ARUN PALLI, J. 1. Vide this order and judgment, I shall decide a batch of 67 appeals, of which 54 appeals have been preferred by the Union Territory, Chandigarh, and the rest 13 appeals have been filed by the claimant/landowners. For, the matter arises out of the same acquisition and the issues that require determination are common, all these appeals are being disposed of by a common judgment. However, by consensus, the facts are being culled out from RFA No. 807 of 2004, titled “Union Territory, Chandigarh v. Joga Singh”. 2. Vide notification, dated 15.05.1998, issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, 'the Act'), a land measuring 130.69 acres of village Jhumroo (Hadbast No. 260), was sought to be acquired for development of third phase of Sectors 48 and 49, Chandigarh. A final declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published on 03.03.1999. Vide award No. 530, dated 24.11.1999, the Land Acquisition Collector assessed the market value of all kinds of lands @ Rs. 4,70,000/- per acre, except gair mumkin khadans, i.e. nala, riverbed and choe, for which the compensation was assessed @ Rs. 1,95,833/- per acre. The claimant/landowners were also awarded compensation for the superstructures/tubewells that existed on the acquired land. However, a few of the claimants were only awarded the scrap value for their superstructures, as the construction raised by them was alleged to be unauthorised. Being aggrieved by the assessment as also the compensation awarded by the Collector, the claimant/landowners filed objections under Section 18 of the Act. Resultantly, the dispute between the parties was referred to the Civil Court. On a consideration of the matter in issue, the Reference Court vide a separate awards enhanced the compensation awarded to the claimant/landowners qua the acquired land. And, which was further enhanced by this Court, vide order and judgment dated 30.03.2009, rendered in RFA No. 2785 of 2002 (Hari Singh and another v. Union Territory, Chandigarh) and other connected matters, to Rs. 16,80,040/- per acre, except the land that was gair mumkin, nadi, choe and khadan, which was assessed at Rs. 7,00,050/- per acre. And as regards superstructures, the Reference Court vide impugned award has awarded enhancement @ 25% upon the compensation assessed by the Collector. Even those land owners who were only granted the scrap value for their superstructures, were awarded compensation at the same rate as the other land owners. 7,00,050/- per acre. And as regards superstructures, the Reference Court vide impugned award has awarded enhancement @ 25% upon the compensation assessed by the Collector. Even those land owners who were only granted the scrap value for their superstructures, were awarded compensation at the same rate as the other land owners. Thus, the short issue that is involved in the present set of appeals is only regarding value of the superstructures. On course, Union Territory, Chandigarh, prays that the award rendered by the Reference Court be set aside and the claimant/landowners pray for further enhancement. 3. All what has been urged by Mr. Suvir Sehgal, learned Senior Standing Counsel for Union Territory, Chandigarh, is that the claimant/landowners, who had raised construction at site without obtaining prior permission of the administration, and in violation of the provisions of the Punjab New Capital (Periphery) Control Act, 1952 (for short, ‘the 1952 Act’), were awarded compensation at scrap value by the Collector. Thus, he asserts that the claimant/landowners, who had raised unauthorised construction, could never be awarded compensation at the assessed value of the superstructures. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance upon an unreported decision of this Court, dated 24.09.2008, rendered in RFA No. 2340 of 1998 (Suraj Singh and others v. Union Territory, Chandigarh) and other connected matters. Further, he submits that the Reference Court also erred, as all those superstructures/buildings that were raised within five years of the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act, were exempted from an appropriate deduction in its value on account of depreciation of the building. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the claimant/landowners simply seeks to reiterate the case the claimants had set out before the Reference Court, and submits that the conclusion arrived at by the Reference Court is well founded and justified. Thus, he prays that the appeals filed by the Union Territory, Chandigarh, be dismissed. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 6. Ex facie, the Reference Court on a consideration of the matter as also the material on record, reached a conclusion that Ram Kanwar (RW-1), a Sectional Officer, examined by the Administration conceded in his cross-examination that the ‘Common Schedule Rates’ that formed basis of the assessment, were of the year 1985, whereas the price index had escalated between 1985 to 1999. So much so, he also admitted that practise to award scrap value was not in vogue prior to the year 1999. That being so, the Reference Court observed that the evaluation of the superstructures was erroneous and not in sink with the prevailing market rates. And, for the cost of material and labour was much higher than what was reflected in the Schedule, the claimants were entitled for reasonable enhancement. Likewise, the testimony of the expert, examined by the claimant/landowners, i.e. Amar Singh (PW-1) was also ruled out of consideration, for the Reference Court was of the view that the valuation report submitted by the said witness was highly exaggerated. But, the valuation as regards the difference between the rates reflected in the Schedule and the prevalent market rates was accepted to be correct. Thus, in reference to the previous judicial pronouncements/awards, i.e. Labh Singh and others v. Union Territory of Chandigarh (Ex. P-40); Harvinder Singh v. Union Territory, Chandigarh (Ex. P-42); Kuldip Singh v. Union Territory, Chandigarh (Ex. P-43); and Sajjan Singh v. Union Territory, Chandigarh (Ex. P-44), it was concluded that for in the similar circumstances, the claimants were awarded 25% increase in the market value of the superstructures (inclusive of 10% increase for the difference in the Schedule rates and the prevalent market rates), the claimant/landowners were also entitled to enhancement @ 25% as regards their superstructures. As indicated earlier, a few of the claimants were only awarded the scrap value for their buildings/superstructures by the Collector, as the construction raised by them was alleged to be without any prior permission by the Administration under the 1952 Act. However, in reference to the two decisions of this Court, rendered in the case of Karam Vir and others v. Union of India (RFA No. 2608 of 1980, decided on 18.08.1981) and Hans Raj and others v. Chandigarh Administration (RFA No. 894 of 1976, decided on 08.04.1980), the Reference Court held that even if the construction raised by the claimant/landowners was said to be unauthorised, yet the claimants were entitled to compensation at the assessed value of their superstructure. 