ORDER : Arun Bhansali, J. These writ petitions have been filed by the petitioners-tenants aggrieved against the judgments dated 1/2/2016 passed by the Rent Tribunal, Jodhpur Metro ('the Tribunal') and judgments dated 14/9/2016 passed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal, Jodhpur Metro ('the Appellate Rent Tribunal'), whereby, the petitions for eviction filed by respondent-Fayaz Ali have been accepted and the appeals filed by the petitioners have been dismissed, respectively. 2. Three petitions for eviction were filed by the respondent against the petitioners under Section 9(a) and 18 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 ('the Act, 2001') inter alia with the averments that the property in the name of 'Lal Khan Building' is situated at Chopasani Road, Jodhpur wherein the petitioners Dinesh Kumar, Bheekam Chand and Mool Chand were tenants in shops on.1, 2 and 3 respectively. The shops were let out 40 years back to late Asan Das father of Dinesh Kumar, Narsingh father of Bheekam Chand and to Mool Chand and they were in possession of the shops. It was indicated that the shops were on monthly tenancy of Rs.135/-, Rs.60/- and Rs.85/- respectively. The last rent of the shops in question was paid on 31/3/2012 for the period 1/5/2011 to 31/3/2012, where after, the rent was neither offered nor tendered despite requiring the petitioners to pay the same. When the rent was not paid despite demand, registered notices were sent to the petitioners through counsel on 19/8/2014 requiring the petitioners to deposit the due rent in the bank account of the landlord. Notices were duly served on the petitioners, to which a response was given through counsel on 15/9/2014 denying the landlord-tenant relationship. It was alleged that the petitioners have committed default in payment of rent, the premises was required by the landlord for his two sons Imran Ali and Irfan Ali. 3. Based on the above averments, it was submitted that the petitioners have committed default in payment of rent and were liable to be evicted in terms of the provisions of Section 9(a) of the Act. 4. A response to the petitions for eviction was filed by the petitioners on 9/1/2015 after the stipulated period of 45 days from the date of service along with an application seeking condonation of delay and for taking the reply on record. 5. 4. A response to the petitions for eviction was filed by the petitioners on 9/1/2015 after the stipulated period of 45 days from the date of service along with an application seeking condonation of delay and for taking the reply on record. 5. The Tribunal by order dated 20/2/2015 directed for taking the reply on record on payment of cost of Rs.500/- each and it was ordered that if the cost was paid on the next date, the reply would be taken on record otherwise the same would be placed in 'D' part of the record. 6. When the cost was not paid, by order dated 6/7/2015, the Tribunal ordered for keeping the reply in 'D' part. In the meanwhile, the landlord had filed replication to the reply along with certain documents which were marked as Exhibits 7 to 16. After hearing the parties, the Tribunal by its judgments dated 1/2/2016 came to the conclusion that there was no substance in the submission that there was no landlord-tenant relationship between the parties as there was no reply or affidavit on record and in the receipt Ex.1 the name of owner Thekedar Ahsan Ali Ramzan Ali was indicated and applicant Fayaz Ali is son of Ahsan Ali and it is well settled law that a co-owner can file a petition for eviction, the landlord-tenant relationship was established. The Tribunal also came to the conclusion that despite notice the due rent of more than four months was not paid and, therefore, on account of default in payment of rent, the petitioners were liable to be evicted. 7. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners filed appeals before the Appellate Rent Tribunal, the Appellate Rent Tribunal by its judgments dated 14/9/2016 upheld the judgments passed by the Tribunal on coming to the conclusion that Fayaz Ali being co-owner was entitled to file the petitions. The Appellate Rent Tribunal, upheld the order passed by the Tribunal placing the reply in part 'D' for non-payment of cost on coming to the conclusion that after the order was passed by the Rent Tribunal placing the reply in part 'D', 14 dates were taken for final arguments in the petitions and no applications were filed offering the cost and the matters were decided. Even in appeals, no such offer was made and only after four months an application was filed offering the cost which was not bona fide. Even in appeals, no such offer was made and only after four months an application was filed offering the cost which was not bona fide. Further plea raised regarding non-grant of opportunity to cross examine Fayaz Ali and the judgments being vitiated on the said count was also negated and consequently the appeals were dismissed. 8. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that both the Tribunals committed grave error in law in ordering for eviction of the petitioners from the premises in question; with reference to definition of 'landlord' as contained in Section 2 (c) of the Act, it was submitted that neither there was any averment in the application nor any material was available on record to show that respondent Fayaz Ali was the landlord and, therefore, the applications for eviction were liable to be rejected; nowhere from the material available on record, it could be deciphered that the respondent was either receiving the rent or was entitled to receive the rent and, therefore, the finding in this regard recorded by both the Tribunals deserve to be set aside. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners further emphasized that the applications for eviction have been accepted by holding the applicant Fayaz Ali as co-owner for which there is no material available on record. Further, as the respondent Fayaz Ali is governed by Mohammedan Law, holding him as co-owner of the property by the Tribunals is baseless inasmuch as, as per Section 41 of the Mohammedan Law by Mulla, the Doctrine of Representation is not applicable to them. It was also emphasized that in terms of Section 21 of the Act, the Tribunal is guided by the principles of natural justice, which have been violated in the present case, wherein, first the reply filed by the petitioners was not taken on record for non-payment of cost and further no opportunity to cross examine the respondent Fayaz Ali was provided. However, if was fairly conceded by learned counsel for the petitioners that no application or demand was made before the Tribunal for cross examination of respondent Fayaz Ali. 10. Further submissions were made that Ex.1, which was rent receipt filed by the landlord, was not proved as mere marking of the exhibit does not prove its contents. However, if was fairly conceded by learned counsel for the petitioners that no application or demand was made before the Tribunal for cross examination of respondent Fayaz Ali. 10. Further submissions were made that Ex.1, which was rent receipt filed by the landlord, was not proved as mere marking of the exhibit does not prove its contents. In the case of petitioner-Dinesh Kumar it was pointed out that even the receipt does not bear the signature of the tenant and, therefore, as the payment of rent was not proved, the respondent not being the landlord could not have maintained the petitions and the same were liable to be dismissed. 11. Reliance was placed on Union of India v. Ram Niwas : AIR 1984 Rajasthan 42 in support of the contention that written statement should have been taken on record, Ganpat Chand v. Jeth Mal : AIR 1983 Rajasthan 146, Modula India v. Kamakshya Singh Deo : AIR 1989 SC 162 in support of the contention that the petitioners should have been permitted cross examination, Bhagwan Dass & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan : 1986 (1) WLN 574 in support of the contention that omission to file written statement does not amount to admission, Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Thukalan Paulo Avira & Ors. : AIR 1959 SC 31 in support of the contention that the plaintiff is required to prove his own case, Sait Tarajee Khimchand & ors. v. Yelamarti Satyam & Ors. : AIR 1971 SC 1865 in support of the contention that mere marking of a document does not dispense with its proof and Achutananda Baidya v. Prafullya Kumar Gayen & ors. : (1997) 5 SCC 76 in support of the contention that interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is permissible. 