ORDER : Ms. Nirmaljit Kaur, J. 1. The prayer in the present petition is to set aside the order dated 04.03.2002 (Annex.14) as also the order passed on review petition dated 13.09.2002 (Annex.16) affirming the aforesaid order after holding that the petitioner stood voluntarily retired w.e.f. 31.12.1997. 2. The petitioner in the first instance was selected in the Central Government Service pursuant whereto he served as GDMO, Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya Hospital, New Delhi. Then he was selected on the post of Pediatrician (Scientific Officer/SOSD), Raap, Kota under Department of Atomic Energy. The aforesaid assignment lasted from 1979 to 1982. Having cleared R.P.S.C. the petitioner was appointed as Junior Specialist PED in 1982 itself. He continued to serve at various places in Rajasthan. It was in March, 1997 while serving as Senior Specialist PED at Bangar Hospital, Pali that he and his wife who was also a doctor, came to be transferred simultaneously to Bundi and Nainwa respectively. The transfer so effected brought in its turn serious problems in his family. Hence both the petitioner and his wife made applications on 5/21.03.1997 seeking voluntary retirement. According to this application three months period of notice was to commence from 01.10.1997 and the voluntary retirement was to become effective on and from 31st December, 1997. This application was sent through registered post. The petitioner simultaneously sent letters dated 21.03.1997 to the competent authority to reckon his Central and State Services so that he may have to his credit requisite qualifying service for voluntary retirement. No order either rejecting his application or accepting his application for voluntary retirement was passed. Hence, he was deemed to have voluntarily retired on 31.12.1997 in accordance with Rule 50 of the Rajasthan Civil Services Pension Rules, 1996. Accordingly, the petitioner did not go back on duty having voluntarily retired from the effective date. After two years, a charge-sheet dated 30.06.1999 was issued to the petitioner. Accordingly, the petitioner preferred S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.4733/1999 with a prayer to set aside the charge-sheet since the petitioner stood retired on 31.12.1997 and no departmental proceedings could be initiated against him under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules with a further prayer to settle and finalise the pension case of the petitioner. Accordingly, the petitioner preferred S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.4733/1999 with a prayer to set aside the charge-sheet since the petitioner stood retired on 31.12.1997 and no departmental proceedings could be initiated against him under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules with a further prayer to settle and finalise the pension case of the petitioner. However, during the pendency of the writ petition, a punishment of removal from service was imposed vide order dated 04.03.2002 rendering the writ petition as having become infructuous. The petitioner challenged the same in a review petition. However, the said review petition was also dismissed vide order dated 13.09.2002. 3. While praying for setting aside the impugned orders, the learned counsel for the petitioner raised threefold arguments: (a) The petitioner stood voluntarily retired on or from 31.12.1997. Thus, at the time of disciplinary action taken against the present petitioner, he was not in government service. Consequently, no disciplinary proceedings could have been initiated against him (b) The petitioner having retired, no departmental proceedings could have been initiated after his retirement without the sanction of the Governor. The charge-sheet and all consequential departmental proceedings are without jurisdiction in view of Section 7(2)(b) of the Rajasthan Civil Services Pension Rules, 1996, vide which the same can be instituted against a retired government servant only with the sanction of the Governor, whereas, no sanction of the Governor is taken in the present case. (c) The application for voluntary retirement submitted by the wife of the petitioner was accepted after dropping similar departmental enquiry which was initiated against her as well. There was nothing to distinguish the case of the petitioner. 4. Reply has been filed by the respondents. 5. Learned counsel for the parties were heard at length. 6. The first issue therefore that requires to be decided is as to whether the petitioner was deemed to have retired on or from 31.12.1997 from service or not. 7. As stated above, the application for voluntary retirement sent by the petitioner was neither accepted nor rejected. In the reply to the writ petition, the only contention is that the petitioner had not sent his application to the Appointing Authority through proper channel i.e. the Directorate and had sent the same to the Secretary to the Government, Jaipur. 7. As stated above, the application for voluntary retirement sent by the petitioner was neither accepted nor rejected. In the reply to the writ petition, the only contention is that the petitioner had not sent his application to the Appointing Authority through proper channel i.e. the Directorate and had sent the same to the Secretary to the Government, Jaipur. If it is so, then the contention raised by the petitioner that the same was not decided as it was not received is not sustainable. Thus, from the reply, it is evident that the respondents have not denied the receipt of the application for voluntary retirement. The only submission is that his application was not sent through proper channel i.e. the Appointing Authority, which is stated to be the Directorate. The said objection too has no merit inasmuch as the petitioner was holding the post of Senior Specialist Pediatrician which is the post falling under the Rajasthan Medical and Health Service Rules, 1963. Clause 2(a) of the said Rules defined the “Appointing Authority” as under:- “‘Appointing Authority’ means the Government of Rajasthan and any other officer to whom powers in this behalf may be delegated by the Government by a special or general order and subject to such conditions as it may deem fit.” 8. Thus, the petitioner has rightly submitted his application for voluntary retirement to the Secretary, Government of Rajasthan. So far as the petitioner is concerned, the Directorate has