JUDGMENT : Sangeeta Chandra, J. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner, who was the defendant - respondent before the lower court for a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the impugned judgment and order dated 6.4.1993 rejecting the objections of the petitioner under Section 47 as also the impugned judgment and order dated 19.1.2000 passed in Revision No. 60 of 1993 (Pyare v. Beni Ram & others) and revision no. 70 of 1993 (Smt. Jashoda v. Beni Ram) and also for setting aside the proceedings in Execution Case No. 10 of 1999 pending before the Additional Civil Judge. 2. When the original writ petition was filed, it was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India thereafter vide an amendment application allowed on 20 April 2015, the writ petition has been sought to be amended by striking off the mention of the "writ petition" by writing in its place "an application under Article 227" and instead of praying for a writ of certiorari asking for an order to be passed by this Court setting aside the impugned order passed by the lower courts. 3. The facts that have not been disputed by opposite parties i.e. the plaintiffs in the original suit are that there was an agreement to sell signed between the plaintiff, Beni Ram and the petitioner, Pyare along with Bhagirath and Ved Ram and one Smt. Jashoda, wife of Pyare, which was a registered agreement under which 3.12 acres of land, which is part of Plot No. 242 with a total area of 5.6 acres situated in village Gangotri, district Rampur was agreed to be sold for a consideration of Rs. 19,500/- out of which an advance of Rs. 2000/- had been paid. It had been agreed upon between the parties that the defendant - respondent (herein after referred to as the petitioner herein) shall sell 2.40 acres of land out of 3.25 acres of land to Beni Ram, Ved Ram and Bhagirath, who were all related to each other, and 0.85 acre out of said parcel of 3.25 acres shall be sold by the petitioner herein to his wife Smt. Jashoda. It was also mentioned in the said agreement that in case the petitioner needs more money, then the same shall be given by the plaintiffs and in terms thereof Rs. It was also mentioned in the said agreement that in case the petitioner needs more money, then the same shall be given by the plaintiffs and in terms thereof Rs. 10,000/- was also paid by Beni Ram on 1.3.1983 of which a receipt was also given by the petitioner to the plaintiff-respondent. In this manner Rs. 12,000/- was paid and only 7500/- remained to be paid and the sale deed was to be executed for 2.40 acres of land. In the said agreement, there was a condition that insofar as Smt. Jashoda Devi, wife of petitioner is concerned, the amount to be spent on registry was to be deposited by the petitioner himself, whereas the expenses that were incurred for registry to be done for sale for 2.40 acres of land, the plaintiff - respondent as well as defendant - respondent nos. 3 & 4 shall pay the expenses i.e. Beni Ram, Bhagirath and Ved Ram. 4. It was alleged in the suit that the plaintiff - respondent asked the petitioner to execute the sale on 11.5.1983 by sending notice by registered post and it was decided amongst the parties that they shall execute the sale deed in the office of the Sub - Registrar on 26.5.1983. There being a local holiday on 26.5.1983 as agreed upon between the parties, the plaintiff - respondent reached the office of the Sub-Registrar on 27.5.1983 i.e. the next date for execution of the sale deed, but the petitioner did not appear for execution of the sale deed. The plaintiff-respondent was ever willing to carry out his part of the agreement and he had expressed his willingness to buy 2.40 acres of land for a sum of Rs. 19,500/-, but the petitioner seemed unwilling to carry out his part of the agreement. 5. In Original Suit No. 50 of 1984, the petitioner initially appeared and filed his written statement. In the written statement, he denied that there was any such agreement between the parties and it was alleged that the agreement was made because the petitioner needed Rs. 2,000/- to meet out his liabilities for payment of electricity dues, for which he had asked the plaintiff - respondent and the plaintiff - respondent agreed to give Rs. 2,000/- on the condition that out of Plot No. 683, a portion of 2.40 acres of land should be sold to him for a consideration of Rs. 2,000/- to meet out his liabilities for payment of electricity dues, for which he had asked the plaintiff - respondent and the plaintiff - respondent agreed to give Rs. 2,000/- on the condition that out of Plot No. 683, a portion of 2.40 acres of land should be sold to him for a consideration of Rs. 19,500/-. This agreement to sell was entered into only by way of securing Rs. 2,000/- advanced by the plaintiff - respondent to the petitioner and was never intended to be acted upon. In the written statement, the petitioner denied of ever receiving Rs. 10,000/- also from the plaintiff - respondent and pleaded that the receipt of Rs. 10,000/- produced before the Court was a forged document and the signatures thereon were also forged and in any case the receipt of Rs. 10,000/- that was produced was of no value as such a document needed to be registered before it could be relied upon as evidence. Also, the agreement to sell was barred by the provisions of Section 168 of U.P. Z.A.& L.R. Act, 1950 as it was for a piece of land, which was less than 3.12 acres. The petitioner was not a person belonging to Scheduled Caste, therefore the agreement to sell was also barred under Section 157 of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act. 6. After framing of issues the petitioner ceased to appear and the Court directed the proceeding to go on ex parte. The petitioner did not file any application for recall of the order of the trial court for the suit to be proceeded against ex parte. 