JUDGMENT : Mr. Prakash Gupta, J. 1. Instant civil second appeal under Section 100 CPC has been filed by the defendants-appellants feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 17.12.1996 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge No.3, Alwar (hereinafter referred to as ‘the first appellate court’) in Civil Regular Appeal No.48/1996 whereby the first appellate court has dismissed the appeal filed by the defendants-appellants against the judgment and decree dated 16.2.1994 passed by learned Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Thanagaji, District Alwar (hereinafter referred to as ‘the trial court’) in civil suit No.34/63/92. By the impugned judgment the learned first appellate court dismissed the appeal filed by the defendants-appellants on the ground that the appeal was barred by limitation. 2. Beifly, stated the facts of the case are that the plaintiff-respondent Smt. Seema Singh filed a civil suit in the trial court for permanent injunction. It was averred in the plaint that vide order dated 31.1.1992 the Minining Engineer, Alwar allotted a marble mine to the plaintiff comprising of Khasra Nos. 1599, 1696, 1704 and 1705 measuring 100 x 100 meter situated in revenue village Dhani Neejhra, Tehsil Thanagaji, District Alwar. As per the case of the plaintiff after demarcation of the land, she took the possession of the land and has been in continuous possession over the same. It was mentioned that vide order dated 30.10.1992, allotment of the said mine was cancelled and in compliance of the order, the defendants bent upon to dispossess her. Therefore, it was prayed that the order dated 30.10.1992 be declared as null and void and the defendants be restrained from dispossessing her from the land in dispute and not to interfere in the mining work. 3. The suit was resisted by defendants Nos. 1 to 6 by filing written statement wherein it was stated that the mining lease issued in favour of the plaintiff was cancelled by the Deputy Secretary, Mines (Gr.2) by his order dated 30.10.1992 and on 9.11.1992 possession of the leased area was taken by the Mining Engineer. It was also submitted that the mining lease of the plaintiff falls in the forest area and before allotment of the mining lease, no-objection certificates from the District Magistrate and Forest Department were required. Order dated 9.11.1992, by which the lease was cancelled is appealable before the Union Government. 4. It was also submitted that the mining lease of the plaintiff falls in the forest area and before allotment of the mining lease, no-objection certificates from the District Magistrate and Forest Department were required. Order dated 9.11.1992, by which the lease was cancelled is appealable before the Union Government. 4. On 15.4.1993 none had appeared for the defendants and ex-parte proceedings were ordered against them. During the intervening period, on the application filed by the plaintiff, Secretary, Mines Department, Ministry of Mines, Union of India was impleaded as a party, defendant No.7 and despite of notice to it, nobody appeared on behalf of defendant No.7. 5. Learned trial court on the basis of the ocular as well as documentary evidence brought on record by the plaintiff, vide impugned judgment and decree dated 16.2.1994 decreed the suit of the plaintiff restraining the respondents from interfering in the mining operation of the plaintiff and from dispossessing the plaintiff from the lease area. 6. Feeling aggrieved, the defendants-appellants filed appeal before the lower appellate court. Since the appeal was not filed within the prescribed period of limitation, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed to condone the delay in filing the same. It was averred in the application that the department received certified copy of the judgment of the trial court on 18th April,1994 and the same was sent for sanction of the concerned officer to file the appeal. The concerned officer granted sanction to file the appeal which was received on 22.12.1994. On 23.12.1994 advocate was appointed for filing the appeal and the appeal was presented before the court on 4.1.1995. Thus, it was prayed that the delay in filing the appeal may be condoned. 7. The plaintiff respondent filed reply to the application and resisted the same on the ground that there is no explanation as to when certified copy of the judgment of the trial court was applied and that there is no explanation for the period between 22.12.1994 and 4.1.1995. The lower appellate court vide impugned judgment and decree dated 17.12.1996 dismissed the appeal as time barred. Hence, the present second appeal. 8. The lower appellate court vide impugned judgment and decree dated 17.12.1996 dismissed the appeal as time barred. Hence, the present second appeal. 8. Vide order dated 7.12.2005, this second appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law:- “(1) Whether the appellate court has erred in rejecting the application under section 5 Limitation Act on the ground that each day’s delay has not been explained even though the defendants had specifically stated in the applications the reasons for the delay ? (2) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the judgment and decree of the trial court is vitiated on the ground that no notice had been issued to the defendants after the plaint was allowed to be amended, and whether it was incumbent upon the trial court to issue notice after amendment, even though proceedings had earlier been deawn ex-parte against the defendants ? (3) Whether in view of the fact that the plaintiff herself had submitted a revision petition against the order of the State Government dated 30.1092 and had also filed a civil suit, the court should have refrained from passing any judgment in favour of the plaintiff as she could not be allowed to avail two remedies simultaneously ? (4) Whether the suit filed by the plaintiff was not maintainable as there was an alternative efficacious remedy available to her under the provisions of the Act of 1957 and the plaintiff had availed of the said remedy ?” 