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2017 DIGILAW 971 (ALL)

HARJIT SINGH v. STATE OF U. P.

2017-04-11

NARAYAN SHUKLA, SHEO KUMAR SINGH I

body2017
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sheo Kumar Singh-I, J.—Heard Dr. Lalta Prasad Mishra, senior counsel, assisted by Mr. A.S. Rakhra, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Shailendra Singh Chauhan, learned counsel for LDA, as well as Mr. I.P. Singh, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Saurabh Lavania, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. Both the writ petitions are based on common facts, therefore, they are decided by the following common order. 3. The Lucknow Development Authority had published an advertisement for tender/auction of certain properties in different areas of Lucknow. The petitioners of Writ Petition No. 9256 (MB) of 2013 made a tender bid with regard to the property mentioned at Serial No. 4 under the Gomti Nagar Yojna viz. property bearing No. TC-49-V-1-C located in Vibhuti Khand, Gomti Nagar, Lucknow and in terms of advertisement earnest money was deposited by means of demand draft. The proceedings of the auction were held on 12.3.2013 wherein the bid of the petitioners of Writ Petition No. 9256 (MB) of 2013 was found to be highest i.e. Rs. 35,500/- per square meter but the same was not accepted by the authorities and the petitioners of Writ Petition No. 9256 (MB) of 2013 were informed that the amount of the bid as offered by them was lower and thus their bid was not accepted by the Lucknow Development Authority giving cause to filing of Writ Petition No. 9256 (MB) of 2013. By means of this petition, a prayer has been made to quash the auction notice dated 22.9.2013 relating to the property in question and further to issue a direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 to issue allotment letter in favour of the petitioners of Writ Petition No. 9256 (MB) of 2013. 4. As it happened, the authorities dealing with the matter decided to re-auction the property and on 7.10.2013, the property in question was put to re-auction whereby the petitioner of Writ Petition No. 22(MB) of 2014 offered the bid amount and being the highest i.e. Rs. 53,200/- per square meter and after that when due to pendency of the Writ Petition No. 9256 (MB) of 2013 the letter of allotment was not executed in favour of the petitioner of Writ Petition No. 22 (MB) of 2014 then he filed the writ petition to enforce the bid of re-auction. 53,200/- per square meter and after that when due to pendency of the Writ Petition No. 9256 (MB) of 2013 the letter of allotment was not executed in favour of the petitioner of Writ Petition No. 22 (MB) of 2014 then he filed the writ petition to enforce the bid of re-auction. According to the petitioner of Writ Petition No. 22 (MB) of 2014, the competent authority rejected the bid of the petitioners of Writ Petition No. 9256 (MB) of 2013 and directed that re-auction should be conducted and accordingly re-auction was conducted on 7.10.2013 and he was the highest bidder for a sum of Rs. 53,200/-. The petitioner of Writ Petition No. 22 (MB) of 2014 has further submitted that re-auction was notified in the papers and all the formalities for holding re-auction were complied with. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners of Writ Petition No. 9256 (MB) of 2013 has contended that the Lucknow Development Authority had no authority to cancel the auction dated 12.3.2013 in which higher bid i.e. Rs. 35,500/- was offered by the petitioners and the respondent Lucknow Development Authority was bound to accept the bid. The decision to re-auction was taken by the competent authority on the ground that the amount offered by the petitioners of Writ Petition No. 9256 (MB) of 2013 was too low and offered amount of both the bidders was the same i.e. Rs. 35,500/- which, in the opinion of the authorities, was found to be collusive. 6. We are of the view that learned counsel for the petitioners of Writ Petition No. 9256 (MB) of 2013 is not correct in contending that the respondents were bound to accept the bid held on 12.3.2013 and it could not be refused and could not be directed for re-auction. The reason for contending the above submission is based on the ground that the authority while rejecting the bid or bids should record the reasons in writing. Copy of the proceedings of the auction is on record which reveals that it was the authority to decide whether bid offered by the petitioners of Writ Petition No. 9256 (MB) of 2013 was collusive or the amount offered by the petitioners of Writ Petition No. 9256 (MB) of 2013 was not fetching the value of the property put under auction. The very purpose of holding the auction is to get maximum amount possible. The very purpose of holding the auction is to get maximum amount possible. When the highest bid itself falls for below expectation, it need not be accepted. When the property in question was put again for re-auction the amount tendered which was found to be highest was Rs. 53,200/-. On the facts of the present case, we are satisfied that the decision of the respondents/Lucknow Development Authority in not accepting any of the bids at the auction held on 12.3.2013 and for holding a fresh auction is justified and more reasonable. The fact that the subsequently held auction resulted in the highest bid i.e. Rs. 53,200/- establishes that the expectations of the respondents were not be belied. Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that in such a circumstance interference of the Court under Article 226 of the Construction of India is not required as observed in State of Orissa v. Harinarayan, [1972] 3 SCR 784, wherein Hon’ble the Supreme Court has observed as follows. “As held by this Court in Cooverjee Bharucha’s case, [1954]1 SCR 873 (supra), one of the important purposes of selling the exclusive right to sell liquor in whole-sale or retail is to raise revenue. Excise revenue forms an important part of every State’s revenue. The Government is the guardian of the finances of the State. It is expected to protect the financial interest of the State. Hence quite naturally, the legislature has empowered the Government to see that there is no leakage in its revenue. It is for the Government to decide whether the price offered in an auction sale is adequate. While accepting or rejecting a bid, it is merely performing an executive function. The correctness of its conclusion is not open to judicial review. . . . . . . Public auctions are held to get the best possible price. Once these aspects are recognised, there appears to be no basis for contending that the owner of the privileges in question who had offered to sell them cannot decline to accept the highest bid if the thinks that the price offered is inadequate. There is no concluded contract till the bid is accepted. Before there was a concluded contract, it was open to the bidder to withdraw their bids - See Union of India v. Bhimsen Walaiti Ram, [1970] 2 SCR 594. There is no concluded contract till the bid is accepted. Before there was a concluded contract, it was open to the bidder to withdraw their bids - See Union of India v. Bhimsen Walaiti Ram, [1970] 2 SCR 594. By merely giving bids, the bidders had not acquired any vested rights”. 7. In Ram and Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana, AIR 1985 SC 11472, the Supreme Court reiterated the said view after referring to a number of its earlier decisions and held that the Government is under no obligation to accept the highest bid and that no rights accrue to the” bidder merely because his bid happened to be the highest.. The Supreme Court also observed that” the object of holding the auction is generally to raise the highest revenue. The Government is entitled to reject the highest bid if it thought that the price offered was inadequate”. In K. Venkatanarayana v. Divisional Forest Officer, Sivaraman Nair, J., held as follows- “Refusal by the State to succumb to profit oriented endeavours of individuals to exclusion of competition from others cannot be termed as arbitrary; nor can it be that a well articulated anxiety to preserve and protect public revenue be considered as an invasion of the rights of persons who would otherwise have earned larger commercial profits if the State and its officers were complacent or foolhardy. On the basis of the observations in the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above, I am of the opinion that an anxiety to enhance the revenues of the State in Commercial transactions, if it is adequately supported by material, is a sufficiently good reason to refuse to accept the highest bid and throw open the transaction for more effective commercial competition once again”. 8. It has been said from time and again by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that a party cannot be permitted to dispute the contractual obligations by invoking the extraordinary writ jurisdiction. In Bareilly Development Authority and another v. Ajay Pal Singh and others, AIR 1989 SC 1076 , a similar contention had been raised. The Apex Court considered a catena of judgments, particularly, M/s. Radha Krishna Agarwal and others v. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1977 SC 1496 ; Premji Bhai Parmar and others v. Delhi Development Authority and others, AIR 1980 SC 738 ; and The Divisional Forest Officer v. Bishwanath Tea Co. The Apex Court considered a catena of judgments, particularly, M/s. Radha Krishna Agarwal and others v. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1977 SC 1496 ; Premji Bhai Parmar and others v. Delhi Development Authority and others, AIR 1980 SC 738 ; and The Divisional Forest Officer v. Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd., AIR 1981 SC 1368 , and arrived at the conclusion that where the contract entered into between the State and the persons agreed is non-statutory and purely contractual and the rights are governed only by the terms of the contract, writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable. Similar view has been taken in State of Gujarat and others v. Meghji Pethraj Shah Charitable Trust and others, (1994) 3 SCC 552 ; and Noida Entrepreneurs Association v. U.P. Financial Corporation and another, 1994 Suppl. (2) SCC 108. 