JUDGMENT : A.S. BOPANNA, J. 1. Respondents No. 1 and 3 to W.P. Nos. 21942/2013 and 30973-30976/2013 are the petitioners in these review petitions seeking that the order dated 01.09.2015 passed in the said writ petitions be reviewed. 2. This Court through the order in the said writ petitions had directed petitioner No. 1 herein to ratify the earlier order to transfer the land in favour of the respondent No. 1 herein who was the writ petitioner. It was further directed that if any other specific order is to be made in order to direct respondent No. 2 herein who was also respondent No. 2 in the writ petition to complete the transaction, the same be made. Pursuant thereto, since according to respondent No. 1 herein the review petitioners had not complied the direction, contempt petition in C.C.C. No. 186/2017 was filed. In the said proceedings, the review petitioner relied on a Government Order dated 28.06.2017 which was noticed therein and a prima facie view was expressed that the same does not amount to completing the transaction but the said order in fact frustrates the transaction which was directed by this Court for completion. It is only at that stage the review petitioners have sought to file the instant review petitions. In that view, since there is delay of 667 days in filing the review petitions, the application in I.A. No. 1/2017 is filed seeking condonation of delay. 3. The application as well as the review petitions are opposed by respondent No. 1 by filing objection statement. 4. Though in a normal circumstance the application for condonation of delay alone required consideration at the outset, in order to come to a conclusion as to whether the delay in filing the review petitions is to be condoned based on the reasons assigned for the delay, keeping in view the sequence of events as noticed above and since in that background the review petitions are filed, I have heard the learned Advocate General, the learned senior counsel for respondent No. 1 as also the learned counsel for respondent No. 2 on the grounds urged in the review petitions as well. In that view of the matter, the delay though inordinate is condoned so as to advert to the contentions in the review petitions and arrive at a conclusion in the matter, though the reasons assigned for the delay does not constitute sufficient cause. 5. The contention of the learned Advocate General is that the prayer in the writ petitions is to seek mandamus against respondent No. 1 herein and in that view, a direction to the review petitioner to complete the transaction is not in accordance with law. The further contention is that the land in question is not in an industrial area and in that view, respondent No. 2 in the writ petition had contended that they cannot exercise jurisdiction and as such the Government directing the respondent No. 2 in the writ petition to complete the transaction also does not arise. It is further sought to be contended that the land in question had been forfeited to the Government and in that light the surplus land available with the Government can be disposed only in accordance with the provision as contained in Section 77 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. In that regard reference is also made to Section 27-A of the Act. Hence it is contended that that the writ petitioner could not have claimed right to such property. 6. Learned senior counsel for respondent No. 1 would contend that the scope for review of an order on merits is very limited. In that regard, it is pointed out that this Court after taking note of the right as claimed under the Government Order dated 29.08.1992 and the other relevant material had passed the order in the writ petition. The review petitioner having acted upon the order but proceeding contrary to the direction cannot now seek review to escape the contempt proceedings. It is contended that respondent No. 1 having purchased the land had set up the industry and at that stage since the KLR Act had come into force the land was forfeited, but the Government keeping in view the industrial policy had allotted such land not only to respondent No. 1 herein but also to similar industries, yet had not completed the transaction insofar as the writ petitioner is concerned. Hence, it is contended that the review petitions are liable to be rejected as no error apparent is pointed out. 7. Hence, it is contended that the review petitions are liable to be rejected as no error apparent is pointed out. 7. Learned Advocate General has relied on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.M. Thomas vs. State of Kerala and Another, (2000) 1 SCC 666 and in the case of Hamza Haji vs. State of Kerala and Another, (2006) 7 SCC 416 to the effect that the High Court being a Court of record under Article 215 of the Constitution is entitled to correct its record by review and that review is to be made when the order is obtained by fraud. In the first of the above cases, it is also held that it will be the duty of the Court to correct the error apparent on the face of the record. The learned senior counsel for respondent No. 1 on the other hand has referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Haridas Das vs. Smt. Usha Rani Banik and Others, (2006) 4 SCC 78 wherein it is held that seeking review on the ground that the review petitioner had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could have argued more forcefully or cited binding precedents to get a favourable judgment is not permissible. 8. On the aspect relating to the power of this Court, there can be no dispute as the law is well settled. In the instant case merely because certain contention is urged about the forfeiture of the land from the company, when subsequently a decision was taken by the Government to allot and an order to that effect was made based on which a mandamus had been sought in the writ petition, it cannot be brought under the bracket fraud so as to entertain these review petitions on that ground. If that contention is discarded, only other permissible option is whether there is an error apparent on the face of record. However the power of review in that circumstance is also well circumscribed and can be made only on the limited grounds permissible. 9. In that background a perusal of the petition papers will disclose that respondent No. 1 herein, as the writ petitioner had sought for issue of mandamus to the second respondent (KIADB) to allot and transfer the land referred therein pursuant to the Government order dated 29.08.1992. 9. In that background a perusal of the petition papers will disclose that respondent No. 1 herein, as the writ petitioner had sought for issue of mandamus to the second respondent (KIADB) to allot and transfer the land referred therein pursuant to the Government order dated 29.08.1992. Therefore, the relief to be considered in the writ petition was based on the right that had been created in favour of the writ petitioner by the Government order which was to be acted upon and completed by way of implementation by respondent No. 2 therein i.e. the KIADB. In that circumstance, it was noticed by this Court that the KIADB had contended that the action proposed cannot be taken by them which in that event was to be enforced by the Government. 10. Hence, in that background having examined the matter, this Court on taking note of the subsistence of the Government order dated 29.08.1992 creating a right in favour of the petitioner had ordered implementation of the same. Since the KIADB had contended that the land is not in an industrial layout, this Court had directed that the order be ratified by the Government by passing an appropriate order so as to ensure completion of the transaction. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion and direction by this Court was that the review petitioner was to either through the KIADB or by itself complete the process in favour of the writ petitioner. Such direction was issued since the right under the order dated 29.08.1992 remained in favour of the writ petitioner and as such a duty was cast on the review petitioner, the performance of which was to be compelled by issue of mandamus. The fact that the Government Order dated 29.08.1992 was intact as on 01.09.2015 when the writ petition was disposed is not in dispute. If that be the position there is no error apparent on the face of the record. That apart when the Government Order dated 29.08.1992 which was in subsistence itself recites the circumstance in which such transfer of land is ordered therein, it cannot be a case of either fraud or can any other ground be considered in the limited scope available in a review petition. 11. In that view the review petitions are without merit. The same are accordingly dismissed. 12. 11. In that view the review petitions are without merit. The same are accordingly dismissed. 12. The application in IA No. 1/2017 for condonation of delay is also disposed in terms of the above order.