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2017 DIGILAW 984 (ORI)

Pradosh Kumar Rout v. I. G. North Sector CISF

2017-09-04

SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

body2017
JUDGMENT S.N. PRASAD, J. - This writ petition is under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India wherein the dismissal order passed by the disciplinary authority under Annexure-7 dated 19.01.1993 whereby and where under the petitioner has been dismissed form service and the order dated 23.04.1993 passed by the appellate authority by which the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority has been affirmed and the order dated 31.12.1996 passed by the revisional authority by which the revision has been rejected, are under challenge. 2. Brief facts of the case has been pleaded by the petitioner in the writ petition is that he appointed under C.I.S.F. on 12.04.1987 and was placed on probation for a period of 2 years. While working at CISF Unit 10C (R & D) Centre, Faridabad, it was observed by the authorities that during the probation, the performance of the petitioner was not satisfactory in order to retain him in Force, so his probation period was extended for the period of further six months and it was observed in spite of extension of probation, the petitioner could not improve his performance, as such the Group Commandant recommended to the D.I.G. for termination of petitioner’s service and accordingly he was terminated vide order dated 9.2.1990. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the Director General, CISF, New Delhi, who on careful examination of the material available on record, has set aside the order of termination and reinstated him in service while passing the order dated 2.4.1991 with a further direction that the disciplinary authority will pass an order on the basis of the finding of the Enquiry Officer. The petitioner was accordingly reinstated in service and as per the direction of the D.G., the disciplinary authority has gave his final order on 3.7.1991 inflicting punishment upon him of dismissal from service, against which the petitioner has preferred an appeal before the D.G., CISF, the appellate authority has set aside the order of the disciplinary authority further ordered that de novo proceeding will be initiated as per the CISF Rules, 1969. On his reinstatement the petitioner will be treated deemed to have been placed under suspension from the date of dismissal and shall continue to be under suspension till further order. On his reinstatement the petitioner will be treated deemed to have been placed under suspension from the date of dismissal and shall continue to be under suspension till further order. In pursuant to the appellate order, the petitioner joined his service, as per the direction of the appellate authority he was placed under suspension w.e.f. 12.07.1991 and fixed his headquarter at CISF Group Headquarters, New Delhi and further direction upon him not to leave the Headquarters without prior permission of the opposite party no. 3. The petitioner during period of suspension was infected with jaundice and fell sick from 4.7.1992. In order to get medical treatment, the petitioner went to the CISF Doctor at North Zone Saket on 4.7.1992 but since it was Saturday the Doctor was absent as such the petitioner has to be examined by a Govt. Doctor in the primary Health Centre, Mehernauli which was the nearest Govt. Primary Health Centre. After examining, the petitioner has been advised one month complete rest and also not to take oily diet. The petitioner in order to take rest under the care of his family at his village has gone to his native place where he has received a Notice dated 23.07.1992 whereby and where under he was directed to report for duty forthwith failing which suitable disciplinary action would be taken against him as per rules. The petitioner in pursuance of the notice, had proceeded to the Group Headquarter at Delhi to report at Headquarter and on his joining the petitioner was served with a charge sheet vide order dated 29.08.1992 by the opposite party no. 3, directing him to submit his reply of the charges leveled against him in the memorandum of charge. The petitioner has submitted his written statement of defence dated 5.10.1992 were in the Enquiry Officer on its appreciation has found the charges proved and accordingly forwarded the report before the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary authority on its acceptance inflicted upon him the punishment of dismissal from service. The petitioner has approached the appellate authority as well as the revisional authority but both the statutory authority have declined to interfere with, hence the petitioner is before this Court. The petitioner has taken ground in assailing the order of dismissal from service that the Enquiry Officer has not appreciated the fact in right perspective. 3. The petitioner has approached the appellate authority as well as the revisional authority but both the statutory authority have declined to interfere with, hence the petitioner is before this Court. The petitioner has taken ground in assailing the order of dismissal from service that the Enquiry Officer has not appreciated the fact in right perspective. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner’s absence was beyond his control and since he was suffering from jaundice, he has submitted application for leave to go on leave but the lower authority has not produced before the Leave Sanctioning Authority and as such the petitioner who was ill at that time went to his native place to take rest and take food as per the advice of the Doctor. But this aspect of the matter has not been taken into consideration by the Enquiry Officer or the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority or the revisional authority. He further submits that it is settle proposition if the absence is not willful, the enquiry will be vitiated in the eye of law. According to him, since the absence was not willful rather it is beyond his control, and as such the order of dismissal is bad in the eye of law, in alternative he has submitted the order of punishment is harsh and not commensurate with the offence as alleged against him. On the basis of such submission, the prayer has been made to interfere with the decision of the disciplinary authority. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the opposite party has vehemently opposed the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. On the basis of such submission, the prayer has been made to interfere with the decision of the disciplinary authority. