JUDGMENT : Badar Durrez Ahmed, J. The present appeal and confirmation arise out of the File No. 52/Sessions before the Sessions Judge, Poonch. By a judgment dated 04.12.2012, the learned Sessions Judge convicted the appellants under Section 302/34 R.P.C. for having committed the murder of Harbhajan Kour on 31.12.2006. By virtue of the order on sentence dated 04.12.2012, each of the appellants have been awarded punishment of life imprisonment. That is the reason, why the sentence has been sent to this Court for confirmation in terms of Section 374 Cr.P.C., 1973 2. The said sessions' case arose out of the FIR No. 03/2007, dated 06.01.2007 recorded at the Police Station, Poonch. Initially, the FIR was [Para 22] [Para 23] [Para 25] [Para 24] [Para 24] registered under Section 307/34 Ranbir Penal code which was, however, later converted to one under Section 302/34 Ranbir Penal code when Harbhajan Kour died in the Hospital on 15.01.2007. 3. The case of the prosecution is that Harbhajan Kour was married to one Gurdev Singh. On 31.12.2006, when she was preparing the meal in the evening, her husband came home at about 7:15 p.m. and asked for the meal. When she was serving the meal to him, their children were also present in the room and her husband asked her to serve food to the children also. She therefore, replied that she would feed the children later as she was still serving the meal to him. She was, at that point of time, making “chapattis”. It is alleged that her husband (Gurdev Singh) got enraged and left the room without eating. It is further alleged that in the meantime, Balbir Singh, who is the brother-in-law of the deceased Harbhajan Kour and who was in the verandah of the upper story said that he would settle the issue between them once and for all by killing her (Harbhajan kour). The prosecution case further goes to allege that Balbir Singh came down from the verandah. In the meanwhile, Harbhajan Kour had also come out of the room. She was dragged in by him. Her mother-in-law (Ranjit Kour) and sister-in-law (Parvinder Kour) also arrived at the spot and started abusing her. The prosecution case further goes to allege that Balbir Singh came down from the verandah. In the meanwhile, Harbhajan Kour had also come out of the room. She was dragged in by him. Her mother-in-law (Ranjit Kour) and sister-in-law (Parvinder Kour) also arrived at the spot and started abusing her. It is then alleged that Ranjit Kour picked up a can of kerosene oil from the room and sprinkled kerosene upon Harbhajan Kour and Parvinder Kour, put her on fire by igniting a match from a match box. Harbhajan Kour tried her level best to get rid of the flames and, according to the prosecution, after a great struggle, she extricated herself from the 'clutches' of the accused persons (appellants herein) and went out of the room and raised an alarm for help. Due to this fire, she received serious burn injuries. 4. This alleged incident is of the evening of 31.12.2006. Harbhajan Kour, after having received burn injuries was initially taken to the District Hospital, Poonch. But, in the same night, she was removed from the District Hospital Poonch and brought to the Government Medical College Hospital at Jammu. She remained in that hospital till 15.01.2007, when she passed away. 5. According to the prosecution, while she was being brought from Poonch to Jammu in an Ambulance, Harbhajan Kour made a statement to her brother-Gurmeet Singh (PW-10) whereby she implicated the three appellants herein. It is also the case of the prosecution that on 03.01.2007, Harbhajan Kour made another statement to her mother-Paramjeet Kour (PW-9) to the same effect. It is the further case of the prosecution that she made a 'dying declaration' to PW-26/Mohd. Hayat (ASI) on 03.01.2007 itself which was allegedly recorded by him in the Government Medical College Hospital at Jammu. It is also alleged by the prosecution that the thumb impression of Harbhajan Kour was taken on the statement and one 'Dr Tausif is said to have endorsed the alleged statement with the word -”Documented”. Strong reliance has been placed by the prosecution on this so-called recorded statement which, according to the prosecution, was the dying declaration of Harbhajan Kour. Some reliance was also sought to be placed on an alleged statement under 161 Cr.P.C. made by the deceased Harbhajan Kour on 13.01.2007. 6. The prosecution examined as many as twenty six (26) witnesses. Strong reliance has been placed by the prosecution on this so-called recorded statement which, according to the prosecution, was the dying declaration of Harbhajan Kour. Some reliance was also sought to be placed on an alleged statement under 161 Cr.P.C. made by the deceased Harbhajan Kour on 13.01.2007. 6. The prosecution examined as many as twenty six (26) witnesses. The accused were examined under Section 342 Cr.P.C., 1973 and they also produced four witnesses in support of their defence. 