JUDGMENT B.K. NAYAK, J. - This appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has been filed by the State-appellants challenging the common judgment dated 04.05.2013 passed by the learned District Judge, Angul in Arbitration Petition Nos.15 of 2012 and 19 of 2012 dismissing Arbitration Petition No.19 of 2012 and confirming the award passed by the sole Arbitrator, and allowing Arbitration Case No.15 of 2012, thereby modifying the award of the Arbitrator and directing that the Contractor shall be paid interest for the pre-reference period as well as pendente lite, as had been awarded by the Adjudicator from the dates mentioned against each item till 30.03.2012. 2. Arbitration Petition No.19 of 2012 was filed by the State of Orissa in Water Resources Department for setting aside the entire award passed by the sole Arbitrator, whereas Arbitration petition No.15 of 2012 was filed by the Contractor(respondent) aggrieved by the portion of the award in so far as it relates to refusing interest on the principal award amount for the pre-reference period and pendente lite, i.e., for the period of adjudication by the Adjudicator and the period of the proceeding before the Arbitrator. Since both the arbitration petitions arose out of the very same award, learned District Judge heard both the petitions together and disposed them of by the impugned common judgment dated 04.05.2013. 3. The State of Orissa in the Department of Water Recourses invited Tender for the work, i.e., “Construction of Afflux Bundh Left and Right of Samal Barrage of Rengali Irrigation Sub Project WRCP Package No.8” in the year 1995. M/s. Budharaja Mining and Construction Ltd. (present respondent), (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Contractor’) was awarded the contract as the lowest bidder. This contract was formally signed on 29.07.1996.As per the contract, the date of completion of work was stipulated as 29.07.1999.The total value of the work was Rs.3,00,35,549.00 (three crore thirty five thousand five hundred forty-nine). The contract comprises of the following works. * Construction of left Afflux Bundh from RDOO to 140 M (Balance Work) * Construction of left Afflux Bundh from RD 140M to 630 M (Balance Work). The contract comprises of the following works. * Construction of left Afflux Bundh from RDOO to 140 M (Balance Work) * Construction of left Afflux Bundh from RD 140M to 630 M (Balance Work). * Construction of left Afflux Bundh from RD2070 M to 2360M (Balance Work) * Construction of left Afflux Bundh from RD3750M to 4910M (New Work) * Bank Protection Work in left Bank of River Brahmani from Rd2950M to 3250M of Left Afflux Bund (New Work) * Construction of Link Drain from RD630M of Left Afflux Bund to CD No.1 of Left Main Canal at RD150M (New Work). * Construction of Right Afflux Bundh from RD180M to 270M and diversion road from RD00 to 825M (New Work). 4. The work could not be completed within the stipulated period of 36 months and continued till 14.011.2000, whereafter the work was stopped. The Contract was closed and the Contractor was instructed to attend the final measurement on 04.05.2004 which was certified on 31.08.2004.The Contractor raised objection to certain deductions made by the Executive Engineer during the final measurement. Disputes relating to imposition of penalty on the contractor and excess payment etc. also cropped up between the parties. The subject matter of disputes were regarding payment of final bill, payment towards benefit of price escalation, payment of compensation, payment towards loss of profit, reimbursement, sales tax rebate and payment of past and future interest. 5. The contract between the parties provided for a two tier adjudication of disputed, viz. through an Adjudicator at the first instance and subsequently through arbitration as per Clause 36.1 of the contract. The disputes between the parties were at the first instance referred to the Adjudicator, namely, Sri Dibakar Mishra, Retired Engineer-in-Chief (Irrigation) for adjudication. 6. By his award dated 07.07.2005, the Adjudicator resolved the disputes in the following manner for payment to the contractor : i. Towards final Measurement withoutdeduction of void Rs.3,01,495/- With interest at 12% per annum from 01.03.2000 ii. Refund of retention Money Rs.11,88,685/- With interest at 12% per annum for half from 01.03.2000 and Rest half from 01.09.2000 iii. Refund deposit Rs.31,442/- With interest at 12% per annum from 01.03.2000 iv. Price escalation Rs. 6,83,545/- With interest at 12% per annum from 01.03.2000 v. Reimbursement Sales Tax Rs. 4,60,590/- With interest at 12% per annum from 01.08.2005 Total 2,6,65,758/- 7. Refund deposit Rs.31,442/- With interest at 12% per annum from 01.03.2000 iv. Price escalation Rs. 6,83,545/- With interest at 12% per annum from 01.03.2000 v. Reimbursement Sales Tax Rs. 4,60,590/- With interest at 12% per annum from 01.08.2005 Total 2,6,65,758/- 7. The appellants (State of Orissa) did not accept the award passed by the Adjudicator and invoked the arbitration Clause in the Contract to decide its correctness. On the application of the appellant under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 Hon’ble Shri Justice S.C. Mohapatra (Retd.) was appointed as the sole Arbitrator. On conclusion of the arbitration proceeding, the Arbitrator upheld the findings of the Adjudicator except on the question of awarding interest and held as follows : (a) Contractor is to receive