JUDGMENT AND ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. D.K. Dey, learned counsel for the respondent railway authorities. 2. The petitioner, who was appointed as an Assistant Medical Officer (Adhoc) in the Maligaon Central Hospital on 28.04.1984 was subsequently appointed to the Group A post of Assistant Divisional Medical Officer on 01.02.1985. Thereafter, he was promoted to the post of Divisional Medical Officer in the year 1991 and subsequently promoted to the Junior Administrative Grade of Senior Divisional Medical Officer in the year 1995. 3. In the year 1995, the petitioner was investigated by the CBI on an allegation of accepting consultation fee from private patients and using his official residence as a Nursing Home. The CBI concluded its investigation by requiring the respondent authorities to proceed against the petitioner in a departmental proceeding. The departmental proceeding so initiated culminated in the order dated 21.06.2000 by which the penalty of compulsory retirement was imposed on the petitioner. 4. Being aggrieved by the order of compulsory retirement, the petitioner preferred OA No. 377/2000 before the Central Administrative Tribunal (for short, CAT) Guwahati. By the order dated 27.02.2002, the learned CAT had set aside and quashed the order of compulsory retirement. The respondent authorities preferred WP (C) No. 6178/2002 before this Court against the order of the learned CAT dated 27.02.2002. During the pendency of the departmental proceeding, which culminated in the order of compulsory retirement, another proceeding was initiated against the petitioner as per the memorandum of charges dated 26.06.1999, on the allegation that the petitioner had remained unauthorizedly absent from 20.09.1996 and that he did not comply with an order of transfer. Further allegations were also raised that by the communication dated 13.09.1996, the petitioner was required to appear before a Medical Board on 18.09.1996, which was again deferred to 20.09.1996. But inspite of such opportunities being given, the petitioner did not appear before the Medical Board. 5. The petitioner submitted his written statement against the memorandum of charges dated 26.06.1999, primarily taking a stand that he was suffering from certain illness, although the details of the illness had not been stated in the written statement. But nevertheless, the petitioner took a stand that on 09.02.1996, he was undergoing treatment in the Railway Hospital at Lumding and, therefore, the order of transfer dated 12.02.1996 could not be carried out. But nevertheless, the petitioner took a stand that on 09.02.1996, he was undergoing treatment in the Railway Hospital at Lumding and, therefore, the order of transfer dated 12.02.1996 could not be carried out. A further stand was taken that on 01.03.1996, he was referred to the Central Hospital at Maligaon and on 06.05.1996, the Central Hospital had referred him for further treatment in the Gauhati Medical College and Hospital, Guwahati. The Department of Neurology of the Gauhati Medical College and Hospital had advised 3(three) months rest to the petitioner w.e.f. 20.08.1996 and as the Medical Board was set up within the said period of 3(three) months, therefore, the petitioner had informed the authorities that it was not possible for him to appear before the Medical Board. 6. As the subsequent departmental proceeding initiated against the petitioner was not finalized, the petitioner preferred OA No. 113/2004 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Guwahati. The said original application was disposed of by the order dated 16.06.2004 by directing the respondent authorities to complete the disciplinary proceeding within a period of 2(two) months. Against the order dated 16.06.2004 in OA No. 113/2004, the respondent Railway authorities preferred a writ petition being WP (C) No. 9131/2004 before this Court. 7. The earlier writ petition being WP (C) No. 6178/2002 of the respondent authorities against the order dated 27.02.2002 of the learned CAT interfering with the order of compulsory retirement and the later writ petition being WP (C) No. 9131/2004 of the respondent Railway against the order dated 16.06.2004 requiring the disciplinary proceeding to be completed within 2(two) months were both taken up for a final consideration as per the Judgment and Order dated 18.07.2009. 8. By the Judgment and Order dated 18.07.2009, the Division Bench of this Court had refused to interfere with the order dated 27.02.2002 of the learned CAT in OA No. 377/2000 as well as the order dated 16.06.2004 in OA No. 113/2004 by providing that the direction of the learned CAT to complete the disciplinary proceeding within 2(two) months be implemented without any delay. Against the said Judgment and Order dated 18.07.2009, an appeal was preferred by the Railway authorities before the Supreme Court which was also dismissed. 9. In the meantime, as the requirement of the order dated 27.02.2002 in OA No. 377/2000 was not complied with, further petitions, including contempt petitions were preferred by the petitioner. Against the said Judgment and Order dated 18.07.2009, an appeal was preferred by the Railway authorities before the Supreme Court which was also dismissed. 9. In the meantime, as the requirement of the order dated 27.02.2002 in OA No. 377/2000 was not complied with, further petitions, including contempt petitions were preferred by the petitioner. It is stated that ultimately sometime in the year 2010, the petitioner was reinstated following the interference with the order of compulsory retirement and that he was also paid approximately an amount of Rs. 52 Lacs towards back-wages. In the resultant situation, the order dated 20.04.2011 was passed by the Deputy Secretary/E(O) of the Railway Board pursuant to the memorandum of charges dated 26.06.1999 by which a penalty of removal from service was imposed on the petitioner. 