9. In Indore Development Authority v. Smt. Sadhana Agarwal and others, (1995) 3 SCC 1 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court affirmed and approved the view taken by the Apex Court in Bareilly Development Authority (supra), but it further observed that the High Court, while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, may satisfy itself on the materials on record that the State has not acted in an arbitrary or erratic manner. A similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Union of India and others v. M/s. Graphic Industries Co. and others, (1994) 5 SCC 398 . In the said judgment, the Apex Court referred to its earlier judgments, particularly in Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and others v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1991 SC 537 ; Mahabir Auto Stores and others v. Indian Oil Corporation and others, (1990) 3 SCC 752 ; and M/s Dwarkadas Marfatia & Sons v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, (1989) 3 SCC 293 , and observed that even in contractual matters, public authorities have to act fairly and if the State or its instrumentalities have failed to do so, then writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution can be resorted to because acting unfairly and arbitrarily amounts to flagrant violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. 10. 10. In L.I.C. of India and another v. Consumer, Education & Research Centre and others, (1995) 5 SCC 482 , the Apex Court observed as under : “While exercising the power under Article 226, the Court would be circumspect to adjudicate the disputes arising out of the contract depending on the facts and circumstances in a given case... each case is to be examined on its own facts and circumstances to find out the nature of the activity or scope and nature of the controversy.... If a contract or a clause in a contract is found unreasonable or unfair or irrational, one must look to the relative bargaining power of the contracting parties.” 11. In Har Shankar and others v. The Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner and others, AIR 1975 SC 1121 , the Apex Court has held as under : “The writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not intended to facilitate avoidance of obligations voluntarily incurred.” 12. Similarly, in State of Orissa and others v. Narain Prasad and others, AIR 1997 SC 1493 , the Apex Court has observed as under : “A person who enters into certain contractual obligations with his eyes open and works the entire contract, cannot be allowed to turn round.... and question the validity of these obligations or the validity of the Rules which constitute the terms of contract. The extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226, which is of a discretionary nature and is exercised only to advance the interest of justice, cannot certainly be employed in aid of such persons. Neither justice nor equity is in their favour.” 13. Similarly, in Raunaq International Ltd. v. I.V.R. Construction Ltd. and others, AIR 1999 SC 393 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in absence of mala fides or extreme case of arbitrariness, it is not permissible for the Writ Court to have a judicial review of contract or to enforce the contractual obligations in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 14. In Kerala State Electricity Board and another v. Kurien E. Kalathil and others, (2000) 6 SCC 293 ; the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a similar situation, observed as under : “If a term of a contract is violated, ordinarily the remedy is not the writ petition under Article 226. 14. In Kerala State Electricity Board and another v. Kurien E. Kalathil and others, (2000) 6 SCC 293 ; the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a similar situation, observed as under : “If a term of a contract is violated, ordinarily the remedy is not the writ petition under Article 226. We are also unable to agree with the observation of the High Court the contractor was seeking enforcement of a statutory contract. A contract would not become statutory merely because it is for construction of a public utility and it has been awarded by a statutory body. We are also agree with the observation of the High Court that since the obligation imposed by the contract on the contracting parties comes within the purview of the Contract Act, that would not make the contract statutory. Clearly the High Court fell into an error in coming to the conclusion that the contract in question was statutory in nature...... The contract between the parties is in the rem of private law. It is not a statutory contract. The dispute relating to interpretation of the terms and conditions of such a contract could not have been agitated in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This is a matter for adjudication by a Civil Court or in arbitration if provided for in the contract.” 15. In Life Insurance Corpn. of India and others v. Smt. Asha Goel and another, 2001 (2) SCC 160 , while dealing with the similar issue the Hon’ble Apex Court held that High Court should not ordinarily entertain a writ petition for mere enforcement of a claim under a contract of insurance. The Court has to examine the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of the dispute raised and the nature of the enquiry necessary to be made for determination of the questions involved. It is neither possible nor proper to enumerate exhaustively the circumstances in which such a claim can be enforced by filing a writ petition. The Court has to examine as to whether petition has been filed merely to enforce contractual rights or case involves important questions of law and constitutional issues. 