JUDGMENT : It is stated that the properties of the petitioners herein have been acquired for the purpose of the establishment of the Kannur International Airport Phase-II and for construction of a drainage on the side of the road, in terms of the provisions contained in the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation & Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred as the “new 2013 Act”, for short). Sec.11(1) notification under the said Act was published on 30.12.2017 and thereafter, the 3rd respondent-Land Acquisition Officer(LAO)/Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), has issued Exts.P-1 to P-9(a) series of notices issued on 05.09.2018 under Sec.37(2) of the Act, informing that awards have been passed in respect of each of these land acquisition cases on the issues of compensation, etc. It is a common ground that the 3rd respondent-LAO has passed the awards not in the presence of the petitioners. Hence, Exts.P-1 to P-9(a) series of notices are notices informing the matter regarding the rendering of the award as envisaged in Sec.37(2) of the said Act. 2. It is stated that Sec.64(2)(b) of the new Act is broadly in pari materia to the provision in Sec.18(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to short as the “old Act”), which is the notice informing the matter of the passing of the award. The petitioners would point out that the 6 weeks' limitation period in filing reference application seeking enhanced compensation is to be ordinarily reckoned from the date of the award, but that in cases, where the award is passed not in the presence of the claimant, than the said period is to be counted from the date of receipt of the notice intimating the passing of the award. The petitioners have submitted application for reference seeking enhanced compensation, as per Exts.P-10 to P-16 applications dated 08.10.2018. The petitioners have submitted application for reference seeking enhanced compensation, as per Exts.P-10 to P-16 applications dated 08.10.2018. The said application for reference has now been rejected by the 3rd respondent-LAO, as per the impugned Exts.P-17 to P-23 proceedings on the ground that in view of the provision in Sec.64 (2)(b) of the new Act, the period of limitation for submission of reference application in cases where the parties are not present before the Collector at the time of passing of the award, shall be within 6 weeks from the date of receipt of the notice from the Collector under Sec.21 of the new Act or within 6 months from the date of the Collector’s award, whichever period shall expire first. It is stated in the impugned rejection orders by the 3rd respondent-LAO that in the instant case, Sec.21 notice was issued on 20.11.2017 and has been received by the petitioners on 28.11.2017 and that the award has been rendered on 16.08.2018 and that therefore, the period of limitation, as per Sec.64(2)(b) of the new Act, will be 6 weeks from 28.11.2018 (date of receipt of Sec.21 notice) or 6 months from the award dated 16.08.2018, whichever is earlier and that the said period of limitation has expired on 08.01.2018 (6 weeks from 28.11.2017, which is the date of receipt of Sec.21 notice). If the provision contained in Sec.64(2)(b) of the new Act is literally adhered to, then the view of the 3rd respondent-LAO in the impugned rejection orders, though hyper technical, cannot be branded as illegal. If the provision contained in Sec.64(2)(b) of the new Act is literally adhered to, then the view of the 3rd respondent-LAO in the impugned rejection orders, though hyper technical, cannot be branded as illegal. However, the essence and substance of the main contentions of the petitioners is that going by the provisions contained in Sec.64(2) (b) of the new Act in comparison with the provisions contained in Sec.18(2) of the old Act and on a proper understanding of the legislative scheme, and on a proper understanding of the scheme and purpose, it can only be held that the provision expressly engrafted in the first limb of clause (b) of Sec.64(2)(b) that the period is to be counted from 6 weeks of the receipt of notice under Sec.21, is an error committed in the legislative draftsmanship and that the word “Sec.21” appearing in the first limb of clause (b) of Sec.64 (2) could only be understood as “Sec.37(2)” of the new Act, as otherwise in vast majority of cases, where the award would be rendered only the long after the expiry of the period of 6 weeks from the date of receipt of Sec.21 notice, no reference application could ever been entertained from any aggrieved claimants. Further Sri.Joby Jacob Pulickekudy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that the above said aspects which warrants a proper purposive interpretation of the first limb of Sec.64(2)(b) of the new Act would be all the more clear like the blue sky, when the legislative scheme and the purpose of the legislation in the provisions as in Sec.64(2)(b) is understood from the provision contained in Sec.18(2) of the old Act, which is broadly in para materia to the one in Sec.64(2)(b) for the new Act, etc. It is in the light of these factual averments and contentions, that the petitioners have filed the instant Writ Petition with the following prayers: “(i). Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction calling for the records relating to Exts.P17 to Exts.P23 and quash the same. (ii). Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction commanding the 3rd respondent to refer Exts.P10 to P16 applications under Section 64 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. (iii). (ii). Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction commanding the 3rd respondent to refer Exts.P10 to P16 applications under Section 64 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. (iii). Declare that Section 64(2)(b) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 is similar to Section 18(2) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894, Section 37(2) is the similar provision for Section 12(2) of the old Act and therefore “Section 21 mentioned in Section 64(2) (b) of the new Act may be read as Section 37(2)” for the purpose of calculating ‘six weeks time from the date of receipt of notice from the Collector’. (iv). Grant such other and incidental relief as this Honorable court may deem fit for the facts and circumstances of the case and allow this Writ Petition.” 3. Heard Sri.Joby Jacob Pulickekudy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, Sri.Saigi Jacob Palatty, learned Sr.Government Pleader appearing for respondents 1 to 3, Smt.Latha Anand, learned Standing Counsel appearing for R-4 & Smt.C.G.Preetha, learned Central Government Counsel (CGC) appearing for R5-Union Government. 4. The facts in this case are not in dispute. In the instant case, the 3rd respondent has averred in the impugned rejection orders that notice under Sec.21 of the new Act has been issued on 20.11.2017 and has been served on the petitioners on 28.11.2017. The petitioners do not have any serious dispute to that factual assertion of the 3rd respondent. So also it is common ground that the impugned award has been rendered on 16.08.2018 and that too not in the presence of the petitioners. Sec.37(2) notice intimating the petitioners about the passing of the award has been issued on 05.09.2018 as evident from Exts.P-1 to P-9(a) notices. After getting intimation about the award on receipt of Sec.37(2) notice, the petitioners have submitted reference applications as per Exts.P-10 to P-16 on 08.10.2018. The period of 6 months from the award dated 16.08.2018 is upto 15.02.2019. The period of 6 weeks from the date of receipt of Sec.21 notice (received on 28.11.2017) is upto 08.01.2018. The period of 6 weeks, if computed from the date of receipt of Sec.37(2) notice dated 05.09.2018 is upto 16.10.2018. The period of 6 months from the award dated 16.08.2018 is upto 15.02.2019. The period of 6 weeks from the date of receipt of Sec.21 notice (received on 28.11.2017) is upto 08.01.2018. The period of 6 weeks, if computed from the date of receipt of Sec.37(2) notice dated 05.09.2018 is upto 16.10.2018. Sec.64(2) of the new Act provides as follows: “The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken: Provided that every such application shall be made- (a) If the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of Collector’s award; (b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section 21, or within six months from the date of the Collector’s award, whichever period shall first expire: Provided further that the Collector may entertain an application after the expiry of the said period, within a further period of one year, if he is satisfied that there sufficient cause for not filing it within the period specified in the first proviso.” 5. Clause (b) of Sec.64(2) of the new Act would mandate that in cases other than the ones in which the awards has been passed in the presence of the parties concerned, then the reference applications should be submitted, within 6 weeks of the receipt of the notice under Sec.21 or within 6 months from the date of the Collector’s award, whichever period shall first expire. If the first limb of clause (b) of Sec.64(2) which explicitly mentions about receipt of notice from the Collector under Sec.21 of the new Act is interpreted literally, then in the instant case, the period of limitation of 6 weeks from the date of receipt of Sec.21 notice is upto 08.01.2018 and 6 months from the award is upto 15.02.2019 and as the period of limitation is first among the two days, then the period of limitation has expired on 08.01.2018, which is even before the rendering of the award dated 16.10.2018. So if a literal approach is taken in understanding the wordings in the first limb of clause (b) of Sec.64(2) of the new Act, then certainly