12. Learned counsel for the respondent vehemently opposed the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioners. It was submitted that the entire conduct of the petitioners, from the very beginning, clearly reflected their attitude in somehow retain the possession of the suit property and for the said purpose they are prepared to go to any extent. 12. Learned counsel for the respondent vehemently opposed the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioners. It was submitted that the entire conduct of the petitioners, from the very beginning, clearly reflected their attitude in somehow retain the possession of the suit property and for the said purpose they are prepared to go to any extent. With reference to the reply to the notices given by the counsel for the petitioners, it was submitted that the petitioners admitted to be tenants in the suit property and though claimed that they were paying rent, nowhere disclosed as to whom other than the respondent rent was being paid and did not deny the rent receipts, reference whereof was specifically made in the notices given to them and the only objection raised was that in the absence of partition by metes and bounds the respondent cannot claim himself to be the landlord and, therefore, there was absolutely no substance in the plea raised by the petitioners seeking to question the landlord tenant relationship and consequently the judgments impugned do not call for any interference. 13. Further submissions were made that for absence of reply by the petitioners, they themselves were responsible inasmuch as they did not pay cost as imposed by the Tribunal and, thereafter, did not make any effort or raised any plea for taking the reply on record and now in the present writ petitions the attempt to question the scrapping of the reply by the Tribunal is being made. On the issue of cross examination, it was submitted that at no stage the petitioners sought cross examination of the respondent and, therefore, the said aspect is now not open. 14. Further submissions were made that the pleas now sought to be raised in the present writ petitions are not open in view of the limited jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, the law regarding right of co-owner to file the proceedings for eviction is well settled and consequently the petitions deserve to be dismissed. 15. Reliance was placed on Om Prakash & ors. v. Mishri Lal : Civil Appeal No.4309/17 decided on 21/3/2017, Ambika Savaria & ors. v. Sanjay Sharma : 2016 (2) WLC (SC) Civil 586, Madan Lal v. Board of Revenue & Ors. : 2011(3) RLW 2021 (Raj.), Shalini Shyam Shethy & Anr. 15. Reliance was placed on Om Prakash & ors. v. Mishri Lal : Civil Appeal No.4309/17 decided on 21/3/2017, Ambika Savaria & ors. v. Sanjay Sharma : 2016 (2) WLC (SC) Civil 586, Madan Lal v. Board of Revenue & Ors. : 2011(3) RLW 2021 (Raj.), Shalini Shyam Shethy & Anr. v. Rajendra Shanker Patil : (2010) 9 SCC 329, Shailendra Kumar v. Rent Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur & Ors. : 2012 (4) CDR 2196, Mehta Cycles & Anr. v. Shri Ram Kripal : 2012 (3) WLC (Raj.) 760. 16. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record. 17. As already noticed hereinbefore, the respondent, claiming himself to be landlord qua the premises in possession of the petitioners as tenants, gave notice to all the three petitioners. v. Shri Ram Kripal : 2012 (3) WLC (Raj.) 760. 16. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record. 17. As already noticed hereinbefore, the respondent, claiming himself to be landlord qua the premises in possession of the petitioners as tenants, gave notice to all the three petitioners. An identical reply was given on behalf of the petitioners through their counsel with the following relevant averments :- **---------;gka ;g mYys[kuh; gS fd mDr fdjk;slqnk ifjlj la;qDr ifjokj dh la;qDr fefYd;r o LokfeRo dh tk;nkn gS rFkk esjs eqOofdyku us dnkfi vkids eqOofdy dks fdjk;k vnk ugha fd;k gS vkSj uk gh esjs eqOofdyku ls vkids eqOofdy }kjk dHkh olwyh dqfuUnk gksdj fdjk;k olwy fd;k gS] ,slh fLFkfr esa tc rc vkids eqOofdy ds mDr tk;nkn esa LoRo ,oe~ LokfeRo dks ysdj l{ke U;k;ky; esa caVokMk ugha gks tkrk rFkk l{ke U;k;ky; ls mRrjkf/kdkj izek.k i= o vU; fof/kd izek.k izLrqr ugha dj fn;k tkrk rc rd vkidk eqOofdy uk rks fdjk;slqnk ifjlj dk vf/kd`r olwyh dqfuUnk dh ifjHkk"kk esa vkrk gS vkSj uk gh Hkw&Lokeh@yS.M yksMZ dh ifjHkk"kk esa vkrk gSA----------- --------tgka rd fdjk;slqnk ifjlj dh vkids eqOofdy ds iq=ku bejku vyh o bjQku vyh ds fy, ln~Hkkfod vko';drk gksus dk iz'u gS rks ;gka ;g