7. On 15.12.1987, the trial court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff - respondent on the documentary evidence produced by the plaintiff - respondent with regard to the correctness of the agreement to sell. A decree was issued that within two months 2.40 acres of land shall be sold by the petitioner to the plaintiff - respondent and defendant nos. 3 & 4, Bhagirath and Ved Ram after payment of Rs. 7,500/- and payment of other expenses for registration by them, and 0.85 acres of land shall be sold by the petitioner to his wife Smt. Jashoda at his own expense. 8. 3 & 4, Bhagirath and Ved Ram after payment of Rs. 7,500/- and payment of other expenses for registration by them, and 0.85 acres of land shall be sold by the petitioner to his wife Smt. Jashoda at his own expense. 8. Against the ex parte decree dated 18.12.1987, the petitioner filed a Restoration Application on 3.2.1989, which was registered as Case No. 4 of 1998 and allowed vide order dated 3.2.1999 at the cost of Rs. 60/-. Due to non payment of cost, however, the restoration application of the petitioner was rejected on 13.2.1989. 9. The petitioner filed a Misc. application for recalling of the order dated 13.2.1989, which was registered as Misc. Case No. 2 of 1990, but the said application was dismissed on 2.4.1992 and thereafter Revision No. 24 of 1992 against the said order was also dismissed. 10. In the meanwhile, the respondent no.1, Beni Ram filed an Execution Case No. 10 of 1989, in which Jashoda, wife of the petitioner filed her objections under Section 47 saying that she was never part of the alleged agreement to sell and she had never gone to the office of the Sub - Registrar and did not sign the document alleged to be registered as agreement to sell. She did not wish to buy 0.85 acres of land from her husband and therefore that part of the decree directing the petitioner to sell 0.85 acres of land in her favour could not have been issued. She also supported the case of the petitioner that the agreement to sell was never intended to be acted upon and was only executed as a security for the Rs. 2,000/- advanced by the defendant - respondent in favour of her husband. 11. On 6.4.1993, the objections of Smt. Jashoda was rejected by the executing court holding that it was open to Smt. Jashoda not to get the sale deed executed in her favour, but in so far as the other respondents are concerned, the decree ex parte to them was absolutely valid. 12. 11. On 6.4.1993, the objections of Smt. Jashoda was rejected by the executing court holding that it was open to Smt. Jashoda not to get the sale deed executed in her favour, but in so far as the other respondents are concerned, the decree ex parte to them was absolutely valid. 12. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an objection under Section 47 of the CPC in the Execution case and the petitioner took objection that the land measuring 2.40 acres, which was the subject matter of the agreement to sell could not be sold as it amounted to selling of a 'fragment', which was barred under Section 168-A of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act. Since the decree had been passed for performance of a contract which was against the law it was in violation of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. Thus the decree passed was nullity. 13. The objections of the petitioner were rejected by the executing court vide its judgment and order dated 6.4.1993 on the ground that there was nothing on record to show that the area was under consolidation and in the absence of such evidence, the petitioner's plot cannot be said to be a consolidated one and therefore there was no question of 'fragmentation'. Moreover, such objection should not be raised before the executing court. 14. The respondent no.4 Jashoda filed a revision against the order dated 6.4.1993 and the petitioner also filed a Revision and both the Revisions were consolidated and dismissed on 30.11.1998. The petitioner had filed a copy of CH Form-45 which was purportedly issued under consolidation proceedings showing that the petitioner's plot was a consolidated one along with application but the same was rejected vide order dated 1.12.1999 by the Revisional court. Thereafter, the objections of the petitioner and his wife under Section 47 CPC were also rejected on 19.1.2000 by the Revisional court on the ground that the bar under Section 168-A would not be attracted as there was no evidence on record to prove that the area in question was a consolidated one and the question regarding executablity of the decree could not be gone into by the executing court. 