the view taken by the 3rd respondent-LAO in the impugned rejection orders though rather hyper technical, cannot be said to be in violation of the provision in Sec.64(2)(b), etc. The main endeavour of Sri.Joby Jacob Pulickekudy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is that he has no quarrel that if a literal approach is taken, the consequence though hyper technical is the one as reflected in the impugned orders. But the learned counsel for the petitioners has strongly urged that going by the legislative scheme and very purpose and objectives of the legislation, such a literal view is highly unwarranted and if the same is adhered to, then it will result in absurd and unreasonable consequences, in as much as in the great majority of cases the period of limitation if computed from 6 weeks from Sec.21 notice, will expire even before the passing of the award and that claimants can never even dream of getting their reference application accepted or adjudicated on merits. It is pointed out that it will be rather highly impossible for any Land Acquisition Officer to pass an award before the expiry of 6 weeks from the date of receipt of Sec.21 notice and therefore, it is pointed out that the words “Section 21” appearing in the first limb of clause (b) of Sec.64(2) is an error in the legislative draftsmanship and could be only understand as “Sec.37(2)” of the new Act. 6. To understand the abovesaid submissions, it will be pertinent to refer to some of the relevant provisions in the new Act as well as that in the old Act. Sec.64(2) though quoted hereinabove, in order to have a comparative evaluation of understanding of the provision under Sec.64(2) is quoted once again, which reads as follows: Sec.64(2) “The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken: Provided that every such application shall be made- (a) If the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of Collector’s award. (b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section 21, or within six months from the date of the Collector’s award, whichever period shall first expire; Provided further that the Collector may entertain an application after the expiry of the said period, within a further period of one year, if he is satisfied that there sufficient cause for not filing it within the period specified in the first proviso.” 7. The first limb of clause (b) of Sec.64(2) stipulates the period of 6 months from the date of receipt of the notice from the Collector under Sec.21. Sec.21(1) of the new Act which deals with notice to persons interested, reads as follows: “21. Notice to persons interested: (1) The Collector shall publish the public notice on his website and cause public notice to be given at convenient places on or near the land to be taken, stating that the Government intends to take possession of the land, and that claims to compensations and rehabilitation and resettlement for all interests in such land may be made to him.” 8. So it can be seen that Sec.21 of the new Act consists of a notice to be issued before an award is passed and this provision is broadly similar to Sec.9 of the old Act. The provision contained in the old Act relating to reference is the one in Sec.18 of the old Act reads as follows: “18. Reference to Court.-(1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. (2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken: Provided that every such application shall be made,- (a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector’s award; (b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section 12, sub-section (2), or within six months from the date of the Collector’s award, whichever period shall first expire.” 9. It can be seen from a comparison of Sec.18 of the old Act and Sec.64 of the new Act that the former is broadly in para materia to the provision in Sec.64 of the new Act. 10. Sec.37(2) reads as follows: “The Collector shall give immediate notice of his awards to such of the persons interested who are not present personally or through their representatives when the awards are made.” 11. Sec.12(2) of the old Act, reads as follows: “The Collector shall give immediate notice of his award to such of the persons interested as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made.” 12. Thus it can be seen from a reading of clause (b) of Sec.18(2) of the old Act that in cases other than one in which the awards have been passed in the presence of the parties, then the period of limitation for submission of the reference application shall be within 6 weeks from the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Sec.12(2) of the old Act or within 6 months from the date of the Collector’s award, whichever period shall expire first. From a comparison of the above provisions, it can be seen that Sec.12(2) of the old Act, is broadly in para materia to the one in Sec.37(2) of the new Act. 13. The notice contemplated