ORAL JUDGMENT : 1 This is an appeal preferred against the judgment and order dated 3.2.2004 passed in Sessions Trial No. 116/2002 by the learned Additional Session Judge, Amravati, whereby this respondent as well as his close relatives / coaccused Ravindra Bhujade, Chhaya Bhujade and Sushilabai Bhujade, have been acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 498A and 306 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code. 2. Deceased Archana was the wife of the respondent. Their marriage was solemnized in the year 1998. At that time, respondent was residing in a joint family consisting of himself, his mother Sushilabai and brother Rajendra and Chhaya, wife of Ravindra. After the marriage, deceased Archana joined the company of respondent and started cohabiting with the respondent. She was well treated initially for 3 to 4 months, but it appears that differences arose between deceased Archana on the one hand and the respondent and his close relatives on the other. In order to find solution, the respondent took a decision to have a separate residence and mess and, therefore, he together with deceased Archana moved out of the joint family house at village Dawargaon, District Amravati. However, the differences between the two did not dissipate, rather, there was increase in them. It is alleged that respondent used to demand amount of Rs. 20,000/, from deceased Archana and her father in order to finance digging of well in his agricultural field and his close relatives used to support him in such a demand. It was further alleged that on failure of deceased Archana and her father to meet illegal demand, respondent and his close relatives used to harass and illtreat deceased Archana. Deceased Archana was also allegedly illtreated by the respondent and his close relatives for the reason of her inability to bear a child. Fed up with the illtreatment, deceased Archana put an end to her life by consuming poison on 31.1.2002 in the late afternoon hours, in her house at village Dawargaon. Information of the death was passed on to the police and A.D. inquiry was instituted. Postmortem Report revealed the cause of death to be poisoning. Necessary panchanamas were drawn out. 3. Fed up with the illtreatment, deceased Archana put an end to her life by consuming poison on 31.1.2002 in the late afternoon hours, in her house at village Dawargaon. Information of the death was passed on to the police and A.D. inquiry was instituted. Postmortem Report revealed the cause of death to be poisoning. Necessary panchanamas were drawn out. 3. The matter was about to be closed as a case of suicidal death when on 3.2.2002, at about 1.45 p.m., Santosh – brother of the deceased visited Police Station and lodged his report against the respondent and his close relatives. The report was reduced into writing and police registered offences punishable under Sections 498A and 306 r/w Section 34 of Indian Penal Code against the respondent, his brother, brother's wife and mother. Further investigation was carried out. After completion of investigation, a chargesheet came to be filed against the respondent and his said close relatives. As one of the offences involved was exclusively triable by the Sessions Court, the learned Magistrate committed the case to Sessions Court for trial against all of the accused including the respondent, in accordance with law. Accordingly, they were tried for the said offences by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and on merits of the case, the learned Sessions Judge, found that the prosecution could not prove beyond reasonable doubt the illtreatment and harassment as contemplated under Section 498A of Indian Penal Code and consequently, the facts necessary for proving the charge of abatement of suicide and so acquitted the respondent, his brother, brother's wife and mother of all the offences i.e. offences punishable under Sections 498A and 306 r/w Section 34 of Indian Penal Code, with which they were charged and tried. The judgment was rendered on 3.2.2004. Not being satisfied with the judgment of acquittal against the present respondent, the State is before this Court in the present appeal. 4. I have heard Smt. N.P. Mehta, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State and Shri A.R.Wagh learned counsel for the respondent. I have gone through the record of the case and also the impugned judgment and order. 5. According to learned Additional Public Prosecutor for State, the inferences drawn by the learned Additional Sessions Judge do not logically arise from the facts on record as, this is not a case wherein all the witnesses have spoken about illtreatment or harassment in general terms. 5. According to learned Additional Public Prosecutor for State, the inferences drawn by the learned Additional Sessions Judge do not logically arise from the facts on record as, this is not a case wherein all the witnesses have spoken about illtreatment or harassment in general terms. She submits that, the father of the deceased P.W. 2 Maroti, has clarified the nature of illtreatment when he states in so many words that he used to be told by his daughter about the beatings that she received at the hands of the respondent. She further submits that even the illegal demand of Rs. 20,000/to- finance digging of well has been proved by the prosecution witnesses. But, the learned Additional Sessions Judge has erroneously concluded and that too simply on the basis of some suggestions given to the prosecution witnesses, that it was improbable for the respondent or his close relatives to put up a demand of some money in order to enable the respondent to dig a well in his agricultural field. P.W. 4 Kaushalyabai, the neighbour of father of deceased is an independent witness and even she supports the evidence of the key prosecution witnesses namely P.W. 2 – Maroti, P.W. 3 – Ramkrushna and P.W. 5 Santosh, so submits the learned A.P.P. Therefore, according to learned A.P.P., this is a fit case for interference with the impugned judgment and order. 