15. Counsel for the petitioner, Sri. 15. Counsel for the petitioner, Sri. K. Ajit while challenging the orders of the learned courts below argued before this Court that the learned courts below committed an error in not deciding the objections under Section 47 with regard to executability of the decree, which according to him, was a void decree. Firstly, the agreement to sell being barred under Section 168-A and Section 157 of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act was violative of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, and the suit for specific performance could not have been decreed by the trial court below, without going into such objections being raised by the petitioner in his written statement. Secondly, even an ex parte decree should be a judgment in the eye of law under Section 2(2) of the CPC and there should be a formal adjudication of the issues to be framed by the trial court and the decree dated 18.12.1997 in Original Suit No. 50 of 1984 being non speaking, cannot be said to be a decree in the eyes of law. Since at time of trial before the learned court below, the petitioner in his written statement had taken such objections and issues were also framed, the learned Civil Judge, Rampur should have given his finding on the issues framed, which was not done. Thirdly, such a decree wherein defendant - respondent nos. 2, 3 & 4 did not express their readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contract and purchase the land in question could not be said to be executable in their favour. Since Jashoda wife of the petitioner did not wish to buy 0.85 acres of land, which the trial court had decreed to be sold in her favour, the land which was to be sold in execution of the decree being 2.40 acres alone, which was less than 3.125 acres required under Section 168, and under Section 157, of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act the sale deed would be void by the operation of law under Section 167 of U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act. 16. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner during the course of argument, read out the additional pleas taken in the written statement in the suit filed before the court of Civil Judge, Rampur wherein a specific plea was made with regard to agreement to sell being barred by Section 157 and Section 168-A of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act, and thereafter the judgment and order dated 18.12.1987 wherein no finding with respect of applicability of Section 157 and Section 168-A of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act was returned by the Civil Judge, Rampur. With regard to the objections filed by the petitioner and his wife under Section 47 of the CPC in Execution Case No. 10 of 1989, it was argued that the objections regarding Sections 157 and 168 were again taken as also the objection that there was no evidence produced before the trial court regarding receipt of additional Rs. 10,000/- and the fact that respondent nos. 2 to 4 in the original suit, Bhagirath, Ved Ram and Jashoda had not expressed their readiness and willingness to buy the land in question, no decree could have been passed in their favour against their will. Also, in the alleged agreement to sell dated 27.11.1982, there were no signatures of all the parties and therefore such agreement to sell was void. It was alleged that in fact, it was never intended to be acted upon as the petitioner's case all along had been that the agreement to sell was executed and registered only by way of securing the amount of Rs. 2,000/- advanced by the plaintiff - respondent to the petitioner. 17. It has also been argued by Sri K. Ajit, counsel for the petitioner that the Revisional court, first rejected the application for taking on record, additional documents in Civil Revision No. 61 of 1993 by which the petitioner had filed certified copy of CH Form-45, which was a public document to show that the Plot No. 683 of village Gangotri, district Rampur was falling under consolidated area, and sale of the part of the land violated the provisions of Section 168-A and amounted to sale of a 'fragment' and such sale was prohibited in law, on 1.12.1999, and thereafter also dismissed the Revision against rejection the objections under Section 47 of the CPC in the Execution Case No. 10 of 1989 vide its judgment and order dated 19.1.2000. 18. Counsel for the respondents, Sri M.P. Singh Yadav pointed out the discrepancies in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner mainly on the ground that the writ petition itself was not maintainable in view of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Radhey Shyam v. Chhabinath 2015 (5) SCC 423 wherein the Supreme Court has held that writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against the private respondents should not be entertained and certiorari does not lie to quash the judgment of Inferior Courts of civil jurisdiction. Orders of judicial court stand on different footing from judicial orders of statutory Authorities or Tribunals and there were no precedent in India for the High Courts to issue writs to subordinate court, in exercise of power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. The power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution can be exercised in very rare cases and only when the High Court is convinced that the order passed by the court below is completely without jurisdiction. 19. Learned counsel for the respondents read out paragraphs 64, 65, 66 & 67 of the judgment in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rejendra Shankar Patil 2010 8 SCC 329 extracted in paragraph 22 of the judgment rendered in the case Radhey Shyam & anothers v. Chhabi Nath & others which are as follows:- "64. However, this Court unfortunately discerns that of late there is a growing trend amongst several High Courts to entertain writ petition in cases of pure property disputes. Disputes relating to partition suits, matters relating to execution of a decree, in cases of dispute between landlord and tenant and also in a case of money decree and in various other cases where disputed questions of property are involved, writ courts are entertaining such disputes. In some cases the High Courts, in a routine manner, entertain petitions under Article 227 over such disputes and such petitions are treated as writ petitions. 