Rs.3,01,495/- more on measurement of work executed from the employer. (b) Contractor is to receive Rs.31,442/- not paid to it for want of extension of time from the employer; (c) Contractor is to receive Rs.83,545/- more towards price adjustment from the employer. (d) Contractor is to receive Rs.4,60,590/- towards reimbursement of Sales Tax from the employer; (e) Contractor is to receive Rs.11,88,686/- towards retention money from the employer; and (f) Contractor is not entitled to any amount towards interest from the employer till 07.07.2005, the date when the Adjudicator decided the dispute. However, on the question of award of interest, the Arbitrator was of the opinion that the claim raised by the contractor is unreasonable. Therefore, the arbitrator did not award any interest till the date of award, but directed for payment of interest in the award at the rate of 18% per annum the date of award till payment. 8. Before the District Judge, Angul and State- appellants challenged the entire award, whereas the contractor challenged the award in so far as it had refused interest for the pre-reference period. To sum up, the grounds of challenge before the learned District Judge were that the award is beyond the scope of reference and not based on evidence on record; the Arbitrator did not assign adequate reasons in support of his findings; the award was in violation of the provisions of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, and that the award is against the Public Policy of India. 9. 9. After hearing the parties, learned District Judge dismissed the petition filed by the State holding that none of the grounds urged by the State in challenging the impugned award is justified. For coming to such conclusion learned District Judge took note of the principles underlying the scope of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act as has been interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court from time to time. The District Judge came to hold that the dispute which have arisen between the parties relate to purely factual aspects regarding the terms of the contract expressed in monetary terms. Referring to Clause 43.1 and 43.2. of the contract, the learned District Judge came to hold that the learned Arbitrator committed illegality in not awarding interest for the pre-reference period as well as pendente lite. Accordingly, the State’s Arbitration Petition No.19 of 2012 was dismissed and the Contractor’s Arbitration Petition No.15 of 2012 was allowed lby the impugned common judgment. 10. In assailing the impugned judgment, the learned Advocate General contended that the Arbitrator entered into the reference on 31.03.2005 on the basis of dispute raised by the contractor on 28.03.2005 but the dispute raised by the contractor was not adjudicable within the scope of Clause 24.1 of the agreement in as much as there was no decision of the Engineer which could have been referred to the Adjudicator. Therefore the initiation of the proceeding before the Adjudicator was contrary to the terms of the contract. It was further contended that the adjudicator committed gross error of law in deciding fresh claims raised by the contractor in course of the proceeding. The Adjudicator therefore went wrong in deciding disputes/claims which were beyond the reference, and, therefore, learned Arbitrator and the learned District Judge should have set aside the same. It is further contended on behalf of the appellants that the respondent made a claim of Rs.5,92,313/- (Rupees five lakh ninety two thousand three hundred thirteen) during the escalation, but the Adjudicator awarded more than the said claim amount, which was illegally affirmed by the Arbitrator. The learned District Judge, has also failed to appreciate this. It is further contended on behalf of the appellants that the respondent made a claim of Rs.5,92,313/- (Rupees five lakh ninety two thousand three hundred thirteen) during the escalation, but the Adjudicator awarded more than the said claim amount, which was illegally affirmed by the Arbitrator. The learned District Judge, has also failed to appreciate this. It is submitted that as found by the Adjudicator and the Arbitrator that up to 23rd R.A. bill a sum of Rs.22,89,096/- (rupees twenty two lakh eighty nine thousand ninety six) was paid to the contractor towards price escalation on the basis of the bill submitted by him, and, therefore, there was no outstanding on the department towards price escalation. Therefore, raising a claim for Rs.5,92,313/- by the contractor before the Adjudicator without raising any dispute before the department, and the calculation and grant of the same on the ground that the Engineer had no record for production, although the contractor failed to substantiate the same, is imaginary and unsustainable. It was also contended that for reimbursement of sales tax, in terms of Clause 45.2 of the contract, deducted from the running bills of the contractor should be according to the assessment order. It is stated that the contractor never submitted any assessment order before approaching the Adjudicator, but he filed the assessment order for the first time before the Adjudicator. Therefore, the tax is not reimbursable. It was submitted that the contractor is not entitled to get interest on the retention money inasmuch as Clause 43.2 of the agreement is not applicable to the retention money, and, therefore, the award of interest by the Adjudicator as well as the Arbitrator on the retention money invoking Clause 43.2 of the contract amounts to complete non application of mind. It was the further submission on behalf of the appellants that award of Rs.31,442/- (rupees thirty one thousand four hundred forty two) by the Adjudicator as well as Arbitrator, for which the contractor raised no claim and failed to establish any such claim, was wrong, which the learned District Judge was also failed to appreciate. 