JUDGMENT : John Michael Cunha, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 29.09.2014 in SC No.898/2009 passed by the 13th Additional Fast Track Court, Bengaluru City, whereby, the appellant is convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and a fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for three months. 2. The appellant is the husband of deceased (Deepa). According to the prosecution, the appellant (hereinafter referred to as ‘accused’) was suspecting the fidelity of the deceased and used to abuse her. That on 03.05.2009 at about 10.00 p.m. he picked up a quarrel and assaulted the deceased with club on her head, due to which, she succumbed to the injuries in the matrimonial home at Subbaiahnaplaya within the limits of Banaswadi Police Station. 3. During the trial, the prosecution examined in all 15 witnesses as PWs.1 to 15 and got marked 27 documents as Exs.P1 to P27 and the material objects at MOs.1 to 8 in proof of the charge framed against the accused. 4. PW1 is the mother and PW2 is the sister of the deceased. Both these witnesses have spoken about the ill-treatment suffered by the deceased at the hands of accused and have also spoken about the incident as informed to them by PW3- the daughter of accused and the deceased. PW3 is examined as eye witness to the incident. PW4 is the brother of the deceased and his evidence corroborates the testimonies of PWs.1 and 2. PW5 is the pancha witness to the seizure of blood stained shirt (MO1) worn by the accused at the time of his apprehension, under the mahazar Ex.P2. PW6 is the pancha witness to the spot mahazar Ex.P3. PWs.7 and 8 are the immediate neighbors who have been examined to speak about the fact that on the night of the incident, they heard the quarrel between the accused and deceased and the scream of deceased in the matrimonial home. PW9 is the Medical Officer who conducted autopsy and issued postmortem report as per Ex.P9 and also examined the club used for the commission of offence namely MO4 and gave his opinion as per Ex.P7. PW10 is the Police Constable attached to Banaswadi Police Station who delivered the seized articles to FSL. PW9 is the Medical Officer who conducted autopsy and issued postmortem report as per Ex.P9 and also examined the club used for the commission of offence namely MO4 and gave his opinion as per Ex.P7. PW10 is the Police Constable attached to Banaswadi Police Station who delivered the seized articles to FSL. PW11 is the Constable and PW13 is the Head Constable working in Banaswadi Police Station. According to these witnesses, they took custody of the accused at Commercial Street Police Station and produced him before the Station House Officer of Banaswadi Police Station. PW12 is the Forensic Scientist who examined the seized articles and issued report as per Ex.P10. PW14 is the Police Constable who took the dead body of deceased to Dr.Ambedkar College Hospital for postmortem and PW15 is the Investigating Officer. In the course of examination of these witnesses, the defence has marked Exs.D1 and D2 on behalf of the accused. 5. Upon hearing the learned Counsel for the accused and learned Public Prosecutor and on analyzing the entire material on record, the Trial Court believed the evidence of PW3 and relying on other circumstances proved by the prosecution found the accused guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced him as above. 6. We have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant and the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor on the grounds and contentions urged in the appeal filed by the accused challenging the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. 7. Sri.R P Chandrashekar, the learned Counsel for the appellant/accused has tenaciously presented the argument using all the power of persuasion at his command. He has assailed the very basis of the prosecution case contending that the entire case of the prosecution is rested on the testimony of a solitary witness namely, PW3 - the daughter of accused. The prosecution has treated her as eye witness to the incident, but she was a child aged about 11 years at the time of her examination before the court. Her evidence is contrary to the prosecution case. She has stated that on the date of incident, an uncle had come to their house in the evening and the said uncle and her father namely the accused were talking inside the house and in the evening, the said uncle took PW3 and her younger brother to a bakery and bought them Ice Cream. She has stated that on the date of incident, an uncle had come to their house in the evening and the said uncle and her father namely the accused were talking inside the house and in the evening, the said uncle took PW3 and her younger brother to a bakery and bought them Ice Cream. At about 10.00 p.m., once again the said uncle came home. He was given lime juice. He was standing near the door and her father and mother were quarrelling with each other. She was awake. At that time, her father asked the said uncle to come inside. The said uncle came and stood near the kitchen. At that time, her father took a club and