7. The Trial Court, after examining the evidence on record convicted all the three accused/appellants herein, as stated above for having committed the murder of Harbhajan Kour by burning her in furtherance of their common intention. 8. Mr. Sethi, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, submitted that the case put forth by the prosecution is an absolutely false case. He submitted that first of all, even the prosecution witnesses have not supported the version put forth by the prosecution. He submitted, in particular, that PW Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 14 have testified to the fact that none of the accused were present when Harbhajan Kour caught fire. Furthermore, he submitted that the so-called statement made to PW-26 (Mohd. Hayat) on 03.01.2007 has not been produced in evidence as, according to him, the same could not even be proved. Therefore, no reliance whatsoever can be placed on that alleged statement. Insofar as, the purported statements made by Harbhajan Kour to her brother-Gurmeet Singh and mother-Paramjeet Kour are concerned, he submitted that the same are contradictory and without any other corroborative evidence. In particular, he submitted that when Harbhajan Kour was taken to the Hospital at Poonch, Dr. Amrish Kohli examined her and recorded in a certificate that she was unfit to make a statement, both written as well as verbal. Thereafter, there is no fitness certificate given by any doctor to show that she ever became fit to make any statement. Therefore, the so-called statement made to the brother and mother of the deceased become highly doubtful. The same is also true for the alleged recorded statement on 03.01.2007 and the so-called statement under section 161 Cr.P.C., 1973 9. Mr. Sethi, learned senior counsel, also submitted that if the prosecution versions were to be true, then why was the registration of the FIR delayed. The same is also true for the alleged recorded statement on 03.01.2007 and the so-called statement under section 161 Cr.P.C., 1973 9. Mr. Sethi, learned senior counsel, also submitted that if the prosecution versions were to be true, then why was the registration of the FIR delayed. According to the prosecution, Harbhajan Kour had given her first verbal dying declaration to her brother-Gurmeet Singh (PW-10) on the way from Poonch to Jammu in the Ambulance on 31.12.2006. If that were to be the case, then why was the FIR registered six days later on 06.01.2007? He also submitted that even if, we take the case of the prosecution with regard to the recorded statement having been made on 03.01.2007 and to have been recorded by PW-26/Mohd. Hayat (ASI) to be true, there is no explanation for the delay of three days from 03.01.2007 to 06.01.2007 in registering the FIR. Thus, according to Mr. Sethi, the entire case of the prosecution has been engineered by the police at the behest of Harbhajan Kour's mother, brother and sister and, in particular, the brother because he was a PSO of the Station House Officer of Police Station, Poonch. He further submitted that the entire prosecution case is an afterthought to somehow implicate the appellants. Mr. Sethi, learned senior counsel, also submitted in continuation of the above that Gurmeet Singh, being a police officer and being the brother of Harbhajan Kour, ought to have seen to it that the FIR was registered on 31.12.2006 itself or at least on 01.01.2007 when, according to the prosecution version, Harbhajan Kour had made an oral dying declaration to him en-route Poonch to Jammu on 31.12.2006. Mr. Sethi also submitted that PW-26/Mohd. Hayat (ASI) has also not established the fact that he did come to Jammu on 03.01.2007. He contended that whenever there is a movement of a Police Officer outside his Police Station and in any event, outside the city, there would be a recording in the Case Diary. No such Case Diary entry has been shown to indicate that PW-26 Mohd. Hayat ever visited Jammu on 03.01.2007 when the alleged dying declaration was said to have been recorded in the Government Medical College Hospital at Jammu. 10. Mr. Kotwal, the learned Dy. A.G. appearing for the State, however, reiterated the reasoning adopted by the Trial Court. No such Case Diary entry has been shown to indicate that PW-26 Mohd. Hayat ever visited Jammu on 03.01.2007 when the alleged dying declaration was said to have been recorded in the Government Medical College Hospital at Jammu. 