JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. Alok Kumar Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Prem Kumar Jha, learned counsel for the respondent no.2 and Mr. Rohitabh Das, learned A.C. to Additional Advocate General No.10 for the State. 2. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner for setting aside the Award dated 05.02.2014 passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Patna (for short “Tribunal”) in Reference Case No. 36 of 2007, purportedly exercising power under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short “the Act”) whereby and whereunder the “Tribunal” has held that the retirement of respondent no.2 Bimal Chandra Jha by the management on the basis of other records was bad and he should have been retired on the basis of Matriculation Certificate in which the date of birth has been recorded as 05.01.1951 and further he is entitled to get all consequential benefits. 3. The case of the petitioner, in short, is as under :- (i) Way back on 06.11.1970, the respondent no.2 had filled up a Declaration and Nomination Form-2 in his own handwriting declaring his date of birth to be 05.01.1945 and in the bracket he had also given his age at that time being 25 years. This was the first declaration of date of birth given by the respondent no.2 immediately after joining service and this fact was not disputed by the respondent no.2 before the Tribunal. (ii) After nearly 34 years, when the respondent no.2 was approaching his retirement age of 60 years on 05.01.2005, that suddenly on 09.01.2004 for the first time he submitted a letter enclosing photo copy of an Admit Card purportedly issued by the Bihar School Examination Board, Patna and photo copy of one of the pages of passport and requested that his date of birth be changed from 05.01.1945 to 05.01.1951. He did not supply the Matriculation Certificate along with his application dated 09.01.2004. (iii) In his letter dated 09.01.2004 or even subsequently no explanation of any kind was given as to how the date of birth of 05.01.1945 self declared by him for the first time on 06.11.1970 was wrong and why it should not be believed and also if the first declaration was wrong then why he had given wrong declaration. (iii) In his letter dated 09.01.2004 or even subsequently no explanation of any kind was given as to how the date of birth of 05.01.1945 self declared by him for the first time on 06.11.1970 was wrong and why it should not be believed and also if the first declaration was wrong then why he had given wrong declaration. He also never apprised the petitioner as to why he never informed and requested the management within reasonable time to change his alleged wrong date of birth of 05.01.1945, which he had self declared on 06.11.1970. There was also no explanation why the request for change of date of birth was being made by him after 34 years. (iv) In absence of any satisfactory explanation, the management became suspicious of the motive behind such belated request of respondent no.2 to change his date of birth. The Admit Card purportedly issued by the Bihar School Examination Board, Patna and one page of his passport also did not inspire any confidence as the documents were mere photo copies and not the original one and was not even attested by any competent authority. (v) While examining the request of the respondent no.2, the management came to learn that in the record related to “Gratuity Insurance Scheme”, which is maintained by the management for all its employees, the date of birth of the respondent no.2 had been by mistake recorded as 27.01.1947 instead of 05.01.1945. Whether actually it was a mistake or deliberately done in connivance of the respondent no.2 was something that the management could not conclusively say and therefore, without holding the respondent no.2 responsible for the same and by accepting the said mistake took the most fair and reasonable decision of not retiring the respondent no.2 on 05.01.2005 and allowed him to continue in service till 27.01.2007. The decision to allow the respondent no.2 to continue in service till 27.01.2007 was communicated to him by letter dated 27.12.2006. Based on this letter, the service of the respondent no.2 came to an end from the close of working hours from 27.01.2007 and thereafter his legal dues were computed and paid. (vi) The respondent no.2 felt that the Matriculation Certificate prescribing his date of birth as 05.01.1951 should have been taken into account and the management should have allowed him in service till 05.01.2011. (vi) The respondent no.2 felt that the Matriculation Certificate prescribing his date of birth as 05.01.1951 should have been taken into account and the management should have allowed him in service till 05.01.2011. By his letter dated 22.01.2007 he raised the dispute, which was referred by the State Government vide notification dated 16.10.2007 to the Tribunal for adjudication. (vii) From a reading of the terms of the reference it was clear that the reference was made for not deciding the correct date of birth of the respondent no.2, but only for deciding as to whether the action of the management of retiring the respondent no.2 on the basis of date of birth of 05.01.1945 rather than on the basis of 05.01.1951 as mentioned in his Matriculation Certificate was justified or not. (viii) Before the Tribunal, apart from filing the written statement, the petitioner also filed a preliminary objection on 11.09.2008 raising the following preliminary objections : (a) The dispute sent for adjudication was an “individual dispute” relating to only one person and it never acquired the character of an industrial