JUDGMENT : 1. This application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. has been filed for quashment of FIR in Crime No.429/2017 registered at Police Station Basoda City, District Vidisha for offence under Section 498-A of IPC and under Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act as well as for quashment of charge sheet and the criminal proceedings. 2. The necessary facts for the disposal of the present application in short are that the applicant No.1 is the husband of the complainant whereas the applicants No.2 and 3 are father-in-law and mother-in-law of the complainant. The applicant No.4 is the uncle-in-law of the complainant, whereas the applicants No.5 and 6 are the elder brothers-in-law (Jeth) of the complainant and applicants No.7 and 8 are the wives of applicants No.5 and 6 (Jethani). The applicants No.9 and 10 are the sisters-in-law of the complainant. 3. On 23.5.2017, the respondent No.2/complainant had lodged a report against the applicants on the allegation that she was married to the applicant No.1 on 22.4.2015 in accordance with Hindu rites and rituals. After the marriage, the applicants started harassing the complainant. They demand Rs.5,00,000/- and when she refused to fulfill their demand, then about 8 to 9 months back when the complainant was pregnant, then her husband and the other applicants assaulted the complainant and she was turned out of her matrimonial house and she gave birth to her child in her parental home and after the compromise in a Social Panchayat, the applicant No.1 took her to Bhopal along with him, where also, she was beaten by the applicants No.1. By keeping her in dark, the applicant No.1 left the complainant at Indore and when she made a complaint of it, the applicant No.1 again compromised the matter and assured that he would neither demand the dowry nor would harass the complainant. However, even after the compromise, the applicant No.1 refused to keep her with him because of non-fulfillment of demand of Rs.5,00,000/-. However, even after the compromise, the applicant No.1 refused to keep her with him because of non-fulfillment of demand of Rs.5,00,000/-. On 11.5.2017, when the complainant went to the house of the applicant No.1, then she was not allowed to enter inside the house and he instructed that the complainant should go to village Pachma and on 22.5.2017, the complainant went to village Pachma where the remaining applicants did not allow the complainant to enter inside the house and they alleged that unless and until she brings an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- they would not allow her to stay in her matrimonial house. It is submitted by the counsel for the applicants that the applicant No.1 has filed a petition under Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act for grant of divorce and only by way of counterblast the false report has been lodged. Even otherwise the allegations made against the applicants are vague, general and omnibus in nature and it is well established principle of law that the near and dear relatives of the husband of the complainant should not be prosecuted on the basis of general and omnibus allegations and they should be compelled to face the prosecution only when there are serious, direct and specific allegations against them and the allegations made against the applicants do not fulfill that qualification. It is further submitted that the respondents are residing separately and they have been falsely implicated as they are near and dear relatives of the applicant No.1. 4. Per contra, it is submitted by the counsel for the State that when the complainant went to village Pachma, she was not allowed to enter inside her matrimonial house and all the applicants threatened that in case their demand of Rs.5,00,000/- is not fulfilled, they would not allow the complainant to reside in her matrimonial house and, therefore, prima facie there are specific allegations against all the applicants. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 6. The allegations made in the FIR were reiterated by the complainant in her statement under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. Thus, the allegations made against the applicants can be bifurcated as under:- (1) The complainant was married to the applicant No.1 on 22.4.2015 and immediately after the marriage all the applicants started harassing her mentally and physically for demand of Rs.5,00,000/-. The allegations made in the FIR were reiterated by the complainant in her statement under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. Thus, the allegations made against the applicants can be bifurcated as under:- (1) The complainant was married to the applicant No.1 on 22.4.2015 and immediately after the marriage all the applicants started harassing her mentally and physically for demand of Rs.5,00,000/-. (2) About 8 to 9 months prior to the date of lodging of the FIR, when the complainant was pregnant, then she was turned out of her matrimonial house and she came to her parental house, where she gave birth to her child. (3) A Panchayat was convened and in that Panchayat the applicant No.1 entered into a compromise and, accordingly, the applicant No.1 took the complainant to Bhopal where he was working and later on by keeping the complainant in dark, he left the complainant at Indore and on complaint made by the complainant, he again assured that she would not be treated with cruelty and there would not be any demand of dowry but still the applicant No.1 did not allow the complainant to stay with him. (4) On 11.5.2017, when the complainant went to Bhopal to live along with the applicant No.1, then she was not allowed to enter inside his house and she was suggested to go to village Pachma. (5) On 22.5.2017, when the complainant went to village Pachma, then the remaining applicants did not allow her to enter her inside the matrimonial house and insisted that unless and until she brings an amount of Rs.5,00,000/-, she would not be allowed to stay in her matrimonial house. 