10. Mr. Kotwal, the learned Dy. A.G. appearing for the State, however, reiterated the reasoning adopted by the Trial Court. He also submitted that the lacuna in the conduct of the case before the Trial Court should not come in the way of the prosecution in the present appeal because the present appeal is nothing but a continuation of the trial. He made this statement with particular reference to the prosecution witnesses (PW-1, 2, 3 and 14), who have only not supported the prosecution case but have completely demolished it and yet were not declared hostile by the prosecutor in the Trial Court. He also submitted that the dying declaration made to PW-26/Mohd. Hayat (ASI) stands established and that clearly points to the guilt of the appellants and that the Trial Court has rightly placed reliance on the same in convicting the appellants. The learned counsel for the State also submitted that the nature of the injuries were such that they could not be accidental because, according to him, the deceased Harbhajan Kour received burn injuries all over her body. He, therefore, submitted that the appeal be dismissed and the sentence be confirmed. 11. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and examining the evidence on record threadbare, we are of the view that the appeal deserves to be allowed and obviously, the question of confirmation of the sentence would not arise. This is so because sufficient doubt exists in our mind so as to give the benefit to the appellants. There are several reasons for this which are discussed herein-below. 12. We may examine the testimony of PW-l/Amarjit Singh, who is a neighbour. He categorically stated that when he arrived at the spot, Balbir Singh was not at home and that he arrived there after the incident and, in fact, took Harbhajan Kour to the Hospital at Poonch. This he has stated in his examination-in-chief. Furthermore, in the course of his cross-examination, he has also stated that appellant-Ranjit Kour was ill for the last two-three months and that she had gone to Jammu alongwith her daughter-appellant (Parvinder Kour). This he has stated in his examination-in-chief. Furthermore, in the course of his cross-examination, he has also stated that appellant-Ranjit Kour was ill for the last two-three months and that she had gone to Jammu alongwith her daughter-appellant (Parvinder Kour). He also stated that they had returned to Poonch, 4-5 minutes prior to the occurrence and that when he arrived at the scene, the other people were extinguishing the fire. It is then that Ranjit Kour and Parvinder Kour reached the place and threw their luggage ('attache') on the gate and rushed to save the girl (i.e., Harbhajan Kour). In this process, the hands of Ranjit Kour also got burnt. At that point of time, Ranjit Kour had immediately questioned Harbhajan Kour as to how the incident had taken place. She responded by saying that the cooking gas had finished and, therefore, she was lighting the stove and in that process, she was accidentaly burnt by her clothes catching fire. 13. The testimony of this witness i.e., PW-l/Amarjit Singh has not been controverted by the prosecution at all. It clearly indicates that neither Bhupinder Singh nor Ranjit Kour nor Parvinder Kour were present when Harbhajan Kour caught fire, therefore, this witness clearly exonerated the accused. 14. The next witness, PW-2/Bhupinder Singh, who is also a neighbour, testified in his examination-in-chief that the couple, that is, late Harbhajan Kour and Gurdev Singh, had good relations amongst them. He said that he heard a noise at around 7:30 p.m. and rushed to see what was happening. He found that Harbhajan Kour was in flames. He also stated that PW-l/Amarjit Singh and PW-2/Makhan Lai were already there and were trying to douse the fire. Thereafter, he stated that Ranjit Kour came from Jammu. In crossexamination, he submitted that Ranjit Kour was ill and she had gone to Jammu with her daughter Parvinder Kour and when they saw that Harphajan Kour was burning, they tried to save her by dousing the fire. 15. PW-3/Gurdev Singh who is also a neighbour, stated in his examination-in-chief that he heard a noise and he saw that PW-l/Amarjit Singh and PW-2/Bhupinder Singh were already at the scene. It is at that point of time that Ranjit Kour and her daughter-Parvinder Kour arrived from Jammu. They left their luggage ('attache') at the gate and immediately rushed to douse the fire. It is at that point of time that Ranjit Kour and her daughter-Parvinder Kour arrived from Jammu. They left their luggage ('attache') at the gate and immediately rushed to douse the fire. In cross-examination, the said witness has confirmed that Harbhajan Kour had been burnt prior to the arrival of Ranjit Kour and her daughter Parvinder Kour. He also confirmed that Ranjit Kour was ill for about two months and for that purpose, had gone to Jammu for treatment. He also stated that when Harbhajan Kour was being taken to the hospital, they met Balbir Singh on the way near the Jail and it is then that he came to know of the incident. PW-3/Gurdev Singh also testified that on her arrival, Ranjit Kour had asked the deceased-Harbhajan Kour as to how she had caught fire, on which she stated that she caught the fire while she was lighting the stove. 