mYys[kuh; gS fd fdjk;slqnk ifjlj lfgr lEiw.kZ tk;nkn yky [kka fcfYMax ds uke ls tkuh tkrh gS] tgka yky [kka th ds fof/kd okfjlku ,oe~ mRrjkf/kdkjh la;qDr :i ls dkfct o ekfyd gS rFkk muds e/; mDr tk;nkn dk ckbZ ehV~l ,.M ckm.M~l uk rks fof/kd rkSj ij uk gh fyf[kr rsgjhj ds :i esa gh dksbZ caVokM+k gqvk gS vkSj uk gh ,sls fdlh Hkh fof/kd caVokM+s dh rsgjhj@fyf[kr gh esjs eqOofdy dks vkids eqOofdy }kjk miyC/k djokdj fdjk;slqnk ifjlj dk vf/kd`r olwyh dqfuUnk gksdj fdjk;s dh ekax dh vkSj uk gh vkids eqOofdy dks olwyh dqfuUnk vFkok Hkw&Lokeh gksuk ekudj dHkh dksbZ fdjk;k esjs eqOofdyku }kjk vnk fd;k x;kA ,slh fLFkfr esa fcuk caVokM+k gq;s rFkk l{ke U;k;ky; }kjk mRrjkf/kdkj izek.k i= izkIr fd;s viuh iq=ksa dh vko';drk tkfgj djrs gq, ;g fof/kd uksfVl izsf"kr djus dk dksbZ fof/kd gd o vf/kdkj vkids eqOofdy dks gkfly ugha gS vkSj uk gh Hkfo"; esa gksxkA --------------,slk izrhr gksrk gS fd vkids eqOofdy dks mDr tk;nkn esa ekfydkuk vf/kdkjksa dks iq[rk djus ds mn~ns'; ls o vuqfpr ykHk izkIr djus dh xyr xjt ls izsfjr gksdj ;g fof/kd uksfVl vkids eqOofdy }kjk esjs eaqOofdyku dks izsf"kr djok;k x;k gS ftldks i<+us ek= ls gh ;g Li"V ugha gksrk gS fd la;qDr tk;nkn esa dkSulk vfoHkDr fgLls ij vkidk eqOofdy dkfct+ o ekfyd gS rFkk vius dCts o fgLls esa fLFkr Bkaoksa dk fdjk;k izkIr dj jgk gS rFkk mldks ;g vf/kdkj fdl fdl ds }kjk iznRr fd;k x;k gSA ;gha ugha vkids eqOofdy us vius }kjk vkids ekQZr izsf"kr djok;s x;s uksfVl esa ;g rd ftØ ugha fd;k gS fd mDr tk;nkn la;qDr fefYd;r dh tk;nkn gS] ftl tk;nkn dk vkids eqOofdy lfgr vU; Hkh fof/kd Lokeh gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa fcuk LokfeRo dk Li"Vhdj.k gq;s esjk eqOofdy uk rks fdjk;slqnk ifjlj dk fdjk;k vkids eqOofdy ds cSad [kkrs esa tek djokus dk fof/kd vf/kdkj gks tkrk gS vkSj uk gh mldk HkkSfrd o okLrfod dCtk vkids eqOofdy dh fdlh Hkh vko';drkvksa dh iwfrZ gsrq fjDr djus dk gh fof/kd gd o vf/kdkj gks tkrk gSA** (emphasis supplied) 18. A bare look at the above contentions/pleas/defence taken by the petitioners would reveal that it was stated therein that the property was of joint ownership, rent was not paid to Fayaz Ali as owner or collector and till partition of the property does not take place, the respondent cannot claim himself to be the landlord. The legal representatives and heirs of Lal Khan were joint owners and in possession and till such time that the partition by metes and bounds in writing takes place, the respondent cannot claim right to get the rent. The respondent has not specified that in the joint property, in which undivided share he has the possession and was getting the rent and who gave him the said right. Further in the end, it was specifically admitted that on the suit property, the respondent along with others have legal ownership. 19. The said plea in the reply to the notice, which reply was marked as Ex.5 before the Tribunal, gives out the entire plea sought to be raised by the petitioners questioning the right of the respondent to file the proceedings for eviction and admission of legal ownership along with others. 20. Section 2(c) of the Act, which defines Landlord, reads as under: "landlord means any person who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of any premises, whether on his own account or as an agent, trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person, or who would so receive or be entitled to receive the rent, if the premises were let to a tenant." 21. A bare look at the definition reveals that any person, who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive rent of any premises is a landlord. The plea as raised by the petitioners, in response to the notice as quoted hereinbefore, clearly brings out/discloses the basis for denying the landlord tenant relationship i.e. lack of partition by metes and bounds between the legal representatives/heirs of Lal Khan. 22. The position of law regarding filing of a petition for eviction by a co-owner is well established as reflected by the latest judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Om Prakash (supra) delivered on 21/3/2017, wherein, after noticing the provisions of law and previous judgments, it was laid down as under:- "32. 