11. It was the further submission on behalf of the appellants that award of Rs.31,442/- (rupees thirty one thousand four hundred forty two) by the Adjudicator as well as Arbitrator, for which the contractor raised no claim and failed to establish any such claim, was wrong, which the learned District Judge was also failed to appreciate. 11. The learned Counsel for the respondent raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of this appeal stating that the impugned judgment is a common judgment passed in two arbitration petitions U/s. 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, and that this single appeal filed against the said common judgment is not maintainable and is barred by constructive resjudicata. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that the component of interest on the payment due as adjudicated by the Adjudicator is part of the terms of the contract between the parties under Clause 43.2 and 43.3 of the conditions of the contract, and therefore, the order of the learned District Judge is quite justified. It was also submitted that the contentions made by the learned counsel for the appellants before this Court were not urged before the learned District Judge U/s.34 of Act, and, therefore, the same cannot be raised and canvassed on this appeal. It is submitted that the contractor was requested to attend final measurement vide letter dated 26.04.2004. The Executive Engineer vide his letter dated 27.11.2004 finally closed the contract. The contractor submitted EOT up to 28.01.2000 on 27.11.2004. The Chief Engineer by his letter No.2220 dated 12.02.2005 closed the contract and levied penalty for which the contractor filed the claim before the Adjudicator on 15.04.2005 and the Adjudicator heard the matter on 20.06.2005 and 29.06.2005.Accordingly the Adjudicator considered the claim of the respondent-contractor after the notification of the decision of the Engineer on 12.02.2005 and the State-appellant participated in the adjudication by filing counter statement and in view of categorical finding of the Arbitral Tribunal that the employer-State submitted to the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator, the contentions of the appellants to the effect that there was no decision of the Engineer for reference to adjudication and that Arbitrator had no jurisdiction is not acceptable. It is submitted that the question of jurisdiction of the Adjudicator was considered by the Arbitrartor in its award (Para-24) and the Arbitrator held that the Adjudicator had jurisdiction as the employer-State submitted to his jurisdiction and never objected to it. It is submitted that this finding of the fact could not have been interfered with by the District Judge within the scope of the power U/s.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. It is submitted that the Court (District Judge) in exercise of power U/s.34 of the Act has no jurisdiction to investigate into the merits of the case and to examine the documentary and oral evidence on record for the purpose of finding out whether or not the Arbitrator has committed an error of law. “8. It is necessary to analyse the scope of judicial interference in an arbitral award. Referring to its different earlier decisions, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the recent decision reported in (2015) 3 SCC 49 : Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority, held that the grounds contained in Section 34 of the Act do not deal with the merits of the decision rendered by an arbitral award. In this respect, the Hon’ble Apex Court held in paragraphs-17 to 19 as follows : “17. It will be seen that none of the grounds contained” in sub-section (2) (a) of Section 34 deal with the merits of the decision rendered by an arbitral award. It is only when we come to the award being in conflict with the public policy of India that the merits of an arbitral award are to be looked into under certain specified circumstances. 18. In Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., the Supreme Court construed Section 7 (1) (b) (ii) of the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961; “7. 18. In Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., the Supreme Court construed Section 7 (1) (b) (ii) of the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961; “7. Conditions for enforcement of foreign awards.- (1) A foreign award may not be enforced under this Act – * * * (b) if the Court dealing with the case is satisfied that – (ii) the enforcement of the award will be contrary to the public policy.” In construing the expression “public policy” in the context of a foreign award, the Court held that an award contrary to (i) The fundamental policy of Indian law, (ii) The interest of India, (iii) Justice or morality, Would be set aside on the ground that it would be contrary to the public policy of India.It went on further to hold that a contravention of the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act would be contrary to the public policy of India in that the statute is enacted for the national economic interest to ensure that the nation does not lose foreign exchange which is essential for the economic survival of the nation (see SCC p. 685, para 75).Equally, disregarding orders passed by the superior Courts in India could also be a contravention of the fundamental policy of Indian law, but the recovery of compound interest on interest, being contrary to statute only, would not contravene any fundamental policy of Indian law (see SCC pp.689 & 693, paras 85 & 95). 