16. PW-14/Gurpreet Singh, who is also a neighbour, testified in like manner as PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3. In particular, he stated that the accused had good relations with the deceased and that Ranjit Kour and her daughter had arrived after the incident. He also stated that Ranjit Kour and her daughter tried to douse the fire in order to save Harbhajan Kour. Furthermore, Balbir Singh was also not present and he met him on the way. 17. Thus, the testimonies of PW-1, PW-2, PW-3 and PW-14, who are all prosecution witnesses, clearly point to the innocence of the appellants because each one of them has stated that the appellants came later. The presence of these witness at the time after Harbhajan Kour had caught fire is established by the prosecution itself. These witnesses were not declared hostile by the prosecution, which means that their testimonies are accepted by the prosecution. In any event, their testimonies clearly point to the innocence of the appellants and do not support the prosecution version. 18. The testimony of another important witness which needs to be examined is PW-19/Dr. Amrish Kohli. He has stated that Harbhajan Kour was brought to the District Hospital, Poonch on 31.12.2006 at about 9.00 p.m. and that she had 45% to 50% burns. He has given a certificate which has been exhibited as EXPW-19-AK wherein it is clearly indicated that Harbhajan Kour was unfit to give a written or verbal statement. Amrish Kohli. He has stated that Harbhajan Kour was brought to the District Hospital, Poonch on 31.12.2006 at about 9.00 p.m. and that she had 45% to 50% burns. He has given a certificate which has been exhibited as EXPW-19-AK wherein it is clearly indicated that Harbhajan Kour was unfit to give a written or verbal statement. We may point out that there is unfortunately no MLC in this case, neither at the District Hospital, Poonch nor at the Government Medical College Hospital at Jammu. However, we have the testimony of PW-21/Dr. Prem Das Bhagat who conducted the post mortem examination. The post mortem examination report has been exhibited as EXPW-21-PD. In this report also, the alleged history of occurrence has been shown to be that the victim had “sustained burns”. 19. Mr. Sethi, the learned senior counsel, pointed out while referring to this document, that even here the alleged history does not indicate that she was burnt as a cause of any criminal act on the part of anybody. What is also interesting to note is that according to the post mortem report, Harbhajan Kour had sustained 93% burns, whereas according to PW- 19/Dr. Amrish Kohli, she had sustained 45% - 50% burns. How this discrepancy has arisen, is, of course, unknown. The opinion for the cause of death has been given as:-”Death in this case was due to septicemia shock as a result of external infected burns”. What is also material is that, in his cross-examination, Dr. Prem Das Bhagat (PW-21) has stated that the hands of the deceased were covered in dressing and both the hands were burnt. This piece of evidence, according to Mr. Sethi, learned senior counsel, raises serious doubts as to whether the thumb impression of the deceased could, at all, have been taken on the purported statement which, in any event, is not part of evidence. 20. On the part of the prosecution, PW-10/Gurmeet Singh, who is the brother of the deceased, has stated that on the way from Poonch to Jammu in the ambulance carrying Harbhajan Kour, she had told him that the appellants had caused her to burn in the manner indicated by the prosecution. Moreover, PW-9/Paramjeet Kour, who is the mother of the deceased, also said that, on 03.01.2007, a similar statement was made to her by the deceased-Harbhajan Kour in Government Medical College Hospital at Jammu. Moreover, PW-9/Paramjeet Kour, who is the mother of the deceased, also said that, on 03.01.2007, a similar statement was made to her by the deceased-Harbhajan Kour in Government Medical College Hospital at Jammu. Then, we have the testimony of PW-26/Mohd. Hayat (ASI), who stated that he is the one who had recorded the statement of the deceased-Harbhajan Kour on 03.01.2007 which forms the basis of the prosecution case against the appellants. Thus, we have four statements (leaving aside the so-called statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C., 1973 allegedly recorded on 13.01.2007 which cannot be part of evidence) which have found mention in the oral testimonies of the above mentioned witnesses. The first statement is the one allegedly made by Harbhajan Kour on enquiry by Ranjit Kour on 31.12.2006 itself in the presence of PW-1, PW-2, PW-3 and PW-14 to the effect that she (Harbhajan Kour) had got burnt accidentally as she caught fire while she was trying to light the stove. This statement has not been controverted by the prosecution at all. Then we have the statement allegedly made by Harbhajan Kour to her brother PW-10/Gurmeet Singh while they were travelling from Poonch to Jammu in the ambulance. There is a serious cloud on that statement. First of all, in the same vehicle, the mother and sister of the deceased were also travelling but they have made no mention