JUDGMENT : A.K. RATH, J. This is a plaintiff’s appeal against a reversing judgment in a suit for partition. 2. The case of the plaintiff is that plaintiff and defendant nos.1 and 2 are the sons of late Satyabadi Mohapatra. They constitute a joint Hindu family. They remained in joint mess till 1961. As dissensions cropped up in the family, they were separated in mess, but continued to possess the joint family property together. Item no.1 of B-schedule property is the ancestral house. The same had been reconstructed by him. The house was mortgaged to one Raghunath Palo on 5.6.1931 for an amount of Rs.3000/-. The said amount with interest was paid by him to the mortgagee in the year 1969. Item no.2 of B-schedule property along with other properties had been sold to one Rama Chandra Palo, his father-in-law. The sale deed is nominal one. The vendee retransferred the land on 23.5.42 to their family in the name of defendant no.1 and his wife, defendant no.3. After sale, the same became the joint family property. 3. The defendants entered appearance and filed a written statement denying the assertions made in the plaint. The specific case of the defendants is that there is no existence of schedule A property. They denied the allegation that the sale deed dated 23.5.42 was a nominal one. Item no.2 of B-schedule property had been purchased by Gouri Pandian, mother of defendant no.3 by means of a registered sale deed dated 23.5.1942 in the name of defendant no.3 and her husband-defendant no.1. Record of right was published in the name of defendant no.3. The same is the stridhan property of defendant no.3. 4. On the inter se pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court struck nine issues. The learned trial court came to hold that A-schedule property is non-existent and as such not available for partition. Item no.2 of B-schedule property is not the joint family property of the parties. The same was purchased by the mother-in-law of defendant no.1 in the name of defendant no.1 and his wife defendant no.3. Held so, it dismissed the suit. The learned trial court came to hold that A-schedule property is non-existent and as such not available for partition. Item no.2 of B-schedule property is not the joint family property of the parties. The same was purchased by the mother-in-law of defendant no.1 in the name of defendant no.1 and his wife defendant no.3. Held so, it dismissed the suit. Assailing the said judgment and decree of the learned trial court, the plaintiff filed an appeal before the learned District Judge, Ganjam, Berhampur, which was subsequently transferred to the court of the learned Ist Additional District Judge, Ganjam, Behrmapur and renumbered as Title Appeal No.36 of 1985 (T.A.16/85 GDC). In course of hearing, the learned counsel for the appellant conceded to the findings of the learned trial court relating to issue no.3 i.e., A-schedule property. Two applications under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. were filed by the plaintiff to accept the documents as additional evidence. It was stated that documents had been filed in the court below, but the same could not be exhibited due to inadvertence. The defendants filed objection to the same. The application was not pressed in respect of 13 documents. Learned appellate court held that the documents are neither relevant nor necessary for deciding the appeal. With regard to second application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C., it held that record of right neither creates title nor extinguishes title. The same is not relevant for decision of the case. Even after closure of argument, an application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. was filed. The same was also rejected. On a threadbare analysis of the evidence on record as well as pleadings, the learned appellate court came to hold that item no.1 of B-schedule property is the joint family property and the plaintiff has 1/3rd share over the same. Learned appellate court concurred with the findings of the learned trial court in respect of lot no.2 of B-schedule property. It held that there is no evidence on record that the sale deed dated 25.3.42 was a benami. The plaintiff had failed to prove that the said property was thrown to the common hotchpot. Accordingly, it decreed the plaintiff’s suit and allowed the appeal. It is apt to state here that during pendency of the Second Appeal, the sole appellant died on 5.5.1993, whereafter his legal representatives have been brought on record. 5. The plaintiff had failed to prove that the said property was thrown to the common hotchpot. Accordingly, it decreed the plaintiff’s suit and allowed the appeal. It is apt to state here that during pendency of the Second Appeal, the sole appellant died on 5.5.1993, whereafter his legal representatives have been brought on record. 5. The Second Appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law enumerated in grounds no.3(1) and (2) of the appeal memo. They are :- “(1) Whether the impugned finding on petition Or.41 R.27 C.P.C. refusing to admit the public documents as evidence for which no formal proof is necessary and same are relevant and necessary for proper adjudication of the suit is legal and justified ? (2) Whether the learned court below erred in law in not considering admissions of defendants 1 and 2 made in the above said documents which clearly nullify the defendant’s which clearly nullify the defendant’s case and prove plaintiff’s case on banami transaction?” 6. Heard Mr. P.K. Das, learned Advocate for the appellants and Mr. U.C. Panda, learned Advocate for the respondents. 7. Mr. Das, learned Advocate for the appellants submitted that the sale deed dated 23.5.42 was a benami transaction. Item no.2 of B-schedule property was thrown to common hotchpot. The same was not a joint family property of the parties. In course of hearing of the appeal, applications for additional evidence had been filed to show that the same property is the joint family property. But then the learned appellate court without considering the same in its proper prospective rejected the applications. 