7. So far as the contention of the applicants that the FIR has been lodged by way of counterblast to the divorce petition filed by the applicant No.1 is concerned, the question is no more res integra. 8. The Supreme Court in the case of Pratibha vs. Rameshwari Devi & Ors. reported in 2007(12) SCC 369 has held as under: “16. It is pertinent to note that the complaint was filed only when all efforts to return to the matrimonial home had failed and Respondent 2 husband had filed a divorce petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. reported in 2007(12) SCC 369 has held as under: “16. It is pertinent to note that the complaint was filed only when all efforts to return to the matrimonial home had failed and Respondent 2 husband had filed a divorce petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. That apart, in our view, filing of a divorce petition in a civil court cannot be a ground to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the Code as it is well settled that criminal and civil proceedings are separate and independent and the pendency of a civil proceeding cannot bring to an end a criminal proceeding even if they arise out of the same set of facts. Such being the position, we are, therefore, of the view that the High Court while exercising its powers under Section 482 of the Code has gone beyond the allegations made in the FIR and has acted in excess of its jurisdiction and, therefore, the High Court was not justified in quashing the FIR by going beyond the allegations made in the FIR or by relying on extraneous considerations.” 9. Thus, the findings of the Civil Court are not binding on the Criminal Court and only because the FIR was lodged after the institution of divorce petition would not ipso facto mean that the FIR was lodged by a counterblast to the divorce petition. On the contrary, it can be presumed that the complainant was initially interested in saving her matrimonial life and only when she realized that she has lost all of her hopes as her husband is not interested in reconciliation and if she decides to bring misdeeds of her in-laws to the light by lodging a FIR, then it cannot be said that the FIR was lodged by way of counterblast. On the contrary, it shows the bonafide intention of the wife to somehow save her married life. 10. The Supreme Court in the case of Kansraj Vs. State of Punjab reported in (2000) 5 SCC 207 , has held as under : “In the light of the evidence in the case we find substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the defence that Respondents 3 to 5 were roped in the case only on the ground of being close relations of Respondent 2, the husband of the deceased. For the fault of the husband, the in-laws or the other relations cannot, in all cases, be held to be involved in the demand of dowry. In cases where such accusations are made, the overt acts attributed to persons other than the husband are required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. By mere conjectures and implications such relations cannot be held guilty for the offence relating to dowry deaths. A tendency has, however, developed for roping in all relations of the in-laws of the deceased wives in the matters of dowry deaths which, if not discouraged, is likely to affect the case of the prosecution even against the real culprits. In their over-enthusiasm and anxiety to seek conviction for maximum people, the parents of the deceased have been found to be making efforts for involving other relations which ultimately weaken the case of the prosecution even against the real accused as appears to have happened in the instant case.” 11. The Supreme Court in the case of Monju Roy Vs. State of West Bengal, reported in (2015) 13 SCC 693 , has held as under: “8. While we do not find any ground to interfere with the view taken by the courts below that the deceased was subjected to harassment on account of non-fulfillment of dowry demand, we do find merit in the submission that possibility of naming all the family members by way of exaggeration is not ruled out. In Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 207 , this Court observed : (SCC p. 215, para 5) “5………A tendency has, however, developed for roping in all relations of the in-laws of the deceased wives in the matters of dowry deaths which, if not discouraged, is likely to affect the case of the prosecution even against the real culprits. In their over enthusiasm and anxiety to seek conviction for maximum people, the parents of the deceased have been found to be making efforts for involving other relations which ultimately weaken the case of the prosecution even against the real accused as appears to have happened in the instant case.” The Court has, thus, to be careful in summoning distant relatives without there being specific material. Only the husband, his parents or at best close family members may be expected to demand dowry or to harass the wife but not distant relations, unless there is tangible material to support allegations made against such distant relations. Mere naming of distant relations is not