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2017 DIGILAW 972 (MP)

State Of Madhya Pradesh v. Chetram

2017-09-06

SANJAY YADAV

body2017
JUDGMENT : Sanjay Yadav, J. Heard on admission. 2. Challenge in this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is to an order dated 15.5.2017 passed in Appeal under section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act 1972; whereby, the Appellate Authority has dismissed the Appeal filed beyond 120 days of the impugned order. 3. That on an application preferred by respondent under Section 7 of the 1972 Act read with Rule 10(1) of the Payment of Gratuity (Central) Rules, 1972, the Controlling Authority by order dated 30.6.2016 on a finding of his having total service of 43 years (43 years 4 months) and was drawing Rs. 5275/- as last wages and by multiplying the two with a factor of 15 and dividing the total by 26 held him entitled for Rs. 130860/- and subtracting Rs. 78923/- found him entitled for Rs. 51937/- and interest thereon from 1.2.2011 till the date of order Rs. 28128/- directed present petitioners to pay the amount of Rs. 80065/- within 30 days failing which the default interest of 2 % for month. 4. The petitioners herein filed the Appeal under Section 7(7) on 20.1.2017 after obtaining the copy of order on 8.7.2016. The Appellate Authority on a finding that instead of 120 days the Appeal was filed after six months declined to entertain the Appeal being barred by time. Sub Section (7) of Section 7 of 1972 Act mandates: “(7) Any person aggrieved by an order under sub-section (4) may, within sixty days from the date of the receipt of the order, prefer an appeal to the appropriate Government or such other authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government in this behalf: Provided that the appropriate Government or the appellate authority, as the case may be, may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the said period of sixty days, extend the said period by a further period of sixty days:” 5. Thus, an appeal against the order passed by the controlling Authority lies with 60 days. That the Appellate Authority can condone the delay of further 60 days, but not beyond 60 days as per first proviso to Section 7(7) of 1972 Act. 6. Thus, an appeal against the order passed by the controlling Authority lies with 60 days. That the Appellate Authority can condone the delay of further 60 days, but not beyond 60 days as per first proviso to Section 7(7) of 1972 Act. 6. Though it is contended on the part of the petitioners that the Appellate Authority ought to have condoned the delay by entertaining the application under section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. However, since the specific limitation period is prescribed under sub-section (7) of Section 7 of the Act of 1972, provision of Section 5 of 1963 Act is not attracted. For an authority please see decision by the Supreme Court in Noharlal Verma v. District Cooperative Central Bank Limited, Jagdalpur : (2008) 14 SCC 445 ; wherein, their Lordships while dwelling upon the similar provisions as sub-Section (7) of Section 7 of 1972 Act in M.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 i.e. first proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 55 of which mandates that the Registrar or the officer referred to above shall not entertain the dispute unless presented to him within thirty days from the date of order sought to be impugned, were pleased to hold : “33. Sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under: “(3) Bar of limitation.-(1) Subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence. (emphasis supplied) Bare reading of the aforesaid provision leaves no room for doubt that if a suit is instituted, appeal is preferred or application is made after the prescribed period, it has to be dismissed even though no such plea has been raised or defence has been set up. In other words, even in absence of such plea by the defendant, respondent or opponent, the Court or Authority must dismiss such suit, appeal or application, if it is satisfied that the suit, appeal or application is barred by limitation. 34. As stated earlier, Section 55 allows an aggrieved party to approach the Registrar within a period of thirty days. There is no provision analogous to section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 allowing the Registrar to condone delay if “sufficient cause” is shown. 34. As stated earlier, Section 55 allows an aggrieved party to approach the Registrar within a period of thirty days. There is no provision analogous to section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 allowing the Registrar to condone delay if “sufficient cause” is shown. In view of this fact, in our opinion, the contention of the learned counsel for the Bank is well founded that the application submitted by the appellant was barred by time.” 7. In view whereof, there being no illegality in the impugned order, no indulgence is caused. Consequently, petition fails and is dismissed. No costs.