9. It is submitted by Shri N.S. Chauhan, learned counsel for the appellants that the lower appellate court while passing the impugned judgment has not properly considered the explanation submitted by the appellants in the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act regarding the delay in filing the appeal as the delay was procedural. Learned counsel further submitted that the learned lower appellate court has not properly considered the judgments cited on behalf of the appellants regarding condonation of delay. 10. It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that the mining lease of the respondent was for a period of ten years from 12.5.1992 and as the application filed by the lease holder for renewal of the lease was withdrawn by the lease holder, the Mining Engineer, Bharatpur has refused renewal of the lease vide its order dated 8th March, 2007 and presently the mining lease is not operative. 11. 11. Having heard learned counsel for the appellants, I have gone through the record. 12. It is revealed from the record of the case that against the judgment and decree dated 16th February, 1994, the appellants preferred the appeal before the lower appellate court on 4.1.1995 with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay in filing the appeal. It is also revealed from the order of the trial court that due to non-appearance of the advocate/representative of the respondents on 15.4.1993, ex-parte proceedings were ordered against them. Thus, the judgment dated 16th February, 1994 was passed by the trial court in absence of the respondents. 13. In the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the explanation given by the defendants-respondents regarding the delay in filing the appeal was due to time consumed in obtaining sanction from the competent authority to file the appeal. In Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst. Katiji & Ors. 1987 AIR 1353, it was held as under:- “The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 51 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on ‘merits’. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice--that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:- “Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.” 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the ‘State’ which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the ‘State’ is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression “sufficient cause”. So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is therefore set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides.” 14. A perusal of the impugned judgment of the learned first appellate court would reveal that the learned first appellate court has dismissed the appeal only on the ground that there is no explanation about not filing the appeal on 2nd or 3rd January, 1995. Regarding the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the appellants including the judgment in the case of Collector Land Acquisition (supra), learned first appellate court has observed that the same are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case. In my view, the first appellate court has failed to consider the well settled legal proposition that ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late, refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the at the most that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties, “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay ? As against this when delay is condoned the at the most that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties, “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner, when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay, there is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides, a litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk and that it must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. 15. On the basis of the observations made by the Apex Court in the judgment of Collector, Land Acquisition (supra), question No.1 is answered in favour of the appellants observing that “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. 16. In view of the above, I am of the view that the learned first appellate court has committed error and illegality in dismissing the appeal filed by the appellants on the ground of delay and the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act filed before the first appellate court deserves to be allowed and the matter deserves to be remanded back to the first appellate court for afresh decision on merits. 17. Consequently, the instant second appeal is, allowed. The judgment and decree dated 17th December, 2012 is, quashed and set aside and the matter is remanded back to the first appellate court for afresh decision on merits of the case. 18. Since the matter has been remanded back to the lower appellate court for its decisions on merits of the case, I am of the view that the substantial questions Nos. 2, 3 and 4 need not be answered. 19. Both the parties are directed to remain present before the lower appellate court on 17th July, 2017. 18. Since the matter has been remanded back to the lower appellate court for its decisions on merits of the case, I am of the view that the substantial questions Nos. 2, 3 and 4 need not be answered. 19. Both the parties are directed to remain present before the lower appellate court on 17th July, 2017. The appellate court is directed to decide the appeal expeditiously.