10. The order of removal from service dated 20.04.2011 was assailed by the petitioner before the learned CAT at Guwahati in OA No. 114/2012. The said original application was given a final consideration by the learned CAT in its Judgment and Order dated 11.03.2015 by which the order of removal from service was upheld. 11. Being aggrieved the present writ petition has been preferred by the petitioner. Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner urges upon three grounds to assail the order of removal from service dated 20.04.2011 as well as the Judgment and Order dated 11.03.2015 of the learned CAT. The first ground urged is that there is a delay of almost 11 years in disposing of the departmental proceeding and such delay by itself had vitiated the proceeding justifying an interference. The second ground urged is that the punishment of removal from service is disproportionate to the allegations made against the petitioner. The third ground urged is that during the stage when the enquiry was conducted against the petitioner in the disciplinary proceeding, the communication dated 24.04.2000 informing the next date of the proceeding to be 08.05.2000 was not served on the petitioner and, therefore, further continuance of the disciplinary proceeding ex-parte against the petitioner was not maintainable. 12. Mr. The third ground urged is that during the stage when the enquiry was conducted against the petitioner in the disciplinary proceeding, the communication dated 24.04.2000 informing the next date of the proceeding to be 08.05.2000 was not served on the petitioner and, therefore, further continuance of the disciplinary proceeding ex-parte against the petitioner was not maintainable. 12. Mr. D.K. Dey, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Railway, per contra, submits that there was no delay in conducting the disciplinary proceeding resulting in the proceeding being vitiated, inasmuch as, a parallel proceeding was pending against the petitioner in respect of the order of compulsory retirement and the present proceeding was immediately brought to an end, after the petitioner was reinstated in service in respect of the other proceeding. 13. Mr. Dey also submits that the overall conduct of the petitioner in persistently refusing to attend to his duties from the year 1996 by itself justifies the penalty of removal from service and if a lenient view is taken in respect of such conduct, the same would be against the public interest and would send a wrong message to the employees of the department towards their conduct in performing their duties and, hence, the penalty imposed cannot be said to be disproportionate. 14. With regard to the contention that the communication dated 27.04.2000 informing about the next date of enquiry to be held on 08.05.2000, was not communicated to the petitioner, Mr. D.K. Dey, learned counsel submits that the communication dated 27.04.2000 was in fact a communication made by the respondent Railway authorities informing the petitioner about the decision of the disciplinary authority to proceed ex-parte against him. A further submission has been made that the earlier dates fixed for the purpose of the enquiry i.e. 31.01.2000, 27.03.2000 and 24.04.2000 were duly communicated and served on the petitioner, but the petitioner on his own volition had remained absent in the enquiry. Therefore, for both the reasons, it cannot be said that the enquiry was proceeded ex-parte against the petitioner in violation of the principles of natural justice. 15. Mr. Therefore, for both the reasons, it cannot be said that the enquiry was proceeded ex-parte against the petitioner in violation of the principles of natural justice. 15. Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned senior counsel for the petitioner relies upon a decision of the Supreme Court rendered in Krushnakant B. Parmar vs. Union of India and Another, (2012) 3 SCC 178 , wherein in paragraphs 16 to 19, it had been held that in a departmental proceeding, the disciplinary authority is also required to prove that the unauthorized absence from duty was wilful and in the absence of such finding, the unauthorized absence will not amount to misconduct. By relying upon the said decision, Mr. Choudhury, learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that in the instant case, no such satisfaction or conclusion had been arrived at by the disciplinary authority that the unauthorized absence of the petitioner was wilful and hence, the order of removal from service in the absence of such satisfaction is not sustainable. 16. Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned senior counsel also relies upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Limited and Another vs. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri and Others, (2009) 15 SCC 620 , wherein an unauthorized absence of six months was held to be unduly harsh and to be grossly in excess to the allegations made. 17. Mr. D.K. Dey, learned counsel for the respondent Railways on the other hand relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others vs. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 , wherein in paragraph 33, it had been held that the employees are expected to maintain discipline, act with responsibility, perform their duties with sincerity and serve the institution with honesty and that a contrary conduct cannot be countenanced as it creates a concavity in the work cultures and ushers in indiscipline. 18. 18. With regard to the contention raised by the petitioner that the departmental proceeding is vitiated inasmuch as, it took more than 11 years to conclude, it is taken note of that even the Division Bench of this Court in its Judgment and Order dated 18.07.2009 in WP (C) No. 6178/2002 and WP (C) No. 913/2004 had taken note of the fact that the respondent authorities had failed to bring about a conclusion to the disciplinary proceeding in spite of there being orders from the learned CAT to conclude the same within a period of two months. To that extent, the Division Bench had also expressed its distress at the conduct of the respondent Railway authorities that in spite of there being no interim order in the consequential proceedings, the direction to conclude the disciplinary proceeding within a period of two months, was not complied with. The Division Bench while taking note of the aforesaid facts had ultimately required the respondent Railway authorities to implement the orders without any further delay. 