JUDGMENT : ASHA ARORA, J. 1. This second appeal is against the judgment dated September 20, 2007 passed by the learned Judge 12th Bench, City Civil Court, Calcutta in Title Appeal No. 26 of 2007 affirming the judgment and decree dated January 6, 2007 passed by the learned Judge 5th Bench, Small Causes Court at Calcutta in Ejectment Suit No. 594 of 2000. The defendants under a decree of eviction are the appellants herein. 2. The facts in brief which are relevant for the purpose of this appeal are as follows: The plaintiff Surjya Pati Devi (since deceased) filed a suit for eviction and recovery of possession against the defendants in respect of the suit premises on three grounds namely, default in payment of rent, reasonable requirement as the accommodation available to her was not sufficient and she had no reasonably suitable accommodation elsewhere. Thirdly, the defendants had caused damage to the suit premises by making addition and alteration in violation of clause (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. As the defendants did not vacate the suit premises inspite of due service of the notice to quit, the eviction suit was filed. The defendants contested the suit by filing written statement denying the material allegations made in the plaint and contending inter alia that the suit was liable to be dismissed. The trial Court framed nine issues and after contested hearing the suit was decreed on the ground of reasonable requirement and violation of the provisions of clause (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. An appeal by the defendants before the learned Judge 12th Bench, City civil Court at Calcutta was dismissed on contest affirming thereby the judgment and decree of eviction passed by the trial court. 3. Aggrieved, the defendants/appellants preferred the second appeal which was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: (a) Whether the learned Court of appeal below committed substantial error in recording a finding that apart from the ground of reasonable requirement, no other ground was urged before him notwithstanding the fact that in the previous page, the learned court of appeal below specifically recorded that the appellants contended that the learned judge acted illegally in holding that clause (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act had been violated? (b) Whether the learned Court of appeal below committed substantial error of law in not recording any finding on the question whether there was violation of clause (p) of the Transfer of Property Act? (c) Whether the learned court of appeal below committed substantial error of law in not taking into consideration the fact that apart from the three vacant rooms, bath and privy received from Saroj Devi Shaw, the plaintiff also obtained a decree against one Hem Chand Loonkar where the finding of the appellate Court was that the plaintiff was in possession of five rooms? (d) Whether the learned court of appeal below committed substantial error of law in not arriving at specific finding as regards the actual requirement of the members of the family of the plaintiff and whether the rooms already in occupation were sufficient? 4. Learned counsel for the appellants strenuously argued that the trial court erred in deciding issue no.9 against the defendants without any finding whether the tile shed structure amounted to “permanent structure” within the mischief of clause (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. It has been canvassed that before the first appellate Court this point was specifically raised but the impugned judgment is bereft of any discussion or finding on the question whether there was violation of clause (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. On the issue of reasonable requirement, it has been urged that the requirement of the plaintiff has been satisfied in view of the fact that during the pendency of the suit the tenanted portion of Saroj Devi Shaw on the ground floor comprising of four rooms fell vacant but the plaintiff did not seek local inspection in respect of the said ground floor of the premises. Placing reliance upon an unreported judgment of this Court in S.A. No. 75 of 2007 in the case of Hem Chand Loonkar vs. Smt. Suryapati Devi, learned counsel for the appellants sought to impress that the matter should be remanded to the trial Court for want of local inspection of the entire premises. Leaned counsel for the appellants also pointed out that out of ten members comprising the plaintiff’s family one of them died during the pendency of this appeal so the requirement is no longer for ten rooms as held by the first appellate Court. 5. Leaned counsel for the appellants also pointed out that out of ten members comprising the plaintiff’s family one of them died during the pendency of this appeal so the requirement is no longer for ten rooms as held by the first appellate Court. 