nothing to do with him and the Directorate is an appointing authority for the post falling within the purview of Medical and Health Subordinate Service Rules, 1965. Thus, by simply saying that the application was not received in the Secretariat as it was not sent through the Directorate is of no avail. The Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana and Ors. v. S.K. Singhal, reported in AIR 1999 SC 1829 while discussing the provisions as applicable in the facts of the said case dismissed the appeal of the State challenging the order of the High Court allowing voluntary retirement holding that the voluntary retirement was conferred in absolute terms by the relevant rules and there was no provision in the rules to withhold permission in certain contingency except as provided in the said rules. In that case, the crucial question that arose was whether the allegation that the respondent was not attending the duties after notice was relevant and could be a valid ground for refusing the permit for voluntary retirement coming into force under Rule 5.32(b) of the Punjab Civil Service Rules. The Apex Court while considering the various judgments including the case of Dinesh Chandra Sangma v. State of Assam and Ors., reported in (1977) 4 SCC 441 observed in para 13 as under :- “Thus, form the aforesaid three decisions it is clear that if the right to voluntarily retirement is conferred in absolute terms as in Dinesh Chandra Sangma’s case (supra) by the relevant rules and there is no provision in Rules to withhold permission in certain contingencies the voluntary retirement comes into effect automatically on the expiry of the period specified in the notice.” 9. The judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dinesh Chandra Sangma v. State of Assam and Ors., reported in (1977) 4 SCC 441 while considering whether Rule 119 of the Defence and Internal Security of India Rules, 1971 is superimposed on F.R. 56(c) of the Fundamental Rules, which was a provision of voluntary retirement observed that the High Court committed an error of law in holding that consent of the government is necessary to give legal effect to the voluntary retirement. 10. In the present case, there is no objection except that the application was not sent through proper channel, which has already been dealt with by this Court as above. Uptill the date 31.12.1997, there was nothing against the petitioner. There was no charge-sheet issued to him prior to this date and neither any disciplinary proceedings were pending against him. Thus, there was no reason available to the respondents-Authority to refuse to grant the permission for retirement. It is also not denied that the petitioner was otherwise entitled for the voluntary retirement as per the rules on the date of the application and also uptil the due date of retirement i.e. 31.12.1997. 11. Rule 50 of the Rajasthan Civil Services Pension Rules, 1996 as applicable to the petitioner reads as under:- “50. It is also not denied that the petitioner was otherwise entitled for the voluntary retirement as per the rules on the date of the application and also uptil the due date of retirement i.e. 31.12.1997. 11. Rule 50 of the Rajasthan Civil Services Pension Rules, 1996 as applicable to the petitioner reads as under:- “50. Retirement on completion of 20 years’ qualifying Service: (1) At any time after a Government servant has completed twenty years qualifying service, he may, by giving notice of not less than three months in writing to the appointing authority, retire from service. (2) The notice of voluntary retirement given under sub rule (1) shall require acceptance by the appointing authority : Provided that where the appointing authority does not refuse to grant the permission for retirement before the expiry of the period specified in the said notice, the retirement shall automatically become effective from the date of expiry of the said period. 12. A perusal of the above Rules reveal that a Government servant whoever has completed fifteen years qualifying service may give a notice of not less than three months in writing and in case of such notice, acceptance of Appointing Authority would be required only if the appointing authority does not wish to grant the permission for retirement before the period specified in the notice. 13. In that eventuality, retirement becomes effective automatically on the expiry of the said period. 14. The said issue in fact has already been decided by this Court in the case of Dr. Kalpana Singh v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. (S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.4526 of 2014), decided on 16.12.2014 and is no more res integra. 15. In view of the above, this Court holds that the petitioner was deemed to have retired on 31.12.1997. Consequently, the charge sheet dated 30.06.1999 was a charge-sheet issued after the date the petitioner stood voluntary retired. Therefore, the same being after retirement was without jurisdiction. 16. Rule 7(2)(b) of the Rajasthan Civil Services Pension Rules, 1996 reads as under :- “7 Right of Governor to withhold or withdrawn pension : (1) xxx xxx xxx (2) xxx xxx xxx (b) The departmental proceedings, if not instituted while the Government servant was in service, whether before his retirement, or during his re-employment- (i) shall not be instituted save with the sanction of the Governor. (ii) shall not be in respect of any event which took place more than four years before such institution, and (iii) shall be conducted by such authority and in such place as the Governor may direct and in accordance with the procedure applicable to departmental proceedings in which an order of dismissal from service could be made in relation to the Government servant during his service.” 17. Admittedly, no sanction of the Governor was taken before instituting the disciplinary action against the petitioner. Consequently, the same are without jurisdiction and deserve to be quashed on this ground alone. 