JUDGMENT : NIRMALJIT KAUR, J. The petitioner herein has prayed for quashing of the final order dated 5.11.2008 vide which the petitioner has been removed from service but with superannuation benefits as well as the order dated 20.06.2009 dismissing the appeal against the final order dated 5.11.2008. 2. As per the averments made in the petition and the arguments raised by the learned counsel, the petitioner was appointed as Cashier cum Clerk in the Bank of Baroda on 4.3.1985 and was transferred to Main Branch, Bhilwara on 10.07.2004. The petitioner had undergone sterilization operation on 25.5.2007 at Krishna Hospital, Bhilwara. She sent her application for leave on 28.05.2007 along with the medical certificate. The said application was stated to have been sent to respondent No. 5 through her daughter on the same day i.e. 28.05.2007. It is alleged by the petitioner that respondent No. 5 misbehaved and also used abusive language when her daughter went to deliver the said application. Thereafter, the husband of the petitioner accompanied with his daughter went to meet respondent No. 5 to find out the cause of his behaviour but the respondent No. 5 misbehaved with the husband of the petitioner as well. When the petitioner came to know about the whole incident, she made a call to Assistant General Manager Shri N.K. Jain and informed him about the entire episode. Thereafter, the petitioner resumed her duties after she was found fit but the authorities did not allow her to join and instead directed her to appear before the Medical Board for Medical examination for the purpose of verifying whether the petitioner had actually undergone the sterilization operation or not. A copy of the letter dated 28.5.2007 vide which she was directed to appear before the Bank's Doctor for being medically examined has been placed on record as Annexure-1 and the order of the office constituting the Medical Board to examine her is dated 13.06.2007. 3. Hurt and aggrieved, the petitioner made written complaint on 19.06.2007 to the higher authorities as well as to the National Women Commission, New Delhi with the allegation that respondent No. 5 had tried to sexual harass her at the work place. A complaint was also made to the Chairman and MD of the Bank on 30.11.2007. 3. Hurt and aggrieved, the petitioner made written complaint on 19.06.2007 to the higher authorities as well as to the National Women Commission, New Delhi with the allegation that respondent No. 5 had tried to sexual harass her at the work place. A complaint was also made to the Chairman and MD of the Bank on 30.11.2007. On the other side, the respondent No. 5 as a counter blast and with the intent to settle scores with the petitioner served a show cause notice dated 31.08.2007 upon the petitioner with the allegation that she was habitually absent from duty without prior sanction. Almost 18 occasions were mentioned in the notice during the year 2007 itself when the petitioner remained absent. The petitioner responded by her reply. However, she was placed under suspension vide order dated 17.09.2007. A charge sheet was also issued to her on 6.10.2007. A corrigendum to the charge sheet was also issued on 26.11.2007. A detail written statement was submitted before the Enquiry Officer. After conclusion of the enquiry, the charges levelled against the petitioner were proved to be correct vide enquiry report dated 15.07.2008. The petitioner was required to respond to the enquiry report. The petitioner also submitted a detailed representation raising objections to the enquiry report. However, a proposed punishment order was issued on 7.10.2008 whereby the punishment proposed was “removal from service with superannuation benefits i.e. pension and/or provident fund and gratuity as would be due otherwise under the rules and regulations prevailing at the relevant time and without disqualification from future employment.” However, her services were removed as above vide order dated 5.11.2008. Her appeal against the order dated 5.11.2008 was also dismissed vide order dated 20.06.2009. 4. While praying for setting aside the order of punishment dated 5.11.2008 as well as the order dated 20.06.2009 dismissing the appeal, it was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the proceedings were conducted at the behest of respondent No. 5 Shri K.D. Kanwar as a counter blast to her complaint against him of sexual harassment. Instead of taking an action against the officer involved in the questionable attitude of sexual harassment, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner along with charges. The said enquiry was conducted hurriedly and hastily. None of the documents sought by the petitioner were supplied. Instead of taking an action against the officer involved in the questionable attitude of sexual harassment, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner along with charges. The said enquiry was conducted hurriedly and hastily. None of the documents sought by the petitioner were supplied. The petitioner had submitted a list of 19 documents vide her application dated 27.2.2008 to be provided to her. However, her prayer was rejected on the same day. During the enquiry, the defence representative of the petitioner withdrew himself from the enquiry. The petitioner immediately moved an application to respondent