assaulted on the head of her mother. She screamed aloud. Her father slapped her on the cheek and asked her to go to sleep turning on the other side. She did not know what happened thereafter. On the next day morning, she saw blood oozing from the nose and head of her mother and she was not responding. Therefore, she ran to the house of her grand mother (PW1) and brought her to the house. Based on this evidence, learned Counsel for the appellant has built up an argument that PW3 had gone to sleep by 10.00 p.m. and she came to know about the death of her mother only on the following day in the morning when she found her mother not responding when she tried to wake her up. Thereafter, she ran to the house of her grand mother and brought her to the house. To bolster this submission, learned counsel has referred to the evidence of PW1 – the grandmother of PW3, wherein PW1 has also narrated that on 04.05.2009 in the morning at about 6.30 a.m., PW3 came to her house and informed her that her mother is not waking up and froth is oozing out from her nose and mouth. Immediately, PW1 rushed to the house of accused and found the deceased lying dead and by her side, there was a club. Immediately, PW1 rushed to the house of accused and found the deceased lying dead and by her side, there was a club. Further referring to the contents of the complaint lodged by PW1 as per Ex.P1, learned Counsel pointed out that even in the complaint, PW1 has stated that at about 7.00 a.m., PW3 came to her house and informed her that her mother was not responding, which indicates that she was not an eyewitness to the incident. If in fact, PW3 had witnessed the incident, she would have told her grandmother at the earliest point of time that her father assaulted her mother as a result of which she sustained bleeding injuries or would have called for help in the night itself as PW1 was residing just in front of the house of PW3. The very fact PW3 has informed the incident to PW1 only on the following day suggests that she did not witness the incident as contended by the prosecution and hence PW3 could not be treated as an eyewitness. The second limb of the argument of the learned counsel is that even if the evidence of PW3 is to be believed, the circumstances brought out in the course of her cross-examination would indicate that she was thoroughly tutored by her grandmother and a woman activist by name Taznam. Her evidence, if believed, would go to show that on the night of the incident, another person who is described as ‘uncle’ by PW3 was also present in the house of the accused. Learned Counsel pointed out that the prosecution had in fact laid the charge-sheet against an unknown person arraigned as accused No.2, which goes to show that the prosecution case right from the inception is that there were two persons and the finger of suspicion was pointed at accused No.2. But for reasons best known to the prosecution, the said accused No.2 is neither sent up for trial nor any effort has been made by the prosecution to trace the said person. Therefore, the very genesis of the prosecution case is shrouded with suspicion. The very fact the prosecution has not proceeded against accused No.2, it has to be held that the prosecution has deliberately suppressed the genesis of crime and has made an attempt to shield the real offender, as a result, the very substratum of the prosecution case is rendered vulnerable. The very fact the prosecution has not proceeded against accused No.2, it has to be held that the prosecution has deliberately suppressed the genesis of crime and has made an attempt to shield the real offender, as a result, the very substratum of the prosecution case is rendered vulnerable. It is the submission of the learned counsel that even assuming that accused No.2 could not have been traced or apprehended, the Investigating Agency could have either submitted a ‘C’ report or he could have been cited as a witness to the alleged incident. That having not been done, serious doubt arises as to the real perpetrator of the crime. In any event, PW3 having maintained in her evidence that another person was present in the house on the night of the incident, the benefit of doubt that has cropped up in the case of prosecution has to be given to the accused. Alternatively, it is argued that in view of the above contradictions, the entire evidence of PW3 should be discarded as not worthy of credit. To support his argument on the question of appreciation of evidence of a solitary witness, learned Counsel has referred to the case of Lallu Manjhi and another Vs State of Jharkhand ( AIR 2003 SC 854 ) at para 10, which reads as under: “10. The Law of Evidence does not require any particular number of witnesses to be examined in proof of a given fact. However, faced with the testimony of a single witness, the Court may classify the oral testimony into three categories, namely (i) wholly reliable, (ii) wholly unreliable. And (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In the first two categories there may be no difficulty in accepting or discarding the testimony of the single witness. The difficulty arises