8. Per contra, Mr.Panda, learned Advocate for the respondents submitted that the learned appellate court, on a threadbare analysis of the evidence on record and pleadings, held that there is no evidence that the sale deed dated 23.5.42 was benami. There is no perversity in the findings of the learned appellate court. This Court should not interfere with findings of the appellate court in a second appeal. Item no.2 of B-schedule property was purchased by the mother-in-law of defendant no.1 in the name of defendant no.1 and his wife-defendant no.3. The same is the stridhan property of defendant no.3. A Hindu female being not a coparcener cannot blend her separate with the joint family properties. He relied on the decisions of the apex Court in the case of Marabasappa (dead) by Lrs. and others Vrs. The same is the stridhan property of defendant no.3. A Hindu female being not a coparcener cannot blend her separate with the joint family properties. He relied on the decisions of the apex Court in the case of Marabasappa (dead) by Lrs. and others Vrs. Ningappa (dead) by Lrs. and others, (2011) 9 SCC 451 and this Court in the case of Brundaban Padhan and others Vrs. Krishna Padhan, 1985 (I) OLR186. 9. The plaintiff instituted a suit for partition of A and B schedule properties. Schedule-B property consists of two lots. Lot no.1 is a dwelling house. Lot no.2 is the agricultural property. The learned trial court came to hold that A-schedule property is nonexistent. In course of hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant conceded to the said issue. The learned appellate court held that the plaintiff has 1/3rd share in item no.1 of B-schedule property. Thus the question remains to be decided as to whether item no.2 of B-schedule property is the joint family property? 10. There is no evidence on record that the sale deed dated 23.5.1942, Ext.G was a benami one. Gouri Pandian is the mother of defendant no.3. She purchased the property in the name of defendant no.3 while she was a minor and her husband defendant no.1. Both the courts concurrently held that defendant no.3 is the absolute owner of the same. In Smt. Pushpa Devi v. The Commissioner of I.T., New Delhi A.I.R. 1977 SC 2230, the apex Court held that a Hindu female not being a coparcener cannot blend her separate property with the joint family properties. Taking a cue from the same, this Court in the case of Brundaban Padhan and others (supra), held that it is elementary that the normal state of every Hindu family is joint and the legal presumption is that the family continues joint until the contrary is proved. There is no presumption that a family, because it is joint, owns joint family property or any property whatsoever. Thus, in a suit for partition, the burden of proving that a particular item of property is a joint family property rests entirely on the plaintiff who claims it to be so. There is no presumption that a family, because it is joint, owns joint family property or any property whatsoever. Thus, in a suit for partition, the burden of proving that a particular item of property is a joint family property rests entirely on the plaintiff who claims it to be so. In order to establish that the acquisition of any property in the name of any of the individual members of the coparcener was, in fact, joint family property, the plaintiff must prove that the family was possessed of some property, the surplus, out of the income of which, was sufficient for the acquisition of the said property by the joint family. Once it is established that the joint family had property from out of the income of which there was a surplus sufficient for the acquisition of other properties, keeping in view the value of such properties the presumption of law is that it is the joint family which has acquired the property even though the acquisition was in the name of the individual member. The said presumption is rebuttable by showing that the property was the separate and self-acquired property of the particular member in whose name it stands or was acquired. The aforesaid presumption of law is available in the case of acquisition in the name of a coparcener, i.e., a male member of the joint family. But there is no such presumption available in the case of property standing or acquired in the name of a female member of the family. 11. On an interpretation of Sec.14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the apex Court in the case of Marabasappa (dead) by L.Rs and others (supra) held that any property of a female Hindu is her absolute property and she, therefore, has ownership over any property that she has acquired on her own or as stridhana. The explanation of sub.sec.1 of Sec.14 provides that a Hindu woman has full ownership over any property that she has acquired on her own or as stridhana. As a consequence, she may dispose of the same as per her wish, and that the same shall not be treated as a part of the joint Hindu family property. 12. The explanation of sub.sec.1 of Sec.14 provides that a Hindu woman has full ownership over any property that she has acquired on her own or as stridhana. As a consequence, she may dispose of the same as per her wish, and that the same shall not be treated as a part of the joint Hindu family property. 12. On a detailed scrutiny of the documents sought to be filed by way of additional evidence, the learned appellate court came to hold that the same were not necessary for deciding the appeal. There is no reason to differ with the view taken by the learned appellate court. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 13. Resultantly, the appeal fails and is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.