Research › Search › Judgment

Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 1010 (MP)

Miss A v. State Of M. P.

2018-12-07

ANAND PATHAK

body2018
ORDER : This is first bail application under section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code’) at the instance of a juvenile (aged 15 years 11 months 23 days at the time of commission of offence) for the alleged offence under sections 498-A, 376, 326-A, 506(B) and 34 of Indian Penal Code registered at Crime No. 264/2018 at Police Station Kumbhraj District Guna. 2. At the outset, learned counsel for the respondent/State raised the objection regarding maintainability of application for anticipatory bail under section 438 of the Code at the instance of a Juvenile, therefore, before adverting to the merits of the case, question of maintainability of application at the instance of juvenile under section 438 of the Code is decided. 3. As per the case of prosecution, prosecutrix is sister-in-law (Bhabhi) of present applicant because she is married to her brother Arbaz Khan. After marriage of the prosecutrix on 1-11-2017, when she and her parents did not satiate the dowry demand of family members of in-laws, then she was subjected to physical and mental abuse. On 22-5-2018 when she was sleeping, her brother-in- law Shahbaz Khan (Devar) knocked the door and after entering the room, raped her. Immediately thereafter, present applicant came to her and threatened her for life if she discloses this incident to anybody. Acid was also thrown over her. Therefore, report was lodged on which, FIR was registered, case was taken into investigation and application under section 438 of the Code was preferred before the Sessions Court. Same was rejected. Therefore, this application has been preferred. 4. It is submitted by learned counsel for the applicant that the application under section 438 of the Code is maintainable and no bar is being created by section 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 2015’). He referred section 12 of the Act of 2015 to take argument further by making submission that although section 12 contemplates grant of bail when juvenile (Child In Conflict with Law) is arrested or detained by the police or appears or brought before Juvenile Justice Board, but from perusal of section 12 of the Act of 2015, it cannot be gathered that anticipatory bail under section 438 of the Code is barred in specific terms. Thus, section 12 of the Act of 2015 nowhere bars the anticipatory bail. While referring sections 4 and 5 of the Code, it is further submitted that the Act of 2015 does not regulate procedure in any way where remedy of section 438 of the Code is altogether wiped out in respect of Juvenile or Child In Conflict with Law (hereinafter referred as ‘CICL’). He relied upon the judgment rendered by the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in the matter of Mr. X s/o Baby V. M. vs. State of Kerala passed on 5-6-2018 in Bail Application No. 3320 of 2018. According to him, the said judgment has considered the judgment of Division Bench of Chhattisgarh High Court in the case of Sudhir Sharma vs. State of Chhattisgarh passed on 3-3-2017 in MCRCA No. 549 of 2016 wherein application under section 438 of the Code was found to be maintainable in respect of juvenile. 5. On the basis of judgments referred above, learned counsel for the applicant submits that the application under section 438 of the Code is maintainable. He argued on merits also while making submission that applicant is juvenile and she has been falsely implicated in the case because in a matter like offence under section 498-A of Indian Penal Code it is an usual practice to rope in all the members of the family by levelling false and improper allegations to build pressure over the family. In such circumstances, he prayed for anticipatory bail under section 438 of the Code. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent/State opposed the prayer made by the applicant and submitted that the application under section 438 of the Code is not maintainable because section 12 of the Act of 2015 bars such application. He opposed the prayer of grant of anticipatory bail on the basis of merits also. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the case diary. 8. The first and foremost question under consideration of this Court is maintainability of application under section 438 of the Code for anticipatory bail at the instance of juvenile or a CICL. It is pertinent to mention that Bail has not been defined in the Code, therefore, exact meaning and import of bail is to be derived from Law Lexicon or Legal Dictionaries or through Common Law procedure. It is pertinent to mention that Bail has not been defined in the Code, therefore, exact meaning and import of bail is to be derived from Law Lexicon or Legal Dictionaries or through Common Law procedure. Black’s Law Dictionary defines the bail as “A security such as cash or a bond; especially, security required by a Court for the release of a Prisoner who must appear at future time”. Concise Law Dictionary (Fourth Edition 2012 Lexis Nexis) defined the bail “To set at liberty a person arrested or imprisoned, on security being taken for his appearance on a day and a place certain, which security is called bail”. Duhaime’s Law Dictionary has defined the bail as “The pledge of cash or property to secure the release of a thing or person which would otherwise be held in custody. In R. vs. Yue, a 2007 decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, Justice Mc Pherson used these words: “...bail is not jail. Bail is what an accused person seeks in order to stay out of jail. “In saying this, I do not suggest that bail is not a restraint on the liberty of an accused person. It is a restraint and, where there are strict bail conditions, it can be a serious restraint. However,. .. there is a fundamental difference between bail and jail. The natural meaning of these words - known at a practical, common sense level by all accused persons who seek bail - is that the pith and substance of bail is liberty, whereas the essence of jail is a profound loss of liberty.” 