JUDGEMENT AND ORDER : Heard Ms. P. Mog, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as Mr. RC Debnath, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent. 2. This revision petition under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C arises from the judgment and order dated 20.09.2016 delivered in Criminal Appeal no. 15 of 2015 by the Sessions Judge, South Tripura, Belonia. 3. The petitioner was convicted and sentenced by the judgment and order dated 16.11.2015 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, South Tripura, Belonia in case No. PRC 465 of 2013 on the complaint filed by one Shyamal Shil (PW-2) revealing that at about 5 pm on 03.11.2013 the petitioner suddenly appeared in their place and gagged his wife, hereinafter referred to as the victim [the name has been concealed for protecting the identity] and tried to drag her away from that place. His wife, the victim, raised alarm and on responding to such alarm the people from the neighbourhood rushed to that place and the petitioner fled away from the place of occurrence. 4. On the basis of the said complaint, Belonia police station case no. 228 of 2013 under Section 447 and 354 of the IPC was registered and investigated. After the charge sheet was filed, the charges under Section 447 and 354 of the IPC were framed against the petitioner, when the petitioner pleaded innocence and claimed to be tried. In order to substantiate the charge, the prosecution adduced 6(six) witnesses including the victim, the informant and the Public Prosecutor. After recording the prosecution witnesses, the petitioner was examined under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C and at that time also, he repeated his plea of innocence. 5. On appreciating the evidences led by the prosecution, the trial court (the court of the CJM, South Tripura, Belonia) has returned the finding of conviction holding that there is no reason to disbelieve PW-1 (the informant-cum-victim) who in the trial has categorically stated that the petitioner gagged her mouth with a napkin and tried to drag her away and when she raised the alarm the people from the neighbourhood rushed in and the petitioner fled away from the place of occurrence. According to the trial court the witnesses who testified the trial had to some extent, are material to ground the tale of outraging the modesty of the victim. 6. According to Mr. According to the trial court the witnesses who testified the trial had to some extent, are material to ground the tale of outraging the modesty of the victim. 6. According to Mr. Debnath, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, there should exist some tenable foundation to disbelieve the testimony of PW-1. The defence by way of cross examination could not elicit any material which can strike at the root of the credence of PW-1. The other witnesses also have lent their support to corroborate the statement of PW-1. Therefore, Mr. Debnath, learned Additional Public Prosecutor has stoutly contended that no interference is called for. 7. As stated earlier, the prosecution has adduced six witnesses to prove the following ingredients in order to establish the charge under Section 354 of the IPC (i) assault or use of criminal force to a woman with intention to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby outrage her modesty and (ii) the essence of a woman’s modesty is her sex. 8. There cannot be any doubt that the ultimate test for ascertaining whether the modesty has been outraged is whether the action of the offender is as such as could be perceived as one which is capable of shocking the essence of decency of a woman [Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj and another vs. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill reported in (1995) 6 SCC 194 ]. On further elucidation of sine qua non of the offence related to the outraging the modesty in Raju Pandurang Mahale vs State Of Maharashtra And Anr reported in (2004) 4 SCC 371 , the Apex Court has laid down the essential ingredients of offence punishable under Section 354 of the IPC as under: (a) That the assault must be on a woman. (b) That the accused must have used criminal force on her. (c) That the criminal force must have been used on the woman intending thereby to outrage her modesty or knowing that his acts would likely to outrage her modesty. 8. Ms. Mog, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that even though the defence has some where drifted from taking a categorical plea in respect of motive behind implicating the petitioner in the complaint, but from appreciation of the evidence it would emerge that PW-1 has not been telling the truth in the trial. 8. Ms. Mog, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that even though the defence has some where drifted from taking a categorical plea in respect of motive behind implicating the petitioner in the complaint, but from appreciation of the evidence it would emerge that PW-1 has not been telling the truth in the trial. When both PW-1 and PW-2 have categorically stated that the incident occurred about 5 pm, none of those Prosecution witnesses (PW-1 and PW-2) have disclosed who the villagers rushed to the place of occurrence, but from the statement of PW-3 (Smt. Parul Shil) the mother-in-law of PW-1 who, according to PW-1, was in the room next to the place of occurrence, has stated that at about 6.30/7 pm when her daughter-in-law was tying their cow she raised alarm. She has also not stated that she had come out of her room. One witness from the neighbourhood, namely Nikhil Shil (PW-4) has clearly stated that at 8/9 pm he heard cry from the house of Shipra Shil but he has categorically stated that he did not rush to the place of occurrence and denied to have any knowledge about the incident. PW-5 (Smt. Rupa Ghosh) stated that she seized the napkin which was allegedly used by the petitioner. PW-6 (Smt. Alpana Sarkar) is the Investigating Officer. She has stated that on 04.11.2013 the day after the occurrence the caused the seizure of the napkin on preparing the seizure list (Exhibit-2) and she had confirmed that though the said napkin was seized from the victim but her signature on the seizure list was not taken by the police officer. 9. On scrutiny of the materials on record and appreciating the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, this court is in agreement with the contention of Mr. Debnath, learned Additional Public Prosecutor that if PW-1, the victim is not believed the prosecution case would not survive the scrutiny of this court. PW-1’s testimony has been supported by PW-2, when PW-3 has categorically stated that PW-2 was nowhere around the place of occurrence and he was away from his house. 10. Having confronted with such circumstance, if the statement of PW-1 is not believed totally, without seeking any corroboration from the other witnesses, as stated by Ms. Mog, learned counsel, the prosecution’s case would cave in. Whether PW-1 can be believed or not. 10. Having confronted with such circumstance, if the statement of PW-1 is not believed totally, without seeking any corroboration from the other witnesses, as stated by Ms. Mog, learned counsel, the prosecution’s case would cave in. Whether PW-1 can be believed or not. There may be some circumstances where the victim is targeted alone or targeted with the criminal assault for outraging her modesty, but in this case what appears before this court that none of the neighbouring witnesses though have stated to have rushed to the place of occurrence was examined by the police officer. Though PW-4 was examined he had categorically stated that he heard hue and cry from the house of PW-1 at about 8/9 pm, but he did not go to the place of occurrence. Thus PW-1’s statement that the incidence of crying out occurred at 5 pm has not been corroborated by any reliable witness rather PW-3 and PW-4 have distinctly made substantively divergent statement in contrary to her statement about the time. Moreover, it is really surprising that when in the written ejahar the complainant has categorically stated that people from the neighbourhood rushed towards the place and on seeing them the petitioner fled away from the place of occurrence, but the Investigating Officer did not extend any explanation why the people from the neighbourhood were not examined. PW-2 is not the witness to any occurrence. His statement is a clear hearsay hit by Section 60 of the Indian Evidence Act. Whereas PW-3 was present very close to the place of occurrence but she also did not say that she came out of the room, but she heard the alarm after about two hours from the time what had been given by PW-1. 11. Thus, this court is of the opinion that participation of the petitioner in outraging the modesty of PW-1 has not been proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt and as such benefit must go to the petitioner. 12. Having held so, the petitioner is acquitted from the charge under Section 354 of the IPC on benefit of doubt. 13. In the result, the impugned judgment and order dated 20.09.2016 delivered in Criminal Appeal No. 15 of 2015 is set aside. The sureties are discharged from their obligations. The petition, therefore, stands allowed. Send down the LCRs forthwith.