JUDGMENT AND ORDER : K.M. Thaker, J. Heard Mr. Pandya, learned advocate for the petitioner and Mr. D.G. Chauhan, learned advocate for the respondent. 2. The petitioner is aggrieved by award dated 17.5.2016 passed by learned Labour Court at Anand in Reference (T) No. 39 of 2008 whereby learned Labour Court dismissed the reference on various grounds including the ground of delay in raising dispute inasmuch as the claimant raised the dispute almost 12 years after alleged termination. 2.1 A specific finding of fact is recorded by learned Labour Court that the dispute is raised with malafide intention and that the claim is raised after inordinate and gross delay of 12 years. 2.2 Besides said finding of fact learned Labour Court also recorded that the claimant was engaged on 2 different occasions, with long hiatus in between two appointments, for limited/fixed tenure and that last of the two engagements was in 1995 whereupon his engagement came to end in May 1996 and that the claimant failed to establish that he was ever engaged by the opponent after 1996. 2.3 With such observation and finding of fact learned Labour Court rejected the reference. 3. Feeling aggrieved by said decision, the original claimant before learned Labour Court has taken out present petition. 4. So far as factual background is concerned it has emerged from the record that in 2008 present petitioner raised industrial dispute against present respondent. Appropriate government referred the dispute vide order of reference dated 6.5.2008 to learned Labour Court at Anand. The terms of reference required the learned Labour Court to decide whether the opponent should reinstate the claimant on his original post with continuity of service or not. 4.1 Before learned labour Court the claimant alleged and claimed that he was employed by the opponent in 1986 and that he worked with the opponent in the category of general labour and that he worked regularly and continuously for 20 years before his service came to be terminated by oral order in May 2006. He also alleged that the opponent employer terminated his service without following procedure prescribed by law and therefore, he should be reinstated with all benefits. 4.2 The said claim and allegations by the claimant were disputed and denied by the respondent. He also alleged that the opponent employer terminated his service without following procedure prescribed by law and therefore, he should be reinstated with all benefits. 4.2 The said claim and allegations by the claimant were disputed and denied by the respondent. The respondent contended that the petitioner was initially engaged with limited/fixed period on casual and daily wage basis during the period from November 1987 to February 1988. When the period of his employment came to end in February 1988 the engagement automatically came to end. Thereafter, the claimant was again engaged on casual and adhoc basis and on daily wage basis for fixed and limited period from May 1995 to May 1996 and that the said fixed period of engagement automatically came to end on 14.5.1996 and thereafter the claimant was never engaged in any capacity or any manner. The opponent submitted that the claimant raised dispute after 12 years and that the demand is misconceived and unjustified and therefore the reference should be rejected. 4.3 After the parties completed respective pleadings learned Labour Court received evidence from both sides and thereafter learned Labour Court heard rival submissions. Upon conclusion of proceeding learned Labour Court considered the material on record and reached to the conclusion that the claimant failed to establish that he worked with opponent after May 1996 and he also failed to establish that he had ever worked with the opponent during 1988 to 1995 and/or that after May 1996 he was ever employed by the opponent and that he ever worked in any capacity with the opponent after May 1996. Learned Labour Court also reached to the finding of fact that the claimant failed to establish that he had worked from 1996 to 2006. Learned Labour Court after taking into account the evidence available on record also held that the engagement of the claimant was covered within the purview of clause (bb) of Section 2 (oo) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the "I.D. Act") because on both occasions the claimant was engaged for specified and fixed period and limited tenure. Having reached such finding of fact learned Labour Court dismissed the reference. 5. Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the claimant worked continuously from 1986 to 2006 and that the opponent illegally terminated service of the claimant by oral instruction in May 2006. Having reached such finding of fact learned Labour Court dismissed the reference. 5. Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the claimant worked continuously from 1986 to 2006 and that the opponent illegally terminated service of the claimant by oral instruction in May 2006. He further submitted that the respondent failed to place relevant evidence on record. The respondent should have placed on record relevant documents however, the respondent did not submit the record before learned Labour Court. Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the service of the claimant came to be terminated without following any procedure and in breach of statutory provisions however, learned Labour Court failed to appreciate the said fact and the Court arbitrarily rejected the reference. With such submission learned advocate for the petitioner claimed that award may be set aside and the respondent may be directed to reinstate the claimant. 