authority to permit her to be represented by a legal person. However, the respondent authorities rejected her application dated 18.2.2008 as well as 2.2.2008 on the ground that her request for allowing a lawyer can be accepted only in case the Presenting Officer was also a lawyer. The said application was rejected in view of Clause 12(a)(iii) of the Bi-partite Settlement. This caused her serious prejudice. All the witnesses of the respondent-Bank were subordinate to respondent No. 5 and therefore, it was not possible for them to depose against him. The respondents had failed to prove any of the charges. Neither, the charge of gross misconduct has been proved and nor any detail and time of Charge No. 12 with respect to her passing nasty remarks and adverse comments against other staff members has been disclosed in the charge-sheet. They have not been able to prove that the petitioner was guilty of slowed down in performance of work or that she was guilty of acts prejudicial to the interest of the Bank. No evidence for these charges has been submitted. The enquiry was conducted with a biased mind. The final order passed by the disciplinary authority was not a speaking order. The disciplinary authority had not applied its own mind while coming to the conclusion that as to whether the charges levelled against the petitioner were proved or not in the enquiry conducted by the enquiry officer. Even the order under appeal was not a speaking order. Neither of the objections raised by the petitioner were considered. The petitioner had not been administered any censure, warning or any adverser remark, therefore, the allegation that the petitioner was habitual in going in leave without prior sanction and guilt of major misconduct as per Clause (b) for unpunctual or irregular in attendance cannot be sustained. Neither of the objections raised by the petitioner were considered. The petitioner had not been administered any censure, warning or any adverser remark, therefore, the allegation that the petitioner was habitual in going in leave without prior sanction and guilt of major misconduct as per Clause (b) for unpunctual or irregular in attendance cannot be sustained. Further, even if all the charges are stated to be proved, they do not fall under the category of gross misconduct and if at all, it is a case of minor misconduct and only a minor punishment under Clause 8 should have been imposed. 5. It was contended that allegations no. 12 and 13 were not included in the show cause notice dated 31.08.2007 and hence could not have been made a part of charge-sheet. Further, as many as 18 documents were demanded by the petitioner vide her letter dated 27.2.2008. Out of 18 documents, almost 14 documents were not allowed which too has vitiated the enquiry. 6. Reply has been filed. As per the reply, the petitioner instead of submitting an application for leave before the date of her operation i.e. 25-05-2007, submitted an application for 17 days leave after her operation through her daughter on 28.05.2007. Furthermore, on the date of the incidents i.e. 28.05.2007, the petitioner telephoned respondent No. 5, then Chief Manager of the respondent Bank, Bhilwara Branch and spoke to him in an insulting loud voice and threatened him in an unruly, harsh and disobedient manner as categorically stated in the documents on record. The husband of the petitioner, Mr. Dinesh Agarwal also came to the bank and threatened the respondent No. 5 to be ready for “dire consequences”. The special cause leave is available only on submission of medical certificate to the satisfaction of sanctioning authority. The said medical certificate can always be got verified from the Bank's Panel Doctor. The process adopted by the respondent bank is a general practice of verification conducted by the authorised doctor of the bank in the cases of sick leave where the sanctioning authorities consider it necessary to satisfy himself before sanctioning of leave. As per the guidelines for conducting departmental enquiry, it is not permitted for the employee to be represented by a Legal Practitioner and thus, the request of the petitioner was denied as per the guidelines. As per the guidelines for conducting departmental enquiry, it is not permitted for the employee to be represented by a Legal Practitioner and thus, the request of the petitioner was denied as per the guidelines. It is pertinent to mention here that the bank while conducting departmental enquiry never engaged or appointed any legal practitioner. The presenting officer was law graduate but was not legal practitioner. The certified copies of all the documents produced during the course of enquiry proceedings as material evidence were tendered to the petitioner and the same were also verified with the originals by her. The charges levelled against her come under the purview of “gross misconduct” as per Clause 5 of the memorandum of settlement and the same were proved beyond doubt against the petitioner. 