JUDGMENT : 1. The instant second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 6th March, 2010 passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), 8th Court, Alipore, District : 24 Parganas (South) in Title Appeal No. 67 of 2006 affirming the judgment and decree dated 30th January, 2006 passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division), Alipore in Title Suit No. 28 of 1997. 2. The plaintiff appellant has impugned the judgment and decree dated 6th March, 2010 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), 8th Court, Alipore whereby he affirmed the judgment and decree dated 30th January, 2006 passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division), Alipore in Title Suit No. 28 of 1997. This Court is called upon to consider the substantial question of law on the score as to whether the learned Courts below committed substantial errors of law in dismissing the suit on the ground that without formal amendment the ground of reasonable requirement pleaded in the original plaint has not been established by totally overlooking the contents of the original plaint wherein the original plaintiff pleaded reasonable requirement for the substituted plaintiff. 3. This second appeal is being heard now ex parte because of the fact that in spite of the notice issued to the respondent defendant and in spite of the compliance order of this Court for paper publication and the paper publication having been made on behalf of the appellant, none has appeared on behalf of the respondent. 4. It is submitted by Mr. Siva Prasad Ghosh, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant that the learned Court below ought to have appreciated the scope and ambit of Rule 25 of Order 41 of C.P. Code and the appeal could have been kept pending and the issue could have been sent back on remand to the trial Court when the learned trial Judge recorded a finding that the present plaintiff is presently residing with his in-law have not been pleaded either by the plaintiff and the present plaintiff could have been permitted to change the case and set up a case which is inconsistent to what has been pleaded except by way of amendment of the plaint and as such same is raising birth to a substantial question of law. 5. 5. It is further submitted that the appeal Court below ought to have appreciated legal aspect that in view of the Order 41 Rule 25 of C.P. Code which is a mandatory requirement, learned Court of appeal below should have recorded that omission on the part of the lower Court to give liberty and/or to direct the plaintiff to amend the plaint or to frame or try any issue, should not have been made in stead of dismissing the case on contest. 6. Finally, it is submitted that the learned appellate Court below has mechanically without appreciating the subsequent developments in the requirement has dismissed the appeal on the score that the reasonable requirement cannot be taken into consideration without any further amendment of the plaint on the ground of reasonable requirement by the plaintiff/appellant. 7. My attention is invited to the paragraph 5 of the plaint wherein the plaintiff has averred that he has reasonably required the suit premises for her personal use and occupation and for the use and occupation of her family members as the present accommodation available to the plaintiff is insufficient and that plaintiff has no other reasonable accommodation elsewhere. The plaintiff is in genuine need of the suit premises. The married son of the plaintiff requires one bed room for himself and he also requires one for study room for his children who are school going student, one drawing room and room for kitchen along with bath and privy. The plaintiff requires one room for herself, one room for drawing room-cum-sitting room and one room is required by the plaintiff herself for Thakur Ghar. The plaintiff and her son have been suffering for short of accommodation. 8. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the ground of reasonable requirement has been covered in the original plaint filed by the mother of the present appellant plaintiff and without even incorporating the present development towards reasonable requirement the appellant plaintiff can claim the suit premises for his own use and occupation on the ground of reasonable requirement as he has no suitable accommodation elsewhere and that he has to put up in his in-law’s house. 9. To fortify his argument Mr. Siva Prasad Ghosh, learned counsel for the appellant referred a decision in the case of Gaiv Dinshaw Irani & ors. vs. Tehmtan Irani & ors. 9. To fortify his argument Mr. Siva Prasad Ghosh, learned counsel for the appellant referred a decision in the case of Gaiv Dinshaw Irani & ors. vs. Tehmtan Irani & ors. reported in AIR 2014 SC 2326 at paragraph 34 on the observation by the Hon’ble Apex Court that in ordinary course of litigation, the right of parties are crystallized on the date the suit is instituted and only the same set of facts must be considered. However, in the interest of justice, a court including a court of appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not precluded from taking note of developments subsequent to the commencement of the litigation, when such events have a direct bearing on the relief claimed by a party or on the entire purpose of the suit the Courts taking note of the same should mould the relief accordingly. This rule is one of ancient vintage adopted by the Supreme Court of America in Patterson v. State of Alabama followed in Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Choudhury. The aforementioned cases were recognized by this Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor and General Traders wherein he stated that : “………..If a fact, arising after the lis has come to Court and has a fundamental impact it is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fair-play is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice-subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for applications of this equitable rule are myriad. We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the Court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognisance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed.” 10. The abovementioned principle has been recognized in a catena of a decisions. This Court by placing reliance on the Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu case ( AIR 1975 SC 1409 ) (supra), held in Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram that : “6. The normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtain at the commencement of the lis. But this is subject to an exception. Wherever subsequent events of fact or law which have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of the relief occur, the court is not precluded from taking a ‘cautious cognizance’ of the subsequent changes of fact and law to mould the relief”. 11. This was further followed in Lekh Raj v. Muni Lal & ors. This Court in Sheshambal (dead) through LRs v. Chelur Corporation, Chelur Building & Ors. while discussing the issue of taking cognizance of subsequent events held that : “19. