JUDGMENT Hon’ble P.K.S. Baghel, J.—The writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is invoked against the order dated 25.1.2014 passed by the District Judge, Bijnor, the third respondent whereby the petitioner’s services have been terminated. 2. The factual matrix of this case is in a short compass. The petitioner was initially appointed as Orderly in the District Judgeship, Bijnor vide order dated 25.8.2003. Later, he was transferred to Outline Court, Nagina on 12.8.2013 and deputed as Chowkidar. It was also mentioned in his transfer order that he shall be on duty in the night. 3. The petitioner joined at Nagina and had been performing his duties as Chowkidar. A complaint was made against him by the Deputy Nazir, Munsif Court, Nagina that he was found absent at 11:45 p.m. on 2.9.2013. It was also mentioned in the report/complaint that after half an hour at 12:15 a.m. he was again called but he did not turn up at the gate, so it was presumed that the petitioner was sleeping and he was negligent in performance of his duties. On the said complaint, a show-cause notice was issued to him. The petitioner submitted his reply on 6.9.2013 denying the allegations made in the show-cause notice. He has stated that there is huge premises of the Court and he takes round of the entire premises and building. 4. A show-cause notice was issued in respect of his absence and it was also alleged that the petitioner does not live at Nagina and he lives at Bijnor daily. In his reply he has also denied the fact that he does not live at Nagina. It is stated that he has taken house on rent at Nagina where he resides. 5. Learned District Judge suspended the petitioner vide order dated 17.9.2013 and a preliminary enquiry was conducted by the Additional District Judge, Outline Court, Nagina, who submitted his report on 30.9.2013. In the said report the complaint made by the Deputy Nazir was found to be correct. 6. The learned District Judge took a decision to hold a final enquiry in the matter vide his order dated 1.10.2013 and the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 5, Bijnor was appointed as an enquiry officer. 7. In the said report the complaint made by the Deputy Nazir was found to be correct. 6. The learned District Judge took a decision to hold a final enquiry in the matter vide his order dated 1.10.2013 and the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 5, Bijnor was appointed as an enquiry officer. 7. It is stated that a charge-sheet dated 3.10.2013 was served upon the petitioner on 9.10.2013 wherein he has been directed to submit his reply by 10.10.2013 hence only twenty-four hours time was granted to the petitioner to submit his reply. 8. The enquiry officer conducted the enquiry and found that both the charges were proved against the petitioner. 9. The disciplinary authority accepted the enquiry report and directed to issue a show-cause notice. A show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 30.11.2013. The said show-cause notice was issued under Rule-3 of the U.P. Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 as to why he may not be punished. 10. The petitioner submitted his reply. He made a request that he may also be personally heard. He also raised the issue of violation of the principles of natural justice as only twenty-four hours time was granted to him to submit his reply to the show-cause notice. He has also stated that the statement of his landlord Sitaram was not considered in proper perspective and he has been punished without any evidence on record. 11. A counter-affidavit is filed. It is stated in the counter-affidavit that the petitioner was appointed as a class-IV employee on purely ad hoc basis in the vacancy occurred in the Fast Track Court vide order dated 29.5.2003 which continues till the life of the Fast Track Court and on the revival of the Fast Track Courts the petitioner was appointed again purely on ad hoc basis as a class-IV employee vide order dated 26.5.2005. 12. It is averred in the counter-affidavit that on 3.9.2013 in a surprise inspection between 11:45 p.m. To 12:15 a.m. he did not found the petitioner present on duty. The A.C.J.M. has also carried out a verification of these facts and he found that the report of Deputy Nazir dated 3.9.2013 is correct. In the regular enquiry the delinquent employee was found negligent in discharge of his duties for remaining absent from duty on 2.9.2013 and 5.9.2013. The A.C.J.M. has also carried out a verification of these facts and he found that the report of Deputy Nazir dated 3.9.2013 is correct. In the regular enquiry the delinquent employee was found negligent in discharge of his duties for remaining absent from duty on 2.9.2013 and 5.9.2013. The enquiry officer found that the charge No. 2 regarding his travelling unauthorizedly without permissioin between Nagina and Bijnor was also correct. 13. It is stated in the counter-affidavit that a charge-sheet was served upon the petitiner on 9.10.2013 hence sufficient time was given to him. 14. Sri V.K. Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner submits that the enquiry was conducted against the principles of natural justice. The petitioner was not allowed reasonable time; and, he was compelled to file reply to the charge-sheet within two days and his application for the grant of fifteen days time was not allowed. The date and time was not fixed for the enquiry. 15. Next, he submitted that from a perusal of the enquiry report and the impugned order it is evident that the conclusion of the enquiry and the impugned order is not based on any evidence but only on suspicion. It is submitted that mere suspicion should not be allowed to take the place of truth even in the domestic enquiry. Lastly, he urged that the punishment of dismissal is disproportionate and not commensurate to the allegation. