JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner, a constable of the Central Industrial Security Force, was proceeded against departmentally. The disciplinary proceedings initiated against him culminated in an order of removal from service dated August 30, 1999 passed by the disciplinary authority (respondent no. 6). The order of removal from service was carried in appeal before the appellate authority (respondent no. 5). The appeal was rejected by an order dated January 25, 2000. A revision having been filed against the appellate order, the revisional authority (respondent no. 4) by his order dated December 7, 2000 rejected it. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 by presenting this writ petition. 2. The pleaded facts reveal that by an order dated January 7, 1999, the petitioner was placed under suspension. A charge-sheet dated February 25, 1999 was issued against the petitioner by the respondent no. 6 levelling the following charges: Charge No. I That the said No. 962330911 Constable Irshad Ahmed of CISF Unit, FCI(NJP) under administrative control of CISF Unit, FSTPP Farakka committed an act of gross misconduct detrimental to the good orders of the force in that while attached with CISF Unit, CPT Calcutta for Republic Day Parade 1999 on 6.1.99 evening he left the Unit lines without any intimation or permission from the competent authority and went to Kiddirpur crossing area where he created nuisance in the public place under influence of liquor, resulting the said Constable Irshad Ahmed was arrested by police at about 01.00 hrs. on 7.1.99 from Kiddirpur crossing area. Subsequently Constable Irshad Ahmed was released from Police custody on 7.1.99 at about 05.05 hrs. Thus No. 962330911 Constable Irshad Ahmed committed an act of gross indiscipline, misconduct and tarnished the image of the disciplined force. Hence the charge. Charge No. II Gross indiscipline and misconduct, on the part of No. 862330911 Constable Irshad Ahmed of CISF Unit, FCI (NJP) in that after releasing from police custody while the said Constable Irshad Ahmed was brought to CISF Control Room Ramnagar of CPT Calcutta by SI/Exe. R.S. Negi, Constable Irshad Ahmed became furious and abused SI/Exe. R.S. Negi in the CISF Control Rom, Ramnagar at about 05.35 hrs. on 07.1.99 in presence of SI/Exe. G. Halder, ASI/Exe. Sheik Nasir Ali and ASI/Exe. M. Rama Swamy. 3. R.S. Negi, Constable Irshad Ahmed became furious and abused SI/Exe. R.S. Negi in the CISF Control Rom, Ramnagar at about 05.35 hrs. on 07.1.99 in presence of SI/Exe. G. Halder, ASI/Exe. Sheik Nasir Ali and ASI/Exe. M. Rama Swamy. 3. In his response dated March 13, 1999 to the charge-sheet, the petitioner denied that he had committed misconduct and claimed innocence. In view thereof, an enquiry officer (respondent no. 8) was appointed who proceeded to conduct inquiry. Seven witnesses placed their statements supporting the prosecution case. The petitioner cross-examined such witnesses and also answered questions put to him by the enquiry officer. On completion of enquiry, a report dated June 25, 1999 was submitted by the enquiry officer recording that the charges levelled against the petitioner stood proved. The findings recorded by the enquiry officer read as follows : “FINDINGS : - In view of the facts as mentioned above and the disputed facts it has been proved on the basis of evidence on record that the charge official on 06-01-99 afternoon left the unit line without any permission intimation and went to Khidirpur crossing area and after consuming lequir (sic liquor) create public nuisance resulted he was taken to police custody at Wattganj Police Station on 07-01-99 at about 01.00 hrs along with Const. D. Kumar of ‘D’ Coy CISF Unit CPT Calcutta. Due to his dranken (sic drunken) state Doctor of S.N.P. Hospital Calcutta was examined him and certified that he was under influence of liquor and consumed lequir (sic liquor) at about 12 (AM) on 06-01-99 that the charged official was released from Wattganj Police Station on 07-01-99 at about 05.05 hours and taken to Ramnagar CISF Control rom in dranken (sic drunken) condition where he became furious and abuse to SI/ Exe. R.S. Negi by using filthy language. Accordingly the enquiry officer concludes that charges lable (sic levelled) against No. 962330911 Constable Irshad Ahamed of CISF Unit FCT/NJP(WB) vide memorandum No. V-15014/Disc./Maj/FSTPP/FCI/99-1214 dated 25-02-99 are fully proved.” 4. Copy of the inquiry report was furnished to the petitioner by the respondent no. 6 vide letter dated July 16, 1999 granting him opportunity to submit his comments within 15 days. Availing such opportunity, the petitioner submitted a representation dated August 2, 1999 requesting the respondent no. 6 to exonerate him from the false and fabricated charges levelled against him. 5. 6 vide letter dated July 16, 1999 granting him opportunity to submit his comments within 15 days. Availing such opportunity, the petitioner submitted a representation dated August 2, 1999 requesting the respondent no. 6 to exonerate him from the false and fabricated charges levelled against him. 5. The contentions raised by the petitioner having failed to gather muster, he was removed from service, as noted above. 6. Mr. Dutta, learned advocate representing the petitioner raised several points in support of his submission that the disciplinary proceedings stood vitiated by reason of gross procedural defects striking at its root and that the order of punishment based on such defective proceedings is unsustainable in law. The points raised by him are summarized below: 1. The charge-sheet dated February 25, 1999 was issued with a closed mind leaving nothing to be decided; 2. No presenting officer was appointed to present the prosecution case and the enquiry officer, by acting in a dual capacity as presenting officer and enquiry officer, acted as a prosecutor and judge, which is impermissible; 3. Documents exhibited in course of inquiry were not duly proved and, therefore, the medical report in particular could not have been considered as legal evidence brought on record by the prosecution for supporting its case; 4. It is a case of mistaken identity because not only the name but the religion of the petitioner was wrongly mentioned in the documents which the prosecution sought to rely on; 5. The punishment of removal from service imposed upon the petitioner is highly disproportionate to the degree of misconduct, if at all, committed by the petitioner; and 6. Another constable, the respondent no. 11, was proceeded against simultaneously with the petitioner on self-same charges and while the petitioner was inflicted with the punishment of removal from service, the respondent no.11 was punished by reducing his pay scale which is clearly discriminatory. 