dispute and hence the reference of “industrial dispute” is illegal and improper as the same cannot be decided under the provisions of “the Act”. (b) At the time of retirement, the respondent no.2 was an “Editor” of Sachitra Ayurved Magazine published by the petitioner and was holding the post and discharging the functions of a Law Officer of the Company and was placed in Managerial Rank. Therefore, he was not a “workman” under “the Act”, and therefore, his dispute cannot be decided under the provisions of the said Act. (c) A retired person is not contemplated within the definition of “workman”, as given under “the Act”. Hence, the dispute relating to the respondent no.2 could not have been taken up for adjudication under the said Act. (d) The term of reference was based on a wrong premise and therefore it was invalid because at no stage the respondent no.2 ever submitted his Matriculation Certificate to the management as proof of his age. (ix) The preliminary objections raised by the petitioner were kept pending to be decided along with the merit of the case vide order dated 05.05.2009. (ix) The preliminary objections raised by the petitioner were kept pending to be decided along with the merit of the case vide order dated 05.05.2009. (x) After considering the case of both the parties, the Tribunal delivered its Award on 05.02.2014, which was pronounced on 28.02.2014 by which it erroneously held that the retirement of respondent no.2 on the basis of other records was bad and he should have been retired on the basis of his Matriculation Certificate in which date of birth was recorded as 05.01.1951. It further entitled respondent no.2 to get all consequential benefits. 4. On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings, Mr. Alok Kumar Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned Award delivered by the Tribunal is bad in law, perverse and unsustainable. 5. He has submitted that in deciding the reference in favour of the respondent no.2, in spite of clinching evidences against him that he was an “Editor” and “Law Officer” of the petitioner Company and thus was not a “workman”, the Tribunal treated him to be a “workman” under “the Act”. It failed to consider that the change of date of birth in the Provident Fund records was of no consequence to the petitioner because the said change was communicated by the Provident Fund Department to the respondent no.2 on 08.06.2007 by which time the management had already issued letter dated 27.12.2006 retiring the respondent no.2 with effect from 27.01.2007. According to him, the Tribunal also erred in appreciating that law does not permit rectification of date of birth at the fag end of the service without there being any compelling reasons. The Tribunal also failed to appreciate the fact that at no stage the respondent no.2 submitted his Matriculation Certificate to the management as proof of his date of birth. The Tribunal also failed to appreciate as to why the self declared date of birth of respondent no.2 in his own hand writing while filling up the declaration form on 06.11.1970 be not believed to be true and correct. The Tribunal also failed to appreciate that it had no jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate an “individual dispute”. 6. The respondent no.2 has contested the matter. Mr. The Tribunal also failed to appreciate that it had no jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate an “individual dispute”. 6. The respondent no.2 has contested the matter. Mr. Prem Kumar Jha, learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.2 while opposing the writ petition has submitted that the respondent no.2 is a “workman”, who served the petitioner Company with honesty, integrity and full satisfaction of the management from the date of his appointment till the date of termination from service in the guise of retirement vide notice dated 27.12.2006. According to him, the Tribunal has appreciated the facts and the law involved in the case properly and has rightly delivered the Award whereby the action of the management in retiring the respondent no.2 on the basis of date of birth of 05.01.1945 has been declared to be not correct and has directed that the respondent no.2 ought to have been retired on the basis of date of birth of 05.01.1951. 7. Mr. Jha has submitted that the issue before the Tribunal was not for adjudication of the dispute whether the respondent no.2 was a “workman” or “not a workman” but the dispute was for adjudication made under reference as to whether the retirement on the basis of other records than the Matriculation Certificate was justified and if not what relief the respondent no.2 was entitled to. 8. He has submitted that as in the reference itself, the term “workman” has been mentioned, question for adjudication of the dispute as to whether the respondent no.2 was a “workman” or not did not arise. 9. He has submitted that there is no dispute that as per Matriculation Certificate, the date of birth of the respondent no.2 is 05.01.1951. Hence, no illegality can be found with the Award delivered by the Tribunal. 10. He has submitted that the respondent no.2 has signed settlements as the representative of “workmen” with the representative of the management of the petitioner Company and contested several cases on behalf of the workers in the Labour Court/Tribunal and before the Conciliation Officer and has signed several documents as the General Secretary of the Union of the workers. Hence, there is no dispute that he was not a “workman” himself as no person under managerial category can sign the settlement as the representative of the “workmen”. 