5. Repudiating the aforesaid submissions learned counsel for the respondents countered that at the time of hearing before the first appellate Court, only the issue of reasonable requirement was urged on behalf of the appellants so there was no requirement for recording any finding or reason on the trial court’s decision regarding issue no.9. It is evident from the judgment of the first appellate Court that the other grounds though taken in the memorandum of appeal, were not raised at the time of hearing. At this juncture it is significant to refer to the relevant portion of the judgment of the first appellate Court which is quoted hereunder: “In the instant case the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant and respondent confined their argument only on the point of reasonable requirement. Learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant contended that except the ground of reasonable requirement, with regard to other grounds as per instruction is not pressed.” Learned counsel for the respondents argued that under the aforesaid circumstances, non recording of finding on the question whether there was violation of clause (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act does not vitiate the judgment of the first appellate Court. It has also been contended that the case should not be remanded for want of finding on an issue which can be decided by this Court on the basis of the material available on record. It is submitted by the learned advocate for the respondents that the report of the learned Commissioner was not challenged by the appellants at any stage nor did the appellants raise the ground of remand of the case before the first appellate Court. Placing reliance upon the case of Syeda Rahimunnisa Versus Malan Bi (Dead) by L.Rs. and Another reported in 2016 (4) ICC 881 Supreme Court, learned advocate for the respondents argued that in order to claim remand of the case to the trial court, it is necessary to first raise such plea and then make out a case of remand on facts. and Another reported in 2016 (4) ICC 881 Supreme Court, learned advocate for the respondents argued that in order to claim remand of the case to the trial court, it is necessary to first raise such plea and then make out a case of remand on facts. Referring to the case of Purushottam Das Bangur and Others versus Dayanand Gupta reported in (2012) 10 Supreme Court Cases 409, learned advocate for the respondents canvassed that the unauthorised structure raised by the appellants/defendants falls within the mischief of clause (p) of Section 108 of Transfer of Property Act in view of the factors determining the issue whether such structure is permanent or temporary. 6. It is clear from the judgment of the first appellate Court that although in the memorandum of appeal the appellants/ defendants assailed the finding of the trial court regarding issue no. 9 on the question of violation of clause (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, at the time of hearing of the appeal the learned advocate for the appellants made no submission on the aforesaid issue and the argument was confined only on the issue of reasonable requirement. The relevant portion of the judgment of the first appellate Court is reproduced as follows: “The Appellant/defendant being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed by the Learned Judge, has preferred this Appeal contending inter alia that the Learned Judge totally mis-directed himself in the matter of appreciation of evidence. The appellant/defendant contended that the Learned Judge acted illegally and without jurisdiction in holding that the clause (p) of Sec. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act has been violated by the appellants in the instant case. The appellant/defendant further contended that the Learned Judge failed to consider the judgment and decree passed by the 2nd Fast Track Court, Calcutta in title suit no. 273/98. The appellant/defendant submits that the plaintiff has failed to prove the case of requirement. Hence the Learned Judge was not justified in passing the impugned judgment and decree on the ground of reasonable requirement. The main point for consideration is whether the appeal should be allowed. Decision with reasons In the instant case, Ld. Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant and respondent confined their arguments only on the point of reasonable requirement. Ld. Hence the Learned Judge was not justified in passing the impugned judgment and decree on the ground of reasonable requirement. The main point for consideration is whether the appeal should be allowed. Decision with reasons In the instant case, Ld. Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant and respondent confined their arguments only on the point of reasonable requirement. Ld. Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant contended that except the ground of reasonable requirement, with regard to other grounds as per instruction is not pressed. The Ld. Advocates confined their argument on the point of reasonable requirement.” 