in the third category of cases. The Court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial, before acting upon testimony of a single witness.” Further, placing reliance on the case of Smt.J Yashoda Vs Smt.K Shobha Rani ( AIR 2007 SC 1721 ), learned Counsel submitted that the prosecution has sought to rely on Ex.P26 the extract of the station house dairy maintained by the Commercial Street Police Station. It is a xerox copy and therefore, not admissible in law. It is a xerox copy and therefore, not admissible in law. The same is hit by Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. “Evidence Act prohibits the admission of statement made to the police officer except in the limited circumstances provided under the Act and this bar applies irrespective of the fact whether the statement was made before the commencement of investigation or it was made during the course of investigation”. Hence, if Ex.P26 is excluded from consideration, the prosecution is not left with any evidence which would establish the charge framed against the accused. Consequently, the accused is entitled for honorable acquittal. 8. Refuting the above argument, Sri.Vijaykumar Majage, the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor submitted that even if the testimony of PW3 is held unreliable and unacceptable, yet the prosecution has proved its case by other facts and circumstances which by themselves would be sufficient to bring home the guilt of accused. He has highlighted the following circumstances emanating from the evidence of the prosecution as chain of circumstances making out the ingredients of the offence charged against the accused namely, “(1) The incident has taken place in the matrimonial home wherein the deceased and the accused were residing together along with their children at the time of incident; (2) It is proved in evidence that the accused was present in the house on the night of incident; (3) The dead body of deceased was found in the house on the following morning with bleeding injury on her head; (4) The accused was not available in the house subsequent to the incident; (5) The blood stained shirt of the accused was seized in the Police Station; (6) The FSL report certifying that the ‘B’ group blood which was found on the shirt of accused found tallied with the blood group found on the clothes of the deceased as well as the Club – MO4.” It is the submission of the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor that the above circumstances coupled with the motive spoken to by PWs.1 and 2, namely, the mother and sister of the deceased as well as by PWs.7 and 8 – the immediate neighbors of the deceased clinchingly establish that on the night of the incident, the accused picked up quarrel with the deceased and assaulted her with the Club – MO4 and caused her death. Moreover the prosecution having proved that the above offence has taken place within the four walls of matrimonial home, the burden shifts on the accused to explain the circumstances as to how the deceased met with homicidal death on the night of the incident. 9. We have bestowed our thoughtful consideration to the factual and legal submissions canvassed by the parties and have carefully scrutinized the oral and documentary evidence on record. 10. There is no serious challenge to the fact that the deceased died on account of the injuries sustained on the night of 03.05.2009 in the matrimonial home where she was residing alongwith the accused and her children. The injuries found on the deceased have been noted in the postmortem report Ex.P6 as under: “1) Split laceration present over the top of head measuring 4 cm x 0.5 cm x bone depth; 2) Contusion present over left side of the frontal region measuring 4 cm x 2 cm; 3) Grazed abrasion present over front of upper 1/3rd of left arm measuring 2 cm x 1 cm; 4) On reflection of scalp, effusion of blood present over frontal and parietal region measuring 6 cm x 5 cm. Skull shows fissure fracture in the middle cranial fossa extending from left temporal bone to right temporal bone horizontally across the sellaturcica bone and sellatarcic for a length of 15 cms. Blood effused around the fracture site; 5) Brain – Lacerated at fracture site and covered by extra dural and sub dural haemorrhage. The injuries described are antermortem in nature and fresh. Abrasion is bright red in colour. Contusion is blue in colour. The injuries are caused by fairly heavy blunt weapon.” The doctor has opined that the death was due to shock and haemorrhage consequent to homicidal head injury sustained. PW9 – the doctor who conducted autopsy has stated that he examined MO4 and has confirmed that the injuries found on the head of deceased are possible to be caused by the said weapon. Thus, the homicidal nature of the death stands established. 11. With regard to the culpability of the accused, the trial Court has fully relied on the evidence of PW3 and has held the accused responsible for the murder of the deceased. But the accused has seriously challenged the veracity and credibility of her evidence. Thus, the homicidal nature of the death stands established. 