19. When it came to construing the expression “the public policy of India” contained in Section 34 ((2) (b) (ii) of the Arbitration Act, 1996, this Court in ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd. held: (SCC pp.727-28 & 744-45, paras 31 & 74. “31. Therefore, in our view, the phrase “public policy of India” used in Section 34 in context is required to be given a wider meaning. It can be stated that the concept of public policy connotes some matter which concerns public good or in public interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the public good or public interest has varied from time to time. However, the award which is, on the face of it, patently in violation of statutory provisions cannot be said to be in public interest. Such award/judgment/decision is likely to adversely affect the administration of justice. However, the award which is, on the face of it, patently in violation of statutory provisions cannot be said to be in public interest. Such award/judgment/decision is likely to adversely affect the administration of justice. Hence, in our view in addition to narrower meaning given to the term ‘public policy in Renusagar case it is required to be held that the award could be set aside if it is patently illegal. The Result would be – award could be set aside if it is contrary to : (a) fundamental policy of Indian law, or (b) the interest of India; or (c) justice or morality, or (d) in addition, if it is patently illegal. Illegality must go to the root of the matter and if the illegality is of trivial nature it cannot be held that award is against the public policy. Award could also be set aside if it is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the coincidence of the Court. Such award is opposed in public policy and is required to be adjudged void.” 09. Elucidating the meaning of the expression “Fundamental Policy of Indian Law”, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid decision held as follows : “Fundamental Policy of Indian Law 27. Coming to each of the heads contained in Saw Pipes judgment, we will first deal with the head “fundamental policy of Indian law”. It has already been seen from Renusagar judgment that violation of the Foreign Exchange Act and disregarding orders of superior Courts in India would be regarded as being contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law. To this it would be added that the binding effect of the judgment of a superior Court being disregarded would equally violative of the fundamental policy of Indian law. 28. In a recent judgment, ONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco International Ltd., this Court added three other distinct and fundamental juristic principles which must be understood as a part and parcel of the fundamental policy of Indian law. The Court held : (SCC) pp. 278-80, paras 35 & 38-40). “35. What then would constitute the “fundamental policy of Indian law” is the question. The decision in ONGC does not elaborate that aspect. Even so, the expression our opinion, include all such fundamental principles as providing a basis for administration of justice and enforcement of law in this country. The Court held : (SCC) pp. 278-80, paras 35 & 38-40). “35. What then would constitute the “fundamental policy of Indian law” is the question. The decision in ONGC does not elaborate that aspect. Even so, the expression our opinion, include all such fundamental principles as providing a basis for administration of justice and enforcement of law in this country. Without meaning to exhaustively enumerate the purport of the expression “fundamental policy of Indian law”, we may refer to three distinct and fundamental juristic principles that must necessarily be understood as a part and parcel of the fundamental policy of Indian law. The first and foremost is the principle that in every determination whether by a Court or other authority that affects the rights of a citizen or leads to any civil consequences, the Court or authority concerned is bound to adopt what is in legal parlance called a :judicial approach” in the matter. The duty to adopt a judicial approach arises from the very nature of the power exercised by the Court or the authority does not have to be separately or additionally enjoined upon the fora concerned. What must be remembered is that the importance of a judicial approach in judicial and quasi-judicial determination lies in the fact that so long as the Court, tribunal or the authority exercising powers that affect the rights or obligations of the parties before them, shows fidelity to judicial approach, they cannot act in an arbitrary, capricious or whimsical manner. Judicial approach ensures that the authority acts bonafide and deals with the subject in a fair, reasonable and objective manner and that its decision is not actuated by any extraneous consideration. Judicial approach in that sense acts as a check against flaws and faults that can render the decision of a Court, tribunal or authority vulnerable to challenge. 