7. Quite a few authorities were cited by Mr. Dutta to support his contentions, as recorded above, which this Bench proposes to deal with at a later part of this judgment. 8. It was, accordingly, prayed that the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner including the charge-sheet, the report of enquiry, the final order of removal from service, the appellate order and the revisional order be quashed and the petitioner reinstated in service with full back wages. 9. Mr. 8. It was, accordingly, prayed that the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner including the charge-sheet, the report of enquiry, the final order of removal from service, the appellate order and the revisional order be quashed and the petitioner reinstated in service with full back wages. 9. Mr. Chatterjee, learned advocate representing the respondents contended that absolutely no ground had been set up for interference with the order of punishment imposed on the petitioner. According to him, a domestic inquiry cannot be equated with a criminal trial and in exercise of the power of judicial review of a departmental action of imposing punishment, the Court must confine its scrutiny to examine and ascertain as to whether the domestic inquiry has been conducted in accordance with principles of natural justice or not and further as to whether the petitioner has suffered prejudice or not by reason of if any act, which may border on a technical violation of the procedural laws. Referring to the reply/representation of the petitioner in response to the charge-sheet/report of the enquiry officer, it was contended that no allegation was levelled that the petitioner by reason of any procedural flaw had suffered prejudice; on the contrary, there was sufficient enough material on record to establish the petitioner’s guilt and the enquiry officer by holding him guilty upon due appreciation and analysis of the evidence on record did not commit any wrong. That apart, he contended that the allegations against the petitioner being grave and his conduct being totally unbecoming of a member of the uniformed service, the disciplinary authority was justified in imposing the punishment of removal from service and no acceptable ground having been raised in appeal/revision, the appellate/revisional authority did not fail in the exercise of jurisdiction in dismissing/rejecting the appeal/revision. Insofar as punishment of reduction in pay imposed on the respondent no. 11 is concerned, he submitted that the facts and circumstances that weighed in the mind of the disciplinary authority in imposing such punishment are not on record and hence, the plea of discrimination need not be examined. He, accordingly, prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 10. This Bench has heard the parties and perused the materials on record. 11. 11 is concerned, he submitted that the facts and circumstances that weighed in the mind of the disciplinary authority in imposing such punishment are not on record and hence, the plea of discrimination need not be examined. He, accordingly, prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 10. This Bench has heard the parties and perused the materials on record. 11. The first article of charge framed against the petitioner contained two ingredients of misdemeanor, i.e. (i) the petitioner had left the unit line without any intimation or permission from the competent authority; and (ii) the petitioner created nuisance in a public place under the influence of liquor. 12. Insofar as the second article of charge is concerned, it had one ingredient i.e. the petitioner had abused SI/Exe. R.S. Negi, PW-1, in the CISF control room at about 05.35 hours in the presence of other CISF personnel after being released from police custody. 13. In his reply dated March 13, 1999 to the charge-sheet, the petitioner disclosed as follows: “I had been compel (sic compelled) to go out from the Unit lines because of some unavoidable circumstances, I had no intention to disobey the standing order.……….Due to some laches and unavoidable circumstances, I failed to take permission from the competent authority, I tried at my best level to intimate the reasons of my absence from Unit lines on 6.1.99 at the evening. ……… I tried to meet the competent authority, but at the relevant time when I had been compelled to go out from the unit line no competent authority was available to grant permission, but at this relevant time, the situation was so urgent in nature that the attending urgent circumstances as prevailing there was no allowed (sic did not allow) me to wait for uncertain arrival of said competent authority….. I am extremely sorry for the said unfortunate incident.” 14. This constitutes a clear admission of the allegation that he had left the unit line without any intimation or permission. Although it is settled law that an admission can be explained, there was no effort on the part of the petitioner worth the name to bring on record at any subsequent stage of the proceedings what were the urgent circumstances that prompted him to leave the unit line on January 6, 1999 except referring to a so-called ‘verbal permission’. Although it is settled law that an admission can be explained, there was no effort on the part of the petitioner worth the name to bring on record at any subsequent stage of the proceedings what were the urgent circumstances that prompted him to leave the unit line on January 6, 1999 except referring to a so-called ‘verbal permission’. Such plea did not find corroboration in course of enquiry and the identity of the officer granting ‘verbal permission’ never surfaced. It was clearly an after-thought and the disciplinary authority, thus, did not have the benefit of considering whether the petitioner was entitled to a lenient view being taken despite having left the unit line without intimation or permission. 