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Bal Krishna Agarwal v. State of U.P. and others, (1995) 1 SCC 614 ; State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772 ; Union of India v. H.C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364 ; B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and others, (1995) 6 SCC 749 ; Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India and others, (1987) 4 SCC 611 ; Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank v. Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank Employees Assn. and another, (2007) 4 SCC 669 ; Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, AIR 1983 SC 454 ; D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd., (1993) 3 SCC 259 ; and, S.R. Tewari v. Union of India and another, (2013) 6 SCC 602 . 17. and another, (2007) 4 SCC 669 ; Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, AIR 1983 SC 454 ; D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd., (1993) 3 SCC 259 ; and, S.R. Tewari v. Union of India and another, (2013) 6 SCC 602 . 17. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the petitioner was given sufficient opportunity and the charge of negligence of duty has been proved. He further submits that the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution has no jurisdiction to see the proportionality of the punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority. 18. I have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 19. The petitioner claims that he was appointed as orderly in District Judgeship, Bijnor on 25.8.2003. The letter of appointment has not been filed by the petitioner. In the counter-affidavit also his appointment letter has not been brought on the record. 20. It is stated in the counter-affidavit that the petitioner was appointed as an orderly/peon vide order dated 29.5.2003 on ad hoc basis in terms of Government Order dated 21.1.2013 for the period prescribed in the said Government order in the pay scale of Rs. 2550-3200 in the vacancies created in the Fast Track Court in Bijnor Judgeship. 21. From the record it is also not clear whether the respondents have proceeded under the provisions of the Rules, 1999 (as mentioned in the notice issued by the District Judge dated 30.11.2013, annexure-9 to the writ petition) or under the U.P. Subordinate Courts Staff (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1976. The dismissal order shows that the petitioner’s services have been terminated under the U.P. Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975 and the Rules, 1976. 22. The petitioner was served a charge-sheet wherein two charges were framed against him. It is mentioned that allegation made in charge No. 1 is in violation of the Rule 3(1) of the U.P. Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956. The second charge is also said to be in violation of the same rule. It states that the petitioner does not live at Nazibabad and without the permission of the concerned authority he makes journey to and fro from Nazibadad to Bijnor. The charge-sheet has been issued on 3.10.2013 which was approved by the District Judge on 4.10.2003 and it has been served upon the petitioner on 9.10.2013 at 01.30 p.m.. It states that the petitioner does not live at Nazibabad and without the permission of the concerned authority he makes journey to and fro from Nazibadad to Bijnor. The charge-sheet has been issued on 3.10.2013 which was approved by the District Judge on 4.10.2003 and it has been served upon the petitioner on 9.10.2013 at 01.30 p.m.. He was called upon to submit his reply on 10.10.2013. The petitioner moved an application immediately on 9.10.2013 seeking fifteen days time to submit the reply to the charge-sheet which was declined thus he was forced to submit the reply within twenty-four hours of receipt of the charge-sheet. 23. The disciplinary authority in his order has also recorded that since the services of the delinquent employee are purely temporary being on ad hoc basis as such his services can be terminated at any time without any notice in exercise of powers conferred under the Rules, 1975. The said finding is self contradictory. At the one hand the petitioner was placed under suspension and was served a charge-sheet. This procedure clearly indicates that a regular enquiry was conducted against the petitioner but at the same time in the show-cause notice the District Judge has mentioned that it was in terms of Rule-3 of the Rules, 1999. In the dismissal order it is mentioned that the petitioner has been terminated under the Rules, 1975 and Rules, 1976 thus it is not clear that under which rules the disciplinary authority has proceeded against the petitioner, thus there is an element of ambiguity. 24. On the perusal of enquiry report it is evident that a finding is recorded that the petitioner in his defence has not given any explanation regarding his absence. I find that the said finding is not correct. In his reply dated 11.10.2013 to the charge-sheet he has referred his earlier reply dated 6.9.2013 (annexure-3 to the writ petition) wherein he has categorically denied the charges and stated that he was present on 2.9.2013. He has further stated that since the premises is very huge, he was on the round when the officer concerned had made the visit. 25. Evidently, this explanation has not been considered either by the enquiry officer or disciplinary authority. 26. The Supreme Court, in the context of enquiry report in departmental proceedings, has laid down the law that when the findings become perverse. 25. Evidently, this explanation has not been considered either by the enquiry officer or disciplinary authority. 