6. Shri. A.R. Wagh learned counsel for the respondent submits that the view taken by the learned Additional Session Judge on the basis of the evidence available on record, is plausible and, therefore, as per the settled law, it would not be permissible for this Court to substitute another view just because some other view is possible. According to him, merely because some other inferences could possibly have been drawn in the instant case, the judgment can not be branded as perverse. Thus, he submits that no interference in the instant case is warranted. 7. Upon perusal of the judgment and order as well as the evidence of key prosecution witnesses, P.W. 2 – Maroti, P.W.3 – Ramkrushna, P.W. 4 – Kaushalyabai and P.W. 5 – Santosh, I find that there is substance in the argument of the learned counsel for respondent and no merit in the argument of learned Additional Public Prosecutor. 8. 7. Upon perusal of the judgment and order as well as the evidence of key prosecution witnesses, P.W. 2 – Maroti, P.W.3 – Ramkrushna, P.W. 4 – Kaushalyabai and P.W. 5 – Santosh, I find that there is substance in the argument of the learned counsel for respondent and no merit in the argument of learned Additional Public Prosecutor. 8. If the evidence of P.W. 2Maroti P.W. 3 – Ramkrushna, P.W. 4 – Kaushalyabai and P.W. 5 – Santosh, is considered together, one would notice that all of them are speaking about harassment or illtreatment of deceased Archana at the hands of respondent only in general terms. P.W. 3 – Ramkrushna a relative of P.W. 2 – Maroti has not elaborated as to what kind of illtreatment that deceased Archana was subjected to by the respondent. He only says about some sarcastic remarks being passed by respondent on account of failure to bring amount of Rs. 20,000/by her father. Same is true about P.W. 4 Kaushalyabai, the neighbour of father of deceased and, whom, the prosecution would like to term as an independent witness though, I do not see her to be an independent witness for the reason that she is a neighbour of the father of the deceased and is quite likely to exhibit a tendency of faithfully performing neighbour's duty. Be that as it may. Even this witness does not say as to what kind of illtreatment that the deceased was handed out by the respondent. She just says that the deceased was illtreated and that is true of even P.W. 5 – Sanjay, the brother of the deceased, who testifies more or less on the same lines. The only difference that he makes is about the physical as well as mental illtreatment. But here again, he does not elaborate as to what was the nature of physical illtreatment and mental illtreatment. 9. When the prosecution witnesses speak of some sarcastic remarks or physical or mental illtreatment, one would have to view such statements as only opinions of the witnesses. But here again, he does not elaborate as to what was the nature of physical illtreatment and mental illtreatment. 9. When the prosecution witnesses speak of some sarcastic remarks or physical or mental illtreatment, one would have to view such statements as only opinions of the witnesses. In order to consider a fact or set of facts to be constituting an illtreatment or harassment as contemplated under section 498(A) I.P.C., it is necessary that witnesses testify before the court the acts or the particular deeds committed or performed by the accused so that an independent agency like the Court, whose job it is to determine and adjudicate if any offence is committed or not, would be in a position to perform its job of judging properly. It is for the witnesses to state the facts and not the impression that the facts give, and it is for the courts to adjudge about what impression the hard facts make or in other words to determine if the facts amount to illtreatment or not. Here, the witnesses have expressed an opinion of illtreatment or harassment and thus themselves have performed the job of the court without elaborating anything which, in their opinion, went into their perception of illtreatment or harassment. As the witnesses namely P.W. 3 Ramkrushna, P.W. 4 Kaushalyabai and P.W. 5 Santosh have not elaborated anything about the nature of illtreatment or harassment, it would not be possible for this court to accept their simple opinion that, there was illtreatment of deceased at the hands of the respondent. 