage in the appeal itself. 9. Learned Counsel for opposite party no. 4 relies on a judgment reported at AIR 1965 SC 304 (Kothamasu Kanakarathamma Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh) for the proposition that inherent lack of jurisdiction can be taken at any juncture of the litigation. In the said report, a reference had been made under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act to the Court for apportionment of compensation. The Court, however, treated it as a reference with respect to the entire compensation amount. It was held by the Supreme Court on such facts that there was inherent lack of jurisdiction and where the want of jurisdiction appears on the face of the proceedings, it cannot be waived. 10. It is thus submitted that the Tribunal committed no jurisdictional error in permitting the opposite party no. 4 to file a belated cross objection, since such cross objection urged an inherent lack of jurisdiction which could be taken at any point of time. Since discretion had been exercised judicially by the Tribunal, it was submitted, this Court ought not to interfere merely because another view was possible in its opinion. 11. Upon hearing both sides and considering the materials on record, it is evident that the opposite party no. 4 ought not to have been granted leave to file a cross objection at such a belated stage for the following reasons: First, the predecessor-in-interest of the opposite party no. 4, being the appellant-opposite party no. 1, had all along been represented from the inception of the demolition proceeding. Opposite party no. 4 ought not to have been granted leave to file a cross objection at such a belated stage for the following reasons: First, the predecessor-in-interest of the opposite party no. 4, being the appellant-opposite party no. 1, had all along been represented from the inception of the demolition proceeding. Opposite party no. 1 never took the point of inherent lack of jurisdiction of the Special Officer (Building) to pass a demolition order under Section 400 of the said Act at any point of time. The opposite party no. 4, claiming and impleaded entirely through the opposite party no. 1 and not by virtue of any independent title, had to step into the shoes of the opposite party no. 1 and could not take any contrary stand. Hence, the scope of filing an independent cross-objection different from the appellant’s stand was very limited, if at all existent, for the opposite party no. 4. Secondly, it is a cardinal tenet of judicial propriety that an objection as to jurisdiction ought to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity. Although rendered in a slightly different context, the judgments of Jupiter General (supra) and Prasun Roy (supra) lay down a proposition which is squarely applicable in the present context. After having lost in the demolition proceeding and participated in the hearing of the appeal, the opposite party no. 1 could not turn around and challenge the jurisdiction of the first forum. Consequently opposite party no. 4, claiming through opposite party no. 1, could also not take such a point and was bound by the stand of opposite party no. 1. Thirdly, opposite party no. 4 was impleaded in the appeal in the year 2016, that is, much after the judgment in Susama Saha (supra) was rendered. Opposite Party no. 4 participated in the hearing of the appeal and even filed his own lengthy written notes of arguments. All along the benefit of Susama Saha (supra) was available to the opposite party no. 4, but he chose not to avail such benefit. In fact, Susama Saha, even if taken to be the correct law (which was disputed by the petitioner), merely interpreted inter alia the provisions of Sections 48 and 400 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980. Such provisions were there since the inception of the proceeding and point of jurisdiction, if any, was available to the opposite party nos. In fact, Susama Saha, even if taken to be the correct law (which was disputed by the petitioner), merely interpreted inter alia the provisions of Sections 48 and 400 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980. Such provisions were there since the inception of the proceeding and point of jurisdiction, if any, was available to the opposite party nos. 1 and 4 all along. They chose not to avail such argument. In fact, Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not strictly applicable to appeals before the Municipal Building Tribunal. Even if such provision was to be applicable, it is now settled by judicial pronouncements that although no formal cross objection is filed by a respondent, such respondent is not precluded from assailing any adverse finding of a subordinate forum. Hence there was no bar for the opposite party no. 4 to take the challenge, contemplated in the proposed cross objection, earlier. Lastly, as lucrative as the argument of inherent lack of jurisdiction may seem, such argument has a fallacy in the present context. To be of such a nature as to render an entire action a nullity, an absence of jurisdiction has to go to the very root of the action, such as to vitiate the entire action. There is a subtle difference between a lack of authority springing from a technical flaw in appointment of the person manning a quasi-judicial post and a statutory lack of jurisdiction behind an action arising from non-conferment of power by the relevant statute. While the latter may nullify the action itself, the former is a mere irregularity which is waivable at its worst. In fact, the requirement under Section 48 of the said Act, as interpreted in Susama Saha (supra), does not stipulate any essential qualification, absence of which would vitiate the very action, but is restricted merely to a requirement to be an employee or an officer of the Corporation. The Special Officer (Building) was in fact appointed by the Corporation and exercised powers under the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980, though such appointment may have been in derogation of the procedure laid down in the Act. The Special Officer (Building) was in fact appointed by the Corporation and exercised powers under the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980, though such appointment may have been in derogation of the procedure laid down in the Act. In such scenario, even if Susama Saha (supra) hits at the authority of the incumbent acting as a delegate of the Municipal Commissioner under Section 48 of the said Act to exercise a power under Section 400 thereof, such lack of authority cannot be elevated to such a high pedestal that it automatically nullifies all previous orders of the incumbent and renders void the entire proceedings even without a challenge. The objection as to jurisdiction sought to be taken by the opposite party no. 4 by way of cross-objection had to be taken specifically at the inception, but was not taken. Implicit in the nature of such objection is the principle that such objection is waivable. That is precisely what was done by the opposite party no. 4 and his predecessor-in-interest, the opposite party no. 1, whose shoes the opposite party no. 4 stepped into, having fully submitted to the jurisdiction of the hierarchy of forums which decided the matter. 12. It would be a travesty of justice if, after having participated full-fledged in the entire proceedings, the opposite party no. 4 is permitted to turn coat and challenge the very authority to which its predecessor-in-interest submitted and which challenge was waived by the opposite party no. 4 himself. Neither in oral arguments, nor in written notes of arguments filed in the appeal, did the opposite party no. 4 ever urge such point. 13. Hence, the Tribunal committed a patent jurisdictional error and a gross abuse of the process of court in permitting the opposite party no. 4 to file a cross objection after arguments were over. 14. As a result, the present application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India succeeds. C.O. No. 3355 of 2017 is allowed on contest by setting aside the impugned order dated August 16, 2017 passed by the Municipal Building Tribunal in Building Tribunal Appeal No. 39 of 2011. The opposite party no. 4 is granted liberty to withdraw costs, if any, deposited pursuant to the impugned order. 15. There will be no order as to costs.