under Sec.21 of the new Act is to be issued well before the award is passed. From a comparison of the above provisions, it can be seen that Sec.12(2) of the old Act, is broadly in para materia to the one in Sec.37(2) of the new Act. 13. The notice contemplated under Sec.21 of the new Act is to be issued well before the award is passed. Therefore, if a literal understanding of the first limb of clause(b) of Sec.64(2) is taken, then in vast majority of cases it is almost impossible for any Land Acquisition Officer to pass an award before the expiry of the period of 6 weeks from the date of receipt of notice under Sec.21 and therefore, it will be almost impossible for any aggrieved claimant to file a reference application, after getting the award within the said limitation period. So, even if the claimant makes an application for reference on the very same day on which he gets intimation about the passing of the award, in cases covered by clause (b) of Sec.64(2), then the limitation period could have expired by then going by the literal wording in the first limb of Sec.64(2)(b). This would certainly create absurd and unreasonable consequences never intended by the Parliament. Therefore, the contention urged by Sri.Joby Jacob Pulickekudy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners regarding the purposive construction of the wordings appearing as “Sec.21” in the first limb of clause (b) of Sec.64(2) that the same should be understood as “Sec.37(2)” of the new Act is reasonable and fair and would certainly merit acceptance. 14. But then this Court is placed in a dilemma as to whether this Court in exercise of its power of judicial review should take a view which would inevitably be a correction of the mistake in the legislative draftsmanship in that regard. The jurisprudential area in that regard is certainly controversial. However, this Court is persuaded to accept the well-considered views of the eminent jurist, Justice Aharon Barak, the former President of the Supreme Court of Israel, on the scope and ambit of purposive interpretation of laws and on the scope of correcting the mistakes in the language of a text. The jurisprudential area in that regard is certainly controversial. However, this Court is persuaded to accept the well-considered views of the eminent jurist, Justice Aharon Barak, the former President of the Supreme Court of Israel, on the scope and ambit of purposive interpretation of laws and on the scope of correcting the mistakes in the language of a text. In this background, it will be also pertinent to note that the relevance and necessity for adherence to contextual interpretation in appropriate cases has been underscored by the Apex Court and various High Courts, including this Court in a catena of rulings as in Vanguard Fire & General Insurance v. Fraser & Ross, reported in AIR 1960 SC 971 , National Building Construction Corporation v. Pritam Singh, reported in AIR 1972 SC 1579 paras 12 to 16, Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Company Ltd., reported in (1987) 1 SCC 424 para 33, K.V.Muthu v. Angamuthu Ammal, reported in (1997) 2 SCC 53 , Paul Enterprise v. Rajib Chatterjee & Co., reported in (2009) 3 SCC 709 para 28, National Insurance Company v. Kirpal Singh, reported in (2014) 5 SCC 189 paras 12 to 16, and in Division Bench decision of this Court in cases as in Thomas v. Sahitya Pravarthaka Co-operative Society Ltd., reported in 2014(3) KLT 761 paras 7 to 8, etc. 15. It would also be pertinent to refer to the canons of interpretative construction based on the principle of purposive interpretation or purposive construction. In that regard, it will be relevant to refer to the views of Justice Aharon Barak, the eminent jurist and former President of the Supreme Court of Israel, who in his illuminating treatise “Purposive Interpretation in Law”, has pithly put it as follows: “Purposive interpretation is based on three components: language, purpose, and discretion. Language shapes the range of semantic possibilities within which the interpreter acts as a linguist. Once the interpreter defines the range, he or she chooses the legal meaning of the text from among the (express or implied) semantic possibilities. The semantic component thus sets the limits of interpretation by restricting the interpreter to a legal meaning that the text can bear in its (public or private) language.” 16. Once the interpreter defines the range, he or she chooses the legal meaning of the text from among the (express or implied) semantic possibilities. The semantic component thus sets the limits of interpretation by restricting the interpreter to a legal meaning that the text can bear in its (public or private) language.” 