7. The trial court decreed the suit on two counts namely, the defendant has done an act contrary to the provisions of clause (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act and on the ground of reasonable requirement. The first mentioned ground has been extensively discussed under issue no.9 of the impugned judgment of the trial Court. There is clear finding of the trial court that the defendant has made construction in the suit premises without the consent of the plaintiff. In Purushottom Das Bangur’s case (supra) the Supreme Court held that the use of the term “permanent structure” in Section 108(p) of the Transfer of Property Act does not mean that the structure must last forever. A structure which lasts till the end of tenancy can be treated as a permanent structure. No hard and fast rule can be prescribed for determining whether a structure is permanent or not. It is a question that depends on the facts of each case and on the nature and extent of a particular structure as also the intention and purpose for which the structure was erected. For the aforesaid reasons reliance upon the decision in the case of Om Prakash Versus Amar singh and Another reported in AIR 1987 Supreme Court 617 by the learned counsel for the appellants/defendants is of no avail. By affirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, the first appellate Court concurred with the findings of the trial judge on both the grounds of eviction. By affirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, the first appellate Court concurred with the findings of the trial judge on both the grounds of eviction. This fact is evident from the impugned judgment the relevant portion of which is quoted as follows: “Thus, on hearing of both sides and in view of evidence, I hold firmly that the learned Judge was justified in passing the decree in favour of the plaintiff and there is no reason to interfere with the findings of the learned Judge.” In the case of Girijanandini Devi and Others versus Bijendra Narain Choudhary reported in AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1124 it has been held by the Supreme Court that when the appellate Court agrees with the view of the trial court on evidence it need not restate the effect of evidence or reiterate reasons given by trial Court. Expression of general agreement with reasons given by the trial Court decision of which is under appeal would ordinarily suffice. I am therefore unable to hold that the learned first appellate Court committed substantial error of law by not recording any finding on the question whether there was violation of clause (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act particularly in view of the fact that the aforesaid issue was not agitated by the appellants/defendants at the time of hearing of the appeal as is clear from the impugned judgment of the first appellate Court referred to hereinabove. 8. Coming to the issue of reasonable requirement, there is clear finding of the first appellate Court that the family of the plaintiff/respondent comprises of 10 members and the requirement is for at least 10 rooms. Both the courts below have taken note of the fact that the plaintiff is in occupation of three rooms on the first floor and after execution of the decree against Saroj Devi Shaw, plaintiff will get possession of the rooms in her occupation. According to the learned counsel for the appellants there were four rooms in occupation of Saroj Devi Shaw possession of which has already been obtained by the respondents/plaintiffs. Learned advocate for the respondents admits that the plaintiffs/ respondents are now in possession of seven rooms including the four rooms which were occupied by Saroj Devi Shaw. According to the learned counsel for the appellants there were four rooms in occupation of Saroj Devi Shaw possession of which has already been obtained by the respondents/plaintiffs. Learned advocate for the respondents admits that the plaintiffs/ respondents are now in possession of seven rooms including the four rooms which were occupied by Saroj Devi Shaw. Both the courts below have concurrently held that the accommodation available to the plaintiff is not sufficient and the requirement will be satisfied only if possession of the suit premises is obtained. Learned advocate for the respondents submitted that the decree against Hem Chand Loonkar has not been executed so possession has not been obtained. On behalf of the appellants/defendants nothing could be placed on record to show that during the pendency of this appeal, Hem Chand Loonkar vacated the portion of the premises in his occupation or possession has been delivered in execution of the decree. It is on record that the original plaintiff Smt. Surjya Pati Devi died during the pendency of this appeal and has been substituted by her legal heirs who are the present respondents. Learned advocate for the appellants contended that as the requirement of the original plaintiff no longer exists, nine rooms would suffice for the nine family members of the respondents/plaintiffs. From the evidence discussed by both the Courts below it is palpable that the respondents/plaintiffs are in possession of seven rooms including the four rooms which were occupied by Saroj Devi Shaw. Therefore, their requirement still falls short of two rooms. There is concurrent finding of fact of both the lower Courts in this regard. There is no merit in the argument on behalf of the appellants that the case should be remanded to the trial court for local inspection of the entire premises for determining the extent of accommodation in possession of the plaintiff. Curiously enough, the defendants/appellants did not assail the report of the learned Commissioner at any stage before the trial court or before the first appellate Court on the ground that the entire premises has not been inspected