enough to summon them in absence of any specific role and material to support such role. 9. In Raja Lal Singh vs. State of Jharkhand, (2007) 15 SCC 415 , it was observed : (SCC p. 419, para 14) “14. No doubt, some of the witnesses e.g. PW 5 Dashrath Singh, who is the father of the deceased Gayatri, and PW 3 Santosh Kr. Singh, brother of the deceased, have stated that the deceased Gayatri told them that dowry was demanded by not only Raja Lal Singh, but also the appellants Pradip Singh and his wife Sanjana Devi, but we are of the opinion that it is possible that the names of Pradip Singh and Sanjana Devi have been introduced only to spread the net wide as often happens in cases like under Sections 498-A and 394 IPC, as has been observed in several decisions of this Court e.g. in Kamesh Panjiyar v. State of Bihar [ (2005) 2 SCC 388 ], etc. Hence, we allow the appeal of Pradip Singh and Sanjana Devi and set aside the impugned judgments of the High Court and the trial court insofar as it relates to them and we direct that they be released forthwith unless required in connection with some other case.” * * * * * * 11. The Court has to adopt pragmatic view and when a girl dies an unnatural death, allegation of demand of dowry or harassment which follows cannot be weighed in golden scales. At the same time, omnibus allegation against all family members particularly against brothers and sisters and other relatives do not stand on same footing as husband and parents. In such case, apart from general allegation of demand of dowry, the court has to be satisfied that harassment was also caused by all the named members.” 10. The Supreme Court in the case of Chandralekha & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. reported in 2013 (1) UC 155 has held as under:- “8. We must, at the outset, state that the High Court’s view on jurisdiction meets with our approval and we confirm the view. The Supreme Court in the case of Chandralekha & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. reported in 2013 (1) UC 155 has held as under:- “8. We must, at the outset, state that the High Court’s view on jurisdiction meets with our approval and we confirm the view. However, after a careful perusal of the FIR and after taking into consideration the attendant circumstances, we are of the opinion that the FIR lodged by respondent 2 insofar as it relates to appellants 1, 2 and 3 deserves to be quashed. The allegations are extremely general in nature. No specific role is attributed to each of the appellants. Respondent 2 has stated that after the marriage, she resided with her husband at Ahmedabad. It is not clear whether appellants 1, 2 and 3 were residing with them at Ahmedabad. The marriage took place on 9/7/2002 and respondent 2 left her matrimonial home on 15/2/2003 i.e. within a period of seven months. Thereafter, respondent 2 took no steps to file any complaint against the appellants. Six years after she left the house, the present FIR is lodged making extremely vague and general allegations against appellants 1, 2 and 3. It is important to remember that appellant 2 is a married sister-in-law. In our opinion, such extra ordinary delay in lodging the FIR raises grave doubt about the truthfulness of allegations made by respondent 2 against appellants 1, 2 and 3, which are, in any case, general in nature. We have no doubt that by making such reckless and vague allegations, respondent 2 has tried to rope them in this case along with her husband. We are of the confirmed opinion that continuation of the criminal proceedings against appellants 1, 2 and 3 pursuant to this FIR is an abuse of process of law. In the interest of justice, therefore, the FIR deserves to be quashed insofar as it relates to appellants 1, 2 and 3.” 11. The Supreme Court in the case of Arnesh Kumar Vs. State of Bihar reported in (2014) 8 SCC 273 has held as under : "4. There is a phenomenal increase in matrimonial disputes in recent years. The institution of marriage is greatly revered in this country. Section 498-A IPC was introduced with avowed object to combat the menace of harassment to a woman at the hands of her husband and his relatives. There is a phenomenal increase in matrimonial disputes in recent years. The institution of marriage is greatly revered in this country. Section 498-A IPC was introduced with avowed object to combat the menace of harassment to a woman at the hands of her husband and his relatives. The fact that Section 498-A IPC is a cognizable and non-bailable offence has lent it a dubious place of pride amongst the provisions that are used as weapons rather than shield by disgruntled wives. The simplest way to harass is to get the husband and his relatives arrested under this provision. In a quite number of cases, bedridden grandfathers and grandmothers of the husbands, their sisters living abroad for decades are arrested. “Crime in India 2012 Statistics” published by the National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs shows arrest of 1,97,762 persons all over India during the year 2012 for the offence under Section 498-A IPC, 9.4% more than the year 2011. Nearly a quarter of those arrested under this provision in 2012 were women i.e. 47,951 which depicts that mothers and sisters of the husbands were liberally included in their arrest net. Its share is 6% out of the total persons arrested under the crimes committed under the Penal Code. It accounts for 4.5% of total crimes committed under different sections of the Penal Code, more than any other crimes excepting theft and hurt. The rate of charge-sheeting in cases under Section 498-A IPC is as high as 93.6%, while the conviction rate is only 15%, which is lowest across all heads. As many as 3,72,706 cases are pending trial of which on current estimate, nearly 3,17,000 are likely to result in acquittal." 