65. We would like to make it clear that in view of the law referred to above in cases of property rights and in disputes between private individuals writ court should not interfere unless there is any infraction of statute or it can be shown that a private individual is acting in collusion with a statutory authority. 66. 65. We would like to make it clear that in view of the law referred to above in cases of property rights and in disputes between private individuals writ court should not interfere unless there is any infraction of statute or it can be shown that a private individual is acting in collusion with a statutory authority. 66. We may also observe that in some High Courts there is a tendency of entertaining petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution by terming them as writ petitions. This is sought to be justified on an erroneous appreciation of the ratio in Surya Dev and in view of the recent amendment to Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999. It is urged that as a result of the amendment, scope of Section 115 CPC has been curtailed. In our view, even if the scope of Section 115 CPC is curtailed that has not resulted in expanding the High Court's power of superintendence. It is too well known to be reiterated that in exercising its jurisdiction, High Court must follow the regime of law. 67. As a result of frequent interference by the Hon'ble High Court either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution with pending civil and at times criminal cases, the disposal of cases by the civil and criminal courts gets further impeded and thus causing serious problems in the administration of justice. This Court hopes and trusts that in exercising its power either under Article 226 or 227, the Hon'ble High Court will follow the time honoured principles discussed above. Those principles have been formulated by this Court for ends of justice and the High Courts as the highest courts of justice within their jurisdiction will adhere to them strictly." 23. Thus, we are of the view that judicial orders of civil courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226. We are also in agreement with the view of the referring Bench that a writ of mandamus does not lie against a private person not discharging any public duty. Scope of Article 227 is different from Article 226. 20. We are also in agreement with the view of the referring Bench that a writ of mandamus does not lie against a private person not discharging any public duty. Scope of Article 227 is different from Article 226. 20. In response to the argument raised with regard to maintainability of the writ petition, Sri K Ajit has argued that an amendment application had been moved on 16 February 2015 after the judgment rendered in the case of Radhey Shyam (supra) came to the notice of the counsel for the petitioner, and the said application had been allowed on 20.4.2015 by this Court, and instead of prayer being framed for issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing of the judgment and orders of the learned court below, a prayer for setting aside of the impugned judgments. The writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, as it was originally framed, had been allowed by this Court by way of amendment to be converted into an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 21. Sri M.P. Singh Yadav, counsel for the respondents pointed out that insofar as the argument regarding bar of Section 157 and 168-A of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act are concerned, the argument of non executability of the decree as being in violation of U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act cannot now be considered as by way of an amendment in 2004 of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act, the relevant Sections have been ommitted. 22. Sri K. Ajit per contra, pointed out that as per Section 11 of the amending Act, the operation of the amendment would be prospective in nature, with effect from the date of notification of such amendment. Section 11 of the amending Act protects transfers already made in violation of Section 168-A of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act, for a period of one year only. Moreover, the decree was passed in 1987 and execution case was filed in 1989 wherein Objections were rejected in 1993, and Revision against the rejection of such Objections were also dismissed in 2000 by the learned court below. The amendment in the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. in 2004 being prospective in nature would not protect an agreement to sell or a decree for specific performance or a contract, which was void in the eye of law at the time it was executed. 23. The amendment in the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. in 2004 being prospective in nature would not protect an agreement to sell or a decree for specific performance or a contract, which was void in the eye of law at the time it was executed. 23. In support of his argument, Sri K. Ajit relied upon a judgment rendered in the case of Mithlesh Kumari & another v. Fateh Bahadur Singh & another, 1991 R.D. 184 (SC) wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering a case where the land in question was sought to be sold in 'fragmented' sales in favour of the appellants and was less than 3.125 acres and the land was also in consolidated area. 24. It was observed by the Supreme Court as under: [Sub-section (1) of Section 168-A begins with a non-obstante clause and it over - rides the provisions of any law for the time being in force. The expression no person' would include the bhumidhar. The object of the section is to prevent fragmentation of land situated in a consolidated area and transfers that would result in fragmentation or further fragmentation shall be void and to such transfers Section 167 will mutatis mutandis be applicable. There is no doubt that under sub-section (2) transfer of any land country to the provisions of sub-section (1) shall be void and under sub-section (3) the provisions of section 167 shall mutatis mutandis apply." 