15. Although the petitioner has denied that he was arrested for committing nuisance in a public place under the influence of liquor by contending that neither any arrest memo was issued nor was he medically examined, it is clear from the documents on record that he was taken into custody by the police (not formally arrested), was medically examined and later on released from custody. It appears from the list of documents annexed to the charge-sheet that the prosecution sought to rely on General Diary Entry Nos. 679, 682, 683 and 684, dated January 6, 1999 of Wattgunge Police Station as well as a medical report of Sambhu Nath Pandit Hospital, Calcutta dated January 7, 1999. The general diary entries as well as the medical report were made exhibits in course of the inquiry conducted against the petitioner. The general diary entries reveal that the petitioner was picked up along with two other CISF personnel by a a police officer for having been involved in a brawl creating disturbance to the local people under the influence of liquor at Kidderpore crossing. After having been brought to the police station, they did not disclose their names but it seemed to the police officer that they were CISF personnel. The fact of detention was informed to the CISF control room for taking them back. Although the surname of the petitioner was wrongly written in the general diary entries, the number allotted to him at the time of entry in service i.e. 962330911 was correctly inserted in G.D.E. No. 682. G.D.E. No. 684 reveals that, inter alia, the petitioner was handed over to S.I. R.S. Negi (hereafter PW-1) for taking charge. Although the surname of the petitioner was wrongly written in the general diary entries, the number allotted to him at the time of entry in service i.e. 962330911 was correctly inserted in G.D.E. No. 682. G.D.E. No. 684 reveals that, inter alia, the petitioner was handed over to S.I. R.S. Negi (hereafter PW-1) for taking charge. Copy of such G.D.E. reveals that the same may have even been signed by the petitioner and the respondent no. 11. The petitioner on January 7, 1999 was medically examined by a medical officer attached to Sambhu Nath Pandit Hospital. What stands out from such report is that he smelt of alcohol. It has been specifically recorded that the “patient is intoxicated…..….illegible…..…” 16. Exception has been taken by Mr. Dutta to such documents by contending that the surname of the petitioner was wrongly written in the general diary entries and the medical report, and also the religion of the petitioner was wrongly mentioned as Hindu in the medical report. He has also contended that the contents of such documents were not duly proved in course of the inquiry and, therefore, the same could not have been relied on by the enquiry officer to record a finding of guilt. 17. The aforesaid contentions of Mr. Dutta do not commend acceptance in view of the statement of PW-1 in course of cross-examination by the petitioner. PW-1 stated that when he reached Wattgunge Police Station, he found the petitioner and the respondent no. 11 sitting on the floor in an intoxicated condition. The petitioner had also badly abused PW-1. The aforesaid version of PW-1 was corroborated by SI. G. Halder (PW-2). PW-2 deposed that the petitioner had abused PW-1 in drunken state without any reason. ASI M. Ramaswamy (PW-4) also deposed having seen and heard the petitioner abusing PW-1 at the control room. Constable A.K. Biswal (PW-9) deposed having accompanied PW-1 while the two CISF constables were taken to Sambhu Nath Pandit Hospital. He clarified that one of such constables was indeed the petitioner. Constable L.N. Samanta (PW7) deposed having been to Wattgunge Police Station along with PW-2 where he found the petitioner and the respondent no. 11. They were thereafter taken to the hospital by PW-2 and PW-1. 18. He clarified that one of such constables was indeed the petitioner. Constable L.N. Samanta (PW7) deposed having been to Wattgunge Police Station along with PW-2 where he found the petitioner and the respondent no. 11. They were thereafter taken to the hospital by PW-2 and PW-1. 18. It appears that replying to a question of the enquiry officer, the petitioner stated to have left the unit line on the basis of a “verbal permission to take food…….for roza and police arrested him at 21.00 hrs…”. On the basis of the evidence adduced, the enquiry officer recorded the following facts to have been admitted: “FACTS ADMITTED : - The following facts have been admitted by both the sides. 1. That the charged official while attended with CISF unit CPT Calcutta in connection with Republic day parade 99 on 06-01-99 evening he left …..illegible….. authority and went to Khidirpur crossing area and taken to Wattganj Police Station. 2. The charged official was under police custody at Wattganj Police Station. 3. That the charged official had been taken to SNP hospital Calcuta on 07-01-99 at about 04.10 hours during his detaintion (sic detention) at Wattganj Police Station. 4. That one CISF No. 962330124 Const. D. Kumar of CISF unit CPT Calcutta “D” Coy was ecompaning (sic accompanying) with the charged officials. 5. That the charged official was released from police custody Wattganj Police Station at about 05.05 hours on 07-01-99 and taken to Ram Nagar CISF control room.” 19. The enquiry officer then recorded that the following facts were disputed: “DISPUTED FACTS: (a) Weather (sic whether) the charged official created nuisance to the public place at Khidirpur crossing area under influence of laquir (sic liquor) at about 01.00 hours on 07-01-99 and arrested by police. (b) Weather (sic whether) the charged official became furious and abused ST/Exe. (sic SI/Exe) R.S. Negi in the CISF Control room Ram Nagar at about 05.35 hours in presence of SI/Exe. G. Halder ASI/Exe. S.N. Ali and ASI/Exe. M. Ramaswamy.” 20. Under the heading ‘DISCUSSION’, the enquiry officer on consideration of the oral evidence as well as the documentary evidence found that the doctor had examined the petitioner at about 04.10 hours and certified that he had consumed alcohol and that PWs 1, 2 and 7 had confirmed that he was drunk. S.N. Ali and ASI/Exe. M. Ramaswamy.” 