18. One of the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the respondents was that the petitioner remained absent from his duties w.e.f. 07.03.1997 to 14.05.1997, from 16.05.1997 to 12.06.1997, from 14.06.1997 to 10.09.1997 and then, continue from 12.09.1997 and if it is so, then the charge-sheet dated 30.06.1999 so issued to the petitioner was perfectly legal, valid, justified, well within jurisdiction and does not suffer from any vice or infirmity. Attention of this Court has been invited to the fact that all these dates are after the submission of the application for voluntary retirement. It is stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner had duly applied for leave during this period. Moreover, to say that he was continuously absent after 12.09.1997, no fault can be found with the petitioner not coming to work after the due date of retirement. Moreover, both the petitioner and his wife have submitted their applications for voluntary retirement. Subsequently, on a direction issued by the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal to consider the application of his wife for voluntary retirement, the same was accepted after dropping the departmental enquiry which was initiated against her as well. The allegations against his wife were similar. 19. In fact, the disciplinary authority has not even recorded its own finding with respect to the charges. None of the grounds raised by the petitioner in his reply dated 18.10.2004 have been considered by the disciplinary authority. 20. It would be appropriate to refer the law laid down in the case of S.L. Gupta v. LIC, reported in 2005(4) RDD 861 (Raj.), wherein this Court held as under :- “In normal course a speaking and reasoned order is required to be passed by every quasi judicial authority as it is a cardinal principle of rule of law. 20. It would be appropriate to refer the law laid down in the case of S.L. Gupta v. LIC, reported in 2005(4) RDD 861 (Raj.), wherein this Court held as under :- “In normal course a speaking and reasoned order is required to be passed by every quasi judicial authority as it is a cardinal principle of rule of law. The action of the disciplinary authority is quasi judicial by nature, therefore, in order to enable the delinquent employee to know the reasons which weighed in the mind of the disciplinary authority in determining the guilt the order with reasons in support to the findings and conclusions is must. However, in the present case the stand taken by the respondents is that the order passed by the disciplinary authority is in concurrence to the findings given by the Inquiry Officer in the inquiry report which is having sufficient reasons, therefore, the order passed by the disciplinary authority need not to be a reasoned one. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana, 1987 (Supp) SCC 582, held that when the punishing authority agrees with the findings of the inquiring authority and accepts the reasons given by him in support of such findings it is not necessary for the punishing authority to again discuss evidence and come to the same findings as that of the Inquiry Officer and given the same reasons for the findings. In the instant case, I am to see as to whether the above principles can be applied in the present set of facts. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, AIR 1991 SC 471 , held that the inquiry report is an adverse material if the Inquiry Officer records a findings of guilty and with proposed punishment so far as the delinquent is concerned. In a quasi judicial inquiry if the delinquent is being deprived of knowledge of the material against him though the same is being available to the disciplinary authority in the matter of reaching his conclusion rules of natural justice would be affected. In view of this position of law the inquiry report wherein an employee is found guilty, is adverse material to the delinquent employee. In view of this position of law the inquiry report wherein an employee is found guilty, is adverse material to the delinquent employee. In the present case also the inquiry report along with the notice to show-cause was given to the petitioner as an adverse material and the petitioner was required to meet the same by submitting a reply. The petitioner submitted a reply to the disciplinary authority and raised various objections with regard to denial of opportunity of defence and also with regard to the findings of the Inquiry Officer. As I stated above that in the light of the law laid-down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Ramzan Khan’s case (supra) the inquiry report is an adverse material. Therefore, the agreements to the findings by the disciplinary authority was tentative. The disciplinary authority after receiving the order of comments by the delinquent employee is always required to reach at its own findings and conclusions. The disciplinary authority is under an obligation to deal with the objections raised by the employee and he is required to prescribe findings and conclusions supported by the reasons. In a case where a copy of the inquiry report is supplied to a delinquent employee with a notice to show-cause with regard to proposed punishment, the principle laid-down in the case of Ram Kumar’s case (Supra) cannot be applied. These are not the case of agreement with the findings of Inquiry Officer but in these cases the inquiry report itself has been treated as an adverse material, as such it is all the more necessary for the disciplinary authority to record reasons in support of his findings and conclusions.” 21. In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the view that since the petitioner stood retired on 31.12.1997, therefore, the charge-sheet issued after the date of retirement was without jurisdiction. Even, the order of punishment and the order dismissing the review have been passed without dealing with the objections and the submissions of the petitioner and are, therefore, non-speaking orders. 22. Accordingly, the charge-sheet, impugned order dated 04.03.2002 as well as order dated 13.09.2002 are set aside with a direction to the respondents to release the retiral benefits to the petitioner in accordance with rule. The benefits shall be released to him within three months of the receipt of this order with 6% interest. 22. Accordingly, the charge-sheet, impugned order dated 04.03.2002 as well as order dated 13.09.2002 are set aside with a direction to the respondents to release the retiral benefits to the petitioner in accordance with rule. The benefits shall be released to him within three months of the receipt of this order with 6% interest. In case, the same are not released within the stipulated period, the petitioner shall be entitled to 12% per annum interest from the expiry of three months period till payment.