25. Thereafter the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 12 has considered the effect of Section 189 of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act which provides for extinction of the interest of bhumidhar with transferable rights in his holding or any part thereof when the holding or part thereof has been transferred or let out in contravention of the provisions of this Act and had held that the sale in question would attract the provisions of Section 168-A, as it had resulted in transfer of the 'fragment'. 26. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a judgment of this Court rendered by Coordinate Bench in the case of Govardhan Singh & others v. Board of Revenue & others and has referred to the observations made therein that this Section 168-A comes into play only when a 'fragment' situated in consolidated areas is transferred. 26. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a judgment of this Court rendered by Coordinate Bench in the case of Govardhan Singh & others v. Board of Revenue & others and has referred to the observations made therein that this Section 168-A comes into play only when a 'fragment' situated in consolidated areas is transferred. If the transfer of the 'fragment' is to a person, who holds the land contiguous to the plot of the transferee, then such transfer is not void. 27. It has been pointed out by counsel for the respondents that the agreement to sell related to 3.125 acres part of which i e. 2.40 acre was to be sold to Beni Ram, Ved Ram and Bhagirath, and 0.85 acres was to be sold by the petitioner to his wife, only to avoid the operation of Section 168-A of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act. It was the intention of the plaintiff as well as the defendant - respondents to carry out the agreement to sell in totality, and this method was devised only to save the said agreement to sell being rendered void by operation of law under Section 168-A of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. Also, it was pointed out by the counsel for the respondents that there is a specific denial in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents that the petitioner did not belong to Scheduled Caste. It is only with respect to selling of less than 3.125 acres of land by a person of reserved category to a person belonging to unreserved category that Section 157 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act applies. The agreement to sell as it was framed was between two sets of reserved category persons, and was framed in such a manner as to avoid the operation of law under Section 168-A as the two 'fragments' together i.e. 2.40 acres and 0.85 acres constituted a total area ad measuring 3.125 acres. 28. The agreement to sell as it was framed was between two sets of reserved category persons, and was framed in such a manner as to avoid the operation of law under Section 168-A as the two 'fragments' together i.e. 2.40 acres and 0.85 acres constituted a total area ad measuring 3.125 acres. 28. Learned counsel for the petitioner Sri K. Ajit also relied upon a judgment rendered in the case Sundar Dass v. Ram Prakash AIR 1977 SC 1201 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering retrospective operation of Section 3 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1953 and observed that it is settled principle of statutory construction that the Court ought not to give a larger retrospective operation to a statutory provision than what can plainly be seen to have been meant by the legislature. Since the retrospective operation to the 2004 U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act is governed by Section 11 thereof, which says transfer made within previous one year only would be saved, an agreement to sell made purportedly in 1983 could not be said to be saved by it. 29. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the said judgment to argue that an objection as to nullity of a decree can always be raised and the executing court can examine whether the decree is a nullity and the principle of finality of the decree cannot be invoked by the appellant to avoid the consequence and incident flowing from retrospective introduction of the proviso in Section 3. 30. Now it is settled law that an executing court cannot go behind the decree, nor can it question its validity. Where a decree sought to be executed is questioned on grounds of being a nullity for lack of inherent jurisdiction in the court passing it, its invalidity can be set up in an execution proceeding. Where there is lack of inherent jurisdiction, it goes to the root of the Court power to try the case, and a decree which is a nullity is void and can be declared to be void by any Court in which it is presented. Its nullity can be set up whenever and wherever, it is sought to be enforced or relied upon and even at the stage of execution or even in collateral proceedings. Its nullity can be set up whenever and wherever, it is sought to be enforced or relied upon and even at the stage of execution or even in collateral proceedings. The executing court can, therefore, entertain an objection that the decree is a nullity and can refuse to execute the decree. By doing so, the executing court would not incur the reproach that it is going behind the decree, because the decree being null and