6. Learned advocate for the respondent opposed the reference. He submitted that the claimant could not place any material on record which would establish that he was continuously employed and/or that he worked continuously from 1988 to 2006. The opponent also claimed that actually the claimant was engaged on two occasions viz. during November 1987 to February 1988 and from May 1995 to 1996. Except said period the claimant was never engaged however, he raised dispute in 2008 on incorrect allegations. Learned advocate for the respondent submitted that since the claimant failed to prove the allegation, learned Labour Court rejected the reference. There is no error in the award and therefore petition should be rejected. Learned advocate for the respondent submitted that actually learned Labour Court has shown undue sympathy towards claimant by awarding Rs. 6,000/- as ex gratia compensation. He submitted that in light of the facts of the case the claimant is not entitled for such payment however, since the learned Labour Court has awarded said amount, if the said amount is already not paid to claimant, the opponent will comply the direction and pay amount. 7. I have considered rival submissions and material available on record. 8. From the record and from rival submissions and from the impugned award it has emerged that after considering documentary and oral evidence available on record learned Labour Court reached to certain specific finding of fact viz. 7. I have considered rival submissions and material available on record. 8. From the record and from rival submissions and from the impugned award it has emerged that after considering documentary and oral evidence available on record learned Labour Court reached to certain specific finding of fact viz. (a) that the claimant worked with the opponent, on two different occasions on adhoc and casual basis and as daily wager (b) that on both occasions the claimant was engaged for fixed/specified period and for limited duration (c) that the claimant was first engaged, for limited and specified period from 1987 to 1988 and his said engagement came to end on 29 February 1988. Thereafter the claimant was not engaged until May 1995 (d) at the time when the claimant's engagement came to end and he was relieved in February 1988 the claimant did not raise any dispute (e) subsequently the claimant was again engaged in May 1995 on adhoc and casual basis and for limited and specified period i.e. from 15.5.1995 to May 1996. The said period was specifically mentioned in the appointment order (f) that after May 1996 the claimant was never appointed and never engaged by the opponent and the claimant failed to place any material on record and failed to prove that he was ever engaged after May 1996-1997 and/or he ever worked after May 1996. (g) that the claimant failed to place any material on record which would even prima facie demonstrate and suggest that the opponent had engaged claimant after 1996 and/or that he worked with opponent after 1996 and/or that he worked with the opponent until January 2006 (h) that after May 1996 when the claimant was relieved, he never raised any dispute (i) that the claimant raised dispute almost 12 years after he was engaged in May 1996 (j) that during his cross examination the claimant admitted that he was relieved in May 1996 and that after 1996 he was never engaged by the opponent and that though he tried to look for work with other establishment after 1996 he could not secure employment. 9. In light of the said admission by the claimant learned Labour Court concluded that there was no substance or merit in the allegation and the claim that the claimant had worked after 1996, much less, till 2006. 9. In light of the said admission by the claimant learned Labour Court concluded that there was no substance or merit in the allegation and the claim that the claimant had worked after 1996, much less, till 2006. 9.1 Having reached such conclusion and finding of fact learned Labour Court dismissed the reference. 9.2 In paragraph Nos. 8.1 to 8.15 learned labour Court has elaborately discussed entire set of documentary and oral evidence available on record, its probative and evidentiary value and its effect. Learned Labour Court has carefully evaluated, examined and analyzed the evidence and recorded specific finding of fact in paragraph Nos. 8.1 to 8.5. 9.3 Learned Labour Court has also recorded cogent, sufficient and satisfactory reasons for rejecting claimant's allegation and submissions. The reasons recorded by the learned Labour Court are supported by proper discussion and evidence. 9.4 What is important and relevant is the fact that learned advocate for the claimant failed to show any material from the record which would even prima facie suggest or indicate that the finding of facts recorded by learned Labour Court are incorrect or contrary to evidence which was placed on record. The petitioner also failed to demonstrate and establish that learned labour Court failed to take into account evidence which was available on record or that learned Labour Court ignored the material available on record. 10. In this view of the matter there is nothing to suggest or indicate that the findings recorded by learned Labour Court are perverse and warrant any interference. The petitioner has failed to show any error or infirmity in the award. Therefore the petition fails and deserves to be rejected. 