26. The Supreme Court, in the context of enquiry report in departmental proceedings, has laid down the law that when the findings become perverse. Relevant paragraphs of the judgment in Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police and others, (1999) 2 SCC 10 , are extracted herein-below: “9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of “guilt” is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with.” 27. In the case of Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant and others, (2001) 1 SCC 182 , the Supreme Court observed as under: “19. While it is true that in a departmental proceeding, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and the High Court may not interfere with the factual findings but the availability of judicial review even in the case of departmental proceeding cannot be doubted. Judicial review of administrative action is feasible and the same has its application to its fullest extent in even departmental proceedings where it is found that the recorded findings are based on no evidence or the findings are totally perverse or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of evidence is not permitted but in the event of there being a finding which otherwise shocks the judicial conscience of the Court, it is a well-nigh impossibility to decry availability of judicial review at the instance of an affected person. The observations as above however do find some support from the decision of this Court in the case of Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, 1999 (1) SCC 759 .” 28. The observations as above however do find some support from the decision of this Court in the case of Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, 1999 (1) SCC 759 .” 28. On the analysis of the above principles, it is clear that the findings of the enquiry officer and disciplinary authority regarding the charges against the petitioner are perverse. The findings clearly show that these are based on suspicion. It is trite that mere suspicion cannnot take place of proof. A case of judicial review, thus, is made out. 29. In any view of the matter granting only two days time for submission of the reply to the charge-sheet was not being in conformity with the requirement of fair play and reasonableness as two days time cannot be sufficient by any stretch of imagination. 30. The doctrine of proportionality has been considered by the Supreme Court in a large number of cases. It is a trite law that the High Court is not a Court of appeal under Article 226 of the Constitution in the matter of departmental proceedings. It interfers in the matter when the decision of the authority/tribunal is wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could even have arrived at the conclusion or against the principles of natrual justice or the punishment was in outrageous definance of logic and was shocking. 31. Even if the Court finds that the order of disciplinary authority was shocking and disproportionate, ordinarly it would not substitute its view on penalty imposed on delinquent. 32. Recently the Supreme Court in the case of Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Limited and another v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri and others, (2009) 15 SCC 620 after analyzing a large number of cases including B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 , came to hold as under: “20. One of the tests to be applied while dealing with the question of quantum of punishment would be: would any reasonable employer have imposed such punishment in like circumstances? Obviously, a reasonable employer is expected to take into consideration measure, magnitude and degree of misconduct and all other relevant circumstances and exclude irrelevant matters before imposing punishment. 21. One of the tests to be applied while dealing with the question of quantum of punishment would be: would any reasonable employer have imposed such punishment in like circumstances? Obviously, a reasonable employer is expected to take into consideration measure, magnitude and degree of misconduct and all other relevant circumstances and exclude irrelevant matters before imposing punishment. 21. In a case like the present one where the misconduct of the delinquent was unauthorized absence from duty for six months but upon being charged of such misconduct, he fairly admitted his guilt and explained the reasons for his absence by stating that he did not have any intention nor desired to disobey the order of higher authority or violate any of the Company’s Rules and Regulations but the reason was purely personal and beyond his control and, as a matter of fact, he sent his resignation which was not accepted, the order of removal cannot be held to be justified, since in our judgment, no reasonable employer would have imposed extreme punishment of removal in like circumstances. The punishment is not only unduly harsh but grossly in excess to the allegations.” 33. Applying the aforesaid principles, in the present case, I find that quantum of punishment, if the petitioner is found guilty, also needs to be considered by the disciplinary authority. In the present case the petitioner had been working for more than ten years and no warning or memo was issued earlier to inflictment of major punishment regarding his unsatisfactory work. Only on one single incident, when it is alleged that the petitioner was sleeping, a major punishment appears to be disproportionate. 34. For all the reasons mentioned above, I find that the order impugned dated 25.1.2014 is not sustainable. It is accordingly set aside. The matter is remitted to the District Judge, Bijnor to hold a fresh enquiry after furnishing the petitioner sufficient opportunity. 35. With the aforesaid observations, the writ petition is allowed. No order as to costs.