ORDER 1. This petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution takes exception to the order passed in MCA No.169/2015 passed by First Additional District Judge, Bhopal on 13.12.2016. By this order, the miscellaneous appeal preferred by respondent No.1 under Order 43 rule 1 CPC was allowed and injunction order of trial Court dated 4.11.2015 is set aside. 2. Briefly stated, the case of the petitioner is that he filed a civil suit for declaration. Along with said suit, he filed an application under Order 39, rules 1 and 2 CPC. The said application was allowed by the trial Court on 4.11.2015 (Annexure P-65) and the defendants were restrained the other side from interfering into the possession of the present petitioner. 3. Aggrieved, the respondent No.1 preferred MCA No.169/2015 before the appellate Court which was allowed by impugned order dated 13.12.2016. Criticizing this order, Shri O.P. Namdeo, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was allotted a piece of land by order dated 13.5.1991 (Annexure P-5). The land was although allotted for three years, the petitioner was permitted to run his health club at said land. Thereafter, petitioner shifted his health club to the present place and preferred an application for renewal of the permission to continue at the present place. Since the permission was not accorded, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No.4408/2015, which was disposed of by this Court by directing the respondents to decide the representation of the petitioner. 4. Shri Namdeo, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that before deciding petitioner's application for renewal, the respondents issued the impugned notice dated 18.3.2015 (Annexure P-54) and directed the petitioner to vacate the accommodation/land. The petitioner assailed this action by filing the aforesaid civil suit. The trial Court rightly passed the injunction order dated 4.11.2015. Heavy reliance is placed by Shri Namdeo on para-8 of the order of trial Court which refers the letter of Revenue Inspector dated 23.9.2015 wherein he stated that land in question does not belong to the Municipal Corporation. On the strength of this letter, Shri Namdeo contends that Municipal Corporation has no authority, jurisdiction and competence to issue notices to the petitioner for the purpose of eviction. In addition, it is submitted that no expert report was filed by the Municipal Corporation to establish that the building in question is in dangerous/ dilapidated condition. On the strength of this letter, Shri Namdeo contends that Municipal Corporation has no authority, jurisdiction and competence to issue notices to the petitioner for the purpose of eviction. In addition, it is submitted that no expert report was filed by the Municipal Corporation to establish that the building in question is in dangerous/ dilapidated condition. In absence thereto, no fault can be found in the order of learned trial Court and learned appellate Court has committed an error in interfering with the said injunction order. 5. Per contra, Shri Rajeshwar Rao, learned counsel for respondent No.1/Corporation submits that by letter dated 13.5.1991 (Annexure P-5), the petitioner was temporarily permitted for three years to run the health club near the small lake. The said three years were over in the year 1994. Thereafter, no renewal order was issued and, therefore, the petitioner has no legal right whatsoever to run his health club at the present place. The petitioner is an encroacher and no injunction can be issued in favour of such an encroacher. Shri Rao submits that petitioner on the one hand filed the civil suit on the strength of document dated 13.5.1991 (Annexure P-5) issued by respondent No.1 and on the other hand contended that the respondent No.1/Corporation has no authority to direct the petitioner to vacate the land. The learned counsel for the Corporation further submits that petitioner filed aforesaid writ petition and sought direction against the Municipal Corporation. After having done so, it is no more open to the petitioner to say that land does not belong to Municipal Corporation. Apart from the document dated 13.5.1991 (Annexure P-5) issued by Municipal Corporation, there is no other document which shows that petitioner was permitted to run the health club even for a temporary period of three years. In addition, Shri Rao submits that lower appellate Court has not committed any error in placing reliance on section 310 of Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 which empowers the Municipal Corporation to take appropriate action against dangerous buildings which may create serious threat/danger to people. It is argued that section 310 of the said Act is applicable to all kinds of buildings irrespective of the fact whether such buildings belong to Municipal Corporation or not. 6. Shri Ankit Agarwal, learned Government Advocate for the respondent No.2/State borrowed the stand taken by Shri Rajeshwar Rao. 7. It is argued that section 310 of the said Act is applicable to all kinds of buildings irrespective of the fact whether such buildings belong to Municipal Corporation or not. 6. Shri Ankit Agarwal, learned Government Advocate for the respondent No.2/State borrowed the stand taken by Shri Rajeshwar Rao. 7. No other point is pressed by learned counsel for the parties. 8. I have heard the parties at length and perused the record. 9. The learned appellate Court opined that for grant of injunction, the necessary ingredients are (a) prima facie case, (b) balance of convenience and (c) irreparable loss. The appellate Court tested the case of the present petitioner on the anvil of said principles and opined that in the year 1991, the petitioner was permitted to run Royal Health Club for a period of three years as per the conditions contained in the said order. The Court further opined that the petitioner is unable to show any document to establish that to run the health club at present place, any formal order/permission was granted. The record shows that way back in the year 2010, the Municipal Corporation in its note-sheet found that the building is in dangerous condition and, therefore, no permission can be accorded to run the health club to the petitioner. In absence of any strong prima facie material to establish the right to continue at present place by the petitioner, no fault can be found in the order of the appellate Court. 10. I also find substance in the arguments of Shri Rao that the stand taken by the petitioner that land in question does not belong to Municipal Corporation is contradictory. The civil suit is filed on the strength of a temporary permission granted to the petitioner by the Municipal Corporation and on the other hand it is argued that Municipal Corporation has no authority to issue the impugned notices. Apart from this, section 310 of the Act is wide enough to include all properties/buildings which are in dilapidated/dangerous conditions and Municipal Corporation as per its satisfaction can issue necessary directions for vacating the premises. Such power is given to ensure public safety/interest. 11. In the opinion of this Court, the order passed by Court below is neither without jurisdiction nor suffers from any procedural impropriety, illegality or perversity. Such power is given to ensure public safety/interest. 11. In the opinion of this Court, the order passed by Court below is neither without jurisdiction nor suffers from any procedural impropriety, illegality or perversity. However, in the interest of justice, it is made clear that findings given hereinabove are given for the purpose of deciding the question of grant/refusal of injunction and such finding shall not have any bearing on the merits of civil suit. The trial Court shall decide the suit as per its own merits. 12. Resultantly, interference is declined, petition is dismissed.