22. The position of law regarding filing of a petition for eviction by a co-owner is well established as reflected by the latest judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Om Prakash (supra) delivered on 21/3/2017, wherein, after noticing the provisions of law and previous judgments, it was laid down as under:- "32. It is no longer res integra and is settled by this Court in Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath and Ors., (1976) 4 SCC 184 , Dhannalal v. Kalawatibai and Ors. (2002) 6 SCC 16 and India Umberalla Manufacturing Co. and Ors. v. Bhagabandei Agarwalla (dead) by Lrs. Savitri Agarwalla (Smt.) and Ors. (2004) 3 SCC 178 that a suit for eviction of a tenant can be maintained by one of the co-owners and it would be no defence to the tenant to question the maintainability of the suit on the ground that the other co-owners were not joined as parties to the suit. The judicially propounded proposition is that when the property forming the subject matter of eviction proceedings is owned by several co-owners, every co-owner owns every part and every bit of the joint property along with others and thus it cannot be said that he is only a part owner or a fractional owner of the property and that he can alone maintain a suit for eviction of the tenant without joining the other co-owners if such other co-owners do not object. In the contextual facts, not only the compromise decree, as aforementioned, has declared the appellants to be the joint owners of the suit premises, their status as such has not been questioned at any stage by anyone interested in the title thereto." 23. So far as the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioners based on Section 41 of the Mohammedan Law by Mulla seeking to distinguish the judgments on the basis that the respondent being Mohammedan cannot claim himself to be a co-owner of the property is concerned, suffice it to observe that unless the partition is made by metes and bounds even among the tenants in common, who are governed by Mohammedan Law, they are entitled to get benefit of each part of the property according to their respective share. The provisions of Section 41 no doubt show that the persons governed by Mohammedan Law while inheriting the property take as tenants in common and not as joint tenants and doctrine of representation is not applicable to them, nonetheless such persons acquire interest to the extent of their respective shares in each part and item of the property and, therefore, the submissions made by counsel for the petitioners seeking to distinguish the law laid down in the case of Om Prakash (supra) based on the fact that the respondent is governed by Mohammedan Law is not of any avail in the present case. 24. In view of the above state of affairs, whereby, the plea raised by the petitioners in their reply to notice is very clear regarding lack of partition by metes and bounds between the parties but admitting legal ownership of the respondent with others and even under the principles of Mohammedan Law, the respondent having right on each and every part of the allegedly undivided property, the principle laid down in the case of Om Prakash (supra) would apply with full force and the objection raised by the petitioners regarding maintainability of petitions for eviction by the respondent has no substance as he is entitled to receive the rent of the premises, which brings him well within the definition of 'landlord' (supra). 25. So far as the pleas raised by the petitioners regarding lack of proper opportunity to defend the case based on the fact that reply filed by them was ordered to be placed in part 'D' of the record for non-payment of cost and not permitting cross examination of respondent are concerned, a bare reading of the events as noticed hereinbefore, would clearly indicate that it is the petitioners themselves who are to be blamed for the position in which they find themselves on account of their own conduct and it cannot be said that petitioners can take advantage of their own conduct for alleging the judgments of the Tribunals as vitiated. 26. 26. Admittedly, the reply of the petitioners was taken on record subject to payment of cost by order dated 20/2/2015, when the cost was not paid till 6/7/2015 i.e. even after five months from the order dated 20/2/2015 was passed and in the meanwhile two dates i.e. 20/3/2015 and 22/4/2015 had also passed, the Tribunal was justified in ordering for placing the reply in part 'D' of record. Thereafter, between 6/7/2015 and 1/2/2016, as many as 14 dates were fixed for final arguments, during which period neither any application was filed for taking the reply on record/pay the cost nor the order dated 6/7/2015 was challenged, which clearly indicates that the petitioners did not want their reply to be taken on record. It is not a case where the order of closing the written statement and passing the judgment has happened on the same date or within a short span of time so as to come to the conclusion that the petitioners had no opportunity to undo the wrong committed by them or take remedial action. 