7. Further, as stated in the reply, the contention of the petitioner that the allegations No. 12 & 13 were not included in the show cause notice dated 31.08.2007 and hence cannot be allowed to be a part of charge sheet dated 6.10.2007 is not tenable as per law. As per the bipartite settlement/bank's procedure, it is not necessary that charge sheet and show cause notice against an employee must have identical allegations. The petitioner was given all the opportunity, at every stage of the proceedings to defend her case. As many as 08 witnesses who deposed against the aforesaid allegations spoke in one voice that the petitioner openly used indecent, foul and derogatory words and comments for her colleagues. The allegation No. 12 was proved beyond doubt against the petitioner and the same attracted charge No. 2 & 4 of the charge sheet. Similarly allegation No. 13 was also proved against the petitioner which clearly portrayed the violent and disobedient behaviour of the petitioner towards her superiors and thus attracted charges No. 1, 2 and 4 of the charge sheet. The petitioner was in habit of remaining absent from duty without prior sanction. Although the leave were subsequently sanctioned but there was delay on the part of the petitioner in complying the guidelines as contained in bipartite settlement. The final order dated 5.11.2008 is an exhaustive summary of the entire case divided into the parts viz., allegations in brief, findings of the enquiry, comments and decision. 8. Learned counsel for the parties were heard at length. 9. The final order dated 5.11.2008 is an exhaustive summary of the entire case divided into the parts viz., allegations in brief, findings of the enquiry, comments and decision. 8. Learned counsel for the parties were heard at length. 9. One of the main allegation against the petitioner as per Charge No. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 is that she was absent from duties without prior sanction. As many as 18 occasions have been mentioned when she was absent from the duties without prior sanction. The detail of the absence without prior sanction leave along with the date of applications have been mentioned. However, it is an admitted position that the said leave was duly sanctioned by the respondents and the said period was regularised without any objection. No show cause notice or warning was ever issued to the petitioner for having proceeded on leave without prior sanction. Neither of these objections raised in her reply to the show cause notice issued by the punishing authority with respect to the proposed punishment or in her grounds of appeal have been considered by the concerned authorities. 10. The Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Bakshish Singh : (1998) 8 SCC 222 : AIR 1999 SC 2626 wherein the finding of the trial Court and the lower appellate court to the effect that once the period of absence from duty having been regularised and converted into leave without pay, the charge of absence from service did not survive was upheld and it was observed as under:— “It will thus be sent that the trial Court as also the lower appellate Court had both recorded the findings that the period of absence from duty having been regularised and converted into leave without pay, the charge of absence from service did not survive. Once it was found as a fact that the charge of unauthorised absence from duty did not survive, we fail to understand how the lower appellate Court could remand the matter back to the punishing authority for passing a fresh order of punishment.” 11. Another main charge is charge No. 6 that the petitioner was absent from 24.05.2007 without submitting leave application and she did not report for duties on 26.05.2007 and also did not inform about her absence etc. to the Bank. 12. Another main charge is charge No. 6 that the petitioner was absent from 24.05.2007 without submitting leave application and she did not report for duties on 26.05.2007 and also did not inform about her absence etc. to the Bank. 12. Admittedly, the petitioner sent her daughter on 28.05.2007 along with the medical certificate requesting special leave for 17 days from 24.05.2007 to 09.06.2007 due to her having undergone Bilateral Tubal Ligation. Actually, as is evident from the allegations of both sides, the incident that followed the visit of the daughter of the petitioner seems to be root cause of the subsequent dispute between the petitioner and the respondent No. 5. Thus, the charges No. 7, 8 and 9 pertained to the said incident. It is alleged that the petitioner had telephoned to Mr. Kanwar — respondent No. 5 and talked to him in insulting voice and that her husband too had misbehaved with him. 13. Whereas, the specific allegations of mala-fide have been alleged against the respondent No. 5. Respondent No. 5 has been made a party by name but no reply has been filed by respondent No. 5. Kanwar — respondent No. 5 and talked to him in insulting voice and that her husband too had misbehaved with him. 13. Whereas, the specific allegations of mala-fide have been alleged against the respondent No. 5. Respondent No. 5 has been made a party by name but no reply has been filed by respondent No. 5. The petitioner raised objection in her representation to the show cause notice with respect to the proposed punishment and the findings of the enquiry report as under:— ^^5- tgka rd vkjksi&i= esa of.kZr ,yhxs'ku la[;k 6] 7] 8] o 9 furkUr vlR; :i ls izkFkhZ;k }kjk rRdkyhu eq[; izcU/kd egksn; Jh dsŒMhŒ daoj ds fo:} jk"Vªh; efgyk vk;ksx ,oa cSad ds mPpkf/kdkfj;ksa dks izkFkhZ;k dks 'kkjhfjd NsM+NkM+ djus ds lEcU/k esa f'kdk;r dh xbZ Fkh] ftlls vk/kkj gksdj eq[; izcU/kd Jh dsŒMhŒ daoj