void there would really be no decree at all. 31. The argument raised by learned counsel for the petitioner has also been sought to be supported by judgment rendered in the case of Jai Narayan Rao v. Kedar Nath reported in AIR 1956 SC 349 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the argument that when a decree imposes obligations on both sides which are so conditioned that performance of by one is conditional to performance by other, execution will not be ordered unless the party seeking execution not only offers to perform his side, but when an objection is raised, satisfies the executing court that he is in a position to do so. 32. It was argued by the counsel for the respondents that the agreement to sell as decreed by the lower court imposed obligations on each side which are distinct and severable with respect to the wife of the petitioner Smt. Jashoda, who was not ready and willing to buy her plot of land i.e. 0.85 acres. The decree was severable and therefore executable, and in such a case each party may be left to his own execution. 33. However, but it was argued on behalf of the petitioner that this is not a case of two independent and severable directions in the same decree, but of one set of reciprocal conditions indissolubly linked together so they cannot exist without each other. The fact that it is a decree for specific performance where the decree itself cannot be given unless the side seeking performance is ready and willing to perform his side of the bargain and is in a position to do so, would make such a decree inexecutable. The fact that it is a decree for specific performance where the decree itself cannot be given unless the side seeking performance is ready and willing to perform his side of the bargain and is in a position to do so, would make such a decree inexecutable. The decree has to be construed as a whole, and to hold otherwise would be to permit an executing court to go behind the decree, and vary its terms by splitting up what was fashioned as an indivisible whole, into distinct and divisible parts having separate and severable existence, without any interrelation between them. It was also argued on the basis of paragraph 11 of the said judgment, that the executing court can consider whether the defendant is in a position to perform his part of the decree. 34. Counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Rameshwar Dayal v. Banda (Dead) through his LRs reported in (1993) 1 SCC 531 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering that even when the Small Causes Court is called upon to decide the matter under the provisions of Small Causes Courts Act, the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable, and the Small Causes Courts is bound to set out the "points for determination" or "issues" contemplated under Rules 1 & 3 of Order 14 of the Code. It has been argued that the decision of the Civil Judge, Rampur which has not even stated the points for determination and given finding thereon, is obviously not a judgment within the meaning of Section 2(9) of the Code. Since the matters were in controversy between the parties, it is only a judgment which could have given rise to a decree and the so called decision of the Civil Judge, Rampur does not amount to a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) read with Section 2(9) and Rules 4(1) & 5 of Order 20 of the Code. 35. Having considered the rival submissions of the parties, I also have noticed a judgment rendered by a Coordinate Bench in the case of Thakur Prasad v. Beni Prasad (dead) through his Lrs. & others 2015 (3) AWC 2638. 35. Having considered the rival submissions of the parties, I also have noticed a judgment rendered by a Coordinate Bench in the case of Thakur Prasad v. Beni Prasad (dead) through his Lrs. & others 2015 (3) AWC 2638. In the said judgment although the court has come to the conclusion that a judgment rendered by the civil court of competent jurisdiction could be challenged by means of filing the writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. The said judgment also emphasises the limited jurisdiction which the High Court has under Article 227 of the Constitution and it relates to only supervision of lower courts or Tribunals as has been settled by the Apex Court in the case of Waryam Singh & another v. Amarnath & another 1954 SCR 565 which has been consistently followed and reiterated by the Supreme Court in several cases thereafter, including the judgment rendered in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shanker Patil (2010) 8 SCC 329 . 36. The supervisory jurisdiction of the Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is available in matters arising out of the proceedings/judicial orders of civil court subject to the limited review as elucidated in Radhey Shayam (supra) relying upon the case of Waryam Singh (supra). The writ petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution against the judicial orders passed by the civil court was therefore held to be not maintainable and was accordingly dismissed. 