JUDGMENT : M.K. Hanjura, J. This civil revision is directed against the order dated 13th of September, 2017, of the Court of learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Srinagar, passed in an application filed under Order 37 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for setting aside the exparte decree in case titled 'Bashir Ahmad Wandroo v. Noor Mohammad Rah'. 2. The factual background of the case is that the plaintiff/respondent herein filed a summary suit for the recovery of Rs. 20 lacs alongwith interest in the Court of the learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Srinagar, under Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the defendant/applicant. The said suit was determined by the learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Srinagar, by a judgment and decree dated 5th of June, 2017 and, accordingly, the defendant/applicant was directed to pay Rs. 20 lacs to the plaintiff alongwith interest @ 9 percent per annum from the date of the institution of the suit till realization of the decretal amount together with the costs of the suit calculated at Rs. 35,000/-. 3. The facts that persuaded the applicant to file this revision are that on the date of the institution of the suit, i.e. the 3rd of May, 2017, summons in form 4 Appendix 'B' were issued to the defendant/applicant in accordance with the mandate of Rule 2 of Order 37 of the Civil Procedure Code for entering his appearance before the Court, within a period of ten days from the date of the service thereof on him, in accordance with Rule 3 Order 37 of the Civil Procedure Code. The defendant/applicant, in pursuance of the said summons, filed an application on 13th of May, 2017, seeking to enter his attendance/appearance in the suit in accordance with the Rule 3 of Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the plaintiff/respondent herein filed an application buttressed with an affidavit for the service of summons on the defendant/applicant for judgment and, accordingly, summons for judgment in Form 4-A in Appendix 'B' were issued to the defendant/applicant on 18th of May, 2017 and these were served on him on the same day. Thereafter, the plaintiff/respondent herein filed an application buttressed with an affidavit for the service of summons on the defendant/applicant for judgment and, accordingly, summons for judgment in Form 4-A in Appendix 'B' were issued to the defendant/applicant on 18th of May, 2017 and these were served on him on the same day. The defendant/applicant did not file any application for leave to defend the suit within ten days from the service of summons for judgment on him, as enunciated under Order 37 Rule 3 sub-Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Srinagar, held that in these circumstances, the plaintiff/respondent herein is entitled to the judgment in terms of Order 37 Rule 3 sub-Rule 6(a) and, as a consequence thereof, the Court directed that the suit of the plaintiff/respondent herein deserves to be decreed in favour of the plaintiff/respondent herein and against the defendant/applicant. The defendant/applicant filed an application before the Court of 2nd Additional District Judge, Srinagar, in terms of Order 37 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the decree passed against him, inter alia, on the grounds which are reproduced below, verbatim: i. For the applicant had duly engaged the lawyer, sooner the summons of appearance were issued and on the resumption of summons for judgment the counsel was exhorted to prosecute the matter further while seeking the defence but the drawl of decree by the court suggests that the counsel has not bothered to pursue the matter given the summary nature of the suit which act is largely prejudicial and against the interest of the applicant/defendant. ii. For the applicant/defendant does not understand the niceties summary nature of the suit and the technicalities embodied therein and now when the exparte decree is drawn by the court, same is telling upon the applicant/defendant for none of his faults. iii. For the applicant has the substantial defense to plead in the matter, as the many sort to be recovered on the basis of the instrument is already paid to the plaintiff, does rendering the act too dishonest and sham to withstand the test of law. In as much as the plaintiff/non-applicant has filed a complaint under section 138 Negotiable Instrument Act pending consideration in the court of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class/Sub Registrar Srinagar for the same amount. In as much as the plaintiff/non-applicant has filed a complaint under section 138 Negotiable Instrument Act pending consideration in the court of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class/Sub Registrar Srinagar for the same amount. On the plea that the plaintiff is in the nick of double recovery from the non-applicant/defendant less against no liability, this application merits grant. iv. For the applicant/defendant has been in business with the plaintiff/non-applicant for a pretty long time by now wherein the dealings where in crores of rupees and in the unusual course of business the non-applicant/defendant having issued the instrument of cheques worth Rs. 20.00 lacs and on the availability of the case, the plaintiff/non-applicant was requested to hand over the instruments which are now being used dishonestly despite having received Rs. 20.00 lacs, the ground which may kindly be considered for the grant of this application. v. For the applicant/defendant in the statement recorded under section 242 CrPC before the Trial Court has stated that the plaintiff/non-applicant has received the cash against the instruments of cheque on the basis of which the prosecution under Section 138 N.I. Act is pending consideration besides institution of the summary suit on the same instruments. vi. For this application is supported by an affidavit duly sworn in by the applicant. 