38. Equally important and indeed fundamental to the policy of Indian law is the principle that Court and so also a quasi-judicial authority must, while determining the rights and obligations of parties before it, do so in accordance with the principles of natural justice. Besides the celebrated audi alteram partem rule one of the facets of the principles of natural justice is that the Court/authority deciding the matter must apply its mind to the attendant facts and circumstances while taking a view one way or the other. Besides the celebrated audi alteram partem rule one of the facets of the principles of natural justice is that the Court/authority deciding the matter must apply its mind to the attendant facts and circumstances while taking a view one way or the other. Non-application of mind is a defect that is fatal to any adjudication. Application of mind is best demonstrated by disclosure of the mind and disclosure of mind is best done by recording reasons in support of the decision which the Court or authority is taking. The requirement that an adjudicatory authority must apply its mind is, in that view, so deeply embedded in our jurisprudence that it can be described as a fundamental policy of Indian law. 39. No less important is the principle now recognized as a salutary juristic fundamental in administrative law that a decision which is perverse or so irrational that no reasonable person would have arrived at the same will not be sustained in a Court of law. Perversity or irrationality of decisions is tested on the touchstone of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness/ Decisions that fall short of a standards of reasonableness are open to challenge a Court of law often in writ jurisdiction of the superior Courts but no less in statutory processes wherever the same are available. 40. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to attempt an exhaustive enumeration of what would constitute the fundamental policy of Indian law nor is it possible to place the expression in the straitjacket of a definition. What is important in the context of the case at hand is that if on facts proved before them the arbitrators fall to draw an inference which ought to have been drawn or if they have drawn in inference which is on the face of it, untenable resulting in miscarriage of justice, the adjudication even when made by an Arbitral Tribunal that enjoys considerable latitude and play at the joints in making awards will be open to challenge and may be cast away or modified depending upon whether the offending part is or is not severable from the rest.”‘ (emphasis in original) 29. It is clear that the juristic principle of a “judicial approach” demands that a decision be fair, reasonable and objective. On the obverse side, anything arbitrary and whimsical would obviously not be a determination which would either be fair, reasonable or objective. 30. It is clear that the juristic principle of a “judicial approach” demands that a decision be fair, reasonable and objective. On the obverse side, anything arbitrary and whimsical would obviously not be a determination which would either be fair, reasonable or objective. 30. The audi alteram partem principle which undoubtedly is a fundamental juristic principle in Indian law is also contained in Sections 18 and 34 (2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. These sections read as follows : “18. Equal treatment of parties.-The parties shall be treated with equal and each party shall be given a full opportunity to present his case. 34. Application for setting aside arbitral award- (1) ** (2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the court only if – (a) the party making the application furnishes proof that – x x x x (iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an Arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case;” 31. The third juristic principle is that a decision which is perverse or so irrational that no reasonable person would have arrived at the same is important and requires some degree of explanation. It is settled law that where – (i) a finding is based on no evidence, or (ii) an Arbitral Tribunal takes into account something irrelevant in the decision which it arrives at; or (iii) ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision. Such decision would necessarily be perverse. 32. A good working test of perversity is contained in two judgments. In Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons, it was held : (SCC 317, para 7) “7.... It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law.” In Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police, it was held (SCC p.14 para 10 ) “10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. of Police, it was held (SCC p.14 para 10 ) “10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unrealistic and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with.” 33. It must clearly be understood that when a Court is applying them “public policy” test to an arbitration award, it does not act as a Court of appeal and consequently errors of fact cannot be corrected. A possible view by the arbitrator on facts has necessarily to pass muster as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and quality of evidence to be relied upon when he delivers his arbitral award. Thus an award based on little evidence or an evidence which does not measure up in quality to a trained legal mind would be held to be invalid on this score. Once it is found that the arbitrators approach is not arbitrary or capricious, then he is the last word on facts. In P.R. Sah, Shares & Stock Brokers (P) Ltd. v. B.H.H. Securities (P) Ltd., this Court held : (SCC pp.601-02, para 21). 