in their testimonies of any such statement having been made by the deceased, on the way from Poonch to Jammu. Secondly, it will be pertinent to note that PW-19/Dr. Amrish Kohli had already certified in the District Hospital at Poonch that Harbhajan Kour was unfit to make any statement, written or verbal. Thirdly, if such a statement had been made to P W-10/Gurmeet Singh, why was no FIR registered on this basis on 31.12.2006 itself or at least by 01.01.2007 ? Thus, it is clear that the testimony of PW-10/Gurmeet Singh with regard to the making of any such statement by the deceased-Harbhajan Kour cannot be relied upon. 21. We come next to the statement allegedly made to the mother on 03.01.2007. This suffers from the same infirmity as the statement allegedly made to PW-10/Gurmeet Singh. Furthermore, since Harbhajan Kour was already in hospital, the fact that no fitness certificate was given by any doctor of that hospital also becomes extremely relevant, in the backdrop of the fact that Dr. This suffers from the same infirmity as the statement allegedly made to PW-10/Gurmeet Singh. Furthermore, since Harbhajan Kour was already in hospital, the fact that no fitness certificate was given by any doctor of that hospital also becomes extremely relevant, in the backdrop of the fact that Dr. Amrish Kohli had already declared her to be unfit for making any statement, written or verbal. Therefore, the testimony of PW-9 cannot also be relied upon. As regards, PW-26/Mohd. Hayat (ASI), we find that he has not produced the statement as part of the evidence and has certainly not proved the same. Therefore, it cannot be said as to whether that statement was at all made by the deceased Harbhajan Kour. According to his testimony, Harbhajan Kour placed her thumb impression on the said statement but, contradicting this is the evidence of doctor who conducted the post mortem examination, which indicates that both the hands of Harbhajan Kour were burnt and were bandaged. Then, there is reference to a mysterious Dr. Tausif, who has never been seen and in any event, has not been produced by the prosecution. It is also not explained as to what is the meaning of the word 'documented' said to have been endorsed by the unknown Dr. Tausif. Thus, no reliance whatsoever can be placed on the purported statement which, in any event, does not form part of the evidence as it has neither been proved nor exhibited. This also casts a serious doubts on the testimony of PW-26/Mohd. Hayat. Another reason for disbelieving PW-26/Mohd. Hayat (ASI) is the fact that he was a Police Station, Poonch. No FIR had been registered till 03.01.2007. He was not an Investigating Officer in the case. What was he doing at Government Medical College Hospital at Jammu on that date? No answer is forthcoming from the prosecution. On the contrary, no evidence of his movement from Poonch to Jammu has been produced by way of any entry in a Case Diary etc. 22. The law with regard to dying declarations is well settled and has been appropriately indicated in a Division Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in Geeta and another vs. State, 170 (2009) DLT 268, to which, one of us (Badar Durrez Ahmed-J., as he then was) was a party. In the said decision, it was observed as under:- “24. The law with regard to dying declarations is well settled and has been appropriately indicated in a Division Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in Geeta and another vs. State, 170 (2009) DLT 268, to which, one of us (Badar Durrez Ahmed-J., as he then was) was a party. In the said decision, it was observed as under:- “24. The law with regard to dying declarations is quite well settled. It is an established principle that a conviction can be based solely upon a dying declaration. But, before this can be done, the dying declaration must be established to be authentic and correct as well as truthful. Insofar as the authenticity and correctness of the dying declaration is concerned, the prosecution has to establish that the dying declaration in question was, in fact, made by the person who lost his life. Even where it can be established that the statement, which purports to be the dying declaration of the deceased, was in fact made by the deceased, the prosecution has also to establish that the statement was truthful. Of course, it is normally presumed that a dying person in his last moments does not utter any falsehood. But that does not rule out the possibility that in some cases this may not be the position. There may be instances where out of hate or spite a person may falsely implicate his enemy, even in his dying moments. It is also quite possible that the person making the dying declaration is under the influence or control of someone else and out of fear or other reasons, he may make a false statement prior to his death. There is also a possibility that a person, in order save his honour and the honour of his family, who would survive-him, may