ORDER : 1. The instant writ petition has been filed for quashing the orders dated 08.07.2006 and 19.06.2006 (Annexure-9 & 10) whereby and whereunder the case of the petitioner for employment under clause 9.5.0 (III) has been rejected most illegally on the ground of delay and also for issuance of a further appropriate order or direction commanding upon the respondents to appoint the petitioner in their services as also for doing consignable and equitable justice o the petitioner. 2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to cause to filing of the writ petition are that the father of petitioner late Rajendra Dom was working as a Sweeper in M/s C.C. Ltd. Unfortunately, the father of petitioner died in harness on 07.03.1998 and mother of the petitioner died on 10.07.1994. The information regarding the death of his father was given to respondent company on 25.05.1998. At the time of death of his father, the petitioner was aged about 15 year old and just after the death of his father petitioner requested before the respondent that his name may be kept in live roster in accordance with Para 9.5.0 (III) of N.C.W.A.-VI. Para 9.5.0 (III) of N.C.W.A.-VI states that if a male dependent who is 12 year and above in age, he will be kept on a live roster and would be provided employment commensurate with his skills and qualification when he attend the age of 18 year. Accordingly, the petitioner after attaining majority requested the respondents to allow him to fill up the form and he formally submitted the application for employment on 30.08.2002. The said application form which was duly authenticated by the respondents the petitioner's age was stated to be 18 years. Pursuant to the aforesaid application for employment, the respondent by term of letter dated 09.11.2002, directed the petitioner to appear before the unit level Screening Committee on 15.11.2002 along with all the document for interview/physical verification examination. After the interview the petitioner was shocked to receive a letter dated 08.07.2006 whereby and whereudner the petitioner was communicated with the rejection order dated 19.06.2006 in which the case of the petitioner was rejected by the respondents on the ground of delay. Hence, this writ petition. 3. After the interview the petitioner was shocked to receive a letter dated 08.07.2006 whereby and whereudner the petitioner was communicated with the rejection order dated 19.06.2006 in which the case of the petitioner was rejected by the respondents on the ground of delay. Hence, this writ petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the ground of rejection is wholly illegal and arbitrary in view of the settled principles of law and guidelines of N.C.W.A. The case of the petitioner is covered under Clause 9.5.0 (III) of N.C.W.A. and not under Clause 9.3.0 of N.C.W.A.-VI. He submits that the petition of limitation is applicable only in case of Clause 9.3.2 and not in case of Clause 9.5.0 (III). It was submitted that it was obligatory on the part of the respondents to keep the name of the petitioner in the live roster particularly when the petitioner had requested for the same. It was further submitted that ground of delay of 4 year is absurd and capricious and not tenable and the ground for rejection has no leg to stand and it is even supported by Section 6 of Limitation Act which provides that period of limitation for a minor starts from the date of cessation of the legal disability i.e. minority. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision in the case of Mohan Mahto vs. M/s. Central Coal Field Ltd. 2007 (4) JLJR 144 (SC) which reads as under: The terms and conditions of service of the workman working in coal mines are inter-alia governed by settlement known as National Coal Wage Agreement (NCWA-V). Indisputably, the said settlement, in terms of Sub section 3 of Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is binding on the parties. Clause 9.3.2 of N.C.W.A.-V refers to appointment of dependents of the deceased employees working in the coal mines. Sub Clause (iii) of Clause 9.5.0 whereof reads as under: (iii) In case of death either in mine accident or for other reasons or medical unfitness under Clause 9.4.0, if no employment has been offered and the male dependent of the concerned worker is 15 years and above in age he will be kept on a live roster and would be provided employment commensurate with his skill and qualifications when he attains the age of 18 years. During the period the male dependent is on live roster, the female dependent will be paid monetary compensation as per rates at Paras (i) and (ii) above. 5. Per Contra the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the writ petition filed on behalf of the petitioner is not maintainable in law or on facts. It is contended that the petitioner even after attaining adulthood age of 18 years on 23.05.1999 did not apply for compassionate appointment under the provisions of Clause of 9.3.2 of N.C.W.A. in time rather he delayed intentionally in applying for employment vitiating the basic purpose for appointment on compassionate ground, justifying the impugned orders dated 08.07.2006 and 19.06.2006 (Annexure-9 & 10) to the writ petition. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that as per Circular dated 1st January, 2002 issued under the signature of the Director (Personnel) of the respondent no. 1 company the time limit for applying for employment in case of death before February, 2000 was six months from the date of death. It is further submitted that the application of the petitioner for compassionate appointment under the provisions of Para 9.3.2 of the N.C.W.A. was examined by the respondent no.1 and finally the competent authority regretted the case of the petitioner as the same was a belated one and as such no appointment could be given to the petitioner. 6. Having gone through the rival submissions of the parties, I am of the considered view that the case of the petitioner stands on different footing and the respondents have misconstrued the guidelines and have rejected the case of the petitioner illegally and arbitrarily. The case of appointment of the petitioner has been rejected relying on Para 9.3.2 of the agreement. The case of the minor has been specifically provided in Para 9.5.0 and it appears to have been the intention of the respondent company that those who are minors at the time when their parents in employment die, should be provided with employment once the minor attains majority. It that be the simple interpretation of Para 9.5.0 of NCWA-VI, I see no reason why the said benefit should not be extended to the writ petitioner as well. It that be the simple interpretation of Para 9.5.0 of NCWA-VI, I see no reason why the said benefit should not be extended to the writ petitioner as well. The objection taken, that he had applied only four years after death of his father, besides being highly technical, is also not supported by the Scheme since it does not, in any way, indicate that a minor has to apply within six months from the date of the deceased. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Mahto (supra) at Para 17 held as under: “We have indicated hereinbefore, that it is not necessary for us to go into the question as to whether on the teeth of the provision of N.C.W.A.-V, the respondent at all had any power to fix a time limit and thereby curtailing the right of the workman concerned. We would assume that even in such a matter, it had a right. But, even for the said purpose, keeping in view the fact that a beneficial provision is made under a settlement, the State was expected to act reasonably. While so acting, it must provide for a period of limitation which is reasonable. Apart from the fact that the period of limitation provided for in the circular letter with a power of relaxation can never be held to be imperative in character, the matter should also be considered from the subsequent conduct of the respondent in so far as it had issued another circular letter in the year 2000 providing for filing of an application for appointment on compassionate ground within a period of one year. It may be that the said circular letter has prospective operation but even in relation thereto we may notice that whereas the said circular letter was issued upon holding discussion with the Unions, the circular letter of the year 1995 was an unilateral one. Furthermore, in its letter dated 2/3.8.2000 it will bear repetition to state, expiry of the period of limitation was not taken as a ground for rejecting his application. Under age and non-placement of his name in live roster are stated be the reasons. It is, therefore, unfair on the part of the respondent to raise such a plea for the first time in its counter affidavit to the writ petition. Under age and non-placement of his name in live roster are stated be the reasons. It is, therefore, unfair on the part of the respondent to raise such a plea for the first time in its counter affidavit to the writ petition. If he was under-age, definitely, it was obligatory on the part of the respondent to keep his name in the live roster. It was not done.” 7. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid rules, guidelines, judicial pronouncements and the observations made above, the impugned order dated 08.07.2006 and 19.06.2006 are hereby, quashed. The writ petition stands allowed. The respondents are directed to consider the case of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground within a period of two months from the date of receipt of copy of this order.