us ckn esa fopkjksijkar ,d vfrfjDr vkjksi cukus ds mn~ns'; ls feF;k ?kVuk lkft'k dj cukbZ xbZ gSA izkFkhZ;k fnukad 28-5-2007 dks fpfdRlk/khu Fkh] mldk vkWijs'ku gqvk Fkk] bl dkj.k izkFkhZ&vipkfjk iwjh rjg ls fcLrj ij Fkh ,oa mldh gkyr ,slh ugha Fkh fd og fcLrj ls mBdj Qksu ij ckr dj ldsA izkFkhZ;k tc fcLrj ls mBus dh fLFkfr esa gh ugh Fkh rks izkFkhZ;k }kjk Jh dsŒMhŒ daoj ls ckrphr djus esa l{ke ugha FkhA ,yhxs'ku la[;k 6 o 7 esa ;fn fdlh izdkj dh fdafprek= Hkh lR;rk gksrh rks rRdkyhu eq[; izca/kd Jh dsŒMh daoj izkFkhZ;k }kjk bl izdkj dk O;ogkj djus ds laca/k esa de ls de izkFkhZ;k dks uksfVl rks ns gh ldrs Fks] blds foijhr Jh daoj us rks izkFkhZ;k dk vodk'k gh fcuk fdlh vkifRr ds Lohd`r dj fn;k ,oa tc izkFkhZ;k dh vksj ls Jh daoj ds fo:} 'kkjhfjd NsM+NkM djus dh f'kdk;r dh rks vius cpko esa ,oa izkFkhZ;k dks ;su&dsu izrkfM+r djokus ds vk'k; ls vius v/khuLFk vf/kdkfj;ksa] ftuds fd okf"kZd xksiuh; izfrosnu Hkjus ,oa inksUufr ds fy;s vfHk'ka"kk djus ds fy;s vf/kd`r gS] dks vius izHkko esa ysdj ckn es fopkjksijkar feF;k ?kVuk izoafpr dh xbZ gSA 7- vkjksi&i= esa of.kZr ,yhxs'ku la[;k 6] 7] 8 esa izkFkhZ;k }kjk Jh dsŒMhŒ daoj] rRdkyhu eq[; izcU/kd ds lkFk nwjHkk"k ij vkjksi esa of.kZr vuqlkj ykmM okbZl esa ckr djus ds lEcU/k esa daoj ds vfrfjDr fdlh izdkj dh dksbZ vU; lk{; ugha gS ,oa u gh izkFkhZ;k dh dkWy dh okbZl dks fjdkMZ dj vfHkys[k ij izLrqr fd;k x;k gSA Jh dsŒMhŒ daoj ds fo:} izkFkhZ;k }kjk 'kkjhfjd NsM+NkM+ djus ds lEcU/k esa f'kdk;r dh xbZ gS] tks oRrZeku tkap dk;Zokgh ds iwoZ dh gSA izkFkhZ;k dk mDr vof/k fnukad 24-5-2007 ls 9-6-2007 rd dk vkosfnr vodk'k Lohd`r djus ds i'pkr~ tc mudks ;g Kku gqvk fd izkFkhZ;k dks muds }kjk 'kkjhfjd NsM+NkM+ djus ds lEcU/k esa izkFkhZ;k }kjk jk"Vªh; efgyk vk;ksx ,oa cSad izcU/ku dks f'kdk;r izLrqr dh xbZ gS] rks muds }kjk vkjksfir ?kVuk dh feF;k izoapuk dj izkFkhZ;k ds fo:} foHkkxh; tkap dk;Zokgh izLrkfor dj nh xbZA ;fn bl izdkj dh dksbZ ?kVuk gksrh rks izkFkhZ;k dk vodk'k muds }kjk Lohdkj ugha fd;k tkrk ,oa cSad ds mPpkf/kdkfj;ksa dks izkFkhZ;k ds fo:} rRdky gh f'kdk;r dh tkrh gSA bruk gh ugha bl izdkj dh ?kVuk ds lEcU/k esa Loa; Jh dsŒMhŒ daoj izkFkhZ;k dks uksfVl nsdj izkFkhZ;k dk Li"Vhdj.k rks de ls de gh dj ldrs Fks] fdUrq muds }kjk izkFkhZ;k dk vkosfnr vodk'k Lohd`r djus ds iwoZ fdlh izdkj dk dksbZ uksfVl gh ugha fn;k x;kA blls gh Li"V gS fd Jh daoj }kjk ;s nksuksa ,yhxs'ku "kM;a= iwoZd feF;k :i ls izoafpr fd;s x;s gSA bu rF;ksa dks tkap vf/kdkjh egksn; }kjk fopkjxr gh ugha fd;k x;k ,oa izkFkhZ;k ds fo:} mDr nksuks ,yhxs'ku fl} gksuk ekuus esa fof/kd =qfV dh gSA** 14. However, the said objections too have not been dealt with at all by the punishing authority and the order is a non speaking order. The appellate authority too did not deal with the said objection. 15. With respect to Charge No. 10 that the petitioner had adopted the tactics of slow work, the petitioner submitted that it was factually incorrect. The petitioner had given a detail response to the said charge. The same too has not been dealt with either by the punishing authority or by the appellate authority. 16. The objection to Charge No. 11 that the petitioner is regularly on phone too is vague. No warning was ever issued to her. Similarly, the allegation No. 12 is general and states that the petitioner used to pass nasty remarks and adverse comments against other staff members. However, no detail or particular incident or instance has been mentioned. The charge itself is vague. 17. The Apex Court in the case of Transport Commissioner, Madras-5 v. A. Radha Krishna Moorthy: (1995) 1 SCC 332 set aside the order of punishment on the ground of vague charges while holding as under:— “Insofar as the vagueness of the charges is concerned we find that it deserves acceptance. It is asserted by Shri Vaidyanathan, learned counsel for the respondent that except the memo of charges dated 4.6.1989, no other particulars of charges or supporting particulars were supplied. This assertion could not be denied by the learned counsel for the appellant. A reading of charges would show that they are not specific and clear. They do not point out clearly the precise charge against the respondent, which he was expected to meet. One can understand the charges being accompanied by a statement of particulars or other statement furnishing the particulars of the aforesaid charges but that was not done. The charges are general in nature to the effect that the respondent along with eight other officials indulged in misappropriation by falsification of accounts. What part did the respondent play, which account did he falsify or help falsify, which amount did he individually or together with other named persons misappropriate, are not particularised. The charge is a general one.” 18. The charges are general in nature to the effect that the respondent along with eight other officials indulged in misappropriation by falsification of accounts. What part did the respondent play, which account did he falsify or help falsify, which amount did he individually or together with other named persons misappropriate, are not particularised. The charge is a general one.” 18. The objection of the petitioner with respect to both the allegation No. 12 and 13 that it was not included in the show cause notice dated 31.8.2007 and hence could not have been allowed to be a part of charge sheet dated 6.10.2007 too has not been dealt with, although it is admitted in the reply that the allegation No. 12 and 13 was not included in the show cause notice. 