37. In the case of Waryam Singh on which reliance has been placed by this Hon'ble Court in the case of Thakur Prasad (supra), it was observed that the Court will not review findings of fact of the Inferior Court/Tribunal even if they be erroneous, based on the principle that the court which has jurisdiction over the subject matter has the jurisdiction to decide wrongly as well as rightly, and when the legislature does not choose to give right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy if a Superior Court was to rehear the case on the evidence, and substitute its own in the exercise of supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution. The error which has occurred in exercise of its jurisdiction by the civil court of competent jurisdiction, should be an error which is apparent on the face of the record and under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited. 38. From a perusal of the orders impugned in this petitioner, it is clear that the judgment and orders impugned in the aforesaid writ petition, namely the order passed by the Civil Judge, Rampur decreeing the suit ex parte, and the order passed thereafter by the appellate court in rejecting the appeal of the petitioner against the order of rejection of an application for restoration by the Civil Judge, Rampur, and the orders passed in revision thereafter are all orders passed by the competent civil courts in exercise of civil jurisdiction and this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 may not interfere at this late stage, when the petitioner had remedy of filing an appeal against the decree passed ex parte by the Civil Judge, Rampur at the first instance, which he did not avail. 39. Even otherwise, the jurisdiction of an executing court is limited jurisdiction and unless the decree passed by the court is without jurisdiction or there is inherent lack of jurisdiction, which is found pleaded and proved, Executing court should not and could not entertain any objection regarding in exercise of jurisdiction of the court passing the decree under execution. 40. Learned counsel for the respondent, Sri M.P. Singh Yadav has relied upon the judgment are by the Supreme Court in the case of Rajindra Kumar v. Kuldip Singh reported in 614 15 SCC 529 and Government of Orissa v. M/s Ashok Transport Agency & others reported in 2002 AIR SCW 2582 and two judgments of the Madras High Court and the Madhya Pradesh High Court, namely Padmavathi v. Kaveriammal, CivLJ 2009 2 45 and Moolchand and others v. Magania AIR 1965 MP 75 . 41. In the case of Government of Orissa v. M/s Ashok Transport Agency & others reported in 2002 AIR SCW 2582, the Supreme Court was considering the question as to when a decree passed by the competent court of law can be said to be void and when such a decree can be treated as voidable. 41. In the case of Government of Orissa v. M/s Ashok Transport Agency & others reported in 2002 AIR SCW 2582, the Supreme Court was considering the question as to when a decree passed by the competent court of law can be said to be void and when such a decree can be treated as voidable. It relied upon the judgment rendered by it in the case of Vasudev Dhanjibhat Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman & others AIR 1970 SC 1475 to hold that the scope of objection under Section 47 of the Code in relation to the executabality of a decree was limited and that only such a decree can be subject matter of objection, which is a nullity and not a decree which is erroneous either in law or on facts. The Supreme Court had laid down the law which runs as under:- "A court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree between the parties or their representatives; it must take the decree according to its tenor, and cannot entertain any objection that the decree was incorrect in law or on facts. Until it is set aside by an appropriate proceeding in appeal or revision, a decree even if it be erroneous is still binding between the parties. When a decree which is a nullity, for instance, where it is passed without bringing the legal representatives on record. In the judgment rendered by the High Court of Madras and Madhya Pradesh judgment of the Supreme Court had been relied upon to hold that a distinction must be drawn between a decree which is a nullity and decree which is not according to law in that the Court passing the decree ignores certain provisions of the law. A decree cannot be according to law, yet it is binding and conclusive between the parties until it is set aside either in appeal or in revision and the executing Court has no jurisdiction to refuse to execute the decree on the ground that it is not according to law." 42. In the case of Rajendra Kumar v. Kuldeep Singh, the Supreme Court was dealing with an ex parte decree for specific performance of agreement of sale of immovable property. In the case of Rajendra Kumar v. Kuldeep Singh, the Supreme Court was dealing with an ex parte decree for specific performance of agreement of sale of immovable property. In this case, ex parte decree had been passed under Order 8, Rule 10 of the CPC even in the absence of written statement, the Court had applied its mind to the pleadings and pronounced the judgment, this order was not challenged further. The Supreme Court observed that the decree for specific performance attained finality, the vendors thereafter cannot turn around and make weak and lame contentions regarding the executability of the decree. The main contention of the vendors was that there is no decree under Section 2(2) because there is no formal expression of adjudication and the Court had not conclusively determined the rights of the parties, but the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that having referred to the entire contention of the plaintiff, the suit was decreed as prayed for and such a decree could not be said "no decree" in the eyes of law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that it was not the case of the vendors that the Court did not have the jurisdiction to pass the decree. Nor was there any case that the decree was a nullity on account of any jurisdictional error. Hence, such a decree was executable for all intents and purposes, but limited to some of the vendors. 