4. The plaintiff/respondent herein strenuously resisted the application of the defendant/applicant on the grounds, inter alia, that the application for setting aside the exparte decree is cryptic in details. It does not spell out any special circumstance under which the defendant/applicant could take refuge and shelter. The defendant/applicant has tried to pass the buck on to his lawyer by stating that his lawyer has been remiss, calous and negligent in conducting his case. The plaintiff/respondent proceeded to state that once the defendant/applicant engaged a counsel to represent him in the Court, it has to be presumed that he gave him the proper advice as to how and in what manner he has to proceed in the case and still then the defendant/applicant preferred to abstain from the proceedings which is a deliberate and intentional act on his part and this excuse, on the face of it, does not constitute any special circumstance as stated in and required under Rule 4 of Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. 5. The learned 2nd Additional District Judge, after applying his mind to the facts and circumstances of the application filed by the defendant/applicant, came to the conclusion that the application is without any merit and, accordingly, dismissed the same by order dated 13th of September, 2017. Aggrieved by this order, the defendant/applicant has filed this revision petition on the following grounds: 1. That the special circumstances, as mandated in order 37 rule 4 CPC were explained, but instead of returning a finding on the same, the trail court conclusively determined the suit. 2. That the trial court has travelled beyond the pleadings in the application which essentially is aimed at setting aside the ex-parte decree only, onto the explanation of the special circumstances which prevented the petitioner from entering into defence within the statutory period, as entailed in order 37 Rule 5 CPC but the decision on the merits of the case not specifically pleaded by the petitioner while holding the defence dishonest and sham taints the order impugned in law and renders it worth setting aside. On the premise that the respondents plaint consists of eight factual para's and none of the plea is replied in the application exception the demonstration of the special circumstances, yet the finding on the facts is too boldly spelt by the court in absence of the specific plea's at the cost of the petitioner's valuable right enshrined in order 37 rule 5 CPC thereby truncating the proceedings at the altar of law. 3. That the trial court has miserably failed to appreciate the mandate of law as is provided in order 37 rule 4 CPC on the pleading of the petitioner and give the citation of the case laws to support the order impugned. It is gainsaying to submit that the court has misconceived the scope of the application of pleadings. On the count that the substantial defence available to the petitioner has been scuttled while issuing the order impugned this petition merits grant. 4. That the satisfaction derived by the trail court as expressed in para 25 to 29 in the order impugned, is all perverse in facts and law, as the court voluntarily has sided with the respondent while enlarging the scope of the pleadings on mere imagination and suppositions, the practice which is highly proscribed in law. 5. 4. That the satisfaction derived by the trail court as expressed in para 25 to 29 in the order impugned, is all perverse in facts and law, as the court voluntarily has sided with the respondent while enlarging the scope of the pleadings on mere imagination and suppositions, the practice which is highly proscribed in law. 5. That the reasoning available in the case laws cited in the order impugned is too simply applied on the petitioner's case, as if the facts and circumstances of it were in synchrony, as a matter of fact the application of the petitioner is objectively specific viz the setting aside of the ex-parte decree only. On the premise that the trial court has over reached the facts and law in the present case while delivering the order impugned, the present petition merits grant. 6. That the pursuit of exploring the existence of the tri-able issues on the part of the trial court is also a significant misnomer and the treatment lend in this regard is incorrigible and wayward to the pleadings in generality. 7. That the principles of law in practice for drawing inference onto facts is illuminatingly thrown to winds, as the trial court seems triumphing to favour the respondent while drawing imaginary reasoning, the ground which may kindly be considered while granting this petition. 8. That the contra-distinction interse order 9 rule 13 and order 37 rule 4 CPC is ballooned by the trial court unnecessarily, for the difference is aptly provided by the law itself, as the petitioner diligently projected the special circumstances to have the ex-parte decree set aside. On the count that the trial court itself is unsure viz the academic constitution of the “Special Circumstances” illuminatingly writ large in the order impugned, this petition merits grant. 9. That the trial court has plunged the petitioner to face the consequence in law not otherwise due in the attending circumstances. 6. Heard and considered. 7. The law on the subject is succinctly clear and luminous. 9. That the trial court has plunged the petitioner to face the consequence in law not otherwise due in the attending circumstances. 6. Heard and considered. 