11. At this stage it is necessary and appropriate to mention that even after having recorded specific finding of fact that the claimant instituted proceedings with malafide intention and that such proceeding came to be instituted almost 12 years after the limited and fixed tenure engagement of the petitioner came to end, learned Labour Court awarded Rs. 6,000/- by way of ex gratia compensation to the claimant. Any justification for said direction is not recorded by the learned Labour Court. However, since respondent has not challenged the award, the said direction need not be and cannot be disturbed in present petition (filed by workman). 6,000/- by way of ex gratia compensation to the claimant. Any justification for said direction is not recorded by the learned Labour Court. However, since respondent has not challenged the award, the said direction need not be and cannot be disturbed in present petition (filed by workman). Learned advocate for the respondent submitted that if said amount is already not paid, the respondent will pay said amount within 4 weeks. 12. For reasons mentioned above and in light of foregoing discussion, it has emerged that the petition is without substance and merits. 13. It has also emerged that the reference could have been and should have been rejected on solitary ground viz. inordinate and gross delay in raising dispute inasmuch as the petitioner raised dispute almost after 12 years. The petitioner also failed to offer any explanation for such gross delay. A dead dispute and stale claim was submitted before learned Labour Court after 12 years and such dispute deserved to be rejected at threshold only on ground of gross delay. In this context reference can be had to the decision in case of Prabhakar vs. Joint Director, Sericulture Department, (2015) 15 SCC 1 wherein Hon'ble Apex Court observed that:- "8. From the facts narrated above, it becomes clear that for a period of fourteen years no grievance was made by the petitioner qua his alleged termination. Though it was averted that the petitioner had approached the Management time and again and was given assurance that he would be taken back in service. there is nothing on record to substantiate this. No notice was served upon the Management. There is no assurance given in writing by the Management at any point of time. Such assertions are clearly self-serving. Pertinently. even the Labour Court has not accepted the aforesaid explanation anywhere and has gone by the fact that the dispute was raised after a delay of fourteen years. Therefore, keeping in mind the aforesaid facts, we would decide the issue which has arisen, namely, whether reference of such a belated claim was appropriate. 9. It may be stated that the question is of utmost importance as it is seen that many times. as in the instant case, the workers raise dispute after a number of years of the cause of action. Whether the dispute can still be treated as surviving? 9. It may be stated that the question is of utmost importance as it is seen that many times. as in the instant case, the workers raise dispute after a number of years of the cause of action. Whether the dispute can still be treated as surviving? Or whether it can be said that the dispute does not exist when the workmen concerned after their say termination kept quiet for a number of years and thus acquiesced into the action? 20. At this stage, it may be pointed out that admittedly the law of limitation does not apply to industrial disputes. The Limitation Act does not apply to the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act and under the Industrial Disputes Act no period of limitation is prescribed. This is now well settled by a series of judgments of this Court. 21. On the reading of these judgments, which are discussed hereinafter, it can be discerned that in some decisions where the reference was made after a lapse of considerable period, the Court did not set aside the reference but moulded the relief by either granting reinstatement but denying back wages, fully or partially, or else granted compensation, denying reinstatement. On the other hand, in some of the decisions, the Court held that even when there was no time prescribed to exercise power under Section 10 of the Act, such a power could not be exercised at any point of time to revive matters which had since been settled or had to become stale. We would like to refer to these judgments at this juncture. 24. Again in Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. State of AR" the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that reference made nearly six years after in: dispute amounted to being inordinate, unreasonable and unjustifiable. 25. In Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. KP. Madhavankutty the Court cautioned that power of reference should be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner and not in a mechanical fashion. It was specifically observed the power to make reference cannot be exercised to revive settled matters or to refer stale disputes in spite of absence of statutory limitation period. The Court not only reiterated that the courts had power of judicial review though to limited extent, but also made the following pertinent observations on delay: (SCC pp. 460-6l. Paras 6-8) "6. The Court not only reiterated that the courts had power of judicial review though to limited extent, but also made the following pertinent observations on delay: (SCC pp. 460-6l. Paras 6-8) "6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after a lapse of about seven years of the order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising an industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent. 7. In the present appeal it is not the case of the respondent that the disciplinary proceedings, which resulted in his dismissal, were in any way illegal or there was even any irregularity. He availed his remedy of appeal under the rules governing his conditions of service. It could not be said that