20. Under the heading ‘DISCUSSION’, the enquiry officer on consideration of the oral evidence as well as the documentary evidence found that the doctor had examined the petitioner at about 04.10 hours and certified that he had consumed alcohol and that PWs 1, 2 and 7 had confirmed that he was drunk. The enquiry officer also on the basis of the other evidence on record found the petitioner to have abused PW-1 without any reason. Based on the above findings, which were returned on consideration of the evidence on record, it is difficult to hold that there was no material/evidence on record to establish the petitioner’s guilt and that he had been punished without cogent reason. The two articles of charge stand well and truly proved against the petitioner. 21. It has now to be examined whether the petitioner was denied fair and reasonable opportunity to defend himself in the inquiry leading to deflection of justice. 22. The contention that the charge-sheet was issued with a closed mind is taken up for consideration first. It has been contended that an impression could legitimately be formed on perusal of the charges that the disciplinary authority had no doubt in its mind in regard to the petitioner’s complicity and that an opportunity was sought to be extended to him to dispel the conclusions already drawn against him, and this is violative of principles of natural justice and fair play in action. 23. The decisions reported in 2011-I-LLJ 845 (Jiban Kumar Sarkar v. Union of India and others) and 2011 (2) CHN (Cal) 498 (Krishna Chowdhury v. State of West Bengal) have been cited by Mr. Dutta to drive home the point that if the disciplinary authority had a closed and biased mind from the stage of framing the charges, the inquiry following such charge-sheet would be vitiated by bias and violate principles of natural justice. Support was also sought to be drawn based on the decision reported in 1982 (II) LLJ 318 (Taramohan Chowdhuri v. Union of India & ors.), wherein the wording of the charge-sheet was held to have been made clearly with a closed mind. 24. It is settled law that even though a charge-sheet may not have been appropriately worded, the same per se is not decisive as to whether proceedings have been initiated with a closed mind or not. 24. It is settled law that even though a charge-sheet may not have been appropriately worded, the same per se is not decisive as to whether proceedings have been initiated with a closed mind or not. Reference in this connection may be made to a decision of this Bench reported in (2015) 2 CAL LT 167 (HC) [Indrani Dutta (Choudhury) vs. Vidyasagar University & ors.] where, upon consideration of a host of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and decisions of Division Benches/Single Benches of this Court, it was held as under: “14. I have considered the principles of law laid down in the aforesaid decisions and my understanding thereof is as follows. It is settled law that the real purpose of initiating a disciplinary proceeding is to inquire as to whether the facts relating to delinquency, prima facie ascertained against a charged officer/staff, are correct or not. The purpose cannot be to cause a secret inquiry against him and to form a positive and firm view about his complicity in the alleged misconduct and thereafter to give him an opportunity to dispel the conclusion already drawn against him. Charges framed must be clear and must not suffer from any ambiguity or vagueness. If the charge is not expressed in clear and certain terms, then the officer/staff is likely to be misled and suffer prejudice for the vagueness in the charge-sheet, not knowing the case he has to meet. A charge-sheet has to be read in a common sense way to see that there is a plain statement of an act complained as wrong, so that the officer/staff complained against may raise effective defence. A technically and legalistically strict view would have to be eschewed. Whether or not a disciplinary authority has a closed and pre-judged mind at the inception of disciplinary proceeding cannot really be comprehended only by having a look at the expressions used in the charge-sheet. Expressions used, at times, may be deceptive. A disciplinary proceeding may be ruled to have been initiated with closed and pre-judged mind if from the attending circumstances such a conclusion can reasonably be drawn, even though there is a proliferation of non-injurious expression in the charge-sheet like ‘alleged acts’, ‘prima facie guilty’, ‘tentative view’, etc. Expressions used, at times, may be deceptive. A disciplinary proceeding may be ruled to have been initiated with closed and pre-judged mind if from the attending circumstances such a conclusion can reasonably be drawn, even though there is a proliferation of non-injurious expression in the charge-sheet like ‘alleged acts’, ‘prima facie guilty’, ‘tentative view’, etc. and the charge-sheet appears to be perfectly worded; whereas, a proceeding initiated absolutely bona fide, may not be interdicted despite definite expressions in the charge-sheet which might give an impression in the mind of the charged officer/staff that nothing remains to be decided and that the same has been initiated only to complete a formality in law, unless of course surrounding circumstances are such that the Court is convinced that there has been deflection of justice. A charge-sheet has to be construed in a reasonable manner and too much legalism cannot be expected of a domestic enquiry. If apart from the inappropriately worded charge-sheet there is no other incriminating circumstance having the effect of vitiating the proceedings culminating in an order of penalty, it would be prudent exercise of judicial discretion not to interfere.” 25. If indeed the disciplinary authority had initiated the disciplinary proceedings with the sole view of completing a formality in law, there would have been a visible manifestation of conducting the same with intent to deprive the petitioner reasonable opportunity of defence at some stage of the proceedings. Except for reading out the charges and citing the aforesaid two decisions, there was no real attempt on behalf of the petitioner to convince the Bench that the charge-sheet was issued with a closed mind. The accusations were made known to the petitioner by clearly mentioning the acts of omission/commission on his part, amounting to misconduct. Had it not been so made known, the charge-sheet would have been vulnerable on the ground of vagueness. 