7. The reliance placed by learned counsel for Union Territory, Chandigarh, upon a decision of this Court in the case of Suraj Singh (supra) would also not advance the case of the appellant-UT, Chandigarh. 7. The reliance placed by learned counsel for Union Territory, Chandigarh, upon a decision of this Court in the case of Suraj Singh (supra) would also not advance the case of the appellant-UT, Chandigarh. For on a comprehensive consideration of a similar issue, this Court rather reached a conclusion that in the case of State of Orissa v. Rajakishore Das, (1996) 4 SCC 221 , that was being relied upon by the Chandigarh Administration, was hardly of any consequence, for under the Orissa Town Planning and Improvement Trust Act, 1956, payment of compensation on account of unauthorised construction of a building was specifically barred, whereas no such bar or amendment as regards Union Territory, Chandigarh, was pointed out. Further, although the 1952 Act envisaged restriction as regards unauthorised construction within the ‘Controlled Area’, as declared for the purposes of said Act, but that too was inconsequential, for nothing was brought on record to show as to what were the boundaries of the ‘Controlled Area’ at the material time. Still further, the construction of some rooms and cattle sheds in the said case, which were raised for a purpose subservient to agriculture, and in terms of Section 5 of the 1952 Act, the provisions of the 1952 Act were inapplicable. Learned counsel for the Administration could not point out as to how the claim of the claimant/landowners shall not be covered with the decisions of this Court, rendered in the cases of Karam Vir (supra) and Hans Raj (supra). Rather, even the decision in the case of Suraj Singh (supra) fortifies the case of the claimants. It was observed; that Section 3(a) of the Act provides that expression ‘land’ includes benefits to arise out of the land and the things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. It is not making any distinction between authorised and unauthorised construction. Thus, the finding recorded by the Reference Court that even those landowners, who alleged to have raised unauthorised construction, would also be entitled to enhancement @ 25% cannot be taken exception to. 8. It is not making any distinction between authorised and unauthorised construction. Thus, the finding recorded by the Reference Court that even those landowners, who alleged to have raised unauthorised construction, would also be entitled to enhancement @ 25% cannot be taken exception to. 8. In so far as the grievance of the Administration that the structures that were raised within five years of the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act, could not be exempted from a suitable deduction in its value on account of depreciation, suffice it to say that the Reference Court had relied upon a decision of this Court rendered in the case of Union of India v. Balwinder Singh, 1990 LACC 378, to hold that merely because five years had elapsed since completion of construction, would not justify that mechanically depreciation must be awarded. Neither any decision to the contrary was cited nor learned counsel for the Administration could show as to how the said decision would not apply to the present case. 9. The Reference Court had also assessed the value of a tubewell at Rs. 25,000/-, for the Collector had only awarded the compensation for excavation of land and nothing was awarded as regards construction, material and machinery. Even otherwise, the finding rendered by the Reference Court in this regard has not been questioned by the learned counsel for the Administration. That being so, there hardly exists any ground least plausible to interfere with the impugned award as regards the appeals preferred by the Union Territory, Chandigarh. 10. In so far as the appeals filed by the claimant/landowners, learned counsel for the claimants only sought to justify the conclusions arrived at by the Reference Court, to sustain the award. Nothing was pointed out to suggest that the claimant/landowners were entitled to any further enhancement. Even otherwise, the limited concern that was expressed by the claimants before the Reference Court was as regards the measurements of the area and the dimensions of the superstructures. On a consideration of the testimony of Ram Kanwar (RW-1) and other evidence on record, the Reference Court had recorded a finding of fact that the officials had taken 2½ months to complete the process of measurements of all the sites. As made out even from the documents Exs. P-7 to P-166. On a consideration of the testimony of Ram Kanwar (RW-1) and other evidence on record, the Reference Court had recorded a finding of fact that the officials had taken 2½ months to complete the process of measurements of all the sites. As made out even from the documents Exs. P-7 to P-166. Thus, the demarcation/measurements carried out by the officials in the discharge of their official duties, could not be held to be incorrect. Particularly, when no evidence was brought on record to the contrary. That being so, even the appeals filed by the claimant/landowners are bereft of merit. 11. In conspectus of the above, the only and the inevitable conclusion that could be reached is that; no inference is warranted in the impugned award. Accordingly, the appeals filed by the parties are dismissed.