JUDGMENT : 1......... (i) Is the State absolved from the liability to compensate persons whose properties are lost, in the attack by wild animals coming out from the forest? (ii) Is not the doctrine of strict liability applicable to cases wherein properties have been lost to persons in the attack of wild animals? 2. The respondent herein as plaintiff had approached the Munsiff's Court, Ranni through O.S. No. 187 of 2003 seeking damages of Rs. 90,000/- on account of loss sustained to his properties in the attack of wild animals. The property of the plaintiff is abutting the reserve forest. In the absence of any fencing to the forest, wild animals like wild elephants, deer etc. used to come out from the forest to have frequent visits to the property of the plaintiff, mostly in odd hours. The plaintiff had planted the property with high yielding species of rubber trees and also arecanuts. All the arecanut trees except one were broken/uprooted by the elephants. 40 rubber trees were severely attacked by the elephants and deer and its entire bark were removed thereby making it impossible for the plaintiff to tap the said rubber trees for extracting latex. He had caused to issue a demand notice to the defendants which did not evoke proper response, and hence the suit. 3. The defendants filed a written statement contending that the defendants and the State are not bound to compensate the plaintiff in this particular case. It has been contended that any negligence from the State or its officers has not been specifically pleaded and further that the State and its officers have no control over the wild animals and therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to claim any damages. 4. Repelling the contentions resorted to by the defendants, the Munsiff's Court decreed the suit by directing the defendants to pay an amount of Rs. 40,000/- as damages with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of suit till the date of realisation. The judgment and decree passed by the trial court were challenged by the defendants before the District Court, Pathanamthitta through A.S. No. 96 of 2007. The District Court, Pathanamthitta also concurred with the findings rendered by the trial court and dismissed the appeal and, hence this Second Appeal. 5. Heard the learned Special Government Pleader (Forest) for the appellants, and the learned counsel for the respondent. The District Court, Pathanamthitta also concurred with the findings rendered by the trial court and dismissed the appeal and, hence this Second Appeal. 5. Heard the learned Special Government Pleader (Forest) for the appellants, and the learned counsel for the respondent. The learned counsel for the respondent has opposed this Second Appeal and has pointed out that any substantial question of law is not involved in the matter. 6. Per contra, the learned Special Government Pleader has argued that the respondent is not entitled to any common-law remedy when there is a statute in force which provides for compensation to such persons who are victims of attack by wild animals, under the name and style “Kerala Rules for payment of Compensation to Victims of Attack by Wild Animals, 1980.” According to him, therefore, the matter involves a substantial question of law. 7. There is no quarrel that in the case of attack by wild animals, the liability on the part of the State and its officers is based on the doctrine of strict liability. The doctrine of strict liability has its origin from the celebrated decision in Rylands vs. Fletcher, (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330, which says: “If a person brings or accumulates on his land anything which, if it should escape, may cause damage to his neighbours, he does so at his peril. If it does escape and cause damage, he is responsible, however careful he may have been, and whatever precautions he may have taken to prevent damage.” “We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.” It was further held: “But for his act in bringing it there no mischief could have accrued, and it seems but just that he should at his peril keep it there so that no mischief may accrue, or answer for the natural and anticipated consequences. And upon authority, this we think is established to be the law whether the things so brought be beasts, or water, or filth, or stenches.” 8. And upon authority, this we think is established to be the law whether the things so brought be beasts, or water, or filth, or stenches.” 8. The rule in Rylands vs. Fletcher (supra) has resulted in the creation of a category of liability, for damage caused by ultra hazardous business or activity, which is justified on the basis that the persons carrying them on should bear all the risks associated with them, and not merely those arising from their negligence. Therefore, in short, the principle of proof of negligence always is not an ingredient to invite the principle of strict liability. When persons carrying on such ultra hazardous activities are bound to bear all the risks associated with them, the proof of negligence is not required to prove their liability for damages. 9. This Court has held in Varghese vs. Kerala State Electricity Board, 2013 (2) KLT 67 that even when no negligence is attributed in such cases of strict liability, the defendant is liable for damages, based on the principles of strict liability. 10. The learned Special Government Pleader has invited the attention of this Court to the decisions in State of Punjab vs. M/s. Modern Cultivators, AIR 1965 SC 17 , Jay Laxmi Salt Works (P) Ltd. vs. State of Gujarat, 1994 (4) SCC 1 and Vohra Sadikbhai Rajakbhai and Others vs. State of Gujarat and Others, AIR 2016 SC 2429 and attempted to distinguish those decisions relating to the principles of strict liability with the facts and circumstances of the present case. It has been argued that when the State or its officers have no control over the wild animals in reserve forest, the principle of strict liability cannot be fastened. An attempt has been made to argue that the State is only a trustee as far as the wild animals are concerned and the State has no control over it. It is hard to agree with the said propositions propounded by the learned Special Government Pleader. 11. This is also a case wherein the principle of strict liability is squarely applicable. Reserve forests are, no doubt, the property of the State. The State has been protecting wild life. As per Sections 9 and 11 of the Wild Life Protection Act, 1972, nobody is permitted to carry out hunting of wild animals. 11. This is also a case wherein the principle of strict liability is squarely applicable. Reserve forests are, no doubt, the property of the State. The State has been protecting wild life. As per Sections 9 and 11 of the Wild Life Protection Act, 1972, nobody is permitted to carry out hunting of wild animals. Even for self defence, killing of wild animals is permitted only in case of attack on persons, and not on their properties. Therefore, when even the right of self defence to killing wild animals for avoiding loss or damage to property in the attack of wild animals is totally prohibited by the Wild Life Protection Act, 1972, it is the duty of the State to see that the properties of persons should be protected from the attack of wild animals. 12. It is the duty of the State to install necessary fencing to the reserve forest for making it impossible for the wild animals to enter and wander in the private properties situated near the reserve forest. According to the learned Special Government Pleader, the plaintiff has not pleaded any specific negligence from the part of the State or its officers in the alleged loss sustained to the rubber trees or arecanut trees of the plaintiff. As I have stated above, even without a plea of negligence, the State is bound to compensate such persons when the principle of strict liability is applicable, especially when even self defence has not been permitted to preserve and protect one's property from the attack of wild animals. It is the duty of the State to ensure that such wild animals do not trespass into human habitation or agricultural properties of other persons. 13. This is a clear case wherein the facts reveal that the principle of res ipsa loquitur can be applied. The entire bark of 40 rubber trees, which were 12 years old, have been destroyed and removed. It cannot be said that the said act was done by the plaintiff. No person will dare to do such act, because the removal of the bark of the rubber trees will result in total loss to the said trees. Therefore, it goes without saying that the bark of the said 40 rubber trees were removed in the attack of wild animals. The appellants have no case that the plaintiff was keeping any wild animals. Therefore, it goes without saying that the bark of the said 40 rubber trees were removed in the attack of wild animals. The appellants have no case that the plaintiff was keeping any wild animals. The property of the plaintiff is admittedly abutting the reserve forest. There is no fencing in between the property of the plaintiff and the reserve forest. Therefore, the case of the plaintiff that the wild animals are frequently visiting his property, is only to be believed. 14. In the decision in Raman vs. Cochin Devaswom Board, 2015 (3) KLT 928 , a learned Single Judge of this Court has held that in the case of attack by elephants, the liability on its owner would be absolute liability. 15. Here in this particular case, even though it has been pointed out that rules have been formulated by the Government for providing compensation to the victims of attack by wild animals, it is the admitted case that as on the date of suit, the maximum amount payable through such rules was Rs. 10,000/- only. Presently it seems that the rules have been amended and the maximum amount payable has been enhanced to Rs. 75,000/-. When the maximum amount payable as on the date of suit towards such loss was Rs. 10,000/- only, the plaintiff had rightly opted to have recourse to a civil suit for damages. 16. As per the principles enunciated by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Dhulabhai vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, AIR 1969 SC 78 , if a statute gives power to special tribunals the jurisdiction to do what the civil court would normally do in a suit, the civil courts' jurisdiction must be held to be excluded. When a right is there, a remedy should also be there and when there is no forum for getting that remedy enforced, the civil courts will have jurisdiction. Therefore, the existence of the rules which do not provide adequate safe guard or remedy to the plaintiff, does not create a bar to the civil courts' jurisdiction to entertain this suit. 17. Therefore, the existence of the rules which do not provide adequate safe guard or remedy to the plaintiff, does not create a bar to the civil courts' jurisdiction to entertain this suit. 17. The learned Special Government Pleader has invited the attention of this Court to the decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in State of Himachal Pradesh and Others vs. Smt. Halli Devi, AIR 2000 HP 113 , wherein compensation was denied to a lady who had suffered 100% disability in the attack of a bear came out of the forest, on the ground that negligence was not pleaded and proved. When I have already held that in a case relating to strict liability, even if negligence is not pleaded and proved, the defendant's liability to pay damages is writ large because of the principle enunciated in Rylands vs. Fletcher (supra). 18. Regarding the quantum of damages, it seems that when the bark of the rubber trees have been totally removed, it is as good as total loss of the said trees. The amount of compensation of Rs. 1,000/- per tree granted by the trial court itself is too low and has no nexus with the actual. The amount of Rs. 40,000/- ordered by the trial court as damages is therefore not on the higher side. These aspects were carefully considered by the lower appellate court being the final fact finding authority, and the lower appellate court also has come to the very same conclusion. When the aforesaid questions have already been decided, this is a case wherein any further substantial questions of law do not arise. Matters being so, this Regular Second Appeal is not maintainable and is only to be dismissed, and I do so. 19. In the result, the Regular Second Appeal is dismissed. All pending interlocutory applications in this Regular Second Appeal will stand closed.