9. Besides taking guidance from the definition and judgment as referred above, concept of bail can be deciphered by taking the note of the following facts that: i) Period of detention under arrest is troublesome and is far from anybody’s liking. (ii)- According to Criminal Jurisprudence, person is deemed to be innocent unless contrary is proved against him. (iii)- Before person is found guilty he should not undergo hardship more than what is absolutely necessary. On such tenets of Criminal Jurisprudence, concept of Bail rests. 10. In the Code, anticipatory bail is provided under section 438 whereas section 439 of the Code provides for remedy of bail when any person is in custody. 11. (iii)- Before person is found guilty he should not undergo hardship more than what is absolutely necessary. On such tenets of Criminal Jurisprudence, concept of Bail rests. 10. In the Code, anticipatory bail is provided under section 438 whereas section 439 of the Code provides for remedy of bail when any person is in custody. 11. Sections 4 and 5 of the Code have important bearing in the controversy because section 4 mandates that all offences under the Indian Penal Code shall be investigated, enquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions contained in the Code but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigation, enquiry etc. Besides that, section 5 of Indian Penal Code is saving clause which gives sufficient leverage regarding procedure to the special or local law for the time being in force or any special form of procedure prescribed, by any other law for the time being in force regarding jurisdiction or authority etc. Therefore, it is to be seen whether the Act of 2015 provides any special procedure by which section 438 of the Code has been ousted from the purview of the Act of 2015. 12. Chapter IV of the Act of 2015 (Procedure In Relation to Children In Conflict with Law) deals with procedure. Relevant provisions under the Act may be now adverted to. Section 10(1) of the Act reads as under: “10. (1) As soon as a child alleged to be in conflict with law is apprehended by the police, such child shall be placed under the charge of the special juvenile police unit or the designated child welfare police officer, who shall produce the child before the Board without any loss of time but within a period of twenty-four hours of apprehending the child excluding the time necessary for the journey, from the place where such child was apprehended: Provided that in no case, a child alleged to be in conflict with law shall be placed in a police lockup or lodged in a jail.” Section 12 of the Act of 2015 provides as under: “12. (1) When any person, who is apparently a child and is alleged to have committed a bailable or non-bailable offence, is apprehended or detained by the police or appears or brought before a Board, such person shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or in any other law for the time being in force, be released on bail with or without surety or placed under the supervision of a probation officer or under the care of any fit person: Provided that such person shall not be so released if there appears reasonable grounds for believing that the release is likely to bring that person into association with any known criminal or expose the said person to moral, physical or psychological danger or the person’s release would defeat the ends of justice, and the Board shall record the reasons for denying the bail and circumstances that led to such a decision. (2) When such person having been apprehended is not released on bail under sub-section (1) by the officer-in-charge of the police station, such officer shall cause the person to be kept only in an observation home in such manner as may be prescribed until the person can be brought before a Board. (3) When such person is not released on bail under subsection (1) by the Board, it shall make an order sending him to an observation home or a place of safety, as the case may be, for such period during the pendency of the inquiry regarding the person, as may be specified in the order. (4) When a child in conflict with law is unable to fulfil the conditions of bail order within seven days of the bail order, such child shall be produced before the Board for modification of the conditions of bail.” 13. Perusal of Chapter IV specially sections 10 and 12 of the Act of 2015 indicates that legislature has used the word “apprehend or detained” in respect of restricting liberty of a juvenile and deliberately not used the word “arrest” as provided under section 46 of the Code wherein procedure has been prescribed how Arrest is to be made. Perusal of Chapter IV specially sections 10 and 12 of the Act of 2015 indicates that legislature has used the word “apprehend or detained” in respect of restricting liberty of a juvenile and deliberately not