16. AS held by the Apex Court in the judgment in Shailesh Dhairyaman v. Mohan Balakrishna Lulla, reported in (2016) 3 SCC 619 p.641 para 31, that the principle of “purposive interpretation” or “purposive construction" is based on the understanding that the court is supposed to attach that meaning to the provisions which serve the “purpose” behind such a provision. The basic approach is to ascertain what is it designed to accomplish? And to put it otherwise to interpretative process the court is supposed to realise the goal that the legal test is designed or realise, etc. 17. Justice Aharon Barak, in his illuminating treatise “Purposive Interpretation in Law” (First Indian Reprint 2007), has dealt with the subject of “Correcting mistakes in the language of a text” and on “correcting mistakes in statutes” on pages 77 to 78 of the said book, which reads as follows: “4. CORRECTING MISTAKES IN THE LANGUAGE OF A TEXT Is a Judge Authorized to Correct Mistakes in a Text? The author of a text is generally “authorized” to correct a mistake in it. The legislature may correct a mistake in a statute; the parties to a contract may correct a mistake in the formation of a contract; testators may correct their wills. May judges, however, correct mistakes in texts they did not write, like statutes, contracts, or wills? Answering in the affirmative is uncontroversial as long as judges are permitted to make the correct within the frame-work of the text’s language, without having to add to it or subtract from it. Such activity is just ordinary interpretation, in which judges consider the correct reality surrounding the text, rather than the mistaken one. Of course, a given legal system may not allow judges to treat the text as mistaken. That question is an internal one, and each legal system has its own answer. What happens, however, when judges must change the text in order to fix the mistake? May judges make the changes? Of course, a given legal system may not allow judges to treat the text as mistaken. That question is an internal one, and each legal system has its own answer. What happens, however, when judges must change the text in order to fix the mistake? May judges make the changes? Take an example from French law: A statutory provision states that “It is forbidden to embark or disembark while the train is not in motion.” Must interpreters determine the legal meaning of the text according to its semantic meaning, or may they change the language of the statute by eliminating the word, “not”? Take a second example: A state of the United States bars the use of weapons on a public highway, “except for the purpose of killing some noxious or dangerous animal or an officer in pursuit of his duty.” Should a judge determine that the use of weapons in public highways is permitted for the purpose of killing an officer in pursuit of his duty, or may the court correct the mistake and decide that the word “by” comes after the word “or”? These may be extreme examples, but the issue arises in moderate cases, too. The question is whether a judge may correct the language of text. We might say that judicial alteration of a text that someone else created infringes on the autonomy of private actors (in the case of a contract or will) and on separation of powers (in the case of a constitution or statute). Lord Esher, M.R., had this to say about correcting a mistake in a statute: “If the words of an Act are clear, you must follow them, even though they lead to a manifest absurdity. The Court has nothing to do with the question whether the legislator has committed an absurdity.” Esher’s approach is harsh. Take a will in which the testator by mistake wrote Simon’s name instead of Richard’s. Correcting the mistake allows the judge to realize the testator’s intent. The same is true of a mistake in a contract. Its correction realizes the parties joint intent. Similar explanations would seem to apply to a mistake in a statute. The mistake frustrates the legislature’s intent or the statute’s purpose. Why should the judge not have the power to correct the statute and realize the legislative intent or statutory purpose? The same is true of a mistake in a contract. Its correction realizes the parties joint intent. Similar explanations would seem to apply to a mistake in a statute. The mistake frustrates the legislature’s intent or the statute’s purpose. Why should the judge not have the power to correct the statute and realize the legislative intent or statutory purpose? Correcting the mistake would not interfere with reasonable expectations, because most people who read the text realize that it contains a mistake. In any case, the damage done to reasonable expectations, if any exist, from correcting the mistake is no greater than the damage to reasonable expectations wreaked by any act of interpretation. With that in mind, we discuss correcting mistakes.” “Correcting Mistakes in Statutes The English legal tradition authorizes a judge to correct blatant errors in a text that has been enacted. The legislature is presumed to have wanted judges to correct blatant errors in statutes, particularly in order