16. It is neither possible nor proper to enumerate exhaustively the circumstances in which such a claim can be enforced by filing a writ petition. The Court has to examine as to whether petition has been filed merely to enforce contractual rights or case involves important questions of law and constitutional issues. 16. In Verigamto Naveen v. Government of A.P. and others, (2001) 8 SCC 344 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a writ petition involving contractual matters can be entertained by the High Court where breach of contract involves breach of a statutory obligation and order complained of has been made in exercise of statutory power by a statutory authority. In such cases though the cause of action may arise out of a contract, but the dispute of this nature falls within ambit of public law, and therefore, writ may be entertained. 17. In State of Bihar and others v. Jain Plastic & Chemicals Ltd., (2002) 1 SCC 216 , the Apex Court considering the same issue held that in case of a Government contract writ may not be a appropriate remedy. Where disputed questions or rival claims arising out of breach of contract are required to be investigated and determination, writ cannot be entertained. 18. In Style (Dress Land) v. Union Territory, Chandigarh and another, (1999) 7 SCC 89 , the Apex Court held that in case the procedure adopted by the Authority is arbitrary or unreasonable, the case falls within the ambit of Article 14 of the Constitution and writ jurisdiction can be resorted to in such a matter. 19. Thus, there seems to be no law of universal application regarding the issue of maintainability of the writ petition in contractual matters, rather it would depend upon the facts and circumstances of an individual case. 20. In National Highways Authority of India v. Ganga Enterprises and another, (2003) 7 SCC 410 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court cautioned the High Courts that while examining the contractual matters in a writ jurisdiction, the Court is duty bound first to examine the issue of maintainability for the reason that contractual matters cannot be entertained in a routine manner. 21. In Orissa State Financial Corporation v. Narsingh Ch. 21. In Orissa State Financial Corporation v. Narsingh Ch. Nayak and others, (2003) 10 SCC 261 , it was held that the High Court cannot enter the area of contractual obligations between the parties and issue directions annulling an existing contract and introducing a new contract in its stead. 22. In State of U.P. and others v. Bridge & Roof Company (India) Ltd., (1996) 6 SCC 22 , it was held that the High Court was justified in not going into the dispute as it involved interpretation of terms of the contract. 23. In Indu Kakkar v. Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. and another, (1999) 2 SCC 37 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that parties are bound by the terms incorporated in the agreement and in case of violation of any of the conditions, the allotment is bound to be cancelled. 24. Learned counsel for the petitioners of Writ Petition No. 9526 (MB) of 2013 has submitted that he was not given an opportunity of being heard before putting the property under re-auction. 25. It cannot be doubted that the principles of natural justice cannot be put into a strait-jacket formula and that its application will depend upon the fact situation obtaining therein. It cannot be applied in a vacuum without reference to the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. This is what has been held by the Supreme Court in K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India and others, AIR 1984 SC 273 ; N.K. Prasada v. Government of India and others, (2004) 6 SCC 299 ; State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, (2004) 8 SCC 129; Karnataka SRTC and another v. S.G. Kotturappa and another, (2005) 3 SCC 409 ; and in Viveka Nand Sethi v. Chairman, J&K Bank Ltd., (2005) 5 SCC 337 . 26. In Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines and another v. Ramjee, AIR 1977 SC 965 , the Court has observed that natural justice is not an unruly horse, no lurking landmine, nor a judicial cure-all. If fairness is shown by the decision-maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. If fairness is shown by the decision-maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. Unnatural expansion of natural justice, without reference of the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating. The Courts cannot look at law in the abstract or natural justice as a mere artefact. Nor can they fit into a rigid mould the concept of reasonable opportunity. If the totality of circumstances satisfies the Court that the party visited with adverse order has not suffered from denial of reasonable opportunity, the Court will decline to be punctilious or fanatical as if the rules of natural justice were sacred scriptures. 