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the opposite party has vehemently opposed the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. He has submitted that the petitioner being a member of the disciplined force is supposed to act with utmost discipline, the petitioner who has not found to be good performer during the period of probation as such the period was extended but even during the extended time since he has not performed well he was terminated from service, however the termination order having been quashed by the higher authority on technical ground thereafter the petitioner was reinstated in service and while under suspension as per the order passed by the appellate authority he all of a sudden left the office and accordingly he, having been found as deserter, has proceeded departmentally wherein the petitioner has taken ground of medical ailment which according to him was not within his control, his further ground is that he has tried to seek sanction of the leave but his application was not put forth before the Sanctioning authority and as such he has proceeded to his native place. He has further submitted that the petitioner being a member of the disciplined force cannot be excepted to leave the headquarter without seeking any prior permission from the higher authority which is a gross misconduct as per the CISF Rules, 1949. The disciplinary authority after taking into consideration the nature of allegation has proceeded departmentally against him in which he fails to substantiate his argument, which was beyond his control. The enquiry officer has taken note of his ground of medical ailment, but the enquiry officer being not satisfied with the medical certificate has found the charges proved and thereafter forwarded the report before the disciplinary authority to proceed in accordance with the provision of the rules applicable to the petitioner. 5. On the strength of the submission, prayer has been made not to interfere sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India since there is three concurrent finding of three authorities as such the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may not reverse the fact finding by assuming the power of the appellate authority. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents available on record. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents available on record. 6. The fact which is not in dispute in this case is that the petitioner was appointed as Constable under CISF on probation for a period of two years, subject to its extension if the performance is not found to be satisfactory. Accordingly the petitioner is started discharging his duty but his probation period has not found to be satisfactory, he was directed to go on probation for further period of six months the petitioner could not able to improve in his performance in discharging the official duty, he has terminated without following due procedure which has been quashed by the appellate authority with a direction to remit the matter before the competent authority to proceed in accordance with law. The petitioner has been reinstated in service and thereafter he was again been dismissed form service against which the petitioner has again moved to the appellate authority but the appellate authority has again set aside the order of termination vide order dated 3.3.1992 and directed to go for de novo proceeding with a direction that he will be deemed to be under suspension in course of de novo enquiry. The headquarter of the petitioner was fixed under the period of suspension at Headquarter, CISF, New Delhi with a clear cut direction the petitioner shall not leave the headquarter without prior permission of opposite party no. 3 as would be evident from Annexure-4 annexed to the writ petition. 7. The petitioner has left the place of headquarter without any permission of higher competent authority and went to his residence, after lapse of some day, the petitioner was served with a notice with a direction to report at headquarter otherwise disciplinary action will be taken in pursuance of the same, the petitioner was reported on 29.8.1992 and has been served with memo of charge dated 28.09.1992 alleging the following charges. (i) “Gross act of indiscipline, Misconduct, disobedience of order and impertinence on the part of CISF No. 87143003 const. P.K. Rout of CISF Unit, DHER Dulhasti (J & K) while under suspension and attached at CISF Group Hqrs. New Delhi, on 7.7.1992 deserted himself from the Group Hqrs. During under suspension at his own without intimate/permission from the competent authority and remained unauthorisedly absent from the Hqrs. Up to 3.8.1992 from 28 days. (ii) CISF No. 87143003 Const. P.K. Rout of CISF Unit, DHER Dulhasti (J & K) while under suspension and attached at CISF Group Hqrs. New Delhi, on 7.7.1992 deserted himself from the Group Hqrs. During under suspension at his own without intimate/permission from the competent authority and remained unauthorisedly absent from the Hqrs. Up to 3.8.1992 from 28 days. (ii) CISF No. 87143003 Const. P.K. Rout of CISF Unit, DHEP Dulhasit (J & K) have been ordered to have been placed under suspension from the date of dismissal form service by thereinstating authority and by Group Commandant, CISF, Group Hqrs. New Delhi vide order No. V-15014/GHD/Disc./PKR/92/2436 dated 26.03.1992. During the period of suspension the Headquarters of the individual has been ordered to be CISF Group Hqrs., New Delhi-17. But the individual unauthorisedly deserted from the Group Hqrs. Delhi on 7.7.1992 without any intimation to or permission from the competent authority though he was ordered not to leave the headquarters without prior permission from the Group Commandant. The individual remained unatuthrisedly absent from the Headquarters upto 3.8.1992 and joined back on 4.8.1992. Thus, he has exhibited the gross act of indiscipline, misconduct, disobedience of order and impertinence which are unbecoming on the part of a member of an armed force of the Union. Hence the charges.” 