to realize its intent. (1) the garbled text (which is grammatically incomplete or otherwise corrupt); (2) the text containing an error of meaning; (3) the text containing a casus omissus; (4) the text containing a casus male inclusus, and (5) the case where there is textual conflict” See also Cross, supra p.3, note 3 at 36; A.Samuels, “Errors in Bills and Acts,” [1982] Statute L. Rev.94.” AS Lord Reid said: Cases where it has properly been held that a word can be struck out of a deed or statute and another substituted can as far as I am aware be grouped under three heads: where without such substitution the provision is unintelligible or absurd or totally unreasonable; where it is unworkable, and where it is totally irreconcilable with the plain intention shewn by the rest of the deed or statute. American law adopts a similar approach. (Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction 284 (N.Singer ed., 5th ed.1992).)” 18. On an anxious consideration of the various issues arising in this regard, this Court is of the considered view that in this case it is imperative that this Court take resort to a purposive interpretation so as to adopt a proactive approach in the interpretative process. Otherwise the unintended mistake in the legislative draftsmanship would lead to unjust and unreasonable consequences, never contemplated by the Parliament. Otherwise the unintended mistake in the legislative draftsmanship would lead to unjust and unreasonable consequences, never contemplated by the Parliament. Accordingly, in the light of the abovesaid legal principles laid down by the Apex Court and by this Court in the aforementioned decisions as well as in the light of the abovesaid jurisprudential principles enunciated in the aforementioned illuminating treatise of Justice Aharon Barak, this Court is inclined to accept the submission of the petitioners that a literal interpretation of the wordings in the first limb of clause (b) of Sec.64(2) is highly unwarranted and unreasonable and the wordings “Section 21(2)” notice appearing in the first limb of Sec.64(2) should only be understood as “Sec.37(2)” notice. It is accordingly so declared and ordered. 19. Hence, in the light of the abovesaid aspects, it is only to be held that the view taken by the 3rd respondent-LAO in the impugned rejection orders is incorrect and untenable. Going by the admitted facts, Sec.37(2) notice is issued on 16.10.2018 and the award is rendered on 16.08.2018. Six weeks period from Sec.37(2) notice is upto 16.10.2018 and 6 months period from the award dated 16.08.2018 is 15.02.2019 and that therefore, the period of limitation flowing from Sec.64(2)(b) of the new Act is upto 16.10.2018 and as the reference applications as per Exts.P-10 to P-16 have been submitted on 08.10.2018, the said applications are filed well within the period of limitation as flowing out from Sec.64(2) (b). Hence, the rejection orders at Exts.P-17 to P-23 will stand set aside. The 3rd respondent-Land Acquisition Officer/Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition) is directed to accept Exts.P-10 to P-16 applications for references and pass orders thereon, so as to refer the said requests of the petitioners to the authority concerned as understood in Sec.51 of the new Act, in order to ensure adjudication of the claims of the petitioners for enhancement on merits. Orders referring the said reference applications shall be issued by the 3rd respondent-LAO, without much delay, preferably within a period of one month from the date of production of a certified copy of this judgment. The orders so issued shall be duly communicated by the 3rd respondent to each of the petitioners by registered speed post, without much delay. The petitioners may produce a certified copy of this judgment before the 3rd respondent, for necessary information. 20. The orders so issued shall be duly communicated by the 3rd respondent to each of the petitioners by registered speed post, without much delay. The petitioners may produce a certified copy of this judgment before the 3rd respondent, for necessary information. 20. Before parting with the case, this Court would suggest that the competent authority of the 5th respondent-Union Government may seriously consider the necessity of appropriate remedial amendments of the abovesaid provision contained in the first limb of clause(b) of Sec.64(2), so as to substitute the words “Section 21” appearing therein as “Sec.37(2)”, etc. The learned Central Government Counsel is also requested to forward a copy of this judgment to the competent officials of the respondent-Union Government for necessary information. The Registrar General will also forward copy of this judgment to the Secretary to Government of India in the Union Ministry of Law & Justice, for necessary information. With these observations and directions, the above Writ Petition (Civil) will stand finally disposed of.