19. The Division Bench having not provided that the disciplinary proceedings stood vitiated on the ground of it not being brought to its conclusion in spite of there being orders from the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, it would be improper for this Court to take a contrary stand in this proceeding that the disciplinary proceedings stood vitiated only on the ground of there being a delay in bringing the same to its conclusion. Apart from raising a bland contention that the delay had vitiated the disciplinary proceeding, no further materials have been brought on record by the petitioner nor any relevant provision of law is being relied upon to justify that the delay caused in the facts and circumstance of this case, warrants a conclusion that the delay by itself had vitiated the disciplinary proceeding. 20. With regard to the other contention that the penalty of removal from service is highly disproportionate, no reasons have been stated nor any materials produced, other than relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Limited (supra) to substantiate that the penalty is highly disproportionate or the penalty of removal from service in the facts and circumstance of the present case shocks the conscience of the Court so as to warrant an interference. 21. 21. The factual circumstance in which the decision was rendered by the Supreme Court in Chairman-cum- Managing Director, Coal India Limited (supra) is distinguishable from the facts and circumstance of the instant case, inasmuch as in Chairman-cum- Managing Director, Coal India Limited (supra), the delinquent official was firstly absent from duty for a period of six months in contradistinction to the facts of the present case, where the petitioner remained unauthorisedly absent continuously from 20.09.1996 till the memorandum of charges was issued on 26.06.1999. Secondly, in the Chairman-cum- Managing Director, Coal India Limited (supra), the delinquent official had tendered his resignation from service, on the ground of there being some personal inconvenience to him, which was not accepted. But, in the instant case, no material is available on record, which would indicate any reason as to why the petitioner remained unauthorisedly absent continuously from 20.09.1996 up to the date of issuing the memorandum of charges. In his reply dated 16.06.2000 against the enquiry report, all that the petitioner stated was that he was advised rest by the Gauhati Medical College and Hospital for a period of three months up to 20.11.1996. Beyond that, there is no further explanation by the petitioner at any stage as to why he remained unauthorisedly absent, at least from 20.11.1996 up to the date of issuing the memorandum of charges. On the basis of the aforesaid factual background, which are distinguishable from each other, the contention of the petitioner that the penalty of removal from service is disproportionate by relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Limited (supra), cannot be accepted. 22. As regards the other contention of the petitioner that the communication dated 27.04.2000 having not been served upon him, further continuance of the enquiry of the disciplinary proceeding ex-parte against the petitioner is unsustainable, would have to be looked into in the background of the mitigating factors that are available in the present proceeding. 23. 22. As regards the other contention of the petitioner that the communication dated 27.04.2000 having not been served upon him, further continuance of the enquiry of the disciplinary proceeding ex-parte against the petitioner is unsustainable, would have to be looked into in the background of the mitigating factors that are available in the present proceeding. 23. When the communication dated 27.04.2000 is looked into, it is noticed that the said communication not only informs the petitioner that the further proceeding of the enquiry would be held on 08.05.2000, but it also informs of the decision arrived at by the disciplinary authority that in view of the conduct of the petitioner in not appearing before the enquiry on the earlier dates on 31.01.2000, 27.03.2000 and 24.04.2000, the further proceeding would be conducted ex-parte. 24. The reply of the petitioner dated 16.06.2000 to the enquiry report indicates that the petitioner had been duly informed of the dates that the enquiry would be held on 27.03.2000 and thereafter on 24.04.2000. But, in spite of being so informed, the petitioner on his own volition had not attended the enquiry. Therefore, it cannot be wholly accepted that the petitioner was prevented from appearing in the enquiry for presenting his case nor it can be accepted that the decision of the disciplinary authority to proceed ex-parte against the petitioner was unwarranted. 25. A further fact is also taken note of that in his reply dated 16.06.2000, the petitioner had merely taken a stand that he was advised complete rest by the Gauhati Medical College and Hospital for a period of three months up to 20.11.1996. Even if the said explanation is accepted, the petitioner had not provided any reason as to why he remained unauthorisedly absent from duty from 20.11.1996 up to the date of issuing of memorandum of charges in the year 1999. In the absence of any such reason being provided by the petitioner either in his representation dated 16.06.2000 or to that extent in the present writ petition, we are of the considered view that no prejudice had been caused to the petitioner to the effect that the communication dated 27.04.2000 was not served upon him. In the absence of any such reason being provided by the petitioner either in his representation dated 16.06.2000 or to that extent in the present writ petition, we are of the considered view that no prejudice had been caused to the petitioner to the effect that the communication dated 27.04.2000 was not served upon him. In the absence of any reason being given by the petitioner for the absence from duty from 20.11.1996 onwards, the situation could not have been different even if the communication dated 27.04.2000 was served on the petitioner, which could have enabled the petitioner to avail any opportunity to present any such reason. 