21. A Court does not sit in appeal over the award of an Arbitral Tribunal by reassessing or re-appreciating the evidence. An award can be challenged only under the grounds mentioned in Section 34 (2) of the Act. The Arbitral Tribunal has examined the facts and held that both the second respondent and the appellant are liable. The case as put forward by the first respondent has been accepted. Even the minority view was that the second respondent was liable as claimed by the first respondent, but the appellant was not liable only on the ground that the arbitrators appointed by the Stock Exchange under Bye-law 248, in a claim against a non-member, had no jurisdiction to decide a claim against another member. The finding of the majority is that the appellant did the transaction in the name of the second respondent and is therefore, liable along with the second respondent. The finding of the majority is that the appellant did the transaction in the name of the second respondent and is therefore, liable along with the second respondent. Therefore, in his absence of any ground under Section 34 (2) of the Act, it is not possible to re-examine the facts to find out whether a different decision can be arrived at.” 10. In the same decision, the Hon’ble Apex Court elucidated the principle of “patent illegality” in paragraphs-40, 42, 42.1, 42.2 and 42.3 which are quoted hereunder: Patent Illegality. 40. We now come to the fourth head of public policy, namely, patent illegality. It must be remembered that under the Explanation to Section 34 (2) (b), an award is said to be in conflict with the public policy of India if the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption. This ground is perhaps the earliest ground on which Courts in England set aside awards under English law. Added to this ground ( in1802) is the ground that an arbitral award would be set aside if there were an error of law by the arbitrator. This is explained by Denning, L.J. in R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, ex p Show: (All ER p. 130 D-E: KB p. 351). “Leaving now the statutory tribunals, I turn to the awards of the arbitrators. The Court of King’s Bench never interfered by certiorari with the award of an arbitrator, because it was a private tribunal and not subject to the prerogative writs. If the award was not made a rule of Court, the only course available to an aggrieved party was to resist an action on the award or to file a bill in equity. If the award was made a rule of Court, a motion could be made to the Court to set it aside for misconduct of the arbitrator on the ground that it was procured by corruption or other undue means (see Statutes 9 and 10 Will. III, C. 15). At one time an award could not be upset on the ground of error of law by the arbitrator because that would not be said to be misconduct or undue means, but ultimately it was held in Kent v. Elstob, that an award could be set aside for error of law on the face of it. III, C. 15). At one time an award could not be upset on the ground of error of law by the arbitrator because that would not be said to be misconduct or undue means, but ultimately it was held in Kent v. Elstob, that an award could be set aside for error of law on the face of it. This was regretted by Williams, J., in Hodgkinson v. Fernie, but is now well established. 42. In the 1996 Act, this principle is substituted by the “patent illegality” principle which, in turn, contains three subheads : 42.1 (a) A contravention of the substantive law of India would result in the death knell of an arbitral award. This must be understood in the sense that such illegality must go to the root of the matter and cannot be of a trivial nature. This again is really a contravention of Section 28 (1) (a) of the Act, which reads as under “28. Rules applicable to substance of dispute.- (1) Where the place of arbitration is situated in India – (a) in an arbitration other than an international commercial arbitration, the Arbitral Tribunal shall decide the dispute submitted to arbitration in accordance with the substantive law for the time being in force in India.” 42.2. (b) A contravention of the Arbitration Act itself would be regarded as patent illegality – for example if an arbitrator gives no reasons for an award in contravention of Section 31 (3) of the Act, such award will be liable to be set aside. 42(3). (c) Equally, the third subhead of patent illegality is really a contravention of Section 28 (3) of the Arbitration Act, which reads as under : “28. Rules applicable to substance of dispute.