in the circumstances an industrial dispute did arise or was even apprehended after a lapse of about seven years of the dismissal of the respondent. Whenever a workman raises some dispute it does not become an industrial dispute and the appropriate Government cannot in a mechanical fashion make the reference of the alleged dispute terming it as an industrial dispute. Whenever a workman raises some dispute it does not become an industrial dispute and the appropriate Government cannot in a mechanical fashion make the reference of the alleged dispute terming it as an industrial dispute. The Central Government lacked power to make reference both on the ground of delay in invoking the power under Section 10 of the Act and there being no industrial dispute existing or even apprehended. The purpose of reference is to keep industrial peace in an establishment. The present reference is destructive to the industrial peace and defeats the very object and purpose of the Act. The Bank was justified in thus moving the High Court seeking an order to quash the reference in question. 8. It was submitted by the respondent that once a reference has been made under Section 10 of the Act a Labour Court has to decide the same and the High Court in writ jurisdiction cannot interfere in the proceedings of the Labour Court. That is not a correct proposition to state. An administrative order which does not take into consideration statutory requirements or travels outside that is certainly subject to judicial review, limited though it might be. The High Court can exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to consider the question of the very jurisdiction of the Labour Court, In National Engg. Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan" this Court observed: (SCC 13. 393, para 24) '24. It will be thus seen that the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition when there is an allegation that there is no industrial dispute and none apprehended which could be the subject matter of reference for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10 of the Act, Here it is a question of jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal, which could be examined by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. It is the existence of the Industrial Tribunal (sic dispute) which would clothe the appropriate Government with power to make the reference and the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate it. If there is no industrial dispute in existence or apprehended the appropriate Government lacks power to make any reference" 29. If one examines the judgments in the aforesaid perspective, it would be easy to reconcile all the judgments. If there is no industrial dispute in existence or apprehended the appropriate Government lacks power to make any reference" 29. If one examines the judgments in the aforesaid perspective, it would be easy to reconcile all the judgments. At the same time, in some cases the Court did not hold the reference to be bad in law and the delay on the part of the workman in raising the dispute became the cause for moulding the relief only. On the other hand, in some other decisions, this Court specifically held that if the matter raised is belated or stale that would be a relevant consideration on which the reference should be refused. Which parameters are to be kept in mind while taking one or the other approach needs to be discussed with some elaboration, which would include discussion on certain aspects that would be kept in mind by the courts for taking a particular view. We, thus, intend to embark on the said discussion keeping in mind the central aspect which should be the forefront, namely, whether the dispute existed at the time when the appropriate Government had to decide whether to make a reference or not or the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal to decide the same issue coming before it. 34. To understand the meaning of the word "dispute", it would be appropriate to start with the grammatical or dictionary meaning of the term; "Dispute'. to argue about, to contend for, to oppose by argument, to call in question - to argue or debate (with, about or over) -a contest with words; an argument; a debate; a quarrel;" 35. Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edn., p. 424 defines "dispute" as under : "Dispute-A conflict or controversy; a conflict of claims or rights; an assertion of a right, claim, or demand on one side, met by contrary claims or allegations on the other. The subject of litigation; the matter for which a suit is brought and upon which issue is joined, and in relation to which jurors are called and witnesses examined." 36. Thus, a dispute or difference arises when demand is made by one side (i.e. workmen) and rejected by the other side (i.e. the employer) and vice versa. Hence an "industrial dispute" cannot be said to exist until and unless the demand is made by the workmen and it has been rejected by the employer. Thus, a dispute or difference arises when demand is made by one side (i.e. workmen) and rejected by the other side (i.e. the employer) and vice versa. Hence an "industrial dispute" cannot be said to exist until and unless the demand is made by the workmen and it has been rejected by the employer. How such demand should be raised and at what stage may also be relevant but we are not concerned with this aspect in the instant case. Therefore, what would happen if no demand is made at all at the time when the cause of action arises? In other words, like in the instant case, what would be the consequence if after the termination of the services of the petitioner on 1-4-1985, the petitioner does not