make statements which are not entirely correct or truthful. There is also a possibility that the person making the dying declaration is under some medication or because of his precarious condition is suffering from hallucinations and, therefore, the statements he makes at that point of time may be far removed from the truth. It is only when all these circumstances are ruled out and the court is of the belief and opinion that what the dying declaration states is truthful, can a conviction be based upon it without seeking corroboration. It is only when all these circumstances are ruled out and the court is of the belief and opinion that what the dying declaration states is truthful, can a conviction be based upon it without seeking corroboration. A dying declaration must always pass the scrutiny by the Court because, after all, it is merely hearsay evidence and it is admissible and relevant only because the person who made the declaration is no longer alive and cannot be produced before Court for testifying. At the same time, the courts need to exercise caution in relying upon dying declarations because the maker of the statement is not before it and nor does the defence have an opportunity to cross-examine him. Thus, while there is no rule of law which suggests that a conviction cannot be based solely upon a dying declaration, the courts, as a rule of prudence, look for other corroborative material. If the dying declaration is of such a stellar and unimpeachable quality that it fully inspires confidence of the Court, there is nothing to prevent the Court from relying solely on such a dying declaration and on basing a conviction thereupon. But, the emphasis must be on the quality of the dying declaration. If the dying declaration is suspicious or suffers from some infirmity, then it should not be acted upon without any corroborative evidence.” 23. The said observations were made after examining the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Khushal Rao vs. State of Bombay, 1958 AIR SC 22, wherein the Supreme Court summarized the principles with regard to dying declaration as under:- “16. The said observations were made after examining the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Khushal Rao vs. State of Bombay, 1958 AIR SC 22, wherein the Supreme Court summarized the principles with regard to dying declaration as under:- “16. ..(1) that it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated; (2) that each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances in which the dying declaration was made; (3) that it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that a dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence than other pieces of evidence; (4) that a dying declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of evidence and has to be judged in the light of surrounding circumstances and with reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidence; (5) that a dying declaration which has been recorded by a competent Magistrate in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of questions and answers, and, as far as practicable, in the words of the maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human memory and human character, and (6) that in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the court has to keep in view, the circumstances like the opportunity of the dying man for observation, for example, whether there was sufficient light if the crime was committed at night; whether the capacity of the man to remember the facts stated, had not been impaired at the time he was making the statement, by circumstances beyond his control; that the statement has been consistent throughout if he had several opportunities of making a dying declaration apart from the official record of it; and that the statement had been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested parties.” 24. The subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Paniben vs. State of Gujarat: (1992) 2 SCC 474 had also been referred to where the following principles were summed up:- “18. The subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Paniben vs. State of Gujarat: (1992) 2 SCC 474 had also been referred to where the following principles were summed up:- “18. (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration, (ii) If the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration, (iii) This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration, (iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence, (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected, (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction, (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected, (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth, (ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make this dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail, (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the versions as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon.” The same position has been reiterated in subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court including that of Vikas vs. State of Maharashtra : 2008 (2) SCC 516 . 