JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. S. Ali, learned counsel for the appellant. None appeared for the respondents. 2. This appeal has been filed under Order 43 CPC against the order dated 18-08-2007 passed in Misc (J) Case No.11/2006 by the learned Civil Judge, Tezpur, Sonitpur rejecting the petition for condonation of delay and consequently dismissing the petition under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC for setting aside the order dated 25-03-2004 passed in T.S (Arb) No. 3/99 dismissing the suit for default. 3. Learned counsel submits that the appellant herein filed T.S (Arb) No.3/99 in the Court of learned Civil Judge, Tezpur, Spnitpur. The case record of M.S.(Arb) No.13/94 which was necessary for disposal of the suit was called for. However, the said record could not be traced out, as a result of which the trial in T.S. 3/1999 was delayed. Ultimately, the T.S (Arb) No.3/99 was dismissed for default on 25-03-2004. 4. The appellant filed an application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC alongwith petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act praying for setting aside the order of dismissal of the suit for default. 5. The learned Civil Judge by impugned order dated 18-08-2007 rejected the petition holding that the petitioner failed to show sufficient cause. Aggrieved, the appellant has preferred this instant appeal. 6. Learned counsel Mr. S. Ali, relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another Vs. Mst. Katiji and Others reported in (1987) 2 SCC 107 submits that sufficient cause should be construed liberally so as to subserve the ends of justice. The appellant had to leave for Chandigarh to attend his ailing parents and could not come back in time and therefore the delay was caused and there was no negligence or malafide in delayed filing of the petition, submits Mr. Ali. 7. The Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. The appellant had to leave for Chandigarh to attend his ailing parents and could not come back in time and therefore the delay was caused and there was no negligence or malafide in delayed filing of the petition, submits Mr. Ali. 7. The Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. reported in (1987) 2 SCC 107 , enunciating the principle and approach, how the “sufficient cause” has to be construed liberally, so that ends of justice does not suffer, observed as under: “The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 (Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the CPC, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period) of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice--that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:- 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.” 8. No doubt, the expression ‘sufficient cause’ is required to be construed liberally, so that cause of substantial justice does not get defeated. In the instant case, the cause shown by the appellant, as revealed from the impugned order and also from the petition is that, an important record which was necessary for disposal of the suit was called for, but the said record was not traceable and therefore, the matter was pending for long time and because of illness and death of the parents, the appellant had to leave for Chandigarh. After coming back from Chandigarh, the petitioner could file the petition under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC accompanied with the petition for condonation of delay. It is common knowledge, that in case of all delay some amount of laches always may be there, which may not be intentional. Since an appellant does not get benefited by filing an appeal late, it would not be proper to attribute negligence on a party, for such laches. Be that as it may, considering the totality of the matter, the cause shown by the appellant, in my view, can reasonably be construed as sufficient causes, taking a pragmatic view, otherwise there remains a danger of substantial justice being defeated for mere procedural technicality. 9. Be that as it may, considering the totality of the matter, the cause shown by the appellant, in my view, can reasonably be construed as sufficient causes, taking a pragmatic view, otherwise there remains a danger of substantial justice being defeated for mere procedural technicality. 9. In that view of the matter, the appeal is allowed and the order of dismissal of the suit dated 18.08.2007 is set aside, However, the delay has certainly caused some inconvenience to the other side, which is also required to be taken care of, for ends of justice. Keeping in view the above aspect, the petitioner is directed to pay a cost of Rs. 5,000/-. The learned Trial Court shall proceed with the suit subject to payment of the said cost. 10. The appeal is accordingly allowed. 11. Send back the LCR.