used the word “arrest” as provided under section 46 of the Code wherein procedure has been prescribed how Arrest is to be made. Purpose is obvious because legislative intent is to handle the juvenile with care because of tender age, impact of social development over juvenile and avoidance of harshness of the procedure, so that it may not adversely affect the mental makeup of a juvenile and therefore, the word has been coined “Child In Conflict with Law”. Child has not been referred as accused but with some related terms to scale down the gravity of alleged misdeed or offence. Section 10 of the Act of 2015 empowers the police for apprehending a child alleged to be in conflict with law. It does not provide arrest of a child alleged to be in conflict with law. As per section 12 of the Act of 2015, when a person who is apparently a child and alleged to have committed bailable or non-bailable offence is apprehended or detained by the police or appears or brought before Juvenile Justice Board such person shall notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or in any other law for the time being in force, be released on bail unless the Board is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that granting bail to him is likely to bring him into association with any known criminal or expose him to moral, physical or psychological danger or his release would defeat the ends of justice. 14. Section 12(1) of the Act of 2015 to a larger extent obliterates distinction between bailable or non-bailable offences as far as CICL is concerned because whatever be the nature of offence bailable or non-bailable, he is entitled to be released on bail unless the proviso to that provision applies. Section 12(1) of the Act of 2015 deals with a situation where CICL is apprehended or detained by the police or appears or brought before the Board, therefore, it contemplates a situation where a person is apprehended or detained. Therefore, objection was raised by the Government counsel that it indicates legislative intent that no remedy of anticipatory bail exists for a juvenile. Therefore, objection was raised by the Government counsel that it indicates legislative intent that no remedy of anticipatory bail exists for a juvenile. Government counsel also pressed over the expression “notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973” to submit that only remedy for a juvenile or CICL appears to have regarding bail once he is apprehended or detained. Therefore, it is to be seen whether the expression as referred above would create bar for anticipatory bail under section 438 of the Code or not. In fact section 12(1) of the Act of 2015 only deals in respect of procedure when a juvenile is apprehended or detained. It nowhere excludes remedy of section 438 of the Code in expressed or implied terms because if legislative intent would have been to bar the remedy of section 438 of the Code then the said remedy would have been categorically incorporated in the statute. It nowhere refers bar in specific terms. Remedy of anticipatory bail under section 438 of the Code is a substantive right of a person in case of his arrest or detention and is getting its source from Article 21 of the Constitution of India regarding personal liberty. Therefore, seeking anticipatory bail is a substantive right. 15. Chapter IV of the Act of 2015 deals with procedure and usually, chapter which prescribes Procedure for a Statute does not deal in respect of Substantive Rights. Therefore Chapter IV of the Act of 2015 is to be seen holistically and inference can only be drawn on the basis of language of section 12(1) of the Act of 2015 which deals in respect of particular exigency (i.e. when CICL is apprehended) rather than crystallizing other substantive right (i.e. regarding anticipatory bail under section 438 of Code). Chapter IV of the Act of 2015 deals with procedure which includes sections 10 and 12 and it nowhere bars the application under section 438 of the Code. 16. Section 12 of the Act of 2015 only put a juvenile/CICL in better position vis-a-vis any other person facing same allegations. Chapter IV of the Act of 2015 deals with procedure which includes sections 10 and 12 and it nowhere bars the application under section 438 of the Code. 16. Section 12 of the Act of 2015 only put a juvenile/CICL in better position vis-a-vis any other person facing same allegations. Use of expression “notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973” does not mean ouster of remedy of section 438 of the Code but it refers ouster of other strict conditions contained in section 439 of the Code which incorporates conditions under section 437(3) of the Code also as well as a situation under section 439 (2) of the Code wherein procedure for cancellation of bail is also provided. Expression “notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973” means the conditions incorporated under section 437 and 439 of the Code would not operate against a juvenile because a juvenile has to be handled with care so that his future and his life may not spoil at the altar of allegations and rigours of investigation and procedure. Relaxation regarding formalities of section 439 of the Code does not mean that section 12 of the Act of 2015 creates bar for section 438 of the Code. 17. Relaxation regarding formalities of section 439 of the Code does not mean that section 12 of the Act of 2015 creates bar for section 438 of the Code. 17. One more point needs to be addressed is use of word “apprehended” or “detained” instead of “arrest” and it indicates legislative intent that a juvenile cannot be placed under harsh or embarrassing condition when legislative intent is so sensitive towards cause of juvenile then it cannot be presumed (in absence of any expressed provision) that remedy of section 438 of the Code is barred, rather the maintainability of section 438 of the Code takes spirit of the Act of 2015 further and in fact the remedy of anticipatory bail is in line with legislative intent as well as object of the enactment to a higher level because in a particular condition if remedy of section 438 of the Code is treated as barred then only on the pretext of allegations, criminal law will set into motion against a juvenile and even apprehended or detained (not arrested) would cause social and psychological impact on a juvenile and that cannot be the intention of the legislature at the time of framing enactment which is based upon Reformatory Connotation, than the punitive in nature, therefore, interpretation which takes legislative intent further needs to be adopted. Remedy of section 438 of the Code for anticipatory bail to a juvenile furthers the legislative intent of the Act of 2015. 18. The word “any person” as has been referred in section 438 of the Code has been defined in section 11 of Indian Penal Code which reads as under: “Section 11. Person”.- The word “person” includes any Company or Association or body of persons, whether incorporated or not.” 19. The inclusive nature of definition of Person gives liberty to a juvenile to prefer anticipatory bail under section 438 of the Code. 20. Sections 4 and 5 of the Code contemplate a situation wherein procedure is barred by any special law in specific terms but perusal of sections 10 and 12 of the Act of 2015 nowhere bars the provisions of section 438 of the Code in specific terms. 20. Sections 4 and 5 of the Code contemplate a situation wherein procedure is barred by any special law in specific terms but perusal of sections 10 and 12 of the Act of 2015 nowhere bars the provisions of section 438 of the Code in specific terms. Only on the basis of reference of grant of bail when juvenile is apprehended does not ipso facto mean exclusion of the remedy of section 438 of the Code which deals with personal liberty of a person which is basic tenets and rights envisaged under Article 21 of Constitution of India and the Constitutional Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court in the celebrated judgment in the matter of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 1632 has held as under: “Section 438(1) of the Code lays down a condition which has to be satisfied before anticipatory bail can be granted. The applicant must show that he has “reason to believe” that he may be arrested for a non-bailable offence. The use of the expression “reason to believe” shows that the belief that the applicant may be so arrested must be founded on reasonable grounds. Mere ‘fear’ is not ‘belief’, for which reason it is not enough for the applicant to show that he has some sort of a vague apprehension that some one is going to make an accusation against him, in pursuance of which he may be arrested. The grounds on which the belief of the applicant is based that he may be arrested for a non-bailable offence, must be capable of being examined by the Court objectively, because it is then alone that the Court can determine whether the applicant has reason to believe that he may be so arrested. Section 438(1), therefore, cannot be invoked on the basis of vague and general allegations, as if to arm oneself in perpetuity against a possible arrest. Otherwise, the number of applications for anticipatory bail will be as large as, at any rate, the adult populace. Anticipatory bail is a device to secure the individual’s liberty; it is neither a passport to the commission of crimes nor a shield against any and all kinds of accusations, likely or unlikely. Otherwise, the number of applications for anticipatory bail will be as large as, at any rate, the adult populace. Anticipatory bail is a device to secure the individual’s liberty; it is neither a passport to the commission of crimes nor a shield against any and all kinds of accusations, likely or unlikely. Any order of bail can, of course, be effective only from the time of arrest because, to grant bail, as stated in Wharton’s Law Lexicon, is to ‘set at liberty a person arrested or imprisoned, on security being taken for his appearance’. Thus, bail is basically release from restraint, more particularly, release from the custody of the police. The act of arrest directly affects freedom of movement of the person arrested by the police, and speaking generally, an order of bail gives back to the accused that freedom on condition that he will appear to take his trial. Personal recognisance, surety-ship bonds and such other modalities are the means by which an assurance is secured from the accused that though he has been released on bail, he will present himself at the trial of offence or offences of which he is charged and for which he was arrested. The distinction between an ordinary order of bail and an order of anticipatory bail is that whereas the former is granted after arrest and therefore means release from the custody of the police, the latter is granted in anticipation of arrest and is therefore effective at the very moment of arrest. Police custody is an inevitable concomitant of arrest for non-bailable offences. An