27. In view thereof, it cannot be said that either the Tribunal or the Appellate Rent Tribunal committed any error in passing the order/upholding the order of placing the reply in part 'D' of the record. 28. The Appellate Rent Tribunal also noticed the important aspect that even in the appeal no such plea was taken and only when after four months of filing of the appeal the matter was fixed for final hearing that an application in this regard was moved. In view thereof, the application filed by the petitioners was rightly rejected by the Appellate Rent Tribunal as well. 29. So far as the reliance placed on the judgment in the case of Ram Niwas (supra) is concerned, in the said judgment cost was offered when the case was fixed for arguments before the Court, which passed the order for closing the written statement. However, in the present case, even the same was admittedly not done by the petitioners and, therefore, the said judgment has no application to the facts of the present case. 30. However, in the present case, even the same was admittedly not done by the petitioners and, therefore, the said judgment has no application to the facts of the present case. 30. Coming to the submission regarding non-providing of right of cross examination, provisions of Section 21(1) of the Act enable cross examination of the witness, where it appears to the Tribunal that it is necessary in the interest of justice to call a witness for examination or cross examination. For the said purpose, the party seeking cross examination is required to make out a case that it is necessary to call a witness for cross examination, however, admittedly, the petitioners did not move any application seeking to cross examine the respondent on his affidavit, which was filed in support of the petitions before the Tribunal and in those circumstances the blame, if any, lies on the petitioners themselves in not seeking cross examination and the orders passed by the Tribunals below cannot be faulted on the said aspect. 31. The judgments in the case of Modula India (supra) & Ganpat Chand (surpa) have no application to the facts of present case as unless a prayer is made seeking to cross examine the witness, who had filed his affidavit in support of the petition, it cannot be said that the principles laid down in the said judgments have not been followed. 32. So far as the further arguments raised by learned counsel for the petitioners regarding lack of proof of Ex.1 is concerned, the respondent in his affidavit had marked the document as exhibit, and admittedly he was not subjected to any cross examination. Further, in the notice which was given by the respondent a specific reference to the receipt was made qua which there was no denial on the part of the petitioners and, therefore, in those circumstances and the fact that only defence taken in the reply to the notice pertains to lack of partition by metes and bounds between heirs and legal representatives of Lal Khan, it cannot be said that the Tribunals committed any error in accepting the document Ex.1. 33. 33. The rest of the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners laying down various principles pertaining to proof of document and maintainability of the writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India have no application to the facts of the present case in view of the conclusion reached hereinbefore and the fact that the matter, even otherwise, has been examined on merits. 34. In view of the above discussion and the fact that both the Tribunals have concurrently held against the petitioners regarding default in payment of rent and having incurred liability of eviction under the provisions of the Act, no interference is called for in the writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 35. Consequently, there is no substance in the writ petitions and the same are, therefore, dismissed. No order as to costs.