11. With regard to the culpability of the accused, the trial Court has fully relied on the evidence of PW3 and has held the accused responsible for the murder of the deceased. But the accused has seriously challenged the veracity and credibility of her evidence. Hence, the controversy in this appeal is now boiled down to the question as to whether the said evidence could have been made the basis for conviction of the accused? 12. The learned counsel for the accused has assailed the veracity of the testimony of PW3 mainly on the ground that she was tutored by her grandmother and by a woman activist who were inimically disposed towards the accused and secondly, she has spoken about the presence of a stranger during the occurrence which amounts to material contradiction affecting the credibility of her evidence. Hence, the questions that fall for consideration are: “1) Whether the evidence of PW3 suffers from material omission amounting to contradiction rendering her evidence unworthy of credit? 2) Whether on account of the circumstances highlighted by the defence, the entire case of prosecution is liable to be discarded?” 13. In appreciating the evidence of PW3, the star witness relied on by the prosecution, it is relevant to note that at the time of the incident, PW3 was aged 9 years and at the time of her examination before the court she was aged 11 years and was studying in 4th standard. She is a child witness. The deposition recorded by the Trial Court indicates that preliminary questions were put to this witness to ascertain her capacity and understanding which fact has not been disputed by the defence counsel. Law recognizes a child as a competent witness, but a child because of the tender age and being in the care and custody of elders is amenable for tutoring and suggestions and therefore, the law requires that the evidence of a child witness must be evaluated carefully and with greater circumspection because a child is susceptible to be swayed by what others tell him and is an easy prey to tutoring and therefore, the rule of prudence requires that the testimony of a child witness is acted upon provided it receives suitable corroboration. 14. 14. In the backdrop of the above principles, if the evidence of PW3 is analyzed, it is pertinent to note that she has squarely implicated the accused in the death of her mother and has unequivocally stated that at about 10.00 p.m. her father and mother were quarrelling and at that time, her father picked up a club and assaulted on the head of her mother. She has specifically stated that at that time she screamed aloud but her father slapped her and asked her to sleep turning her head on the other side. Though she has stated about the presence of an ‘uncle’ at the time of incident, she has not attributed any overt acts to that person nor has it been elicited in her cross examination that the said person has either assisted or abetted the commission of the offence. As a matter of fact, the statement made by PW3 in the witness box implicating the accused has not been challenged in the cross examination. Therefore, in our considered opinion the statement extracted above imputing culpability solely on the accused deserves full credence. 15. Another circumstances which inspires confidence in the testimony of PW3 is that though PW3 is subjected to lengthy, arduous and meandering cross-examination, the defence has not been able to shake the veracity of this witness regarding the core case of prosecution in respect of the overt acts attributed to the accused. Insofar as the involvement of accused is concerned, we do not find any discrepancy or inconsistency whatsoever in the evidence of PW3. The circumstances brought out in the cross-examination of this witness indicate that PW3 was very much present during the occurrence and she witnessed the assault on the deceased. Merely because she did not rush to the house of her grandmother on the night of the incident to alert them cannot be a factor to doubt her presence at the spot when the defence has not been able to falsify her evidence that when she screamed, the accused slapped her and forced her to sleep. As a child she could not have reacted in any other manner. 16. The main ground on which the testimony of PW3 is sought to be discredited is that in her evidence she has spoken about the presence of a stranger during the occurrence. As a child she could not have reacted in any other manner. 16. The main ground on which the testimony of PW3 is sought to be discredited is that in her evidence she has spoken about the presence of a stranger during the occurrence. In appreciating this contention, it is relevant to note that in the course of the cross-examination of PW3, the defence Counsel has extracted the following portion of her statement as ‘omission’, the translated version thereof reads as follows: “It is true to suggest that in my first statement given before the police, I have not stated that when I went to the house of my grand mother, I informed her that my father assaulted the deceased with club at that time, there was a uncle in the house…... The said uncle came home at 10.00 p.m,. he was given juice. He was standing near the door. My father called him inside. He stood near the kitchen”. According to the learned Counsel for the appellant, the above statement is a material omission which amounts to contradiction as it contradicts the case of the prosecution implicating the accused as the author of the crime in question. 