- (1)-(2) * * * (3) In all cases, the Arbitral Tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms of the contract and shall take into account the usages of the trade applicable to the transaction.” This last contravention must be understood with a caveat. An Arbitral Tribunal must decide in accordance with the terms of the contract, but if an Arbitrator construes a term of the contract in a reasonable manner, it will not mean that the award can be set aside on this ground. An Arbitral Tribunal must decide in accordance with the terms of the contract, but if an Arbitrator construes a term of the contract in a reasonable manner, it will not mean that the award can be set aside on this ground. Construction of the terms of a contract is primarily for an arbitrator to decide unless the arbitrator construes the contract in such a way that it could be said to be something that no fair-minded or reasonable person could do.” 11. Law is well settled, as has been held in MSK Projects (I) (JV) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan (2011) 10 SC 573 that an error in the construction of the contract by the arbitrator cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. This has also been taken note of in the case of Associate Builders (supra) in paragraphs-44 and 45 to the following effect : “44. In MSK Project (I) (JV) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, the Court held : (SCC pp.581-82, para 17) “17. If the arbitrator commits an error in the construction of the contract, that is an error within his jurisdiction. But if he wanders outside the contract and deals with matters not allotted to him, he commits a jurisdictional error. Extrinsic evidence is admissible in such cases because the dispute is not something which arises under or in relation to the contract or dependent on the construction of the contract or to be determined within the award. The ambiguity of the award can, in such cases, be resolved by admitting extrinsic evidence. The rationale of this rule is that the nature of the dispute is something which has to be determined outside and independent of what appears in the award. Such a jurisdictional error needs to be proved by evidence extrinsic to the award. (See Gobardhan Das v. Lachhmi Ram, Thawardas Pherumal v. Union of India, Union of India v. Kishorilal Gupta & Bros., Alopi Prashad, & Sons Ltd. v. Union of India, Jivarajbhai Ujamshi Sheth v. Chintamanrao Balji and Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co.). 45. In Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. v. Dewan Chand Ram Saran, the Court held : (SCC pp.320-21, Paras 43-45) “43 In any case, assuming that Clause 9.3 was capable of two interpretations, the view taken by the arbitrator was clearly a possible if not a plausible one. Ltd. v. General Electric Co.). 45. In Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. v. Dewan Chand Ram Saran, the Court held : (SCC pp.320-21, Paras 43-45) “43 In any case, assuming that Clause 9.3 was capable of two interpretations, the view taken by the arbitrator was clearly a possible if not a plausible one. It is not possible to say that the arbitrator had travelled outside his jurisdiction, or that the view taken by him was against the terms of contract. That being the position, the High Court had no reason to interfere with the award and substitute its view in place of the interpretation accepted by the arbitrator. 44. The legal position in this behalf has been summarized in para 18 of the judgment of this Court in SAIL v. Gupta Brother Steel Tubes Ltd. and which has been referred to above. Similar view has been taken later in Sumitomo Heavy Industries Ltd. v. ONGC Ltd. to which one of us (Gokhale, J) was a party. The observations in para 43 thereof are instructive in this behalf. 45. This para 43 reads as follows : (Sumitomo case, SCC p.313). “43 ... The umpire has considered the fact situation and placed a construction on the clauses of the agreement which according to him was the correct one. One may at the highest say that one would have preferred another construction of Clause 17.3 but that cannot make the award in any way perverse. Nor can one substitute one’s own view in such a situation, in place of the one taken by the umpire, which would amount to sitting in appeal. As held by this Court in Kwality Mfg. Corpn. V. Central Warehousing Corpn. The Court while considering challenge to arbitral award does not sit in appeal over the findings and decision of the arbitrator, which is what the High Court has practically done in this matter. The umpire is legitimately entitled to take the view which he holds to be the correct one after considering the provisions of the agreement. If he does so, the decision of the umpire has to be accepted as final and binding.” 12. It is thus apparent that the interpretation of the terms of the contract is the absolute domain of the Arbitrator. If he does so, the decision of the umpire has to be accepted as final and binding.” 12. It is thus apparent that the interpretation of the terms of the contract is the absolute domain of the Arbitrator. The learned District Judge considered the grounds urged by the State in assailing the arbitral award in the light of the principles of law as noticed above. 