7. The law on the subject is succinctly clear and luminous. Sub-rule 2 of Rule 1 of Order 37 provides that (a) Order 37 applies to the suits upon bills of exchange, hundies and promissory notes; (b) suits in which the Plaintiff seeks to recover a debt only or a liquidated demand in money payable by the Defendant, with or without interest, arising, (i) on a written contract; or (ii) on an enactment, where the sum sought to be recovered is a fixed sum of money or in the nature of a debt other than a penalty; or (iii) on a guarantee, where the claim against the principle is in respect of a debt or a liquidated demand only. Rule 2 provides the particulars which are to be filed by the Plaintiff at the time of the presentation of plaint. Rule 3 details the procedure for the appearance of the Defendant. Sub Rule (1) of Rule 3 envisages a situation where the Plaintiff together with the summons under Rule 2, shall serve on the Defendant a copy of the plaint and annexures thereto and the Defendant may, at any time within ten days of such service, enter an appearance either in person or by pleader and shall file in Court an address for service of notices on him. Sub rule (3) of Rule 3 imparts that on the day of entering the appearance, notice of such appearance shall be given by the Defendant to the Plaintiff's pleader, or, the Plaintiff if he is appearing in person. As per sub rule (4) of Rule 3, on putting appearance by Defendant, the Plaintiff shall serve on the Defendant a summon for judgment in Form No. 4A in Appendix B or such other Form as may be prescribed from time to time, returnable not less than ten days from the date of service supported by an affidavit verifying the cause of action and the amount claimed and stating that in his belief there is no defence to the suit. Sub rule (5) of Rule 3 replenishes that the Defendant may, at any time within ten days from the service of such summons for judgment, by affidavit or otherwise disclosing such facts as may be deemed sufficient to entitle him to defend, apply on such summons for leave to defend such suit, and leave to defend may be granted to him unconditionally or upon such terms as my appear to the Court to be just, with the rider that the leave to defend shall not be refused unless the Court is satisfied that the facts disclosed by the Defendant do not indicate that he has a substantial defence to raise or that the defence intended to be put up by the Defendant is frivolous or vexatious. Sub-rule (7) proffers that the Court may, for sufficient cause shown by the Defendant, excuse the delay of the Defendant in entering an appearance or in applying for leave to defend the suit. Rule 7 of Order 37 provides that save as provided by this order, the procedure in suits hereunder shall be the same as the procedure in suits instituted in the ordinary manner. Sub rule (1) of Rule 14 of Order 7 obliges that where a Plaintiff sues upon a document or relies upon a document in his possession or power in support of his claim, he shall enter such document in a list, and shall produce it in the Court when the plaint is presented by him and shall, at the same time deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be filed with the plaint. The sub rule (3) further enjoins that a document which ought to be produced in Court by the Plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint but is not produced or entered accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit. 8. Looking at the provisions governing the law on the subject, the application under Order 37 Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code is not compatible, equal and synonymous with an application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. These cannot be treated on par, but have to be evaluated on different scales. 8. Looking at the provisions governing the law on the subject, the application under Order 37 Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code is not compatible, equal and synonymous with an application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. These cannot be treated on par, but have to be evaluated on different scales. “Special Circumstances” cannot be equated with “Sufficient Cause”, as provided under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Order 37 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides distinctly, explicitly and in plain language that after the decree, the Court may, under “Special Circumstances”, set aside the decree as is sought by the petitioner herein this petition. Therefore, on this analogy a cause which may be sufficient will not entitle an applicant to seek setting aside of an exparte decree. The “Special Circumstances” have to be established and shown by the applicant to carve out a case in his favour. Not only this, in any case, where a decree is passed under Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure and an application is made for setting aside the same, the judgment debtor/defendant has to disclose his defense. In the case on hand, the defendant/applicant has not disclosed the facts as would impel the Court to grant him the leave to defend the case. A cue can be had, in this behalf, from the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of “Rajni Kumar v. Suresh Kumar Malhotra and Anr., 2003 AIR(SC) 1322, paragraph Nos. 10 and 11 of which read as under: “10. It is important to note here that the power under Rule 4 of Order 37 is not confined to setting aside the ex parte decree, it extends to staying or setting aside the execution and giving leave to appear to the summons and to defend the suit. We may point out that as the very purpose of Order 37 is to ensure an expeditious hearing and disposal of the suit filed thereunder, Rule 4 empowers the court to grant leave to the defendant to appear to summons and defend the suit if the Court considers it reasonable so to do, on such terms as court thinks fit in addition to setting aside the decree. Where on an application, more than one among the specified reliefs may be granted by the Court all such reliefs must be claimed in one application. It is not permissible to claim such reliefs in successive petitions as it would be contrary to the letter and spirit of the provision. That is why where an application under Rule 4 of Order 37 is filed to set aside a decree either because the defendant did not appear in response to summons and limitation expired, or having appeared, did not apply for leave to defend the suit in the prescribed period, the court is empowered to grant leave to defendant to appear to the summons and to defend the suit in the same application. It is, therefore, not enough for the defendant to show special circumstances which prevented him from appearing or applying for leave to defend, he has also to show by affidavit or otherwise, facts which would entitle him leave to defend the suit. In this respect, Rule 4 of Order 37 is different from Rule 13 of Order 9. 