19. As per charge No. 13, the petitioner misbehaved and refused to take the charge when she was directed to do so vide letter dated 11.09.2007 by Sr. Manager (Admn.). It is specifically submitted by her that no such letter was received or dispatched from the office. It is further submitted that one Shri Suresh Patwa — Head Cashier was already on leave from 10.9.2007 to 18.09.2007 and he had already handed over his charge to somebody else and proceeded on leave on 8.9.2007 and the person to whom the charge was handed over continued to do the work from 10.09.2007 onwards. Hence, the question of handing over the charge to the petitioner as alleged on 11.09.2007 does not arise. The said explanation too has not been considered. Moreover, it is evident from the letter dated 11.09.2007 Ex. 30 which is placed on record and marked as ‘A’ that an employee was entitled to waive off and could exercise the option by refusing to take the charge. The letter reads:— “You are hereby advised that in addition to your duties/functions of Cashier/Clerk (the present category), you are required to perform duties of a Chief Cashier (the position to be assigned) with effect from 11.09.2007 until further instructions, at Bhilwara Main Branch. You will be paid Special Allowance of Rs…..per month for the period you are required to perform the aforesaid duties. Please signity your acceptance/refusal in prescribed proforma attached herewith immediately failing which it will be presumed that you have refused to accept this offer, with consequential results in terms of the settlement on other issues (Amendment) 1984.” 20. You will be paid Special Allowance of Rs…..per month for the period you are required to perform the aforesaid duties. Please signity your acceptance/refusal in prescribed proforma attached herewith immediately failing which it will be presumed that you have refused to accept this offer, with consequential results in terms of the settlement on other issues (Amendment) 1984.” 20. Thus, the option exercised by the petitioner cannot be termed as misconduct. 21. This Court is conscious of the fact and in view of the law laid that a punishment order, charge-sheet or show cause notice cannot be set aside on account of infirmity in the disciplinary proceedings. However, certain facts from the entire proceedings which have emerged before this Court have forced this Court to hold otherwise. 22. The petitioner had undergone sterilization operation on 25.5.2007. She had sent an application on 28.5.2007 to grant her leave from 24.05.2007 to 09.06.2007. She had also submitted her medical certificate. Without going into the fact as to whether the said certificate produced by her was false or fabricated and without recording this doubt, she was made to undergo a medical examination. This Court may have even ignored to the same being a prerogative of the employer to ask for substantial proof but for the subsequent conduct which followed the same. 23. The petitioner made a complaint on 19.06.2007 to the Assistant General Manager, Bank of Baroda regarding sexual harassment by respondent No. 5 and requested the authorities to take necessary steps for redressal of her grievance. She was informed vide letter dated 10.01.2008 placed on record as Annexure-R/R/1 that the matter was discussed in Sexual Harassment Apex Committee meeting and after taking into consideration all aspects of the case, the committee has concluded that the representation does not come under the purview of Sexual Harassment and the matter has been treated as closed at their end. However, in response to her application under RTI, she was communicated vide information dated 12.10.2009 that no Committee was constituted to go into the allegation of sexual harassment alleged by the petitioner against respondent No. 5 and therefore, no detail could be provided. However, in response to her application under RTI, she was communicated vide information dated 12.10.2009 that no Committee was constituted to go into the allegation of sexual harassment alleged by the petitioner against respondent No. 5 and therefore, no detail could be provided. The same reads as under:— eq[; izca/kd Jh daoj ds fo:} 'kkjhfjd NsM+NkM+ dh f'kdk;r dj cSad izca/ku vFkkZr~ gekjs }kjk ,isDl desVh xfBr ugha dh xbZ FkhA vr% lnL;ksa ds uke ,oa dk;Zokgh dk fooj.k Li"Vrk ds vHkko esa ugha fn;k tk ldrk gSA 24. This Court would have understood the action of the respondents in proceedings against the petitioner in case the matter had been referred to the Sexual Harassment Committee and the finding was recorded that the said allegations were false and incorrect. Instead of following the said procedure, the respondents seems to have proceeded in issuing a charge-sheet which on the face of it is a counter-blast to the incident that occurred on 28.05.2007. This opinion is further strengthened from the perusal of the various charges as discussed above. 