10. P.W. 2 – Maroti, was the father of deceased. Even P.W.2 – Maroti has maintained silence over the nature of the illtreatment and its consistency and so on. Of course, P.W. 2 – Maroti has stated, as rightly submitted by learned A.P.P., that he used to be told by the deceased Archana about the beatings that she used to receive at the hands of respondent on account of her failure to meet the illegal demand of money. But, I must say, even this part of evidence of P.W. 2 – Maroti, lacs those essentials which constitute an offence of cruelty u/s 498A IPC. This witness, ought to have stated the period of the beatings and their consistency. But, I must say, even this part of evidence of P.W. 2 – Maroti, lacs those essentials which constitute an offence of cruelty u/s 498A IPC. This witness, ought to have stated the period of the beatings and their consistency. But, he makes a general statement about beatings that were given to deceased Archana by the respondent and states nothing more to enable the Court to consider whether the statement reveals essential ingredients of the offence of cruelty or not. Then, it is also surprising that the other key witnesses, who claim that deceased Archana used to tell them everything about the harassment that respondent used to give her, do not say anything about their being told by deceased Archana about her beatings at the hands of the respondent. Therefore, that part of the evidence of P.W. 2 – Maroti which pertains to revelations made to him by the deceased about her beatings does not inspire confidence. Even otherwise, in the absence of necessary details of alleged beatings, one has to say that this part of testimony of P.W. 2 Maroti, if it is assumed to be true for the sake of argument, would have to be treated as relating to some stray incidents of beating and such stray incidents surely would not fall within the sweep of the offence of cruelty as contemplated u/s 498A IPC. 11. In order to constitute an offence of cruelty, there has to be some willful conduct of such a nature as is likely to drive a woman to suicide or to cause injury or danger to life, limb or health. It can also be of the kind which is performed with a view to coercing the woman or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand of any property or valuable security. Willful conduct and / or coercing a woman for achieving a particular purpose as covered under the explanations (A) and (B) to section 498(A) I.P.C. is necessary and for that purpose, it is also necessary for the witness to state the period of the harassment, may be by some approximation, and its frequency or consistency. In the absence of these details, it would be risky for the Court to make any conclusion regarding willful conduct and / or coercion of a woman for meeting an unlawful demand. These facts have not clearly come on record in the instant case. In the absence of these details, it would be risky for the Court to make any conclusion regarding willful conduct and / or coercion of a woman for meeting an unlawful demand. These facts have not clearly come on record in the instant case. 12. In the circumstances, I am of the view that the prosecution evidence on the point of harassment or illtreatment is insufficient for reaching a conclusion that offence of cruelty punishable under Section 498A IPC has been committed by the respondent. It would then follow that the facts essential for establishing commission of the offence of abatement of suicide punishable under Section 306 IPC are also not proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. 13. So far as suicidal death is concerned, I must say, there is no dispute about the same. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has found that the other possibilities like accidental and homicidal nature of death are already ruled out in the instant case. Then a question would arise as to what was it which made the deceased feel so desperate to put an end to her life and the answer to it could be found in the admissions given by the P.W. 2 – Maroti, P.W. Kaushalyabai and P.W.3 Ramkrushna who have admitted that deceased Archana was being given medical treatment at the behest of her husband. P.W. 4 – Kaushalyabai is more specific in her admission. She admits that deceased Archana used to be taken by her husband to a doctor regularly for giving her treatment of the ailment of leucorrhea. Of course, this disease is not known to be incurable or of such a nature as to make a person feel helpless. But, one never knows. The human psychology is so complex that one can not predict that a factor which is not so serious generally may assume a graver form and create extremely adverse impact on the human mind, in a given case. It may be rare but still it can happen. Perhaps, this can be one such rare case. But, that is only a guesswork made by considering the evidence available on record. 14. Thus, having considered the prosecution evidence in its entirety, I find that the view taken by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is plausible. It is not an impossible view. Perhaps, this can be one such rare case. But, that is only a guesswork made by considering the evidence available on record. 14. Thus, having considered the prosecution evidence in its entirety, I find that the view taken by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is plausible. It is not an impossible view. It does appear to be logical in the context of the facts established on record and, therefore, as rightly submitted by learned counsel for respondent, it would be impermissible for this Court to make any interference with the impugned judgment and order. The appeal deserves to be dismissed. Appeal stands dismissed.