13. Apparently being dissatisfied with the Adjudicator’s award the State invoked the arbitration clause for which reference was made to ascertain the correctness of the said award. The award of the Arbitrator reveals that the Arbitrator confined his inquiry and findings only to the specific points of dispute decided by the Adjudicator and the dispute between the parties relate to purely factual aspects concerning the terms of the contract. As against certain amounts claimed by the contractor under different heads, the Adjudicator awarded some amounts which have been found to be correct by the Arbitrator. Having regard to the scope of interference under Section 234 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, it has been clearly held by the learned District Judge that the State fails to make out a specific case as to how the findings on factual aspects of the contract are “oppose to Public Policy of India”. The contention raised on behalf of the State-appellants that the dispute raised by the contractor was not adjudicable within the scope of Clause 24.1 of the contract has no force, inasmuch as no such contention was apparently raised before the learned District Judge. Therefore, it is not open to the appellant to raise such contention in this appeal. Even otherwise, as revealed from the records the contractor was requested to attend final measurement vide letter dated 26.04.2004. The Executive Engineer vide his letter dated 27.11.2004 finally closed the contract,. The contractor submitted EOT up to 28.01.2000 on 27.11.2004. The Chief Engineer by his letter dated 12.02.2005 levied penalty. The contractor filed his claim before the Adjudicator on 15.04.2005 and the Adjudicator heard the matter on 20.06.2005 and 29.06.2005, i.e. after the notification of the decision of the Engineer on 12.02.2005, and the State-appellant participated in the adjudication by filing counter statement. The Arbitral Tribunal has given finding that the employer-State submitted to the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator and never objected to it. The Arbitral Tribunal has given finding that the employer-State submitted to the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator and never objected to it. Therefore, the contention that the dispute was not adjudicable before the Adjudicator cannot be accepted. 14. The other contentions raised on behalf of the appellants relating to award of escalation charges, reimbursement of sales tax, refund of deposit etc. are all based on interpretation of the terms of the contract which is within the domain of the Arbitrator and since nothing was shown before the learned District Judge as to how the award on those heads was opposed in Public Policy of India, learned District Judge has rightly rejected the contentions since he was not sitting in appeal over the arbitral award. 15. Coming to the question of grant of interest on different amounts awarded, it is seen that while the adjudicator granted interest ‘the Arbitrator refused the same, which was challenged by the contractor before the learned District Judge. Clause 43 (1) of the contract provides for award of interest for late payment and Clause 43.2 stipulates award of interest upon delayed payment of increased amount. On clause 43.1 of the contract the learned District Judge has rightly held that the said clause stipulates for payment of interest on any late payment made by the employer. Therefore, the Adjudicator found the contractor to be entitled to interest @ 12 % per annum from the date the amount awarded by the Adjudicator had fallen due since there was delay in payment of the admissible amount to the contractor. The Arbitrator refused to award interest to the contractor on the ground that he had not produced materials to satisfy about the date of filing return, which the Adjudicator had not also found. A reading of Clauses 43.1 and 43.2 manifests that the employer shall pay the contract amount certified by the Engineer within 28 days from the date of certification and if the employer makes late payment, the contractor shall be paid interest on the late payment calculated from the dates by which the payment should have been made up to the date when late payment was actually made. Similarly if the amount certified is increased in a later certificate as a result of an award by the Adjudicator or an Arbitrator, the contractor shall be paid interest upon the delayed payment calculated from the date upon which the increased amount would have been certified in the absence of the dispute. Since the matter was originally referred to the Adjudicator, Clause 43.2 is applicable. Neither Clause 43.2 or any other Clause of the contract stipulates that interest can be claimed by the contractor only upon filing of return by him. On the contrary, interest is to be paid upon lapse of 28 days from the date of certification and not from the date of filing of the return. The findings of the learned District Judge to the above effect appear to be quite reasonable and need no interference. Learned District Judge has therefore, rightly held that the contractor was entitled to interest for the pre-reference period and pendente lite, i.e, for period of adjudication by the Adjudicator and for the period of the proceeding before the Arbitrator. 16. Challenging the common judgment passed by the learned District Judge in two proceedings before him the State-appellants have filed this solitary appeal, without stating as to which one of the judgments of the learned District Judge is challenged in the appeal. Normally two appeals should have been filed challenging the common judgment of the District Judge passed in both the proceedings. However, in view of the findings above that the learned District Judge has rightly granted interest, and that learned District Judge has rightly not interfered with the award of the other sums made by the Adjudicator as well as the Arbitrator, the question whether failure on the part of the appellants to file another appeal would amount to constructive resjudicata need not be delved into. 17. In the light of the discussions made above this Court finds no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. Appeal dismissed.