12. In the case of Preeti Gupta Vs. State of Jharkhand reported in AIR 2010 SC 3363 it has been held by the Supreme Court as under : "34. Unfortunately, at the time of filing of the complaint the implications and consequences are not properly visualized by the complainant that such complaint can lead to insurmountable harassment, agony and pain to the complainant, accused and his close relations. 35. The ultimate object of justice is to find out the truth and punish the guilty and protect the innocent. To find out the truth is a Herculean task in majority of these complaints. The tendency of implicating the husband and all his immediate relations is also not uncommon. 35. The ultimate object of justice is to find out the truth and punish the guilty and protect the innocent. To find out the truth is a Herculean task in majority of these complaints. The tendency of implicating the husband and all his immediate relations is also not uncommon. At times, even after the conclusion of the criminal trial, it is difficult to ascertain the real truth. The courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take pragmatic realities into consideration while dealing with matrimonial cases. The allegations of harassment of husband’s close relations who had been living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant resided would have an entirely different complexion. The allegations of the complainant are required to be scrutinised with great care and circumspection. 36. Experience reveals that long and protracted criminal trials lead to rancour, acrimony and bitterness in the relationship amongst the parties. It is also a matter of common knowledge that in cases filed by the complainant if the husband or the husband’s relations had to remain in jail even for a few days, it would ruin the chances of an amicable settlement altogether. The process of suffering is extremely long and painful. * * 39. When the facts and circumstances of the case are considered in the background of legal principles set out in the preceding paragraphs, then it would be unfair to compel the appellants to undergo the rigmarole of a criminal trial. In the interest of justice, we deem it appropriate to quash the complaint against the appellants. As a result, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. Consequently, this appeal is allowed. 13. In the case of Neelu Chopra and another Vs. Bharti reported in (2009) 10 SCC 184 , it has been held by the Supreme Court, as under : "9. In order to lodge a proper complaint, mere mention of the sections and the language of those sections is not the be all and end all of the matter. What is required to be brought to the notice of the court is the particulars of the offence committed by each and every accused and the role played by each and every accused in committing of that offence. 10. When we see the complaint, the complaint is sadly vague. What is required to be brought to the notice of the court is the particulars of the offence committed by each and every accused and the role played by each and every accused in committing of that offence. 10. When we see the complaint, the complaint is sadly vague. It does not show as to which accused has committed what offence and what is the exact role played by these appellants in the commission of offence. There could be said something against Rajesh, as the allegations are made against him more precisely but he is no more and has already expired. Under such circumstances, it would be an abuse of the process of law to allow the prosecution to continue against the aged parents of Rajesh, the present appellants herein, on the basis of a vague and general complaint which is silent about the precise acts of the appellants." 14. Thus, it is clear that if the allegations are vague and are general and omnibus in nature, then the relatives of the husband of the complainant should not be compelled to face the ordeal of the trial. 15. In the present case the applicant No.4 is the uncle-inlaw of the complainant whereas the applicants No.5 and 6 are the elder brothers-in-law of the complainant and the applicants No.7 and 8 are the wives of applicants No.5 and 6. The applicants No.9 and 10 are the married sisters-inlaw of the complainant who are residing separately. The applicants have filed the documents to show the separate residence of the applicants No.4 to 10. Although the applicants No.4 to 8 are the residents of the same village i.e. village Pachma, therefore, it cannot be said that the distance between their houses is too far to hold that there is no possibility of day to day interference of the said applicants in the family life of the complainant but still in order to prosecute the near and dear relatives of the husband of the complainant the allegations must be specific and should not be of general and omnibus nature. 16. In the present case, the allegations against the applicants No.4 to 10 are that immediately after the marriage, the complainant was harassed physically and mentally by the applicant No.4 to 10 also for non-fulfillment of demand of Rs.5,00,000/-. 