nor was the ground of remand raised before the first appellate Court. Curiously enough, the defendants/appellants did not assail the report of the learned Commissioner at any stage before the trial court or before the first appellate Court on the ground that the entire premises has not been inspected nor was the ground of remand raised before the first appellate Court. On the point of remand, it is pertinent to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Syeda Rahimunnisa (supra) reported in 2016 (4) ICC 881 Supreme Court wherein the Hon’ble Court held as follows in paragraph 35 of the judgment: “35. It is a settled principle of law that in order to claim remand of the case to the trial court, it is necessary for the appellant to first raise such plea and then make out a case of remand on facts. The power of the appellate court to remand the case to subordinate court is contained in order XLI Rule 23, 23-A and 25 of CPC. It is, therefore, obligatory upon the appellant to bring the case under any of these provisions before claiming a remand. The appellate court is required to record reasons as to why it has taken recourse to any one out of the three Rules of Order XLI of CPC for remanding the case to the trial court. In the absence of any ground taken by the respondents (appellants before the first appellate Court and High Court) before the first appellate Court and the High Court as to why the remand order in these cases is called for and if so under which Rule of Order XLI of CPC and further in the absence of any finding, there was no justification on the part of the High Court to remand the case to the trial court.” 9. Reliance upon an unreported judgment of this Court in S.A.75 of 2007 (supra) in support of remand of the case for local inspection is of no help to the appellants since the said case is clearly distinguishable on facts from the case in hand. In the judgment referred it appeared from the evidence that during the pendency of the proceedings some rooms were vacated by three tenants but the first appellate Court did not take into consideration the factum of possession of the said rooms obtained by the plaintiff from the three tenants namely Nandlal Shaw, Tapse Prosad Gupta and Saroj Devi Shaw. In the judgment referred it appeared from the evidence that during the pendency of the proceedings some rooms were vacated by three tenants but the first appellate Court did not take into consideration the factum of possession of the said rooms obtained by the plaintiff from the three tenants namely Nandlal Shaw, Tapse Prosad Gupta and Saroj Devi Shaw. The learned Judge held that since the rooms vacated by the said tenants have not been the subject matter of any local inspection it is not possible for the Court to come to any positive finding on the question of the accommodation available to the plaintiff in the suit building. In the case in hand there is clear and concurrent finding of fact of both the lower courts regarding the accommodation available to the respondents/ plaintiffs. There is nothing on record to show that apart from the four rooms of Saroj Devi Shaw which the respondents obtained possession, other rooms in occupation of tenants fell vacant during the pendency of the proceedings. The decision in the case of Hasmat Rai and another versus Raghunath Prasad reported in (1981) 3 Supreme Court Cases 103 is also not apposite for the purpose of the present case for the simple reason that in the said case it was held by the Supreme Court that the trial Court and the first appellate Court committed a manifest error apparent on the face of the record by upholding the plaintiff’s case and awarding possession on the ground neither pleaded nor suggested. In the instant case, the trial court and the first appellate court on proper appreciation of evidence concurrently held that the plaintiff reasonably requires the suit premises for her own use and occupation as well as for the use and occupation of her family members and she had no other reasonably suitable accommodation elsewhere. The concurrent findings of fact of both the Courts are neither perverse nor in conflict with any provision of law. Such findings are also not against the pleadings or evidence. In the circumstances, these concurrent findings of fact cannot be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its second appellate jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. 10. For the reasons discussed I am of the view that no substantial question of law is involved in this second appeal. In the circumstances, these concurrent findings of fact cannot be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its second appellate jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. 10. For the reasons discussed I am of the view that no substantial question of law is involved in this second appeal. Therefore, no interference is warranted with the judgment of the first appellate Court affirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 11. Consequently the second appeal is dismissed. 12. No order as to costs. 13. A copy of this judgment along with the lower court records be sent forthwith to the learned court below. 14. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the applicant upon compliance of requisite formalities.