8. The petitioner has submitted defence reply wherein he has taken plea of medical ailment and has stated before the enquiry officer that the reason was beyond his control and as such he has although tried to get the leave from the competent authority but his application has not been put forth and having no option he went to native place. He after receipt of notice on 22.07.1991 has reported at the headquarters on 28.09.1992. He has tried to impress upon the enquiry officer that the reason was beyond his control and the absence was not willful hence same maybe condoned by allowing him to continue in service. The enquiry officer on critical examination of defence reply, which has been perused by this Court, has found the petitioner on unauthorised absence from 7.7.1992 to 3.8.1992 which was against the direction passed by the authority dated 26.03.1992 wherien the petitioner was specifically directed not to leave the headquarter without prior permission of the undersigned. It is further evident that the leave application was purported to have been handed over to Mr. It is further evident that the leave application was purported to have been handed over to Mr. Omprakash and as per the contention of the petitioner, the Assistant Commandant but when it was placed before the Assistant Commandant, he was given advise to place the same before the Group Commandant and wait for him since he was away at that time but he did not wait and deserted the office on 7.7.1992 9. It is further evident from the material available on record that the petitioner has given reason of unauthorized absence of his medical ailment since he was suffering from jaundice and as such local Doctor of Delhi has advised him to take rest and avoid oily food and as such in order to take rest he has gone to his native place. He has submitted medical certificate in support to prove his ailment but the enquiry officer on critical examination of the medical certificate has given his finding that no medicine were prescribed, no test were recommended, as such came to conclusion that medical certificate has been obtained on request. He further came to the conclusion that the delinquent did not produced any medical document, prescription slip, cash memos of medicines purchased, lab. Test report etc. at the time of joining back after a month which further strengthened the impression that the medical certificate was obtained just to cover up the unauthorized absence and in view thereof, the enquiry officer has found the charges proved beyond any doubt. The enquiry officer has further come to finding that desertion from duty is serious act of misconduct and amounts to violation of Section 18 of the CISF Act, 1968 which attracts severe action against the defaulter and as such found the charge proved against him. The disciplinary authority has accepted the finding of the enquiry officer and inflicted the punishment of dismissal form service which has been confirmed by the appellate authority as well as by the revisional authority in exercise of power conferred under the statue. 10. These three orders are challenged before this Court by way of this Writ petition. Admittedly, the orders have been passed by the authorities whose offices are not within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. 10. These three orders are challenged before this Court by way of this Writ petition. Admittedly, the orders have been passed by the authorities whose offices are not within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The writ petition has been filed on the ground that the order has been communicated in his residential address, although learned counsel for the opposite party has raised no objection on the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of territorial jurisdiction but this Court has thought it proper to answer this issue first before going on merit. 11. It is not in dispute that the writ petition is amenable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. Article 226 of the Constitution of India confers power upon the High Court to issue certain writs- “(1) notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, qua warranto and certiorari, or any of them or the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part-III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred on a High Court by clause (1) shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by Clause (2) of Article 32.” The Constitution Bench of the apex Court in Election Commission, India-vs- Saka Venkata Rao, AIR 1953 SC 210 held that the writ Court would not run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction and that the petitioner or the authority affected by the writ must be amenable to Court’s jurisdiction either by residence or location within those territories. The rule that cause of action attracts jurisdiction in suits is based on statutory enactment and cannot apply to writs issued under Article 226 of the Constitution which makes no reference to any cause of action or where it arises but insist on the presence of the person or authority within the territories in relation to which High Court exercises jurisdiction. In K.S. Rashid and son –vs-Income Tax Investigation Commission and others, AIR 1954 SC 207 the Hon’ble Apex Court took similar view and held that the writ Court cannot exercise its power under Article 226 beyond its territorial jurisdiction. It is also held that the exercise of power conferred by Article 226 was subject to two-fold limitation, firstly, the power is to be exercised in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction and secondly, the persons or authority on whom the High Court is empowered to issue writ must be within those territories. Both the judgments rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Election Commission, India-vs- Saka Venkata Rao (supra) and K.S. Rashid and son-vs-Income Tax Investigation Commission and others (supra) fell for consideration before the Larger Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh –vs- Union of India and another, AIR 1961 SC 532 and the view taken by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the earlier two judgments has been confirmed by the larger Bench of the Apex Court which stated that unless there are clear and compelling reasons, which cannot be denied, writ Court cannot exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution beyond its territorial jurisdiction. 12. 12. Prior to the insertion of clause 1(A), it was held that the writ should not run beyond territories to which High Court exercise jurisdiction, but due to the aforesaid ratio which resulted undue hardship and inconvenience to litigants in respect of jurisdiction, clause (1)(a) was inserted and that clause is numbered as Clause (2) of the 42nd amendment Act, if the cause of action arises wholly or in part, within the jurisdiction of that High Court, it may issue a writ against a person or authority resides within the jurisdiction of another High Court, as a result of insertion of the clause, a petition can be presented in the High Court, within whose jurisdiction cause of action in respect of which relief is sought under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has arisen wholly or in part, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission –vs- Utpal Kumar Basu and other, (1994) 4 SCC 711 wherein it has been held that High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part-III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territories. The expression ‘cause of action’ means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the Court. Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the Court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. Thus the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition, the truth or otherwise of the averments made in the petition being immaterial. Thus the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition, the truth or otherwise of the averments made in the petition being immaterial. Same view has been taken by the Hon’ble Apex Court while dealing with the matter in the case of Union of India and others –vs- Adani Exports Ltd. and another, (2002) 1 SCC 567 , it has been held that in order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition it must disclose that the integral facts pleaded in support of the cause of action do constitute a cause so as to empower the Court to decide the dispute and the entire or a part of it arose within its jurisdiction. In the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. –vs- Union of India and another, (2004) 6 SCC 254 , it has been held that keeping in view the expression used in Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, indisputably even if a small fraction of cause of action occurs within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in the matter. However, even if a small part of cause of action arises within territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. Inappropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum convenient, that a part of cause of action arise of one or the other forums, it will be for the petitioner to choose its forum. 13. It is settled that each judgment is to be assessed on the basis of the facts and circumstances prevailing in the case. 13. It is settled that each judgment is to be assessed on the basis of the facts and circumstances prevailing in the case. So far as the case of Alchemist Limited And Another –vs- State Bank Of Sikkim and others (supra) is concerned, the fact was that the writ petition has been filed before the Calcutta High Court on the ground that the company has its branch there, while interfering with the order, the Calcutta High Court has entertained the writ petition, the Hon’ble High Court has held that merely because having its office within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, it does not confer power upon the said High Court unless a part of cause of action will arise within the territorial jurisdiction of the said High Court. 14. The material which s available on record is that the petitioner after his dismissal from service is residing within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and on the strength of his residence, he has approached this Court way back in the year 1997, wherein notices have been issued to the parties and they have also filed counter affidavits and the case was listed so many occasions, hence considering the ration laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Nawal Kishore Sharma-vs-Union of India, 2014 (9) SCALE 244 : AIR 2014 SC 3607 , this Court considering the Article 226 Clause-2 and also taking into consideration the fact that the writ petition is of the year 1997 wherein the parties have appeared, filed their counter affidavits and contested the case on merit, taking into consideration all these aspect of the matter and considering the pendency of the lis for 20 years it would be proper for this Court to adjudicate the issue on merit and accordingly the issue of maintainability being decided. 15. So far as the issue on merit is concerned, undisputedly the petitioner was member of the disciplined Force working as Constable in the CISF, his performance has found not to be satisfactory under probation period, accordingly was terminated. He was directed to be proceeded by initiating a regular departmental proceeding and he was put under suspension by the order of the competent authority, while in headquarter, he left the headquarters without any prior permission of the competent authority i.e. leave sanctioning authority. He was directed to be proceeded by initiating a regular departmental proceeding and he was put under suspension by the order of the competent authority, while in headquarter, he left the headquarters without any prior permission of the competent authority i.e. leave sanctioning authority. The notice was issued to him, he appeared and taken plea of medical ailment of suffering from jaundice, to substantiate this, he has produced medical certificate showing the fact that he has been advised by the concerned Doctor to go on rest and also certain restriction on his food has been directed to be followed but he has failed to submit the required medical prescription, cash memo, Lab. Test report etc. in order to show his bona fide, as such the enquiry officer having disbelieved the said documents and found him deserter and accordingly found the charge proved. 16. The allegation of desertion is a serious for a member of the disciplined Force which ultimately affects discipline in the entire Force and as such the petitioner being a member of the disciplined Force is expected to perform the service which is different to that of the other public servant working in the different establishment, reason being that the member of Force is supposed to maintain discipline and if the discipline will go, the entire system will collapse. 17. There is no denial that an employee may come across with the different situation in the discipline Force but the process is there but what this Court has observed by going through the finding of the enquiry officer that he was asked by the Assistant Commandant to wait for the Group Commandant who is the competent authority to sanction leave but instead of doing so, he left the headquarter and rushed to his native place and remained there for some days, as such according to the considered view of this Court, it is gross misconduct committed by the petitioner. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment rendered in the case of Krushnakant B. Parmar vrs. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment rendered in the case of Krushnakant B. Parmar vrs. Union of India and another reported in (2012) 2 JCR 127 SC wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to quash the order of dismissal on the ground that there must be specific finding in case of unauthorized absence to the effect that the absence must be willful and if that specific finding is lacking, the entire enquiry will be vitiated, but so far as the fact of the case is concerned, the Enquiry Officer has given specific finding by disbelieving the documents produced by the petitioner by saying that the certificate shown by the petitioner to substantiate his medical ailment having not been supported by any other medical prescriptions, cash memos, Lab. Test report to substantiate the fact that he actually was suffering from jaundice. In view thereof, the ratio of the said judgment is not applicable to the facts of this case. 19. So far as jurisdiction of this Court, scope of judicial review is very limited. For ready reference the proposition laid down in the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in case of State Bank of Hyderabad and Another Vrs. P.Kata Rao, (2008) 15 SCC 657 wherein at para 18 and 19 it has been held as follows:- “18. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the jurisdiction of superior Courts in interfering with a finding of fact arrived at by the enquiry officer is limited. The High Court, it is trite, would also ordinarily not interfere with the quantum of punishment. There cannot, furthermore, be any doubt or dispute that only because the delinquent employee who was also facing a criminal charge stands acquitted, the same, by itself, would not debar the disciplinary authority in initiating a fresh departmental proceeding and/or where the departmental proceedings had already been initiated, to continue therewith. 19. We are not unmindful of different principles laid down by this Court from time to time. The approach that the Court’s jurisdiction is unlimited although had not found favour with some Benches, the applicability of the doctrine of proportionality, however, had not been deviated from. In another judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Union of India and Others Vrs. The approach that the Court’s jurisdiction is unlimited although had not found favour with some Benches, the applicability of the doctrine of proportionality, however, had not been deviated from. In another judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Union of India and Others Vrs. P.Gunasekaran, AIR 2015 SC 545 the Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased to laid down a guideline in order to make interference with the order of punishment which is being quoted herein below:- “13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No. 1 was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second Court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Art. 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether.” a. The enquiry is held by a competent authority; b. The enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; c. There is violation of the principle of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; d. The authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; e. The authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion. g. The disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; h. The disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; i. The finding of fact is based on no evidence. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) Re-appreciate the evidence; (ii) Interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry in case the same has been conducted in a accordance with law; (iii) Go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) Go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) Interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) Correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) Go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” Thus the settled legal proposition is that the scope of judicial review under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India is very limited and the High Court cannot sit as an appellate Court and in the recent judgment rendered in case of Union of India Vrs. P. Gunasekaran (supra) it has been held that the High Court can interfere under Art. 226 but cannot interfere under Art. 226 to re-appreciate the evidence, to interfere with the conclusion in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law, go into the adequacy of the evidence, go into the reliability of the evidence, interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based, correct the errors of fact however grave it may appear to be, go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks is conscience and the High Court can only see whether the enquiry held by competent authority or the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed or there is violation of principle of natural justice in conducting the proceeding, the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching as fair conclusion by some consideration extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous consideration, the conclusion, on the very fact of it , is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion, the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence, the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding and the finding of fact based on no evidence. 20. If the case of the petitioner will be examined in the light of this principles, it would be evident that the petitioner has been provided with adequate opportunity of being heard before the enquiry officer, the enquiry officer has led the evidence, relevant documents have been produced, the petitioner has been provided an opportunity and thereafter charges have been proved, hence from perusal of the finding given by the enquiry officer no case is made out for interference by this Court as per the guideline laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vrs. P. Gunasekaran (supra). Moreover the appellate authority has also dismissed the appeal. This Court after going through the record of the case in hand also the ratio laid down in the cases referred hereinabove has found that this case is not coming under the fold of the guideline to exercise power of judicial review sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 21. Accordingly and in entirety of facts and circumstances and considering the facts that there are three concurrent findings by the authority based upon cogent evidence, hence this Court declines to interfere with the decision taken by the competent authority. In view thereof, the writ petition fails and dismissed. Petition dismissed.