dispute his termination as wrongful and does not make any demand for reinstatement for a number of years? Can it still be said that there is a dispute? Or can it be said that workmen can make such demand after a lapse of several years and on making such demand dispute would come into existence at that time. It can always be pleaded by the employer in such a case that after the termination of the services when the workman did not raise any protest and did not demand his reinstatement, the employer presumed that the workman has accepted his termination and, therefore, he did not raise any dispute about his termination. It can be said that workman, in such a case, acquiesced into the act of the employer in terminating his services and, therefore, accepted his termination. He cannot after a lapse of several years make a demand and then convert it into a "dispute" what had otherwise become a buried issue. 37. Let us examine the matter from another aspect viz. laches and delays and acquiescence. 38. It is now a well-recognised principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Even when there is no limitation Period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases Courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delays as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants who approached the Court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. Doctrine of laches is in fact an application of maxim of equity "delay defeats equities". 39. Doctrine of laches is in fact an application of maxim of equity "delay defeats equities". 39. This principle is applied in those cases where discretionary orders of the court are claimed, such as specific performance, permanent or temporary injunction appointment of Receiver, etc. These principles are also applied In the wit petitions tiled under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution of India In such cases, courts can still refuse relief where the delay on the petitioners part has prejudiced the respondent even though the petitioner might have 3 Come to court within the period preset abide by the Limitation Act. 40. Likewise, it a patty having a tight stands by and sees another acting in a manner inconsistent with that right and makes no objection while the ac is in progress he cannot afterwards complain This principle is based on the doctrine of acquiescence implying that In such a case the party who did not make any objection acquiesced into the alleged wrongful act of the other party and, therefore, has no right to complain against that alleged wrong. 41. Thus, in those cases where period of limitation is prescribed within which the action is to be brought before the court, if the action is not brought within that prescribed period the aggrieved party loses remedy and cannot enforce his legal right after the period of limitation is over. Likewise, in other c cases even where no limitation is prescribed, but for a long period the aggrieved party does not approach the machinery provided under the law for redressal of his grievance, it can be presumed that relief can be denied on the ground of unexplained delay and laches and/or on the presumption that such person has waived his right or acquiesced into the act of other. As mentioned above, these principles as part of equity are based on principles relatable to d sound public policy that if a person does not exercise his right for a long time then such a right is non-existent. 42. On the basis of the aforesaid discussion, we summarise the legal position as under: 42.1. An industrial dispute has to be referred by the appropriate Government for adjudication and the workman cannot approach the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal directly, except in those cases which are covered by Section 2-A of the Act. 42. On the basis of the aforesaid discussion, we summarise the legal position as under: 42.1. An industrial dispute has to be referred by the appropriate Government for adjudication and the workman cannot approach the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal directly, except in those cases which are covered by Section 2-A of the Act. Reference is made under Section 10 of the Act in those cases where the appropriate Government forms an opinion that "any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended". The words "industrial dispute exists" are of paramount importance, unless there is an existence of an f industrial dispute (or the dispute is apprehended or it is apprehended such a dispute may arise in near future), no reference is to be made. Thus, existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute is a sine qua non for making the reference. No doubt, at the time of taking a decision whether a reference is to be made or not, the appropriate Government is not to go into the merits of the dispute. Making of reference is only an administrative function. At the same time, on the basis of material on record, satisfaction of the existence of the industrial dispute or the apprehension of an industrial dispute is necessary Such existence/apprehension of industrial dispute, thus, becomes a condition precedent, though it will be only subjective satisfaction based on material on record. Since, we are not concerned with the satisfaction dealing with cases where there is apprehended industrial dispute, discussion that follows would confine to existence of an industrial dispute. 