17. In answering the above issue, it is necessary to note that in the course of the cross examination of PW3 it is brought out that in her statement before the police on the first occasion she did not state anything about the visit of the said ‘uncle’ to their house or about his presence in the house at the time of incident. Thus, it is clear that the story of visit of a stranger to the house of accused on the previous day as well as on the night of occurrence has been introduced only in the second statement attributed to PW3. The charge-sheet reveals that the statement of PW3 was recorded on 04.05.2009. Admittedly, in this statement recorded on 04.05.2009, PW3 has nowhere stated about the presence of the so-called ‘uncle’ in their house either on the previous day or on the date of incident. Thus it can be gathered that this story has taken shape for the first time on 16.07.2009. 18. We have verified the records of lower court and it is seen that the charge-sheet was prepared on 15.07.2009. The second statement of PW3 is stated to have been recorded on 16.07.2009. Thus it can be gathered that this story has taken shape for the first time on 16.07.2009. 18. We have verified the records of lower court and it is seen that the charge-sheet was prepared on 15.07.2009. The second statement of PW3 is stated to have been recorded on 16.07.2009. It is not known why the Investigating Officer had to record the second statement of PW3 after completing the investigation by 15.07.2009. The learned Additional State Public Prosecutor is also not able to answer as to how the story of visit of a stranger came to be introduced when it was the case of prosecution from the inception is that the accused alone committed the murder of his wife. Admittedly, the FIR was registered only against the accused. As already stated above, the accused himself surrendered or appeared before the police and he was arrested on the date of the registration of FIR and the bloodstained shirt of the accused was seized on 04.05.2009. Even during the inquest and spot mahazar conducted after registration of FIR, no witness had spoken about the presence of any person in the house other than the accused. During the investigation, the Investigating Officer appears to have recorded the statement of large number of witnesses and none of these witnesses have spoken about the presence of a stranger or the so-called ‘uncle’ of PW3 in the house of deceased. It is only when the charge-sheet was presented to the court, a twist has been given to the prosecution case implicating one more person as co-accused. It is intriguing to note that in the charge-sheet it is stated that even though another person was said to be present during the occurrence, his details and whereabouts were not ascertained which implies that a fictitious person is shown as co-accused. Be that it may, PW3 has categorically denied the suggestion that she has given any such statement before the police on 16.07.2009. 19. PW15 - the Investigating Officer who laid the charge-sheet has stated in his chief examination that he completed the investigation on 15.07.2009 and laid the charge-sheet against the accused under Section 302 of IPC. This is in conformity with the date noted in the charge-sheet. But in the same breath, PW15 has stated that he recorded the second statement of PW3 on 16.07.2009. This is in conformity with the date noted in the charge-sheet. But in the same breath, PW15 has stated that he recorded the second statement of PW3 on 16.07.2009. The manner in which the second statement attributed to PW3 has come into existence, therefore, creates a serious doubt about the genuineness and authenticity of the said statement dated 16.07.2009. The manner in which this story is introduced in the prosecution case goes to show that with a view to bail out the accused, such a story has been introduced by fabricating a statement dated 16.07.2009. 20. Be that as it may, in view of the specific denial by PW3, it was incumbent upon the defence to prove the said omission so as to take advantage of the same. But on going through the entire evidence of PW15, we do not find any such suggestion having been made to PW15. As a result, the said second statement is not proved in accordance with Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. Therefore, it is not open for the appellant to impeach the testimony of PW3 on the basis of purported omission. 21. Even on point of law, it is not every omission or discrepancy that amounts to material contradiction so as to give the accused an advantage. Whether ‘omission’ or variation is a material contradiction or not is a question of fact which has to be determined with reference to the facts of the case. It is only that omission which amounts to contradiction can create serious doubt about the truthfulness or creditworthiness of the witnesses. 