ORDER : VIJAY KUMAR SHUKLA, J. 1. This is an appeal filed by the appellant/defendant challenging judgment and decree dated 19-2-2015 passed by the 9th Additional District Judge, Bhopal in Regular Civil Appeal No. 144-A/2014, parties being Madhav Gogia v. Smt, K. Fatima Khursheed arising out of the judgment and decree dated 29-4-2014 passed by the learned Court of 9th Civil Judge Class-I, Bhopal in Regular Civil Suit No. 96-A/2012. 2. Heard on admission as well as I.A. No. 10780/2016 and also on I.A. No. 16270/2016 filed under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code. 3. The learned counsel for the respondent vehemently opposes the application for amendment filed under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code. 4. The learned counsel for the respondent submits that the suit for eviction was filed by the respondent plaintiff on the ground of section 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(f) of M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred as "Adhiniyam"). The trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 29-4-2014 decreed the suit on the ground of section 12(1)(a) but did not find proof of bona fide need under section 12(1)(f) of the Adhiniyam. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree, both the appellant/defendant and the respondent/plaintiff filed two separate appeals. The appeal filed by the plaintiff was registered as Civil Appeal No. 145-A/2014 Smt. K. Fatima Khursheet v. Madhav Gogia and the appeal filed by the the present appellant/defendant was registered as Civil Appeal No. 144-A/2014 Madhav Gogia v. K. Fatima Khursheed. Both the appeals were decided by the common judgment and decree dated 19-2-2015 by which the appeal filed by the appellant/defendant, Civil Appeal No. 144-A/2014 has been dismissed and the appeal filed by the respondent plaintiff No. 145-A/2014 has been allowed. Thus the decree for eviction has been passed on the ground of section 12(1) (a) and as well as on the ground under section 12(1)(f) of Adhiniyam. An objection has been raised that the present appeal was filed only against the judgment and decree passed in Civil Appeal No. 144-A/2014 by which the appeal filed by the present appellant/defendant was dismissed and there was no challenge to the judgment and decree passed in Civil Appeal No. 145-A/2014 by which the appeal filed by the plaintiff for passing a decree under section 12(1)(f) was allowed. 5. 5. From the cause title and also from the relief claimed in the appeal, it is crystal clear that the present appeal was filed on 17-3-2015, challenging the impugned judgment and decree passed in Civil Appeal No. 144-A/2014 in the case of Madhav Gogia v. Smt. K. Fatima Khursheed. When this objection was raised, appellant filed an application for amendment under Order 6, Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code seeking permission to amend the appeal and to permit him to challenge judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Appeal No. 145-A/2014. This application was filed on 30-11-2016 seeking permission to challenge the judgment and decree dated 19-2-2015 passed in Regular Civil Appeal No. 145-A/2014. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant relies on judgment passed by this Court in the case of Bhagchand v. Administrator, Municipal Corporation, Indore, reported in 2005(2) M.P.L.J. 262 . The learned counsel for the respondent opposes the said application on the ground that the amendment under Order 6, Rule 17 can be allowed only in the pleadings and not for challenging the judgment and decree in the present appeal by seeking amendment in the relief clause. He further submits that the proposed amendment would amount to permitting the appellant to challenge the judgment and decree passed on 19-2-2015 after inordinate delay as the appeal would be barred by limitation and provisions of Indian Limitation Act cannot be by-passed under the guise of an application for amendment under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code. He relies on the judgment passed in the case of Neelu Bai v. Phagumal, 2011(1) M.P.L.J. 675 and also Faqir Mohammad v. Gulabchand, 2011 (2) M.P.L.J. 445 . 