order of anticipatory bail constitutes, so to say, an insurance against police custody following upon arrest for offence or offences in respect of which the order is issued. In other words, unlike a post-arrest order of bail, it is a pre-arrest legal process which directs that if the person in whose favour it is issued is thereafter arrested on the accusation in respect of which the direction is issued, he shall be released on bail. Section 46(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure which deals with how arrests are to be made, provides that in making the arrest, the police officer or other person making the arrest “shall actually touch or confine the body of the person to be arrested, unless there be a submission to the custody by word or action”. Section 46(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure which deals with how arrests are to be made, provides that in making the arrest, the police officer or other person making the arrest “shall actually touch or confine the body of the person to be arrested, unless there be a submission to the custody by word or action”. A direction under section 438 is intended to confer conditional immunity from this ‘touch’ or confinement.” 21. Later on, the Supreme Court in the case of Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2011 SC 312 reiterated the concept of personal liberty in the following words: “17. It is clear from the Statement of Objects and Reasons that the purpose of incorporating section 438 in the Criminal Procedure Code. was to recognize the importance of personal liberty and freedom in a free and democratic country. When we carefully analyze this section, the wisdom of the legislature becomes quite evident and clear that the legislature was keen to ensure respect for the personal liberty and also pressed in service the age-old principle that an individual is presumed to be innocent till he is found guilty by the Court. 54. Blackstone in “Commentaries on the Laws of England”, Vol.I, p.134 aptly observed that “Personal liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation or moving one’s person to whatsoever place one’s own inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint unless by due process of law”. 55. According to Dicey, a distinguished English author of the Constitutional Law in his treatise on Constitutional Law observed that, “Personal liberty, as understood in England, means in substance a person’s right not to be subjected to imprisonment, arrest, or other physical coercion in any manner that does not admit of legal justification.” [Dicey on Constitutional Law, 9th Edn., pp.207-08]. According to him, it is the negative right of not being subjected to any form of physical restraint or coercion that constitutes the essence of personal liberty and not mere freedom to move to any part of the Indian territory. In ordinary language personal liberty means liberty relating to or concerning the person or body of the individual, and personal liberty in this sense is the antithesis of physical restraint or coercion. 62. This Court defined the term “personal liberty” immediately after the Constitution came in force in India in the case of. In ordinary language personal liberty means liberty relating to or concerning the person or body of the individual, and personal liberty in this sense is the antithesis of physical restraint or coercion. 62. This Court defined the term “personal liberty” immediately after the Constitution came in force in India in the case of. The expression ‘personal liberty’ has wider as well narrow meaning. In the wider sense it includes not only immunity from arrest and detention but also freedom of speech, association etc. In the narrow sense, it means immunity from arrest and detention. The juristic conception of ‘personal liberty’, when used the latter sense, is that it consists freedom of movement and locomotion. 63. Mukherjea, J. in the said judgment observed that ‘Personal Liberty’ means liberty relating to or concerning the person or body of the individual and it is, in this sense, antithesis of physical restraint or coercion. ‘Personal Liberty’ means a personal right not to be subjected to imprisonment, arrest or other physical coercion in any manner that does not admit of legal justification. This negative right constitutes the essence of personal liberty. 64. In Kharak Singh vs. State of U.P. and other, AIR 1963 SC 1295 , Subba Rao, J. defined ‘personal liberty, as a right of an individual to be free from restrictions or encroachment on his person whether these are directly imposed or indirectly brought about by calculated measure. The Court held that ‘personal liberty’ in Article 21 includes all varieties of freedoms except those included in Article 19. 65. In Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India and another, (1978) 1 SCC 248 , this Court expanded the scope of the expression ‘personal liberty’ as used in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Court rejected the argument that the expression ‘personal liberty’ must be so interpreted as to avoid overlapping between Article 21 and Article 19(1).It was observed: “The expression ‘personal liberty’ in Article 21 is of the widest amplitude and it covers a variety of rights which go to constitute the personal liberty of a man and some of them have been raised to the status of distinct fundamental rights and given additional protection under Article 19. 22. 