16. In the present case, the allegations against the applicants No.4 to 10 are that immediately after the marriage, the complainant was harassed physically and mentally by the applicant No.4 to 10 also for non-fulfillment of demand of Rs.5,00,000/-. There is no allegation as to how the complainant was physically or mentally harassed by the applicants No.4 to 10. There is no allegation against the applicants No.4 to 10 that they had ever physically harassed or maltreated the complainant because of nonfulfillment of demand of dowry. The allegations are that when the complainant was turned out of her matrimonial house, a social Panchayat was convened and the applicant No.1 had given certain assurances and took her to Bhopal along with him where he is serving. It is alleged that later on by keeping the complainant in dark, the applicant No.1 had left the complainant at Indore and when the complaint was made against him, then again he gave an assurance that neither he would harass the complainant nor would maltreat her physically. Thus the second set of allegation is against the applicant No.1 only. Thereafter, it is alleged that on 20.2.2017 when the complainant went to her matrimonial house at village Pachma, then all the applicants had restrained her from entering inside the matrimonial house and had threatened that unless and until an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- is brought, she would not be allowed to enter inside her matrimonial house. It is true that the applicants No.4 to 8 are also residing in village Pachma. However, in the considered opinion of this Court, this is general allegation against the applicants No.4 to 10, specifically when the applicants No.9 and 10 are residing separately in different cities along with their family. The general and omnibus allegation of not permitting the complainant to enter inside her matrimonial house because of non-fulfillment of demand of Rs.5,00,000/- is not sufficient for prosecuting the applicants No.4 to 10 for offence under Section 498-A of IPC and under Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. Accordingly, FIR in Crime No.429/2017 registered at Police Station Basoda City, District Vidisha for offence under Section 498-A of IPC and under Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, the charge sheet as well as the consequential proceedings against the applicants No.4 to 10 are hereby quashed. 17. Accordingly, FIR in Crime No.429/2017 registered at Police Station Basoda City, District Vidisha for offence under Section 498-A of IPC and under Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, the charge sheet as well as the consequential proceedings against the applicants No.4 to 10 are hereby quashed. 17. So far as the allegations against the applicants No.2 and 3 are concerned, they are the father-in-law and mother-in-law of the complainant. There are allegations that initially they had harassed the complainant physically as well as mentally due to non-fulfillment of their demand of Rs.5,00,000/- but later on, on 22.5.2017 also they did not allow the complainant to enter inside her matrimonial house and also extended a threat that unless and until she brings an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- she will not be allowed to stay in her matrimonial house. In the considered opinion of this Court, the status of the mother-in-law and father-in-law of the complainant is quite different from the status of other in-laws of the complainant. 18. The Supreme Court in the case of Taramani Parakh v. State of M.P. reported in (2015) 11 SCC 260 has held as under:- “10. The law relating to quashing is well settled. If the allegations are absurd or do not make out any case or if it can be held that there is abuse of process of law, the proceedings can be quashed but if there is a triable case the Court does not go into reliability or otherwise of the version or the counter-version. In matrimonial cases, the Courts have to be cautious when omnibus allegations are made particularly against relatives who are not generally concerned with the affairs of the couple. We may refer to the decisions of this Court dealing with the issue. 11. Referring to earlier decisions, in Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander (2012) 9 SCC 460 , it was observed (SCC pp. 482-84, para 27): “27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers. 27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused. 27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. 27.7. The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose. 27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a “civil wrong” with no “element of criminality” and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 27.9. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. 27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. 27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution. 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 27.14. Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. 27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist. (Ref. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist. (Ref. State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha [ (1982) 1 SCC 561 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 283 : AIR 1982 SC 949 ]; Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [ (1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234]; Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [ (1992) 4 SCC 305 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 36 : AIR 1993 SC 892 ]; Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [ (1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059]; G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P. [ (2000) 2 SCC 636 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 513]; Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P. [ (2003) 3 SCC 11 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 703]; Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate [ (1998) 5 SCC 749 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1400 : AIR 1998 SC 128 ]; State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma [ (1996) 7 SCC 705 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 497]; Ganesh Narayan Hegde v. S. Bangarappa [ (1995) 4 SCC 41 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 634]; Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque [ (2005) 1 SCC 122 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 283]; Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd. [ (2000) 3 SCC 269 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 615 : AIR 2000 SC 1869 ]; Shakson Belthissor v. State of Kerala [ (2009) 14 SCC 466 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1412]; V.V.S. Rama Sharma v. State of U.P. [ (2009) 7 SCC 234 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 356]; Chunduru Siva Ram Krishna v. Peddi Ravindra Babu [ (2009) 11 SCC 203 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1297]; Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar [(1987) 1 SCC 288 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 82]; State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 192 : AIR 1991 SC 1260 ]; Lalmuni Devi v. State of Bihar [ (2001) 2 SCC 17 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 275]; M. 8 MCRC.6606/2015 Krishnan v. Vijay Singh [ (2001) 8 SCC 645 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 19]; Savita v. State of Rajasthan [ (2005) 12 SCC 338 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 571] and S.M. Datta v. State of Gujarat [ (2001) 7 SCC 659 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1361 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1201]). 27.16. 27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence. 14. From a reading of the complaint, it cannot be held that even if the allegations are taken as proved no case is made out. There are allegations against Respondent No.2 and his parents for harassing the complainant which forced her to leave the matrimonial home. Even now she continues to be separated from the matrimonial home as she apprehends lack of security and safety and proper environment in the matrimonial home. The question whether the appellant has infact been harassed and treated with cruelty is a matter of trial but at this stage, it cannot be said that no case is made out. Thus, quashing of proceedings before the trial is not permissible. 15. The decisions referred to in the judgment of the High Court are distinguishable. In Neelu Chopra [ (2009) 10 SCC 184 ], the parents of the husband were too old. The husband Rajesh had died and main allegations were only against him. This Court found no cogent material against the other accused. In Manoj Mahavir [ (2010) 10 SCC 673 ], the appellant before this Court was the brother of the daughterin- law of the accused who lodged the case against the accused for theft of jewellery during pendency of earlier Section 498-A IPC case. This Court found the said case to be absurd. In Geeta Mehrotra [ (2012) 10 SCC 741 ], case was against brother and sister of the husband. Divorce had taken place between the parties. The said cases neither purport to nor can be read as laying down an inflexible rule beyond the principles of quashing which have been mentioned above and applied to the facts of the cases therein which are distinguishable. In the present case the factual matrix is different from the said cases. Divorce had taken place between the parties. The said cases neither purport to nor can be read as laying down an inflexible rule beyond the principles of quashing which have been mentioned above and applied to the facts of the cases therein which are distinguishable. In the present case the factual matrix is different from the said cases. Applying the settled principles, it cannot be held that there is no triable case against the accused.” 19. The petition filed by the applicants No.2 and 3 for quashment of the FIR in Crime No.429/2017 registered at Police Station Basoda City, District Vidisha for offence under Section 498-A of IPC and under Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act as well as for quashment of charge sheet and the criminal proceedings is hereby dismissed. 20. So far as the case of applicant No.1 is concerned, this Court has already come to a conclusion that there are specific allegations against him prima facie making out an offence under Section 498-A of IPC and under Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. Accordingly, the application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. filed by the applicant No.1 for quashment of FIR in Crime No.429/2017 and for quashment of the charge sheet and the consequential proceedings is hereby dismissed. 21. Accordingly, the application is partly allowed and the application filed by the applicant No.1 Mahesh Sahu, applicant No.2 Chhakulal Sahu and applicant No.3 Smt. Shantibai Sahu is hereby dismissed whereas the application filed by the applicant No.4 Harisingh Sahu, applicant No.5 Ramesh Sahu, applicant No.6 Pradeep Sahu, applicant No.7 Smt. Vimla Sahu, applicant No.8 Smt. Anita Sahu, applicant No.9 Smt. Asha Sahu and applicant No. 10 Smt. Neera Sahu is hereby allowed. The applicants No.4 to 10 are discharged. No order as to costs.