27. In Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held : “Though the two rules of natural justice, namely, nemo judex in causa sua and audi alteram partem, have now a definite meaning and connotation in law and their content and implications are well understood and firmly established, they are nonetheless not statutory rules. Each of these rules yields to and changes with the exigencies of different situations. They do not apply in the same manner to situations which are not alike. These rules are not cast in a rigid mould nor can they be put in a legal straitjacket. They are not immutable but flexible.” 28. It is equally well-settled that the principles of natural justice must not be stretched too far and in this connection reference may be made to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Sohan Lal Gupta and others v. Asha Devi Gupta and others, (2003) 7 SCC 492 ; Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 2371 and Canara Bank v. Debasis Das, AIR 2003 SC 2041 . 29. In Hira Nath Mishra and others v. The Principal, Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi and another, AIR 1973 SC 1260 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that principles of natural justice are not inflexible and may differ in different circumstances. Rules of natural justice cannot remain the same applying to all conditions. 30. 29. In Hira Nath Mishra and others v. The Principal, Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi and another, AIR 1973 SC 1260 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that principles of natural justice are not inflexible and may differ in different circumstances. Rules of natural justice cannot remain the same applying to all conditions. 30. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Managing Director ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar, AIR 1994 SC 1074 , made reference to its earlier decisions and observed : “In A.K. Kraipak and others v. Union of India and others, AIR 1970 SC 150 , it was held that the rules of natural justice operate in areas not covered by any law. They do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. They are not embodied rules and their aim is to secure justice or to prevent miscarriage of justice. If that is their purpose, there is no reason why, they should not be made applicable to administrative proceedings also especially when it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial ones. An unjust decision in an administrative inquiry may have a more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial inquiry. It was further observed that the concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the inquiry is held and the constitution of the tribunal or the body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a Court that some principle of natural justice has been contravened, the Court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case. The rule that inquiry must be held in good faith and without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably is now included among the principles of natural justice.” (Emphasis added) 31. The rule that inquiry must be held in good faith and without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably is now included among the principles of natural justice.” (Emphasis added) 31. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bihar School Examination Board v. Subhas Chandra Sinha and others, AIR 1970 SC 1269 , while considering the cancellation of the entire examination because of use of mass copy considered the scope of the principles of natural justice in such a matter and observed : “It was not necessary for the Board to give an opportunity to the candidates if the examinations as a whole were being cancelled. The Board had not charged any one with unfair means so that he could claim to defend himself. The examination was vitiated by adoption of unfair means on a mass scale. In these circumstances it would be wrong to insist that the Board must hold a detailed inquiry into the matter and examine each individual case to satisfy itself which of the candidates had not adopted unfair means. The examination as a whole had to go.........” 32. After referring to the aforesaid decision, the Supreme Court in Chairman J&K State Board of Education v. Feyaz Ahmed Malik, AIR 2000 SC 1039 , emphasised that the Board is entrusted with the duty of proper conduct of examinations. 33. In Biswa Ranjan Sahoo and others v. Sushanta Kumar Dinda and others, AIR 1996 SC 2552 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court had the occasion to examine whether principles of natural justice were required to be followed in a matter where because of large scale malpractice in the selection process, the selection was cancelled and in this context it was observed : “Nothing would become fruitful by issuance of notice. Fabrication would obviously either be not known or no one would come forward to bear the brunt. Under these circumstances, the Tribunal was right in not issuing notice to the persons who are said to have been selected and given selection and appointment.” 34. Fabrication would obviously either be not known or no one would come forward to bear the brunt. Under these circumstances, the Tribunal was right in not issuing notice to the persons who are said to have been selected and given selection and appointment.” 