22. In the instant case, as we have already come to the conclusion that a deliberate manipulation has taken place after conclusion of the investigation by introducing a totally new story inconsistent with the original version of the prosecution case by attributing a concocted statement to PW3 and PW3 is made to speak in accordance with the distorted version, in our view, that portion of her testimony which is contrary to the case of prosecution cannot be given any credence and is liable to be discarded. But on that score the entire evidence of PW3 cannot be discarded. 23. It is now well settled that the maxim “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus” (false in one thing, false in every thing) is not applicable to the Indian situation. But on that score the entire evidence of PW3 cannot be discarded. 23. It is now well settled that the maxim “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus” (false in one thing, false in every thing) is not applicable to the Indian situation. It is explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ugar Ahir and Others Vs State of Bihar ( AIR 1965 SC 277 ), that the “maxim “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus” is neither a sound rule of law nor a rule of practice. Hardly one comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggerations, embroideries or embellishments. It is, therefore, the duty of the court to scrutinize the evidence carefully and, in terms of the felicitous metaphor, separate the grain from the chaff. But, it cannot obviously disbelieve the substratum of the prosecution case or the material parts of the evidence and reconstruct a story of its own out of the rest.” (underlining supplied) 24. In the instant case, on careful scrutiny of the evidence of PW3, we find that PW3 has given consistent, unwavering and acceptable evidence with regard to the core case of the prosecution implicating the accused as the author of the crime and this part of her testimony does not suffer from any untruth or falsehood. Therefore, we hold that the testimony of PW3 with regard to the implication of accused and the overt acts attributed to him is reliable and trustworthy and can be relied on as the basis for establishing the complicity of the accused in the commission of the offence in question. 25. It is also relevant to note that apart from the direct evidence of PW3 there are other incriminating circumstances which corroborate the testimony of PW3 in proving the guilt of accused for the offence charged against him. Undisputedly, the incident has taken place within the four walls of the house, wherein the deceased and accused were residing at the time of occurrence. When the offence has been committed in secrecy within the four walls, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan Vs State of Maharastra [ (2006) 10 SCC 681 ], the nature and amount of evidence required to establish the charge cannot be of same degree as required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. When the offence has been committed in secrecy within the four walls, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan Vs State of Maharastra [ (2006) 10 SCC 681 ], the nature and amount of evidence required to establish the charge cannot be of same degree as required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. In view of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation. In the instant case, the prosecution having established by examining PWs.3, 7 and 8 that at the time of incident, the accused was present in the house and they heard the scream of the deceased, it was incumbent upon the accused to offer explanation as to the circumstances which led to the death of the deceased on the fateful night. This circumstances therefore, goes against the innocence of the accused. 26. Prosecution has also proved in evidence that soon after the incident, the accused was not found in the house. The evidence of PWs.1 and 3 and other neighbors i.e., PWs.7 and 8 clearly indicates that when they saw the deceased lying dead in the morning on 04.05.2009 the accused was not in the house, but he was found in the Commercial Street Police Station. Though the learned Counsel for the accused has seriously objected to rely on Ex.P26 the inculpatory entry made in the Station House Dairy of the Commercial Street Police Station on the ground that the same is inadmissible in evidence, yet the fact remains that the accused was produced before the Station House Officer of Banaswadi Police Station on the same day and soon after his arrest, the shirt worn by the accused was seized under a mahazar Ex.P2 in the presence of PW5. Prosecution has also proved that the blood stains contained in the said shirt MO1 was of the same blood group as found in the Club – MO4 as well on the clothes worn by the deceased. As a result, there is sufficient corroboration to the testimony of PW3, thereby, the prosecution has established the guilt of accused beyond all reasonable doubt and therefore, we do not have any hesitation to concur with the findings recorded by the Trial Court that the accused and the accused alone is the author of the crime in question. 