25. The petitioner has dealt with every finding of the enquiry officer on each of the charges in her response to the show cause notice of the proposed punishment. However, the punishing authority has not dealt with any one of her objections. A perusal of the order dated 5.11.2008 passed by the punishing authority shows that it is absolutely a non-speaking order. Similarly, the petitioner raised all the grounds and objections before the appellate authority in her appeal filed against the order of punishment dated 5.11.2008 passed by the punishing authority. A perusal of the order dated 20.06.2009 passed under appeal too shows that although all the charges have been reproduced, the objections have been mentioned but not a single objection has been discussed or dealt. The order passed by the appellate authority too is non-speaking order and passed without application of mind. 26. A perusal of the order dated 20.06.2009 passed under appeal too shows that although all the charges have been reproduced, the objections have been mentioned but not a single objection has been discussed or dealt. The order passed by the appellate authority too is non-speaking order and passed without application of mind. 26. The argument that there was no need to give any reason or pass a speaking order as the authorities agreed with the enquiry report is not tenable as held by this Court in the case of Prabhu Dayal v. State of Rajasthan reported in RLR 1993 (1) 592 while relying various judgments of the Apex Court, set aside the punishment of removal from service and substituted with stoppage of two grade increments without cumulative effect on noticing that the order passed by the punishing authority and the appellate authority was a non-speaking order. Para 15 of the said judgment reads as under:— “15. Yet another important aspect of the matter, which has been completely lost sight by the disciplinary authority, is that it was its duty to record good and sufficient reasons for imposing the impugned penalty on the petitioner. Rule 14 of 1958 Rules, which confers jurisdiction on the competent authority to impose any of the penalties specified in that Rule, begins with the following words: “MAY, FOR GOOD AND SUFFICIENT REASONS, WHICH SHALL BE RECORDED, AND…” These opening words of Rule 14 clearly impose a mandatory duty on the competent authority to record reasons and above all, such reasons must be good and sufficient. There can be no manner of doubt that the action of the disciplinary authority under the Rules of 1958 is quasi judicial and the order passed by it is also quasi judicial. Therefore, even in the absence of a requirement by the statute, it would have been imperative for the disciplinary authority to record reasons. Fulfillment of this requirement of recoding of reasons in support of the order, is a part and parcel of the requirement of following the principles of natural justice. Passing of reasoned order has been treated as an obligatory duty of every quasi judicial authority except in cases where there is an express exclusion of the requirement of recording of reasons. Fulfillment of this requirement of recoding of reasons in support of the order, is a part and parcel of the requirement of following the principles of natural justice. Passing of reasoned order has been treated as an obligatory duty of every quasi judicial authority except in cases where there is an express exclusion of the requirement of recording of reasons. The law on the subject has been lucidly discussed in Testeels Ltd. v. N.M. Desai, by a Full Bench of Gujrat High Court headed by P.N. Bhagwati, J. (as he then was). In S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has referred to the legal position regarding the requirement of passing of a speaking orders as obtaining in Australia, England, United States of America as also in India and after making reference to almost all other decided cases on the subject, the Supreme Court has held that quasi judicial authority is duty bound to record reasons in support of its order as a part of its obligation to follow the principles of natural justice. The matter has been examined by this Court also in a recent decision in Vijay Singh v. R.S.R.T.C. and it has been held that a mandatory duty is cast on the competent authority to record reasons in support of its order. The scheme of the Rules of 1958 reinforces the necessity of giving of good and sufficient reasons which is certainly over and above the basic requirement of passing of a speaking order. The rule making authority has designedly thought it proper to incorporate the requirement of recording good and sufficient reasons. This requirement, contained in Rule 14, carries with it another requirement of communicating those reasons to the affected person. Requirement of communication of reasons can be read as implicit in the Rule from the fact that an aggrieved government servant not only has a right to file appeal or review under the Rules of 1958 but has a constitutional right to challenge the order of punishment before the High Court by way of writ under Article 226 of the constitution. Neither the appellate authority not the reviewing authority nor the High Court will be in a position to make an adjudication on the merits of the punishment awarded to a delinquent employee if it was not in a position to know as to what are the reasons for imposition of a penalty. When the rule requires that reasons to be recorded in support of an order of punishment must be good and sufficient, it is open to the court to examine those reasons and consider for itself whether the reasons are good and sufficient. Thus, even the sufficiency of reasons is open to scrutiny not only by the appellate and reviewing authorities but also by the courts of law. The order passed by the disciplinary authority is, however, singularly laconic. In this respect there is a total absence of reasons as to why the disciplinary authority has chosen to impose the extreme penalty of removal from service on the petitioner. The order passed by the disciplinary authority does not make any reference to the service record of the petitioner, entries in his service roll etc. It has not been shown that the petitioner has been punished in the past for an act of delinquency. Thus, the order of the disciplinary authority depicts a total non-application of mind on this aspect of the matter.” 