22. Therefore, sections 4 and 5 of the Code would be applicable in absence of any contrary provisions in the Special Act or in special provision excluding the jurisdiction and applicability of the Code in specific terms. The word “any person” as referred in section 438 of the Code and as defined in section 11 of Indian Penal Code gives liberty to a Child In Conflict with Law to prefer anticipatory bail under section 438 of the Code. 23. The Hon’ble Apex Court while considering the import of these provisions of the Code has held in the case of Vishwa Mitter vs. O. P. Poddar, AIR 1984 SC 5 in the following words: “Generally speaking, anyone can put the criminal law in motion unless there is a specific provision to the contrary. This is specifically indicated by the provision of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 4 which provides that all offences under any other law-meaning thereby law other than the Indian Penal Code shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences. It would follow as a necessary corollary that unless in any statute other than the Code of Criminal Procedure which prescribes an offence and simultaneously specifies the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall apply in respect of such offences and they shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” 24. At the cost of repeation, it is reiterated that no provision in the Act of 2015, either expressedly or by Necessary Implication, excludes applicability of section 438 of the Code which provides for grant of anticipatory bail. In absence of any special provision dealing with grant of anticipatory bail to a juvenile/CICL the provisions contained in the Code regarding anticipatory bail shall be applicable. The Act of 2015 even otherwise does not exclude general application of the Code, therefore, it cannot be inferred that legislature intended to give overriding effect to statutory scheme of the Act of 2015 over the provisions of general application contained in the Code. 25. The Act of 2015 even otherwise does not exclude general application of the Code, therefore, it cannot be inferred that legislature intended to give overriding effect to statutory scheme of the Act of 2015 over the provisions of general application contained in the Code. 25. This Court is further augmented in its view by taking into consideration, the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala in the matter of Mr. X S/o Baby V. M. (supra) and the Division Bench judgment of Hon’ble Chhattisgarh High Court in the matter of Sudhir Sharma (supra) wherein the application under section 438 of the Code has been found to be maintainable at the instance of juvenile/CICL. 26. Remedy of seeking anticipatory bail under section 438 of the Code by a juvenile is maintainable and sections 10 and 12 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 do not bar the remedy of anticipatory bail. 27. Therefore, in the cumulative analysis, this Court holds application under section 438 of the Code at the instance of the applicant who is juvenile (and allegedly CICL) as maintainable and therefore, objection of the respondent/State is overruled and the application is heard on merits. 28. Applicant herein is aged 15 years 11 months 23 days at the time of commission of offence and as per allegations as contained in the FIR itself she threatened the prosecutrix that if she informed anybody regarding alleged rape committed by the applicant’s brother then she will kill the prosecutrix. Although, charge-sheet against the other co-accused persons have been filed but investigation is going on against the present applicant under section 173(8) of Criminal Procedure Code, therefore, she is having her apprehension of detention. 29. Perusal of case diary, FIR and other documents indicate that chargesheet against the co-accused has been filed and only allegation against the present applicant is in respect of criminal intimidation while other co-accused are facing trial for the offence under section 498-A as well as 376 of Indian Penal Code and other offences. Therefore, from the very nature of the allegations and facts situation of the case, it is a fit case for grant of anticipatory bail. 30. Therefore, the application preferred by the applicant is allowed. It is directed that applicant shall be released on bail in case of her arrest on furnishing personal bond in the sum of Rs. 25,000/- (Rs. Therefore, from the very nature of the allegations and facts situation of the case, it is a fit case for grant of anticipatory bail. 30. Therefore, the application preferred by the applicant is allowed. It is directed that applicant shall be released on bail in case of her arrest on furnishing personal bond in the sum of Rs. 25,000/- (Rs. Twenty Five Thousand Only) with two solvent sureties of the like amount, who shall be her parents or other close relatives, to the satisfaction of Arresting Authority/Investigating Officer. Applicant shall appear before the Juvenile Justice Board as and when she is called upon to do so. 31. Taking into account the spirit and object of section 74 of the Act of 2015 which prohibits disclosure of the identity of Child in Conflict with Law, this Court intends not to disclose identity of the applicant and therefore, directs that name of the applicant shall not be mentioned in the cause title of this order but her name shall be referred as ‘Miss A’. 32. In the result, application under section 438 of the Code for anticipatory bail is hereby allowed and disposed of. Ordered accordingly. Order accordingly.