26. Even otherwise, it does not appear that in course of inquiry the petitioner ever felt of being compelled to participate in a proceeding that was initiated to complete a formality in law. If indeed that were so, the normal reaction would have been to lodge an objection. According to Mr. Dutta, it was not for the petitioner to point out the flaw in course of the proceedings. This Bench is afraid, the contention is unacceptable. If indeed that were so, the normal reaction would have been to lodge an objection. According to Mr. Dutta, it was not for the petitioner to point out the flaw in course of the proceedings. This Bench is afraid, the contention is unacceptable. If by reason of any act of the disciplinary authority or the enquiry officer in course of proceedings the charged officer considers that such act would operate to his prejudice and detriment, it is for him to object then and there or else it might be construed as waiver of a right that such officer had. On facts, it is held that it is not open to the petitioner to raise the point now after imposition of punishment. It is clearly an attempt to wriggle out of the predicament the petitioner finds himself upon termination of his service. 27. There is no valid reason to invalidate the proceedings on the basis of the first contention and it is thus held to have been urged to be rejected. 28. In order to buttress the contention that an enquiry officer cannot play the role of a presenting officer in an inquiry, Mr. Dutta relied on the decisions reported in (2010) 2 SCC 772 (State of Uttar Pradesh v. Saroj Kumar Sinha), (2009)–I–LLJ– 235 (SC) (State of Uttaranchal and others v. Kharak Singh) and AIR 1963 SC 1719 (Meenglas Tea Estate v. The Workmen). Also, the Division Bench decision of this Court reported in 2015 (5) CHN (Cal) 448 (Tara Singh v. Union of India) and decisions of coordinate Benches of this Court reported in 2003 (4) CHN 87 (Prasanta Kumar Basu v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. & ors.) and 2000 (2) CHN 269 (Pato Hembram v. Union of India & ors.) were relied on. Reliance in this connection was also placed on the decision of a single Judge of the Karnataka High Court reported in 1998 LAB. I. C. 3069 (Radhakrishna Setty v. Deputy General Manager, Indian Overseas Bank). 29. In Meenglas Tea Estate (supra), the Court held in favour of the charged workmen because of the reasons set forth in paragraph 4 of its decision. Paragraph 4 is quoted below: “(4) The Tribunal held that the enquiry was vitiated because it was not held in accordance with the principles of natural justice. It is contended that this conclusion was erroneous. But we have no doubt about its correctness. Paragraph 4 is quoted below: “(4) The Tribunal held that the enquiry was vitiated because it was not held in accordance with the principles of natural justice. It is contended that this conclusion was erroneous. But we have no doubt about its correctness. The enquiry consisted of putting questions to each workman in turn. No witness was examined in support of the charge before the workman was questioned. It is an elementary principle that a person who is required to answer a charge must know not only the accusation but also the testimony by which the accusation is supported. He must be given a fair chance to hear the evidence in support of the charge and to put such relevant questions by way of cross-examination as he desires. Then he must be given a chance to rebut the evidence led against him. This is the barest requirement of an enquiry of this character and this requirement must be substantially fulfilled before the result of the enquiry can be accepted. A departure from this requirement in effect throws the burden upon the person charged to repel the charge without first making it out against him. In the present case neither was any witness examined nor was any statements made by any witness tendered in evidence. The enquiry, such as it was, made by Mr. Marshall or Mr. Nichols who were not only in the position of judges but also of prosecutors & witnesses. There was no opportunity to the persons charged to cross-examine them and indeed they drew upon their own knowledge of the incident and instead cross-examined the persons charged. This was such a travesty of the principles of natural justice that the Tribunal was justified in rejecting the findings and asking the Company to prove the allegation against each workman de novo before it.” (underlining for emphasis) 30. The procedure that was followed in the inquiry conducted against the petitioner does not suffer from any of the infirmities as noticed by the Supreme Court in regard to the inquiry under consideration before it. The decision is, therefore, clearly distinguishable. 31. The procedure that was followed in the inquiry conducted against the petitioner does not suffer from any of the infirmities as noticed by the Supreme Court in regard to the inquiry under consideration before it. The decision is, therefore, clearly distinguishable. 31. The reason for which the Supreme Court did not interfere with the judgment and order of the High Court quashing the orders impugned before it in Kharak Singh (supra) are traceable in paragraph 12 of the decision reading as follows: “12……..Though a detailed explanation has been submitted controverting the above charges, no inquiry in terms of the above-mentioned principles was ever conducted. On the other hand, one Mr. P.C. Lohani, Dy. Divisional Forest Officer, Nadhor acting as an enquiry officer after putting certain questions and securing answers submitted a report on November 16, 1985. No witnesses were examined. Apparently there was not even a presenting officer. A perusal of the report shows that the enquiry officer himself inspected the areas in the forest and after taking note of certain alleged deficiencies secured some answers from the delinquent by putting some questions. It is clear that the Enquiry Officer himself acted as the Investigator, Prosecutor and Judge. Such a procedure is opposed to principles of natural justice and has been frowned upon by this Court.” (underlining for emphasis) 32. In the case at hand, the enquiry officer did not commit any of the mistakes