27. The defence representative of the petitioner withdrew himself from the enquiry. Accordingly, the petitioner had moved an application on 18.02.2008 as well as on 22.08.2008 for allowing her to engage a lawyer. However, the said application was rejected in view of Clause 12(a)(iii) of the Bi-partite Settlement stating that the same can be accepted only in case the Presenting Officer was also a lawyer. Clause 12(a)(iii) of the Memorandum of Settlement on Disciplinary Action & Procedure for Workmen reads as under:— “12(a): An employee against whom disciplinary action is proposed or likely to be taken shall be given a charge-sheet clearly setting forth the circumstances appearing against him and a date shall be fixed for enquiry, sufficient time being given to him to enable him to prepare and given his explanation as also to produce any evidence that he may wish to tender in his defence. He shall be permitted to appear before the Officer conducting the enquiry, to cross-examine any witness on whose evidence the charge rests and to examine witnesses and produce other evidence in his defence. He shall also be permitted to be defended. … (iii) With the Bank's permission, by a lawyer.” 28. Whereas, it is accepted in their reply to para 12 that the legal representative of the department was a law graduate. The degree of the representative of the department is placed on record as Annexure-8 which shows that he was the person who had legal knowledge. Thus, the services of the similarly situated person was denied to the petitioner by misleading. The respondent authorities should at least have been fair to the said extent. This objection too was never dealt with while passing the order of punishment. 29. The Apex Court in the case of The Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilip Kumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni: (1983) 1 SCC 124 : AIR 1983 SC 109 (1) set aside the punishment order and held that the enquiry was vitiated on account of refusal by the enquiry officer to allow an employee to be represented by a lawyer specially when the delinquent officer was pitted against the legally trained mind. Para 9 and 10 of the said judgment reads:— “9. We concerned ourselves in this case with a narrow question whether where in such a disciplinary enquiry by a domestic tribunal, the employer appoints Presenting-cum. Prosecuting Officer to represent the employer by persons who are legally trained, the delinquent employee, if he seeks permission to appear and defend himself by a legal practitioner, a denial of such a request would vitiate the enquiry on the ground that the delinquent employee had not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself, thereby vitiating one of the essential principles of natural justice. 10. Even in a domestic enquiry there can be very serious charges and adverse verdict may completely destroy the future of the delinquent employee the adverse verdict may so stigmatize him that his future would be bleak and his reputation and livelihood would be at stake. Such an enquiry is generally treated as a managerial function and the Enquiry Officer is more often a man of the establishment. Such an enquiry is generally treated as a managerial function and the Enquiry Officer is more often a man of the establishment. Ordinarily he combines the role of a Presenting-cum-Prosecuting Officer and an Enquiry Officer a Judge and a prosecutor rolled into one. In the past it could be said that there was an informal atmosphere before such a domestic tribunal and that strict rules of evidence and pitfalls of procedural law did not hamstring the enquiry by such a domestic tribunal. We have moved far away from this stage. The situation is where the employer has on his payrolls labour officers, legal advisers lawyers in the garb of employees and they are appointed Presenting-cum-Prosecuting Officers and the delinquent employee pitted against such legally trained personnel has to defend himself. Now if the rules prescribed for such an enquiry did not place an embargo on the right to the delinquent employee to be represented by a legal practitioner, the matter would be in the discretion of the Enquiry Officer whether looking to the nature of charges, the type of evidence and complex or simple issues that may arise in the course of enquiry, the delinquent employee in order to afford a reasonable opportunity to defend himself should be permitted to appear through a legal practitioner. Why do we say so? Let us recall the nature of enquiry, who held it, where it is held