26. In the aforesaid circumstance, we are unable to accept the contention of the petitioner that the disciplinary proceeding held against him ex-parte stands vitiated inasmuch as, the communication dated 27.04.2000 was not served upon him. 27. With regards to the further ground urged upon by Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned senior counsel for the petitioner by relying upon the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Krushnakant B. Parmar (supra) to the effect that the allegations of unauthorized absence would also have to be supported by proving that the absence was wilful, it is taken note of that in the order of removal dated 20.04.2011, the disciplinary authority had arrived at its conclusion that the unauthorized absence of the petitioner from 20.09.1996 was wilful. To appreciate the situation as to whether the absence of the petitioner was wilful or not, further reference is made to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in paragraphs 16 to 19 in Krushnakant B. Parmar (supra), which are as under:- “16. In the case of appellant referring to unauthorised absence the disciplinary authority alleged that he failed to maintain devotion of duty and his behaviour was unbecoming of a Government servant. The question whether `unauthorised absence from duty' amounts to failure of devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a Government servant cannot be decided without deciding the question whether absence is wilful or because of compelling circumstances. 17. If the absence is the result of compelling circumstances under which it was not possible to report or perform duty, such absence can not be held to be wilful. Absence from duty without any application or prior permission may amount to unauthorised absence, but it does not always mean wilful. 17. If the absence is the result of compelling circumstances under which it was not possible to report or perform duty, such absence can not be held to be wilful. Absence from duty without any application or prior permission may amount to unauthorised absence, but it does not always mean wilful. There may be different eventualities due to which an employee may abstain from duty, including compelling circumstances beyond his control like illness, accident, hospitalisation, etc. but in such case the employee cannot be held guilty of failure of devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a Government servant. 18. In a Departmental proceeding, if allegation of unauthorised absence from duty is made, the disciplinary authority is required to prove that the absence is wilful, in absence of such finding, the absence will not amount to misconduct. 19. In the present case the Inquiry Officer on appreciation of evidence though held that the appellant was unauthorisedly absent from duty but failed to hold the absence is wilful; the disciplinary authority as also the Appellate Authority, failed to appreciate the same and wrongly held the appellant guilty.” 28. In paragraph 17 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court had taken the view that although absence from duty without any application or prior permission may amount to unauthorized absence, but it does not always mean that such absence would be wilful. The Supreme Court was of the view that there may be different eventualities, which may require an employee to remain absent from duties, including compelling circumstance beyond his control like that of illness, accident, hospitalization etc. 29. In the present case, it is noticed that apart from a statement made in the representation dated 16.06.2000 that the petitioner was advised complete rest up to 20.11.1996, no further stand had been taken nor any material had been produced that the petitioner was prevented from attending his duties due to any compelling circumstance beyond his control like illness, accident, hospitalization etc. In the absence of any such material, it cannot be concluded that the unauthorized absence of the petitioner was not wilful. 30. Accordingly in the facts and circumstance of the present case, the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Krushnakant B. Parmar (supra) cannot be the basis to interfere with the order of removal from service because of unauthorized absence. 31. 30. Accordingly in the facts and circumstance of the present case, the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Krushnakant B. Parmar (supra) cannot be the basis to interfere with the order of removal from service because of unauthorized absence. 31. It would also be apposite to take note of that the petitioner, who at the relevant point of time was serving in the Junior Administrative Grade of Senior Medical Officer, was holding a responsible position in the respondent Railways and his conduct of remaining unauthorisedly absent without any reason for a period from 20.09.1996 up to the date of the memorandum of charges on 20.06.1999 has also to be viewed in terms of paragraph-33 of the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and others (Supra) and accordingly such conduct on the part of the petitioner cannot be countenanced as it creates a concavity in the work culture and ushers in indiscipline in an organization. 32. In view of the above, the writ petition is found devoid of any merit and the same is accordingly dismissed.