42.2. Dispute or difference arises when one party makes a demand and the other party rejects the same. It is held by this Court in a number of cases that before raising the industrial dispute making of demand is a necessary Precondition. In such a scenario, if the services of a workman are terminated and he does not make the demand and/or raise the issue alleging wrongful elimination immediately thereafter or within reasonable time and raises the game after considerable lapse of period, whether it can be said that industrial dispute still exists. 42.3. Since there is no period of limitation, it gives right to the workman to raise the dispute even belatedly. However, if the dispute is raised after a long period, it has to be seen as to whether such a dispute still exists? 42.3. Since there is no period of limitation, it gives right to the workman to raise the dispute even belatedly. However, if the dispute is raised after a long period, it has to be seen as to whether such a dispute still exists? Thus, notwithstanding the fact that law of limitation does not apply, it is to be shown by the workman that there is a dispute in praesenti. For this purpose, he has to demonstrate that even if considerable period has lapsed and there are laches and delays, such delay has not resulted into making the industrial dispute cease to exist. Therefore, if the workman is able to give satisfactory explanation for these laches and delays and demonstrate that the circumstances disclose that issue is still alive, delay would not come in his way because of the reason that law of limitation has no application. On the other hand, if because of such delay dispute no longer remains alive and is to be treated as "dead", then it would be non-existent dispute which cannot be referred. 42.4. Take, for example, a case where the workman issues notice after his termination, questioning the termination and demanding reinstatement. He is able to show that there were discussions from time to time and the parties were trying to sort out the matter amicably. Or he is able to show that there were assurances by the Management to the effect that he would be taken back in service and because of these reasons, he did not immediately raise the dispute by approaching the Labour Authorities seeking reference or did not invoke the remedy under Section 2-A of the Act. In such a scenario, it can be treated that the dispute was live and existing as the workman never abandoned his right. However, in this very example, even if the notice of demand was sent but it did not evoke any positive response or there was specific rejection by the Management of his demand contained in the notice and thereafter he sleeps over the matter for a number of years, it can be treated that he accepted the factum of his termination and rejection thereof by the Management and acquiesced into the said rejection. 42.5. Take another example. 42.5. Take another example. A workman approaches the civil court by tiling a suit against his termination which was pending for a number of years and was ultimately dismissed on the ground that the civil court did not have Jurisdiction to enforce the contract of personal service and does not grant any Reinstatement. At that stage, when the suit is dismissed or he withdraws that suit and then involves the machinery under the Act, it can lead to the conclusion that the dispute is still alive as the workman had not accepted the termination but was agitating the same; albeit in a wrong forum. 42.6. in contrast, in those cases where there was no agitation by the Workman against his termination and the dispute is raised belatedly and the delay or laches remain unexplained, it would be presumed that he had waived his right or acquiesced into the act of termination and, therefore, at the time a when the dispute is raised it had become stale and was not an "existing dispute". In such circumstances, the appropriate Government can refuse tr) make reference. In the alternative, the Labour Court/Industrial Court can also hold that there is no "industrial dispute" within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act and, therefore, no relief can be granted. 43. We may hasten to clarify that in those cases where the court finds that dispute still existed, though raised belatedly, it is always permissible. for the court to take the aspect of delay into consideration and mould the relief. In such cases, it is still open for the court to either grant reinstatement without back wages or lesser back wages or grant compensation instead of reinstatement. We are of the Opinion that the law on this issue has to be 0 applied in the aforesaid perspective in such matters. To summarise, although there is no limitation prescribed under the Act for making a reference under Section 10(1) of the ID Act, yet it is for the "appropriate Government" to consider whether it is expedient or not to make the reference. The words "at any time" used in Section 10(1) do not admit of any limitation in making an order of reference and laws of limitation are not d applicable to proceedings under the ID Act. The words "at any time" used in Section 10(1) do not admit of any limitation in making an order of reference and laws of limitation are not d applicable to proceedings under the ID Act. However, the policy of industrial adjudication is that very stale claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed inasmuch as unless there is satisfactory explanation for delay as, apart from the obvious risk to industrial peace from the entertainment of claims after long lapse of time, it is necessary also to take into account the unsettling effect which it is likely to have on the employers' financial e arrangement and to avoid dislocation of an industry." In this view of the matter and in light of foregoing discussion the petition fails. Therefore, the petition is dismissed. Notice is discharged. The petition stands disposed of. Orders accordingly.