as was committed by the Dy. Divisional Forest Officer in Kharak Singh (supra). The said decision is, thus, inapplicable in the facts of the present case. 33. In Saroj Kumar Sinha (supra), the Supreme Court reiterated the law that for establishing a charge of misconduct, the department is required to produce necessary evidence before the enquiry officer for avoiding the charge that the enquiry officer acted as a prosecutor as well as a judge, for, an enquiry officer acting in a quasi judicial authority is in the position of an independent adjudicator, and he is not supposed to be a representative of the department/disciplinary authority/Government. This decision does not lay down as a principle of law that where a presenting officer is not appointed by the prosecution, the enquiry officer has no power or competence to pose questions to the witnesses and to elicit answers from them. 34. This decision does not lay down as a principle of law that where a presenting officer is not appointed by the prosecution, the enquiry officer has no power or competence to pose questions to the witnesses and to elicit answers from them. 34. The decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2015-IV-LLJ-513 (SC) (Brijbihari Singh v. Bihar State Financial Corporation), has quoted paragraphs 28 to 30 of the decision in Saroj Kumar Sinha (supra) but the order of punishment was not set aside on the ground that the enquiry officer acted as the prosecutor. This decision is thus distinguishable. 35. The decision in Tara Singh (supra), placing reliance on the decision in Saroj Kumar Sinha (supra), held that the inquiry conducted against the appellant stood vitiated. However, as noticed above, the inquiry, in the present case, cannot be said to have been vitiated even on application of the principle of law laid down in Saroj Kumar Sinha (supra) and, therefore, the decision in Tara Singh (supra) does not come to the aid of the petitioner. 36. In Prasanta Kumar Bose (supra), the learned Judge while holding that an enquiry officer is entitled to put questions to witnesses for clarification wherever it becomes necessary, went on to hold that if the enquiry officer plays the role of the presenting officer, the inquiry would be vitiated. 37. The decision in Pato Hembram (supra) lays down the law that if the enquiry officer assumes the role of the prosecutor, the enquiry proceeding will be vitiated. The said decision could have application on facts and in the circumstances if it could be shown that the enquiry officer acted in a dual capacity of prosecutor and adjudicator, but not otherwise. 38. The decision in Radhakrishna Setty (supra) was rendered on the facts and circumstances of the case at hand and, therefore, must be held to be a decision that turns on its facts. It was found by the learned Judge that the enquiry officer had put leading questions to the witnesses indicating that he had acted not merely as an enquiry officer but went beyond his limits and played the role of a prosecutor and such dual role would definitely demonstrate that he was unfair and biased. 39. It was found by the learned Judge that the enquiry officer had put leading questions to the witnesses indicating that he had acted not merely as an enquiry officer but went beyond his limits and played the role of a prosecutor and such dual role would definitely demonstrate that he was unfair and biased. 39. At this stage, it would be useful to notice two decisions of the Supreme Court, a decision of the Full Bench and a decision of a coordinate Bench of this Court. The first is reported in (1970) 1 LLJ 26 (The Workmen in Buckingham and Carnatic Mills, Madras v. Buckingham and Carnatic Mills) and the other in AIR 1975 SC 2125 (Mulchandani Electrical and Radio Industries Ltd. v. The Workmen). The Full Bench decision is of recent origin reported in AIR 2015 CALCUTTA 82 (S. V. S. Marwari Hospital v. State of West Bengal & ors.), whereas the coordinate Bench decision is years’ old, reported in AIR 1956 CALCUTTA 662 (A.R.S. Choudhury v. The Union of India and others). 40. In The Workmen in Buckingham and Carnatic Mills, Madras (supra), the standing orders did not provide for appointment of a presenting officer. It was contended on behalf of the dismissed workers that the enquiry officer had acted as a prosecutor and the judge. Repelling the contention, the Supreme Court observed that what the enquiry officer had done in the case was to put questions to the witnesses and elicit answers and allow the workmen to cross-examine those witnesses. Similarly, he had also taken the statements of workers and asked for clarifications wherever necessary. Therefore, the enquiry proceedings were completely fair and impartial. 41. In Mulchandani Electrical and Radio Industries Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court did not interfere with the action of the enquiry officer in putting certain questions to two witnesses by way of clarification. According to the Court, it could not be said that the enquiry officer had done something that was not fair or proper because the witnesses were allowed to be cross-examined on behalf of the union after they had answered the questions asked by the enquiry officer. 42. In A.R.S. Choudhury (supra), the learned judge (Hon’ble D.N. Sinha, J., as His Lordship then was) succinctly expressed how a domestic enquiry is to be conducted. 42. In A.R.S. Choudhury (supra), the learned judge (Hon’ble D.N. Sinha, J., as His Lordship then was) succinctly expressed how a domestic enquiry is to be conducted. To the mind of this Bench, it is a decision which could be used as a useful guide by every employer/employee involved in a disciplinary proceeding to take the same to a conclusion in accordance with law and devoid of infirmities. This Bench is tempted to quote below a passage from the said decision having a bearing on the issue raised by the petitioner, reading as follows: “But the person dealing with the enquiry at any stage is in the position of a Judge, and the rules of natural justice demands that he should not himself be personally interested in the case. Frome United Breweries Co. v. Bath Justices. (1926) AC 586 at p 590 (X). He should be a person with an open mind, a mind which is not biased against the delinquent. Eskersly v. Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, (1894) 2 QB 667 (Y); R. v. Sussex Justices, (1924) 1 KB 256 (Z); R. v. Rand, (1866) 1 QB 230 (Z1); (1926) AC 586 (X); R. v. Camborne Justices, (1954) 2 All ER 850 (Z2). He should not have prejudged the issue. East India Electric Supply and Traction Co. Ltd. v. S. C. Dutt Gupta, 59 Cal WN 162 (Z3). He cannot act both as a Judge and a witness. Bijoy Ch. Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal, 58 Cal WN 988 (Z4). There is no bar to a person, issuing the show cause notice to try it himself. The principle that a prosecutor cannot be a Judge is not strictly applicable to departmental enquiries. Province of Bombay v. Kushaldass Advani, AIR 1950 SC 222 (Z5). But he must not lower himself to the status of a common prosecutor, that is to say of a person who feels it a part of his function to bring the guilt home to the accused at any cost. He must act with the detachment of a Judge, since he is professing to exercise that dignified function.” (underlining for emphasis) 43. Much the same view was echoed by the Full Bench in S.V.S. Marwari Hospital (supra). The relevant passage reads as under: “21. He must act with the detachment of a Judge, since he is professing to exercise that dignified function.” (underlining for emphasis) 43. Much the same view was echoed by the Full Bench in S.V.S. Marwari Hospital (supra). The relevant passage reads as under: “21. It is established law that an Enquiry Officer cannot act as a witness for the management or for that matter for the delinquent employee since a person cannot be a judge in his own cause. However, even an Enquiry Officer is at liberty to put questions to the witnesses and that per se would not vitiate the proceedings. ***” 44. From all the above referred decisions, the position in law can thus be summarized by holding that, appointment of a presenting officer is not a sine qua non for proceeding with a domestic enquiry; that, an enquiry officer should not act as if he were the representative of either the prosecution or the defence; that, anyone appointed as enquiry officer should not have direct or indirect knowledge regarding the incident which is the subject matter of enquiry, for, although not intended, such knowledge may affect his decision and thereby lead to deflection of justice; and that, an enquiry officer may put questions to witnesses for seeking clarifications but not leading questions. 45. It would appear from the materials on record that the enquiry officer obtained statements from the prosecution witnesses in regard to the charges (just as examination-in-chief of a witness on affidavit in a civil suit in terms of Order XVIII, Rule 4, Code of Civil Procedure) in the presence of the petitioner and such statements were signed, inter alia, by the petitioner. It was only for seeking clarifications that the enquiry officer had put certain questions to the prosecution witnesses but that too after cross-examination by the petitioner. It is true that the enquiry officer had asked questions to the petitioner too, which were duly answered; but putting of questions by the enquiry officer were intended to elicit information as to what was actually the defence version. It would appear from the questions put by the enquiry officer to the petitioner after the prosecution witnesses had deposed that the same were in the nature of questions that are usually put to an accused by a judge in terms of section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It would appear from the questions put by the enquiry officer to the petitioner after the prosecution witnesses had deposed that the same were in the nature of questions that are usually put to an accused by a judge in terms of section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The circumstances appearing in the evidence against the petitioner were brought to his notice and he was given the opportunity to rebut the evidence tendered by the prosecution. The petitioner could well have denied making any statement, if he wished so but answered some of the questions. Such a step the enquiry officer was entitled to take as a legitimate part of his duty and it is not correct to say that he assumed the role of a prosecutor. There is also no dispute that the petitioner was given fullest opportunity by the enquiry officer to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and the petitioner did not complain at any stage of the proceedings that there has been a violation of any procedural law. In view thereof, the enquiry officer did not act in a manner so illegal that the conscience of the Court would be pricked and it is well-nigh difficult to hold that the entire inquiry stood vitiated. 46. The contention raised is not sound to hold in favour of the petitioner and, accordingly, stands rejected. 47. In support of the next limb of argument that documents exhibited were not proved, reliance was placed by Mr. Dutta on the decision reported in 1996 (1) CHN 147 (Shri Swapan Ray v. Indian Airlines Ltd.). Hon’ble S.B. Sinha, J. (as His Lordship then was) laid down the law therein that documents do not prove themselves. 48. It is true that the concerned police officer who took the petitioner into custody, the police officer who recorded the general diary entries and the medical officer who prepared the report were not produced as witnesses. However, non-production of the relevant witnesses did not have the effect of vitiating the inquiry inasmuch as there was sufficient evidence on record to prove that the petitioner was detained by Wattgunge Police Station and that some of the prosecution witnesses found him at the police station as well as at the control room under the influence of liquor. However, non-production of the relevant witnesses did not have the effect of vitiating the inquiry inasmuch as there was sufficient evidence on record to prove that the petitioner was detained by Wattgunge Police Station and that some of the prosecution witnesses found him at the police station as well as at the control room under the influence of liquor. The general diary entries and the medical report thus found corroboration from the statements of the witnesses and non-production of the authors to prove the contents of the general diary entries and the medical report did not have the effect of invalidating the inquiry. 