7. First the impugned question arises for consideration whether by way of amendment, the appellant can be permitted to challenge judgment and decree passed in Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 145-A/2014 after a period of more than one and half years. The cause title and the prayer in the present appeal make it clear that the appellant has intended to challenge only the judgment and decree passed in Civil Appeal No. 144-A/2014. The cause title and the prayer in the present appeal make it clear that the appellant has intended to challenge only the judgment and decree passed in Civil Appeal No. 144-A/2014. The relief claimed in the appeal is reproduced as under: It is, therefore, prayed that the Hon'ble Court be pleased to call for records of the Courts below and set-aside the judgment and decree dated 19-2-2015, passed by learned Court of IX Additional District Judge, Bhopal (M.P.), (Shri Rajkumar Choubey) in Regular Civil Appeal No. 144-A/2014, parties being Madhav Gogia v. Smt. K. Fatima Khursheed arising out of the judgment and decree dated 29-4-2014, passed by learned Court of IX Civil Judge Class-I, Bhopal (Shri Sushil Kumar) in Regular Civil Suit No. 96-A/2012, parties being Smt. K. Fatima Khursheed v. Madhav Gogia, may grant any other relief, which this Hon'ble Court deems fit under the circumstances of the case and cost throughout be awarded to appellant/defendant in the interest of Justice. 8. The judgment passed in the case of Bhagchand (supra) relied by the appellant is of no help to him because the said ratio would not apply in the present case. In the said case the suit was filed for declaration and mandatory injunction. Supreme Court declared that the plaintiff is entitled to obtain I possession of the said shop from the defendant. Both the defendants preferred I separate appeals against the judgment and decree, decreeing the suit of the I plaintiff. The Appellate Court by common judgment allowed both the appeals I and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. The preliminary objection was raised by the respondent that single appeal which was filed by the appellant was not maintainable for the simple reason that both the defendants preferred separate appeals and a common judgment was passed but there being two decrees the | plaintiff ought to have filed two separate appeals assailing each decree passed by the Appellate Court. In the said judgment this Court held that it was not necessary to file two separate appeals because there was one suit and both the decrees were in the same case and passed on the same judgment filing of one second appeal by plaintiff is enough and it was not necessary for him to file two separate appeals. The preliminary objection was rejected. 9. The preliminary objection was rejected. 9. In the present case, it is not the question whether the common appeal is maintainable or not. The question which has cropped up for consideration is that whether under the provisions of Order 6, Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code the appellant can be permitted to amend the present appeal by seeking amendment to challenge the judgment and decree dated 19-2-2015 passed in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 145-A/2014. Though it was decided by the common judgment and decree by the lower Appellate Court but the appellant did not challenge the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Appeal No. 145-A/2014. Thus judgment relied by the appellant is misplaced and is of no help to him. 10. Before adverting further to the question of application for amendment, relevant provisions of Order 6, Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code is reproduced as under: Order 6, Rule 17 - Amendment of pleadings : The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties; Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of the diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trail. 11. From bare perusal of the application filed by the appellant under Order 6, Rule 17 , he seeks permission to amend to challenge the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Appeal No. 145-A/2014 by which the appeal filed by the respondent plaintiff was allowed on the ground of section 12(1)(f) also. If the application for amendment is allowed, that would mean that the appellant is permitted to challenge the impugned judgment and decree dated 19-2-2015 passed in Regular Civil Appeal No. 145-A/2014 after period of one and half years and also by-passing the provisions of Limitation Act. The Apex Court in the case of Siddalingamma and another v. Mamtha Shenoy, 2001 MPLJ Online (S.C.) 8 = (2001) 8 SCC 561 , has held that the amendment in the plaint would relate back to the date of institution of suit. The Apex Court in the case of Siddalingamma and another v. Mamtha Shenoy, 2001 MPLJ Online (S.C.) 8 = (2001) 8 SCC 561 , has held that the amendment in the plaint would relate back to the date of institution of suit. The same has been followed by the Apex Court in a recent judgment in the case of Basant Balu Patel, 2016 (4) M.P.L.J. (S.C.) 22. The delay has always been prime consideration for deciding the application for amendment when the proposed amendment is barred by limitation. The doctrine of relation back has been further elaborated in the case of L. C. Hanumanthappa v. H. B. Shiva Kumar, 2016(3) M.P.L.J. (S.C.) 281 = (2016) 1 SCC 332 , wherein it has been held that the doctrine of relation back i.e. relating back the amendment to the date when the suit was originally filed. In the case of Voltas Ltd. v. Rolta India Ltd., 2014 MPLJ Online (S.C.) 13 = (2014) 4 SCC 516 , the Apex Court held as under in Para 29 which is quoted as under : Mr. Nariman, learned Senior Counsel, has also contended that the counterclaims filed before the learned arbitrator is an elaboration of the amount stated in the notice and, in fact, it is an amendment of the claim of the respondent which deserved to be dealt with by the learned arbitrator. In this context, we may refer with profit to the ruling in K. Raheja Constructions Ltd. v. Alliance Ministries wherein the plaintiff had filed a suit for permanent injunction and sought an amendment for grant of relief of specific performance. The said prayer was rejected by the learned trial Court. A contention was canvassed that the appellant had not come forward with new plea and, in fact, there were material allegations in the plaint to sustain the amendment of the plaint. The Court observed that having allowed the period of seven years to elapse from the date of filing the suit, and the period of limitation being three years under Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 any amendment on the grounds set out, would defeat the valuable right of limitation accruing to the respondent. 12. The Court observed that having allowed the period of seven years to elapse from the date of filing the suit, and the period of limitation being three years under Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 any amendment on the grounds set out, would defeat the valuable right of limitation accruing to the respondent. 12. The said principle has been reiterated in South Konkan Distilleries v. Prabhakar Gajanan Naik, 2008 MPLJ Online (S.C.) 12 = (2008) 14 SCC 632 and Van Vibhag Karamchari Griha Nirman Sahkari Sanstha Maryadit v. Ramesh Chander. 13. In Revajeetu Builders and Developers v. Narayanaswamy and Sons, 2009 MPLJ Online (S.C.) 8 = (2009) 10 SCC 84 while laying down some basic principles for considering the amendment, the Court has stated that as a general rule that Court should decline amendment if afresh suit on the amendment claims would be barred by limitation on the date of application. 14. The Apex Court in case of Union of India v. Pramod Gupta, 2005 MPLJ Online (S.C.) 8 = (2005) 12 SCC 1. hold as under : 135. Delay and laches on the part of the parties to the proceedings would also be a relevant factor for allowing or disallowing an application for amendment of the pleadings. The High Court neither assigned sufficient or cogent reasons nor applied its mind as regards the relevant factors while allowing the said application for amendment. It has also not been taken into consideration that the application for amendment of pleadings might not have been maintainable in view of the statutory interdict contained in sub-section (2) of section 25 of the Act, if the same was applicable. 15. In view of the aforesaid discussions and enunciation of law as discussed above, the I.A.No. 16270/2016 under Order 6, Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code for amendment is rejected. 16. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that findings regarding the non-payment of arrears of rent is perverse. He submits that Courts below have not taken into consideration in proper prospective exhibits D-1 to D-4 From perusal of the para 13 of the lower Appellate Court, it is found that the Court has taken into consideration the said exhibits D-1 to D-4 and has recorded a finding after evaluation of evidence on the record that those documents do not prove that the rent was deposited in accordance with law. 17. 17. I do not find any perversity in the impugned judgment and decree so far the decree relates to passing of the decree under section 12(1)(a). The said view is fortified by the judgment of this Court passed in the case of Neelu Bai v. Phagumal (supra), wherein this Court has held that if the tenant has not deposited the arrears of rent within two months from the service of the notice of payment of rent as contemplated under section 13(1) of the Adhiniyam, the decree for eviction can be passed under section 12(1)(a). The said view is further supported by the judgment of this Court passed in the case of Faqir Mohammad (supra). 18. This Court is of the considered opinion that the judgment of the trial Court based upon consideration of facts and those findings of fact have been affirmed by the first Appellate Court no substantial question of law is involved, the question of interference by this Court does not arise and the appeal is dismissed. 19. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that he may be granted three months time to vacate the premises. The said prayer is not opposed by the learned counsel for the respondent. 20. Considering the said prayer which is not opposed by the learned counsel for the respondent, the appellant is granted three months time from today to vacate the premises (shop) in question.