11. Hence, there is no dispute that he was not a “workman” himself as no person under managerial category can sign the settlement as the representative of the “workmen”. 11. He has submitted that it is well settled in law that if the Tribunal has taken a view, which can be a possible view, this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction would not be justified in substituting its view unless the Award delivered by the Tribunal is perverse. 12. Lastly, he has submitted that the reference of the dispute by the State Government to the Tribunal for adjudication of the dispute between the management and the “workman” was in accordance with law and the said reference has rightly been answered by the Tribunal. 13. Mr. Rohitabh Das, learned counsel for the State has submitted that the dispute contained in the writ petition is between the petitioner and the “workman” and nothing is required from the side of the respondent no.1 except defending the reference made to the Tribunal, which is in accordance with law. 14. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully perused the record. 15. It would be manifest from the record that both the parties filed their list of documents and from the side of the respondent no.2 four witnesses were examined before the Tribunal. They are W.W.-1 Kashi Nath Prasad, W.W.-2 Tara Charan Jha, W.W.-3 Jitendra Singh Rathor and W.W.-4 Bimal Chandra Jha. The witnesses examined on behalf of the respondent no.2 were cross-examined at length by the petitioner. The petitioner did not examine any witness from its side during the proceeding pending before the Tribunal. Even the documents, which were filed on behalf of the petitioner were either proved by the respondent no.2 himself or by W.W.-1 Kashi Nath Prasad. 16. On appreciation of the evidence on record, there appears to be no doubt that the dispute, which was referred for adjudication, was in the nature of an “individual dispute”. It had never acquired the status of an “industrial dispute”. It was not a union sponsored dispute. The dispute was whether the retirement on the basis of other records rather than the date of birth, as mentioned in the Matriculation Certificate, as 05.01.1951, shall be justifiable. It was not a dispute relating to discharge, dismissal or retrenchment of the respondent no.2. It was not a union sponsored dispute. The dispute was whether the retirement on the basis of other records rather than the date of birth, as mentioned in the Matriculation Certificate, as 05.01.1951, shall be justifiable. It was not a dispute relating to discharge, dismissal or retrenchment of the respondent no.2. There is no finding of the Tribunal that the notice of retirement was in the nature of retrenchment or termination of the respondent no.2. In that view of the matter, such dispute was individual in nature and its very reference to the Tribunal was not proper. 17. In para-20 of his cross-examination, respondent no.2 has stated as under :- “There is no list of demand or statement of demand submitted by the union attached with notification of Reference. Only document attached with notification of Reference is a copy of my reply to the Management and i.e. dated 22.01.2007 (Exhibit W/5).” 18. Further in para-81 of his cross-examination, he has admitted as under :- “I have myself filed written statement in this case. No written statement has been filed by the union.” 19. Further in para-82 of his cross-examination, he has admitted as under :- “I have not filed any resolution of the union resolving to contest my case throughout but if so ordered by the Tribunal I may file that. I have filed copy of settlement dated 12.02.2007 to show that substantial number of workmen of Patna factory of Shree Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Private Limited wanted to contest the case relating to my date of birth by the union. The settlement dated 12.02.2007 does not carry signature of substantial number of workers but it carries the signatures of union office bearers. Question: Have you filed any document to show that prior to 12.02.2007 the substantial and majority number of workers employed in Patna factory had empowered and authorized the union to enter into the settlement dated 12.02.2007 (Exhibit W/2) with regard to the dispute relating to you as in this case ? Answer: I have not filed copy of resolution having sanction by majority of the workers regarding raising of my dispute before the Management but I can file if so ordered by the Tribunal.” 20. From the evidence adduced by the respondent no.2, it is obvious that the finding of the Tribunal that it was an “industrial dispute” is erroneous and is based on wrong appreciation of evidence. From the evidence adduced by the respondent no.2, it is obvious that the finding of the Tribunal that it was an “industrial dispute” is erroneous and is based on wrong appreciation of evidence. Neither any functionary of the union had come forward to give evidence in support of the respondent no.2 nor had the respondent no.2 himself stood to the test of cross-examination in this regard. He had failed to establish that the reference of the dispute was supported by substantial number of workmen of the petitioner Company said to be having community of interest with his dispute. 