49. The decision reported in AIR 2013 SC 58 (Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of Maharashtra & ors.) was pressed into service by Mr. Dutta for the proposition that the author of the document should have been produced in the inquiry to face cross-examination by the petitioner. For the reasons assigned above for holding the decision in Shri Swapan Kumar Roy (supra) to be not applicable, the decision in Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan (supra) does not advance the cause of the petitioner for a decision on the point. 50. Interestingly, in course of the inquiry, the petitioner never demanded that the prosecution should be called upon to produce the relevant police personnel and the medical officer to face cross-examination by him. Such a course of action was indeed available to the petitioner, which he did not avail. If any authority is required, one may usefully refer to the decision in A.R.S. Choudhury (supra) again. The third contention is, thus, overruled. 51. Insofar as mistaken identity is concerned, the contention is absolutely without any merit. The petitioner did not dispute the number that was allotted to him by the CISF upon entry into service, which was correctly recorded in the relevant general diary entry. In view thereof, error in writing the correct surname of the petitioner or the religion he professes, is immaterial. 52. Relying on the decision reported in 2002(1) LLJ 1140 (Rajanna P. v. Labour Court, Godavarikhani), Mr. Dutta urged that the punishment of removal from service is highly disproportionate to the degree of misconduct, if at all, committed by the petitioner. In view thereof, error in writing the correct surname of the petitioner or the religion he professes, is immaterial. 52. Relying on the decision reported in 2002(1) LLJ 1140 (Rajanna P. v. Labour Court, Godavarikhani), Mr. Dutta urged that the punishment of removal from service is highly disproportionate to the degree of misconduct, if at all, committed by the petitioner. According to him, a driver of a state road transport corporation, who was found on the driver’s rest seat in fully drunken and unconscious condition while on duty, was imposed the punishment of removal of service and such punishment was upheld by the industrial tribunal. Allowing the writ petition challenging the award of the tribunal, an Hon’ble Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that the extreme penalty of removal from service imposed on the driver/petitioner was not warranted in the circumstances of the case and, accordingly, directed reinstatement, without back wages, but with continuity of service to count only for pension and fringe benefits. The reasons assigned by the High Court in support of its direction for reinstatement are found in paragraph 11 of its decision. 53. The petitioner here is not similarly circumstanced. In a public place, he was found to have conducted himself in a manner unbecoming of a member of a disciplined force. In order to interfere with an order of punishment on the ground that it is disproportionate and not commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct alleged, the discretion exercised by the disciplinary authority preferring a particular harsh punishment to a not so harsh punishment must shock the conscience of the Court. Having regard to the misconduct established, the punishment of removal from service does not shock the conscience of this Bench warranting interference. The contention is, thus, answered. 54. The point of discrimination is the last of all contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner. Reliance has been placed on the decision reported in 2015-I-LLJ-257 (SC) (K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation). The Labour Court interfered with the order of dismissal and modified the punishment by directing withholding of four annual increments with cumulative effect. It also directed reinstatement of the workman in service without back wages. The writ petition presented by the employer before the High Court succeeded. The award of the Labour Court was set aside. The Labour Court interfered with the order of dismissal and modified the punishment by directing withholding of four annual increments with cumulative effect. It also directed reinstatement of the workman in service without back wages. The writ petition presented by the employer before the High Court succeeded. The award of the Labour Court was set aside. An intra-court appeal that was carried by the workman failed, whereupon the Supreme Court was approached. The Labour Court’s award was restored by the Court by allowing the appeal. The Court, inter alia, noticed that workmen who had committed similar misconduct were let off with minor punishment whereas the appellant had been dismissed. It was held on consideration of Exs. W.5 to W.11, that there was “no reason as to why for the similar misconduct the appellant should be imposed harsh punishment of dismissal from service”. 55. The facts and circumstances that led to imposition of a penalty on the respondent no. 11 that is less harsh, are not before this Bench. Without being apprised as to what weighed in the mind of the disciplinary authority while letting off the respondent no. 11 with a lesser punishment, such punishment cannot ipso facto be a ground to hold that the petitioner has been discriminated against. This is precisely the reason why the decision in K.V.S. Ram (supra) is inapplicable here. 56. Even otherwise, there cannot be any negative application of the principles of equality guaranteed by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The misconduct which the petitioner committed provided sufficient reason to inflict him with the penalty of removal from service. The petitioner cannot claim that since the respondent no. 11 was let off with a lesser punishment, he is also entitled to maintain a writ petition for issuance of an order/direction that he should be similarly treated. There is no merit in the contention and it is overruled. 57. Mr. Chatterjee is right in his contention that the petitioner has failed to set up any case for interference. 58. In the result, the writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment and order, if applied, may be furnished to the applicant at an early date.