34. In Union of India and others v. O. Chakradhar, AIR 2002 SC 1119 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the question whether it was necessary to issue individual show-cause notices to each selected person when the entire selection was cancelled because of widespread and all pervasive irregularities affecting the result of selection and it was observed : “The illegality and irregularity are so intermixed with the whole process of the selection that it becomes impossible to sort out right from the wrong or vice versa. The result of such a selection cannot be relied or acted upon. It is not a case where a question of misconduct on the part of a candidate is to be gone into but a case where those who conducted the selection have rendered it wholly unacceptable.” 35. In the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. v. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. and others, AIR 1994 SC 853 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court refused to interfere on the ground of breach of principles of natural justice by observing that a person, whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. 36. In the matter of policy decision and economic tests the scope of judicial review is very limited. Unless the decision is shown to be contrary to any statutory provision or the Constitution, the Court would not interfere with an economic decision taken by the authorities of the State. The Court cannot examine the relative merits of different economic policies and cannot strike down the same merely on ground that another policy would have been fairer and better. In a democracy, it is the prerogative of each elected Government to follow its own policy. Unless any illegality is committed in the execution of the policy or the same is contrary to law or mala fide, a decision bringing about change cannot per se be interfered with by the Court. In a democracy, it is the prerogative of each elected Government to follow its own policy. Unless any illegality is committed in the execution of the policy or the same is contrary to law or mala fide, a decision bringing about change cannot per se be interfered with by the Court. It is neither within the domain of the Courts nor the scope of judicial review to embark upon an enquiry as to whether a particular decision or policy is wise or whether better decision can be evolved. Nor are the Courts inclined to strike down a policy at the behest of a petitioner merely because it has been urged that a different order or policy would have been fairer or wiser or more scientific or more logical. Wisdom and advisability of economic policy are ordinarily not amenable to judicial review. In matters relating to economic issues the authority has, while taking a decision, right to “trial and error” as long as both trial and error are bona fide and within the limits of the authority. Normally, there is always a presumption that the State action is reasonable and in public interest and it is for the party challenging its validity to show that it is wanting in reasonableness or is not informed with public interest. The burden is a heavy one and it has to be discharged to the satisfaction of the Court by proper and adequate material. The Court cannot lightly assume that the action taken by the Government is unreasonable or against public interest because there are large number of considerations, which necessarily weigh with the Government in taking an action. 37. Learned counsel for the respondents relying upon the short counter-affidavit has submitted that the decision of the authority has been communicated to the petitioners of Writ Petition No. 9256 (MB) of 2013 and in compliance of the order of the Vice Chairman regarding cancellation of the first auction proceeding and decision of re-auction on the ground of insufficiency of bid amount in ratio to the value of the property was intimated to the petitioners of Writ Petition No. 9256 (MB) of 2013 through concerned Yojna Sahayak i.e. Scheme Clerk Rajendra Singh through his mobile and also through speed post. The affidavit has been filed by Smt. Ambi Bisht, Deputy Secretary in the office of Lucknow Development Authority on 31.5.2014 and the details reveal that the information has been given to the petitioners of Writ Petition No. 9256 (MB) of 2013. 38. On the submissions and discussions as above we are of the view that the first writ petition i.e. Writ Petition No. 9256 (MB) of 2013 is without any merit and is liable to be dismissed. 39. The petitioner of second writ petition i.e. Writ Petition No. 22 (MB) of 2014 participated in the re-auction proceedings and was found highest bidder and amount offered should be accepted by the respondents with consequential execution of the proceedings. The petitioners of Writ Petition No. 9256 (MB) of 2013 could have participated in the second auction instead of coming to this Court. Since bid amount of the first auction was not sufficient and the authority had taken decision to put the property into re-auction and the petitioner of the second writ petition i.e. Writ Petition No. 22(MB) of 2014 participated in the auction, the second writ petition i.e. Writ Petition No. 22(MB) of 2014 succeeds and the prayers contained in the said petition are allowed. Consequently, the Writ Petition No. 9256 (MB) of 2013 is hereby dismissed and Writ Petition No. 22(MB) of 2014 is allowed with direction to the State respondents to act upon the auction held on 7.10.2013.