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Om Prakash Gupta case where the Court declared that although the ordinary rule of civil law is that the rights of the parties stand crystallised on the date of the institution of the suit yet the court has power to mould the relief in case the following three conditions are satisfied : (SCC p. 263, para 11) (p. 1526, Para 11 of AIR) “11……. (I) that the relief, as claimed originally has, by reason of subsequent events, become inappropriate or cannot be granted; (ii) that taking note of such subsequent event or changed circumstances would shorten litigation and enable complete justice being done to the parties; and (iii) that such subsequent event is brought to the notice of the court promptly and in accordance with the rules of procedural law so that the opposite party is not taken by surprise." 12. This Court in Rajesh D. Darbar and Ors. v. Narasinghro Krishnaji Kulkarni and Ors., a matter regarding the elections in a registered society, held that the courts can mould relief accordingly taking note of subsequent events. Furthermore, in Beg Raj Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. while deciding on the issue of renewal of a mining lease held that : “………..A petitioner, though entitled to relief in law, may yet be denied relief in equity because of subsequent or intervening events i.e. the events between the commencement of litigation and the date of decision. The relief to which the petitioner is held entitled may have been rendered redundant by lapse of time or may have been rendered incapable of being granted by change in law. There may be other circumstances which render it inequitable to grant the petitioner any relief over the respondents because of the balance tilting against the petitioner on weighing inequities pitted against equities on the date of judgment.” Even this Court while exercising its powers under Article 136 can take note of subsequent events (See : Bihar State Financial Corporation & Ors. v. Chemicot India (P) Ltd. & Ors., Parents Association of Students v. M.A. Khan & Anr., State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. v. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd.)”. 13. Yet, Mr. Siva Prasad Ghosh has relied on a decision in the case of Netai Chandra Paul & Anr. Vs. Dilip Kumar Saha, reported in 2005(4) CHN 819 at paragraph 57 wherein it has been observed that it is settled principle of law that in a suit for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement, not only the requirement of the plaintiff is considered but also the requirement of the members of the plaintiff’s family is to be considered. Vs. Dilip Kumar Saha, reported in 2005(4) CHN 819 at paragraph 57 wherein it has been observed that it is settled principle of law that in a suit for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement, not only the requirement of the plaintiff is considered but also the requirement of the members of the plaintiff’s family is to be considered. Accordingly, if it is found that even after the death of the original plaintiff/landlord, the heirs of the original plaintiff/landlord still reasonably require the suit premises, their requirement can also be considered in the said suit and/or in the appeal arising therefrom. Of course, the change of requirement which is caused due to the death of the original landlord is no doubt a vital factor which is required to be considered by the Court to assess the total requirement of the substituted heirs of the original plaintiff, as on the date of the passing of the ultimate decree. 14. Mr. Ghosh, learned counsel for the appellant has further relied on a decision in the case of Shasidhar and others vs. Smt. Ashwini Uma Mathad and another reported in AIR 2015 SC 1139 at paragraph 25 wherein it has been observed that – “Being the first appellate Court, it was, therefore, the duty of the High Court to decide the first appeal keeping in view the scope and powers conferred on it under Section 96 read with Order LLI, Rule 31 of the Code mentioned above. It was unfortunately not done, thereby, causing prejudice to the appellants whose valuable right to prosecute the first appeal on facts and law was adversely affected which, in turn, deprived them of a hearing in the appeal in accordance with law”. 15. It was unfortunately not done, thereby, causing prejudice to the appellants whose valuable right to prosecute the first appeal on facts and law was adversely affected which, in turn, deprived them of a hearing in the appeal in accordance with law”. 15. Taking queue from this decision and bearing in mind the principle as laid down in the cited decisions and further considering that there is averment in paragraph 5 pleaded with regard to the ground of reasonable requirement of the suit premises for the use and occupation of the landlord plaintiff and further considering that the learned appellate Court below appears to have passed the order affirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court in a most mechanical manner without considering the merit of the case on evidence adduced by the parties to the suit during trial and the first appellate Court being the Court of facts as well as law, the plaintiff appellant has been adversely affected by the judgment appealed against before this Court depriving him of a hearing in the appeal in accordance with law. 16. For the reasons stated above, this Court finds on record that the averments have been made for the reasonable requirement of the suit premises by the plaintiff. It is also on record on evidence and also the finding as observed by the learned trial Court that the appellant plaintiff was putting up with his family in Bishnupur in his workplace and after his retirement, he has come to Kolkata. So, he obviously required the suit premises for his own use and occupation. This aspect of the fact on record has been overlooked and have not been appreciated and considered by the learned Courts below. Therefore, I cannot countenance to the observation and the finding as made by the trial Court while considering the issues relating to Issue Nos. 5 and 6 relating to reasonable requirement and pertaining to the suitable accommodation available or not available to the plaintiff appellant. 17. For the reasons stated above, the judgment and decree dated 6th March, 2010 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), 8th Court, Alipore, District : 24 Parganas (South) in Title Appeal No. 67 of 2006 and the judgment and decree dated 30th January, 2006 passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division), Alipore in Title Suit No. 28 of 1997 stand set aside. 18. 18. Bearing upon the facts and the evidence on record, this Court is pleased to grant decree of eviction of the defendant respondent from the suit premises. The appellant plaintiff do get decree of eviction against the respondent defendant and the latter is directed to quit, vacate and deliver of peaceful possession to the appellant plaintiff of the suit premises within three months from date hereof. In default, the appellant plaintiff shall be at liberty to put the decree into execution through the learned trial Court. 19. The second appeal is disposed of accordingly. However, there shall be no order as to costs. 20. Let a copy of this order together with LCR be sent down to the learned Courts below at once.