21. The Tribunal has wrongly relied upon the settlement dated 12.02.2007 (Ext. W/2) between the management and five office bearers of the union to hold that the dispute of the respondent no.2 cannot be held to be an “individual dispute”. The aforesaid settlement dated 12.02.2007 did not fulfill the test laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of The Bombay Union of Journalist and Ors. Vs. The Hindu, Bombay [ AIR 1963 SC 318 ] and in the case of The Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Anr. Vs. Krishna Kant [ AIR 1995 SC 1715 ] wherein it has been held that the test for determining as to whether an “individual dispute” has acquired the character of an “industrial dispute” is whether at the date of reference the dispute was taken up by the union of workmen or by appreciable number of “workmen” of the employer against whom the dispute had been raised. 22. It is reiterated that the respondent no.2 has failed to bring any evidence for proving that on the date of reference, i.e. 16.10.2007 the dispute was supported by appreciable number of workmen of the petitioner Company. On the contrary, in para-82 of his cross-examination, the respondent no.2 had admitted that he had not filed copy of resolution having sanction by the majority of workers regarding raising of his dispute. In such view of the matter, the decision of the Tribunal holding the dispute of the respondent no.2 as an “industrial dispute” is erroneous and certainly not in consonance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned cases. 23. In such view of the matter, the decision of the Tribunal holding the dispute of the respondent no.2 as an “industrial dispute” is erroneous and certainly not in consonance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned cases. 23. The objection whereby the petitioner Company had contended that the respondent no.2 by virtue of being the “Editor” of an in-house Magazine and also being the “Law Officer” of the Company and being placed in the managerial rank was not a “workman” under “the Act” has also not been properly appreciated by the Tribunal. 24. In this regard, it would be relevant to note that in para-84 of his cross-examination, the respondent no.2 had admitted as under:- “84. At the time of my retirement I was working as “Editor” of Sachitra Ayurved Magazine published by the Company. I was the full-fledged “Editor” of the said magazine. As an “Editor” my duty included Writing Editorials, Articles, Notes, Reading and Approving proofs etc.” 25. In paras-89 and 90 of his cross-examination, he has admitted as under :- “89. This is copy of letter dated 23.5.1990 signed by Sri B.L. Sharma, Managing Director promoting me as Editor. On the last date I identified this letter dated 23.5.1990. (Marked as Exhibit- M/7).” 26. In para-85 of his cross-examination, he has admitted as under :- “85. By letter dated 01.05.1994 I was given responsibilities of Law Officer of the Company also in addition to my duties as Editor of “Sachitra Ayurved”. This is copy of letter by the Management giving me additional responsibility of Law Officer and this bears my signature in lieu of receipt of the same (marked as Exhibit - M/4). Voluntarily says that I was given responsibility as a Law Officer only for two cases and later on I resigned from the same. This is not a fact that I was given additional responsibility of Law Officer by Exhibit- M/4 for general purpose and not for any specific case. This is copy of affidavit sworn by me while defending the Company before MRTP (marked as Exhibit- M/5). This affidavit was sworn by me as Law Officer of the Company. I cannot show any letter by the Management indicating that I was appointed or given additional responsibility of Law Officer only with respect to two specific cases. This is copy of affidavit sworn by me while defending the Company before MRTP (marked as Exhibit- M/5). This affidavit was sworn by me as Law Officer of the Company. I cannot show any letter by the Management indicating that I was appointed or given additional responsibility of Law Officer only with respect to two specific cases. This is not a fact that after my appointment as a Law Officer in addition to my duty as an Editor of “Sachitra Ayurved”. I continued as a Law Officer of the Company till my retirement in January, 2007. I do not remember the date till which I worked as a Law Officer of the Company. I do not have a copy of my resignation letter from the post of Law Officer.” 27. Further in para-86 of his cross-examination, he has admitted as under :- “86. This is copy of letter dated 7.4.2004 by the General Manager to me informing me that I was not treated as a workman by them as I was Law Officer of the company and therefore I was not entitled to increase in the wages in the light of settlement dated 07.01.2004 (marked as Exhibit- M/6).” 28. Having recorded the evidence adduced by the respondent no.2, at this stage, it would be apt to extract the definition of “workman” as given in Section 2(s) of “the Act” as under :- “2(s). Having recorded the evidence adduced by the respondent no.2, at this stage, it would be apt to extract the definition of “workman” as given in Section 2(s) of “the Act” as under :- “2(s). “workman” means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person- (i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.” 29. A bare reading of the definition provided under Section 2(s) of “the Act” shows that the “workman” means any person employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward and includes dismissed, discharged or retrenched workman in connection with the industrial dispute, but the definition also provides for exception. The exceptions (iii) and (iv) excludes the employees employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity from the ambit of the definition of “workman”. 