and what is the atmosphere? Domestic enquiry is claimed to be a managerial function. A man of the establishment dons the robe of a Judge. It is held in the establishment office or a part of it. Can it even be compared to the adjudication by an impartial arbitrator or a court presided over by an unbiased judge. The Enquiry Officer combines the judge and prosecutor rolled into one. Witnesses are generally employees of the employer who directs an enquiry into misconduct. This is sufficient to raise serious apprehensions. Add to this uneven scales, the weight of legally trained minds on behalf of employer simultaneously denying that opportunity to delinquent employee. The weighted scales and tilted balance can only be partly restored if the delinquent is given the same legal assistance as the employer enjoys. This is sufficient to raise serious apprehensions. Add to this uneven scales, the weight of legally trained minds on behalf of employer simultaneously denying that opportunity to delinquent employee. The weighted scales and tilted balance can only be partly restored if the delinquent is given the same legal assistance as the employer enjoys. Justice must not only be done but must seem to be done is not an euphemism for courts alone, it applies with equal vigour and rigour to all those who must be responsible for fair play in action. And a quasi-judicial tribunal cannot view the matter with equanimity on inequality of representation. This Court in M.H. Hoscot v. State of Maharashtra (1) clearly ruled that in criminal trial where prosecution is in the hands of public prosecutor, accused, for adequate representation, must have legal aid at State cost. This will apply mutatis mutandis to the present situation. 30. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the case of J.K. Aggarwal v. Haryana Seeds Development Corporation Ltd. (1991) 2 SCC 283 : AIR 1991 SC 1221 while defining as to who was a Legal adviser and lawyer held that the same has to be liberally construed and should include whoever assists or advises on facts and in law. A person with the law degree is a person who is bound to have knowledge of law and is eligible to practice law. Para 5 of the judgment reads thus:— “5. On a consideration of the matter, we are persuaded to the view that the refusal to sanction the service of a lawer in the inquiry was not a proper exercise of the discretion under the rule resulting in a failure of natural justice: particularly, in view of the fact that the Presenting Officer was a person with legal attainments and experience. It was said that the appellant was no less adept having been in the position of a Senior Executive and could have defended, and did defend, himself competently; but as was observed by the learned Master of Rolls in Pett's case that in defending himself one may tend to become “nervous” or “tongue tied”. Moreover, appellant, it is claimed, has had no legal background. The refusal of the service of a lawer, in the facts of this case, results in denial of natural justice.” 31. Moreover, appellant, it is claimed, has had no legal background. The refusal of the service of a lawer, in the facts of this case, results in denial of natural justice.” 31. In the present case, it is admitted that the departmental representative possessed the law degree and had knowledge of law. The request of the petitioner to be represented by a lawyer should have been allowed especially keeping in mind the Clause 12(a)(iii) of Bi-partite settlement. The refusal to do so has resulted in vitiating the enquiry especially when the representative of the respondent department was a law graduate. A perusal of Clause 12(a)(iii) shows that there was a discretion with the department to allow the services of a lawyer. The refusal to sanction the services of the lawyer in the present case was not a proper exercise of discretion under the rule. Thus, the rejection by the bank to allow the petitioner to be represented by a lawyer has not only led to miscarriage or failure of justice but amounts to denial of reasonable opportunity and violation of natural justice, so necessary. 32. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied on the judgments rendered in the case of Union of India v. Y.S. Sadhu, Ex-Inspector: (2008) 12 SCC 30 ; Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India v. A. Masilamani: (2013) 6 SCC 530 ; to say that the High Court if at all can direct fresh proceedings from the stage of alleged illegality, without ordering reinstatement and it should be remitted to disciplinary authority to take a fresh decision. 33. However, this Court finds that the same is too late. Several years have passed. The petitioner has sufficiently undergone the harassment and torture for all these years by way of departmental enquiry. 34. The argument that the petitioner has been allowed the pensionary benefits does not help. A bad order which does not stand the test of law has to go. In any case, it is pointed out that the job of bank is not a pensionable job. Almost five years are still left for the petitioner to attain the age of superannuation. 35. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed. The order dated 5.11.2008 and 20.6.2009 are set aside. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner with all consequential benefits. Writ petition allowed.