11. Now adverting to the facts of this case, though appellant has shown sufficient cause for his absence on the date of passing ex parte decree, he failed to disclose facts which would entitle him to defend the case. The respondent was right in his submission that in the application under Rule 4 of Order 37, the appellant did not say a word about any amount being in deposit with the respondent or that the suit was not maintainable under Order 37. From a perusal of the order under challenge, it appears to us that the High Court was right in accepting existence of special circumstances justifying his not seeking leave of the court to defend, but in declining to grant relief since he had mentioned no circumstances justifying any defense. “ 9. The judgment of law rendered by this Court in the case of “Subash Raina v. Suraj Parkash, 1977 AIR(J&K) 30” is also significant in the context of the decision in the instant case and paragraph Nos. 7 to 9 thereof are reproduced below: “7. Coming to the question of special circumstances as envisaged by Rule 4 it is noticed that no special circumstances can be said to be established from the averments made in the application itself. 7 to 9 thereof are reproduced below: “7. Coming to the question of special circumstances as envisaged by Rule 4 it is noticed that no special circumstances can be said to be established from the averments made in the application itself. There is difference between “Special Circumstance” occurring in Rule 4 and “sufficient cause” occurring in rule 13 of order 9. Special Circumstance is not synonymous with sufficient cause. Under Rule 4 the defendant has to explain the special circumstance which prevented him from appearing in the court and seek leave to defend the suit within time. In the instant case no special circumstance entitling the defendant to claim benefit under Order 4 has been set up. The mere fact that the defendant petitioner was busy at Phillaur and was undergoing training there would not have prevented him from engaging an attorney or a lawyer and instructing him to appear on his behalf and seek leave to defend the suit, or at any rate Phillaur being not a far off place from Jammu, he could have boarded the train during night and come over to Jammu on a holiday and after briefing his counsel should have returned to that place. The defendant willfully remained absent and in spite of service did not either personally or through agent or through a lawyer care to make his appearance and seek leave to defend the suit. 8. For the foregoing reasons, I am, therefore, not inclined to accede to the request of the defendant that the decree be set aside against him. 9. Nor, can this application be treated as an application under Order 20, Rule 11 C.P.C. for fixation of instalments. There being two joint requests in a composite application they cannot be allowed to be taken up in one and the same application. The petitioner, if at all, wants fixation of instalments may move a separate application under the relevant rule and then it can be considered. “ 10. The law laid down in case reported in “AIR 2000 Himachal Pradesh 95”, also evolves and enunciates the same principle and it lays down as under: “10. The language used in Rule 2 of Order 37 does not postulate the passing of an ex parte decree as is provided under Order 9, Rule 6, Code of Civil Procedure. “ 10. The law laid down in case reported in “AIR 2000 Himachal Pradesh 95”, also evolves and enunciates the same principle and it lays down as under: “10. The language used in Rule 2 of Order 37 does not postulate the passing of an ex parte decree as is provided under Order 9, Rule 6, Code of Civil Procedure. It is only when the defendant afterwards appears and establishes special circumstances that the Court may set aside the decree and grant leave to him to appear and defend the suit. The procedure set out in Rule 4 of Order 37 leaves no doubt that the provisions contained in Order 9, Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure, can have no application to a decree passed in absentia of the defendant under Rule 3 of Order 37. 10. The words “special circumstances” occurring in Rule 4 of Order 37 and the words “sufficient ground” appearing in Order 9, Rule 13 are not synonymous and as such cannot be equated. The legislature in its wisdom has used the words “special circumstances” in Rule 4, of Order 37. Therefore, the gravity of reasons is higher in the case of “special circumstances”. Under Rule 4, the defendant is obliged to explain the special circumstances which prevented him from appearing in Court and seek leave to defend the suit within time. In addition he has further to show that he has good, substantial and/or meritorious defense in the suit. 11. Looking at the enunciations of law laid down above and the facts and circumstances detailed in the revision petition, the order of the learned trial Court appears to be a reasoned one. It does not call for any interference. The learned Court below has, after referring to the law on the subject, given a lucid account of events, in the order. The applicant has not been in a position to carve out a case for interference in his favour in his application. He has neither shown any “Special Circumstance”, as would compel this Court to set aside the order of the learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Srinagar, nor has he been in a position to disclose the facts on which the grant of leave to defend the case could be given, as a corollary to which, the revision petition entails dismissal and is, accordingly, dismissed. Interim directions, if any, in force as on date, shall stand vacated. 12. Registry to send a copy of this order to the learned Court of 2nd Additional District Judge, Srinagar, for information and record.