30. Under Labour and Industrial Law, while deciding whether a particular person is a “workman” or not, what is relevant is the nature of duties performed by an employee. The job of an “Editor” of a magazine is not a stereotype work. It involves creativity. The “Editor” has to give his own opinion on various subjects. It is a highly skilled job which requires extensive training, studies and specialized knowledge. The job of this nature does not come under the definition of “workman”. The job of an “Editor” of a magazine is not a stereotype work. It involves creativity. The “Editor” has to give his own opinion on various subjects. It is a highly skilled job which requires extensive training, studies and specialized knowledge. The job of this nature does not come under the definition of “workman”. Moreover, apart from being an “Editor” of a magazine being published by the petitioner Company, the respondent no.2 was also discharging the duty of a “Law Officer”, which again required creativity. The “Law Officer” has not only to render legal opinion on a subject but also draft pleadings for the employer and represent him before the various authorities. The respondent no.2 has not disputed the fact that he had appeared as a “Law Officer” for the Company in some of the cases. The person discharging the job of a “Law Officer” can never be termed to be a “workman”. In my considered opinion, the work of an “Editor” or that of a “Law Officer” would not be covered within the definition given under Section 2(s) of “the Act” and such an employee would not be a “workman” under “the Act”. 31. Despite the clinching and cogent evidences, as narrated hereinabove against the respondent no.2, surprisingly the Tribunal held the respondent no.2 to be a “workman” under “the Act” and decided his dispute holding that the retirement of the respondent no.2 from service on the basis of other records rather than on the basis of date of birth on 05.01.1951, as given in the Matriculation Certification was not justified and consequently entitled him to get all consequential benefits. The adjudication by the Tribunal is patently illegal incorrect and erroneous. Even otherwise the impugned Award cannot be sustained for the simple reason that while delivering the Award in favour of the respondent no.2, it had relied upon the Matriculation Certificate which was never produced by the respondent no.2 before the petitioner Company. 32. I am of the view that the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent no.2 lacks merit. There is no force in his submission that the Tribunal could not have adjudicated the objection as to whether the respondent no.2 was a “workman” or not in view of the fact that in the reference order the State government had accepted him to be a “workman”. There is no force in his submission that the Tribunal could not have adjudicated the objection as to whether the respondent no.2 was a “workman” or not in view of the fact that in the reference order the State government had accepted him to be a “workman”. When the petitioner had raised an objection in this regard, it was incumbent upon the Tribunal to decide such issue in accordance with law. If the Tribunal had no authority to adjudicate a dispute, even the State could not have conferred jurisdiction in it to entertain an “individual dispute” of a “non-workman”. It is well settled in law that even by agreement of the parties, a jurisdiction cannot be conferred in any Court, Tribunal or Authority, which it does not possess. 33. So far as the question relating to non-interference with the Award delivered by the Tribunal by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction raised by the learned counsel for the respondent no.2 is concerned, it is a settled position of law that under Article 226 of the Constitution of India a Writ Court can exercise its power of judicial review well within certain parameters. 34. In Syed Yakoob Vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan & Others [ AIR 1964 SC 477 ], the Supreme Court highlighted the limitation of certiorari jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in the following words :- “The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdictions. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was' insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” 35. In Sawarn Singh and Anr. Vs. State Of Punjab And Ors. [ (1976) 2 SCC 868 ], the Supreme Court while reiterating the limitations of certiorari jurisdiction highlighted in Syed Yakoob Vs. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” 35. In Sawarn Singh and Anr. Vs. State Of Punjab And Ors. [ (1976) 2 SCC 868 ], the Supreme Court while reiterating the limitations of certiorari jurisdiction highlighted in Syed Yakoob Vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan (Supra), observed as under :- “In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of Certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends, only to cases where orders are pissed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” 36. Thus, it would be manifest from the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases that a writ in the nature of certiorari may be issued only if the finding of a Tribunal or Labour Court suffers from an error of jurisdiction or from a breach of principles of natural justice or is initiated by a manifest or apparent error of law. 37. In the present case, the findings of the Tribunal are contrary to the evidence led before it. The findings are perverse as the Tribunal has not appreciated the admissible evidence led before it and are not supported by any evidence at all. Such a finding would certainly fall within the parameter of manifest or apparent error of law. 38. Accordingly, the impugned Award dated 05.02.2014 passed by the Tribunal in Reference Case No. 36 of 2007 cannot be sustained. It is accordingly set aside. 39. The writ petition stands allowed.