27. As a result, there is sufficient corroboration to the testimony of PW3, thereby, the prosecution has established the guilt of accused beyond all reasonable doubt and therefore, we do not have any hesitation to concur with the findings recorded by the Trial Court that the accused and the accused alone is the author of the crime in question. 27. Having come to the above conclusion, the question now remains to be considered is whether the facts proved by the prosecution constitute the ingredients of offence under Section 302 of IPC for which the accused is convicted by the Trial court? 28. In answering this question, it is relevant to note that it is proved in evidence that the accused and deceased were having serious matrimonial discords between them. The evidence indicates that their relationship had strained on account of the suspicious character of the accused. The immediate relatives as well as the neighbors of deceased have consistently stated that the accused and deceased were frequently quarrelling in the matrimonial home. PWs.7 and 8 have gone to the extent of stating that on the date of incident, they heard the quarrel between the deceased and accused and they thought it was a regular affair and therefore they did not intervene in the incident, which means that the accused was in the habit of quarrelling with the deceased regularly. Evidence of PW3 indicates that on the date of the incident while engaged in the quarrel with the deceased, the accused picked up the Club – MO4 which was available in the house and assaulted on the head of deceased. The evidence discloses that the deceased had sustained only one injury on the head which resulted in her death. 29. It is not the case of prosecution that it was a pre-planned murder or that the accused had made any preparation to do away with the deceased. On the other hand, the circumstances proved in evidence indicate that on the spur of the moment during quarrel, the accused assaulted the deceased. In this context the subsequent conduct of the accused also assumes relevance. It has come in the evidence that after the incident, the accused straightaway went to the police station and surrendered himself. This is one of the factor indicating remorse on the part of accused. In this context the subsequent conduct of the accused also assumes relevance. It has come in the evidence that after the incident, the accused straightaway went to the police station and surrendered himself. This is one of the factor indicating remorse on the part of accused. But what is important to be noted is that there is nothing in the evidence suggesting that the deceased was assaulted with an intention to cause death. 30. From the nature of the injury sustained by the deceased and the weapon used for the commission of offence, it can be inferred that the accused intended to cause only an injury but did not intend to cause her death. Nonetheless, the said injury having resulted in the death of the deceased on account of the force used by the accused in the backdrop of the ongoing matrimonial strife, the only inference that could be drawn is that he had intention to cause such injury which is likely to cause her death. In that view of the matter we are of the opinion that the facts proved by the prosecution fall within the ambit of Section 304-I of IPC. Hence, the conviction recorded by the Trial Court under Section 302 of IPC cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be modified. Accordingly, we hold the accused guilty of the offence punishable under Section 304-I of IPC. Having regard to the circumstances in which the offence has taken place and in the light of the observations made above, we find it just and appropriate to sentence the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 10 years. The sentence of fine imposed by the Trial Court is maintained. 31. The records reveal that the accused was arrested on 04.05.2009 and since then he has been in custody either as an under trial prisoner or serving the sentence of imprisonment. As the accused has already served substantial portion of the sentence for 8 years 2 months (including the set off period) he shall serve the remaining term as ordered herein. ORDER The appeal is partly allowed. The impugned judgment dated 29.09.2014 in SC No.898/2009 on the file of the 13th Additional Fast Track Court, Bengaluru City, is modified. The appellant/accused is convicted for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part I of IPC and is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a term of 10 years. ORDER The appeal is partly allowed. The impugned judgment dated 29.09.2014 in SC No.898/2009 on the file of the 13th Additional Fast Track Court, Bengaluru City, is modified. The appellant/accused is convicted for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part I of IPC and is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a term of 10 years. The fine awarded by the Trial Court is maintained. The accused is entitled for set off as per Section 428 Cr.P.C.