JUDGMENT : The instant petition has been filed by the candidate who was finally selected in Group-D post after undergoing the process of selection and placed in the order of merit. At one stage, appointment was offered to him vide order dt. 8th February, 2016 but that came to be cancelled by the respondents vide order dt. 9th September, 2016 on the premise that at one stage FIR No. 2015WAG161 dt. 8th November, 2015 was registered against him u/Sec. 3, 4, 5, 6 (2) (4) & 7 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 but indisputably the FIR was challenged by the petitioner in Crl. Petn. No. 14 of 2016 and this Court in exercise of its powers u/Sec. 482 of the Code quashed the FIR vide judgment dt. 1st July, 2016. 2. Since his offer of appointment was cancelled even after quashing of the FIR dt. 8th November, 2015 vide judgment dt. 1st July, 2016 he approached this Court by filing a writ petition in the earlier round of litigation being WP(C) 1286 of 2016 and that was disposed of vide order dt. 18th April, 2017 with a direction to the petitioner to make a fresh representation to be considered in accordance with law. 3. In compliance of the order of this Court dt. 18th April, 2017 a fresh representation was submitted by the petitioner and that was revisited by the Full Court in its meeting held on 9th June, 2017 and prima facie arrived to the conclusion that though the criminal proceedings instituted against the petitioner has been quashed by this Court in Crl. Petn. No. 14 of 2016 but his conduct does not generate confidence for employment in the service of the High Court and taking note thereof, and in terms of the resolution of the Full Court, his representation was rejected vide communication dt.13th June, 2017 which is the subject matter of challenge in the instant writ petition. 4. It is not the case of the respondents that the name of the petitioner does not find place in the order of merit against the advertised vacancies and in the ordinary course he would have been considered for appointment but because of the impediment of the FIR being registered at one stage he was not considered suitable for appointment. 5. It is not the case of the respondents that the name of the petitioner does not find place in the order of merit against the advertised vacancies and in the ordinary course he would have been considered for appointment but because of the impediment of the FIR being registered at one stage he was not considered suitable for appointment. 5. It is also not disputed that apart from the FIR once registered against him, there are no other criminal antecedents which may deny him from consideration for appointment. This Court would further like to note that under the High Court of Tripura Services (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Conduct) Rules, 2014 (for short, “Rules, 2014”) and Rule 9 casts an impediment for the persons who could be disqualified for appointment and R. 9(c) states that a person shall be disqualified for appointment if he has been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude. Indisputably, the petitioner does not carry any of the disqualification for appointment as envisaged u/R. 9 of the Rules, 2014. 6. R. 9 of the Rules, 2014 relevant for the purpose is reproduced hereunder: “9. Disqualification for appointment – No person shall be eligible for appointment to the service – (a) unless he is a citizen of India; or (b) if he has been dismissed from service by the Government, Central Government, High Court, statutory or Local Authority; or (c) if he has been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude; or (d) if he has more than one spouses living; or (e) if he directly or indirectly tries to influence or influences the recruiting authority by any means for his candidature.” 7. The submission of the petitioner’s counsel is that it is not a case of concealment or misrepresentation on his part and once the FIR registered against him, which in his view was a case of false implication, has been quashed by this Court, he has a clean record and in the given circumstances there appears no reason to deprive him from seeking employment and his offer of appointment has been arbitrarily rejected by the authority which needs interference of this Court. In support of his submission, counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Joginder Singh Vs Union Territory of Chandigarh & Ors. reported in (2015) 2 SCC 377 . 8. In support of his submission, counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Joginder Singh Vs Union Territory of Chandigarh & Ors. reported in (2015) 2 SCC 377 . 8. Counsel for the respondents have filed their counter affidavit and has come up with a justification that after the matter being brought to notice that the FIR once registered might have been quashed, but still his conduct does not generate confidence for public employment. 9. Counsel for the respondents submits that mere selection and offer of appointment does not confer any vested right and the decision of the authority cannot be said to be per se arbitrary which needs interference by this Court under the limited scope of judicial review. At the same time, there was material against him which has been considered in overall perspective to withhold his appointment and in the given circumstances the decision making process adopted by the authority cannot be said to be faulty needs interference u/Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. In support of her submission, counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in AIR 2016 SC 3598 . 10. We have considered the submission made by the parties and with their assistance perused the materials available on record. 11. The facts remain indisputed that the process of selection came to be initiated by the respondents pursuant to advertisement dt. 11th August, 2014 for filling up Class-IV posts in the establishment of the High Court of Tripura, pursuant to which the present petitioner also submitted his application and after due participation he was placed in the order of merit against the unreserved post and appointment was offered to him vide order dt. 8th February, 2016, but it appears that he was not permitted to join despite his consent. At this stage, he submitted an application to know the reason for which he has not been permitted to join service after his final selection. He was informed that there was an FIR registered against him for offence u/Sec 3, 4, 5, 6 (2)(4) & 7 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 and that was quashed by this Court in exercise of power u/Sec 482 of the Cr.P.C vide order dt.1st July, 2016. 12. He was informed that there was an FIR registered against him for offence u/Sec 3, 4, 5, 6 (2)(4) & 7 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 and that was quashed by this Court in exercise of power u/Sec 482 of the Cr.P.C vide order dt.1st July, 2016. 12. Indisputably, other than the FIR once registered against him, he has no other criminal antecedents which could disqualify the petitioner from seeking appointment and even when his appointment was cancelled vide order dt. 9th September, 2016 he approached this Court by filing a writ petition and that was disposed of vide order dt. 18th April, 2017 directing the petitioner to make a fresh representation to be considered by the authorities, in accordance with law. But to his dismay, even on revisiting the matter, his representation was rejected and he was informed vide by letter dt. 13th June, 2017. 13. Even after the FIR being quashed by this Court, the only reason forthcoming which has been assigned by the respondents to deprive him of his employment is that his conduct does not generate confidence for employment. 14. In our considered view, the FIR once registered has been quashed by this Court u/Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C. no inference can be drawn to impute any adverse antecedents which in any manner may come in way depriving him from seeking public employment. 15. At the same time, R. 9 of Rules, 2014 also prescribe certain disqualifications for appointment and sub-rule (c) of R.9 clearly envisages that if one has been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude could be a reason for disqualification for appointment. But in the instant case, there was only an FIR registered against him and it was prima facie found to be false and fabricated and that has been quashed, as already observed by us, no adverse inference can be drawn to impute on his conduct which could come in way of the petitioner seeking employment. 16. What has been expressed by us is supported by the judgment of the Apex Court in Joginder Singh (supra). It was the case there that the writ petitioner was selected for the post of Constable but he was not considered for appointment for the reason that an FIR against him was registered at one stage u/Sec 148/149/323/325/307 IPC in which after the trial he was acquitted by the competent court of jurisdiction. It was the case there that the writ petitioner was selected for the post of Constable but he was not considered for appointment for the reason that an FIR against him was registered at one stage u/Sec 148/149/323/325/307 IPC in which after the trial he was acquitted by the competent court of jurisdiction. The Apex Court in para 19 observed that once there was acquittal by the competent court of jurisdiction he should not have been deprived from seeking public employment by declaring him to be unsuitable for the post. 17. Consequently, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order dt. 13th June, 2017 is hereby quashed & set aside. The respondents are directed to consider the candidature of the petitioner for appointment in Group-D post on his selection in reference to the advertisement dated 11.08.2014. No cost.