43. In this case, on an application being made by the petitioner herein the learned court below, had directed that it was open for Smt. Jashoda not to buy 0.85 acres of land in dispute from the petitioner, who was her husband, but insofar as the rest of the land i.e. 2.40 acres was concerned, Pyare was bound as agreed upon earlier to sell of the same to the decree holder. 44. It has also been observed in the said judgment of the Supreme Court that under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, a vendor is free to apply to the Court which made the decree to have the contract rescinded in case the purchaser has not paid the purchase money or other sum which the court has ordered him to pay within the period allowed by the decree, or such other period as the court may allow. On such an application, the court may, by order, rescind the contract "as the justice of the case may require" it has been observed thus: "It is now settled law that a suit for specific performance does not come to an end on passing of a decree and the Court which passed the decree retains control over the decree even after the decree has been passed and the decree is sometimes described as the preliminary decree. 32. In Hungerford Investment Trust Limited (In Voluntary Liquidation) v. Haridas Mundhra it has been held that: (SCC p.693, para 22) "22. It is settled by a long course of decisions of the Indian High Courts that the Court which passes a decree for specific performance retains control over the decree even after the decree has been passed. In Mahommadalli Sahib v. Abdul Khadirr Saheb (1930) MLJ (59) 351 it was held that the Court which passes a decree for specific performance has the power to extend the time fixed in the decree for the reason that Court retains control over the decree, that the contract between the parties is not extinguished by the passing of a decree for specific performance and that the contract subsists notwithstanding the passing of the decree. ..." 45. The Supreme Court has also relied upon the judgment rendered in the case of Satya Jain v. Anis Ahmed Rushdie (2013) 8 SCC 131 and in paragraph 42 of the report has observed as under : "In Satya Jain v. Anis Ahmed Rushdie it has been held that: (SCC pp. 145-146, paras 38-41) "38. The ultimate question that has now to be considered is: whether the plaintiff should be held to be entitled to a decree for specific performance of the agreement of 22-12-1970? 39. The long efflux of time (over 40 years) that has occurred and the galloping value of real estate in the meantime are the twin inhibiting factors in this regard. The same, however, have to be balanced with the fact that the plaintiffs are in no way responsible for the delay that has occurred and their keen participation in the proceedings till date show the live interest on the part of the plaintiffs to have the agreement enforced in law. 40. The same, however, have to be balanced with the fact that the plaintiffs are in no way responsible for the delay that has occurred and their keen participation in the proceedings till date show the live interest on the part of the plaintiffs to have the agreement enforced in law. 40. The discretion to direct specific performance of an agreement and that too after elapse of a long period of time, undoubtedly, has to be exercised on sound, reasonable, rational and acceptable principles. The parameters for the exercise of discretion vested by Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 cannot be entrapped within any precise expression of language and the contours thereof will always depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The ultimate guiding test would be the principles of fairness and reasonableness as may be dictated by the peculiar facts of any given case, which features the experienced judicial mind can perceive without any real difficulty. It must however be emphasized that efflux of time and escalation of price of property, by itself, cannot be a valid ground to deny the relief of specific performance. Such a view has been consistently adopted by this Court. By way of illustration opinions rendered in P.S. Ranakrishna Reddy v. M.K. Bhagyalakshmi: and more recently in Narinderjit Singh v. North Star Estate Promoters Ltd. may be usefully recapitulated. 41. The twin inhibiting factors identified above if are to be read as a bar to the grant of a decree of specific performance would amount to penalizing the plaintiffs for no fault on their part; to deny them the real fruits of a protracted litigation wherein the issues arising are being answered in their favour. From another perspective it may also indicate the inadequacies of the law to deal with the long delays that, at times, occur while rendering the final verdict in a given case. The aforesaid two features, at best, may justify award of additional compensation to the vendor by grant of a price higher than what had been stipulated in the agreement which price, in a given case, may even be the market price as on date of the order of the final Court." 46. The aforesaid two features, at best, may justify award of additional compensation to the vendor by grant of a price higher than what had been stipulated in the agreement which price, in a given case, may even be the market price as on date of the order of the final Court." 46. In view of the observations made herein above by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases cited by the counsel for the respondents, I am of the opinion that the orders impugned in the writ petition, warrant no interference by this Court in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 47. The writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.