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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2017 DIGILAW 982 (MP)

Bhavna Enterprises v. Municipal Council

2017-09-07

S.A.DHARMADHIKARI

body2017
ORDER 1. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, matter is heard finally. 2. In this petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India, the petitioner is seeking issuance of direction to make payment of Rs. 27,700/- lying with the respondents No.1 and 2 towards security deposit and 17% of the total work towards labour and installation charges of Rs.2,35,472/- along with interest @ 24 % P.A. from the date of completion of work. 3. The brief facts leading to filing of this petition are that the petitioner is an 'A' class contractor. In pursuant to NIT No.843 dated 10.8.9, the work was awarded to the petitioner for supply and installation of 11 KV line, 100 KV Transformers and 20 Street Light Poles at Ruthiyaee and installation of 11 KV line 63 KV volt Street light poles at wards No. 15, 17 and 21. The petitioner had deposited earnest money deposit for the same. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that as per terms and conditions of the contract and as per CSR, the petitioner is entitled to get the sum of 17% of the work done by him towards labour and installation charges. He has completed the work, but payment has not been made to him. The petitioner has received the payment, but he has put a remark in the measurement book that he received the same under protest. It is further contended that awarded work was to be executed strictly in compliance of CSR issued by respondent No.3 for the year 2008-09 which is part of the work order, which bears signature of the petitioner and the competent authority of the respondents, therefore, as per CSR the petitioner is entitled to get the sum of 17% of the work done by him towards labour and installation charges. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents No. 1 and 2 by filing return contended that claim of the petitioner is not part of the contract. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents No. 1 and 2 by filing return contended that claim of the petitioner is not part of the contract. The agreement has been executed between the parties in which certain terms of the contract has been mentioned and claiming the amount contrary to the terms and conditions of the contract falls within the definition of “dispute”, therefore, the petitioner can very well refer the dispute before the competent authority i.e. Superintending Engineer of Engineering Cell of Directorate of local body as per clause 29 of the agreement. The present writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India is not maintainable inasmuch as the disputed question of facts are involved. Moreover, the alternative remedy is specifically provided under clause 29 of the agreement. As per M.P. Madhyastham Pradhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 (For brevity 1983 Adhiniyam') definition of Public Undertaking has been given. Under clause 2 (i) of the definition of work contract has also been given. Section 7 of the 1983 Adhiniyam specify that “Either party to work contract shall irrespective of the fact whether agreement contain an arbitration clause or not, refer in writing dispute to the Tribunal.” Thus, it is crystal clear that every dispute in the matter of contract if one of the party is public undertaking or Sate Government then the matter shall be liable to be referred to the Tribunal if the dispute is more than Rs.50,000/-. In the present case, the petitioner is claiming the benefit which is more than Rs. 50,000/-, hence, the instant petition is liable to be dismissed. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 6. It is settled law that if alternative and equally efficacious remedy is available to the litigant then he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to issue prerogative writ without exhausting alternative remedy available under the law. 7. The apex Court in the case of Thansingh Nathmal vs. The Superintendent of Taxes, Dhubri and others, reported in AIR 1964 SC 1419 , has observed as under :- “The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided in the Article. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary; it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self-imposed limitations. Resort so that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by statute. Ordinarily the Court will not entertain a petition for a writ under Article 226, where the petitioner has an alternative remedy which, without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which the writ is claimed. The High Court does not therefore act as a Court of appeal against the decision of a Court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit, by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the machinery created under the stature to be bypassed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up.” 8. In view of aforesaid pronunciation of law and looking to the fact that alternative statutory remedy is available to the petitioner, this Court declines to interfere in the matter. The petitioner is directed to avail the alternative remedy as available under the law. 9. The plea of limitation shall not come in the way of the petitioner if he approaches the competent authority / Court having jurisdiction over the matter within a period of one month from today. 10. Accordingly, the instant petition deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.