25. 25. We may also refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kusa and others vs. State of Orissa : AIR 1980 SC 559 , wherein the Supreme Court observed as under:- “Suffice it to say that it is now well established by a long course of decisions of this Court that although a dying declaration should be carefully scrutinized but if after perusal of the same, the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and is free from any effort to prompt the deceased to make a statement and is coherent and consistent, there is no legal impediment in founding the conviction on such a dying declaration even if there is no corroboration. 26. It is evident from the above that the conviction can be based on a dying declaration alone without the requirement of any corroboration. However, it is also clear that the dying declaration, in such circumstance, must be of a stellar quality. Two facts have to be established before a dying declaration could be relied upon for basing a conviction. The first is that it must be established that the statement, which purports to be a dying declaration, of the deceased person was actually made by that person without any influence of tutoring from any other person and it must have been made by that person while he/she was in a fit state of mind. The second fact that the Court must be satisfied with is that what has been stated by the dying person was the truth. It is only when both these facts are established that the dying declaration attains such a quality that it can by itself be made the basis of conviction without requiring any corroboration. It is, therefore, clear that if there is any doubt with regard to any of the aforesaid aspects, corroboration becomes necessary. That the corroboration need not be on every aspect provided, it is there on material and crucial aspects. It must also be remembered that where a dying declaration is neither correct nor truthful, no amount of corroboration would lead to the conviction of anybody on the basis of a such dying declaration. 27. That the corroboration need not be on every aspect provided, it is there on material and crucial aspects. It must also be remembered that where a dying declaration is neither correct nor truthful, no amount of corroboration would lead to the conviction of anybody on the basis of a such dying declaration. 27. In the present case, the only dying declaration or statement which can be said to have been established by uncontroverted evidence is the first statement made by the deceased to the mother-in-law (Ranjit Kour) in the presence of PW-1, PW-2, PW-3 and PW-14 which clearly points to the fire being accidental and not intentional. All the other so-called statements made by the deceased Harbhajan Kour do not even progress beyond the first stage, that is, of them being established that they were made by Harbhajan Kour. 28. As a consequence of the above discussion, it is clear that the prosecution case is extremely doubtful and is unsupported by any cogent evidence. The benefit would have to go to the appellants. We must also point out that we are not happy with the manner in which the Trial Court has dealt with the case. The impression we get is that the Trial Court had made up its mind to convict the appellants and, therefore, picked only those aspects which supported a conviction and ignored the crucial points which tended to either create doubts or to establish the innocence of the appellants. In a criminal trial, the accused are presumed to be innocent till proven guilty. But, unfortunately, the Trial Court has proceeded just the other way around by presuming them to be guilty, unless proven innocent. That is not how the criminal jurisprudence has evolved in this country. Trial Courts must never forget this important principle of criminal jurisprudence, particularly, because life and liberty of individuals are involved. In this case, we find that the appellants are getting an order of acquittal today after having spent eleven years, seven years and nine years in custody. This could have been prevented if the Trial Court had analyzed the facts and evidence on record in the correct perspective. 29. In sum, the appeal is allowed. The impugned orders of conviction and sentencing are set aside. The question, therefore, of confirmation of the sentences does not arise, the same also stands disposed of. All the appellants are now on bail. 29. In sum, the appeal is allowed. The impugned orders of conviction and sentencing are set aside. The question, therefore, of confirmation of the sentences does not arise, the same also stands disposed of. All the appellants are now on bail. Their bail bonds stand cancelled and sureties stand released.