JUDGMENT & ORDER : A.J. SHASTRI, J. 1. Heard learned advocates appearing for the respective parties. 2. The present petition is directed against order of detention dated 11.06.2018 passed by the respondent - detaining authority in exercise of powers conferred under section 3(2) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act, 1985 (for short "the Act") by detaining the petitioner-detenue as defined under section 2(bbb) of the Act. 3. The case of the petitioner is that on account of two offences which are registered as C.R. No. I-12 of 2018 with GIDC Vatva Police Station on 15.03.2018 and C.R. No. I-70 of 2018 registered with Vatva Police Station on 10.05.2018, though the petitioner was released on regular bail and there is no material sufficient enough to arraigned the petitioner, still the authority without application of mind has passed the order of detention which is made the subject matter of present petition. The Court after perusal of the material was pleased to admit the petition on 13.06.2018 and thereafter, it has come up for final hearing before this Court, in which learned advocate Mr. O.I. Pathan has represented the petitioner whereas Mr. Bharat Vyas, learned AGP has appeared on behalf of the respondent - State. With this background, the present petition is being taken up for final hearing. 4. Learned advocate for the detenue submits that the order of detention impugned in this petition deserves to be quashed and set aside on the ground of registration of two offences under the provisions of the Gujarat Animal Preservation (Amendment) Act, 2011, Cruelty to Animal Act and Indian Penal Code, by itself cannot bring the case of the detenue within the purview of definition under section 2(bbb) of the Act. Further, learned advocate for the detenue submits that illegal activity likely to be carried out or alleged to have been carried out, as alleged, cannot have any nexus or bearing with the maintenance of public order and at the most, it can be said to be breach of law and order. Further, except statement of witnesses, registration of above FIR/s and Panchnama drawn in pursuance of the investigation, no other relevant and cogent material is on record connecting alleged anti-social activity of the detenue with breach of public order. Further, except statement of witnesses, registration of above FIR/s and Panchnama drawn in pursuance of the investigation, no other relevant and cogent material is on record connecting alleged anti-social activity of the detenue with breach of public order. Learned advocate for the petitioner further submits that it is not possible to hold on the basis of the facts of the present case that activity of the detenue with respect to the criminal cases had affected even tempo of the society causing threat to the very existence of normal and routine life of people at large or that on the basis of criminal cases, the detenue had put the entire social apparatus in disorder, making it difficult for whole system to exist as a system governed by rule of law by disturbing public order. It is further submitted by the learned advocate for the petitioner that the petitioner is not named in the FIRs and is falsely implicated. 4.1. It has further been contended that by the learned advocate for the petitioner that there are only two offences in which the petitioner has been arraigned and surprisingly, despite the fact that there is no specific role attributed to the petitioner, nor named in the FIR specifically on the basis of mere inference, the petitioner has been arraigned. It has been further contended that the petitioner has been released on bail and both these cases are pending for investigation and the petitioner except these, having no such criminal antecedents which would warrant the authority to initiate the proceedings of detention against the petitioner. It has further been contended that even the muddamal has also not been recovered nor the car is recovered and it has contended specifically that in identical situation, in similar set of circumstance, the Court has set aside the impugned order of detention. As a result of this, looking to the law laid down on the principle of detention, the Court may kindly set aside the impugned order. 4.2. To substantiate the contention, a reference is made to the decision dated 05.05.2016 passed in Special Civil Application No. 6874 of 2016, a further decision dated 26.04.2017 passed in Special Civil Application No. 6001 of 2017. A further decision dated 17.07. 4.2. To substantiate the contention, a reference is made to the decision dated 05.05.2016 passed in Special Civil Application No. 6874 of 2016, a further decision dated 26.04.2017 passed in Special Civil Application No. 6001 of 2017. A further decision dated 17.07. 2017 passed in Special Civil Application No. 10964 of 2017 and yet there are tow several decision dated 19.12.2013 passed in Special Civil Application No. 15562 of 2013 as well as Special Civil Application No. 8620 of 2018 dated 04.07.2018 and by referring to these decisions, a request is made that the here is a case in which the order of detention is thoroughly uncalled for, not sustainable in the eye of law. As a result of this, the relief prayed for in the petition be granted in the interest of justice. 5. Learned AGP for the respondent State supported the detention order passed by the authority and submitted that sufficient material and evidence was found during the course of investigation, which was also supplied to the detenue indicate that detenue is in habit of indulging into the activity as defined under section 2(bbb) of the Act and considering the facts of the case, the detaining authority has rightly passed the order of detention and detention order deserves to be upheld by this Court. 5.1. Learned AGP has further submitted that two consecutive incidents are sufficient enough for the authority to prevent the petitioner by passing the order of detention and ultimately, the order of detention is to be passed to prevent the petitioner, When a person has not been able to be prevented by general law, and here is a case in which looking to the activities which are narrated in the first information report sufficient inference is possible to be drawn that the petitioner is a habitual offender and is falling within a purview to definition contained under Section 2(bbb) of the Act. It has further been contended that simply because the petitioner is released on bail, the same would not prevent the authority from passing any order of detention. On the contrary, looking to the entire chronology of narration of the complaint, the petitioner is rightly been dealt with by passing the order of detention. It has further been contended that simply because the petitioner is released on bail, the same would not prevent the authority from passing any order of detention. On the contrary, looking to the entire chronology of narration of the complaint, the petitioner is rightly been dealt with by passing the order of detention. The very object of the definition is submerged if the petitioner is allowed to challenge the order in the manner in which it has been challenged by way of the present petition. Looking to the material attached to the order of detention, not only two incidents which are narrated specifically but there are few other statements of witnesses are also sufficient enough to indicate that the petitioner is arraigned in offences, habitual and consistent activity is such which deserves to be prevented. As a result of this, the authority is justified in passing the order of detention. By contending this, learned AGP has submitted to dismiss the petition. However, while concluding the submissions, learned AGP has candidly submitted that in view of the aforesaid decisions which are cited in respect to the petitions which are referred to above, the matter is ultimately left to the discretion of the Court to consider and there is no deviating material or contention is raised by learned AGP t o deal with this identical matters. No other submissions have been made. 6. Having heard learned advocates for the parties and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority cannot be said to be legal, valid and in accordance with law, inasmuch as the offences alleged in the FIR/s cannot have any baring on the public order as required under the Act and other relevant penal laws are sufficient enough to take care of the situation and that the allegations as have been levelled against the detenue cannot be said to be germane for the purpose of bringing the detenue within the meaning of section 2(bbb) of the Act. Unless and until, the material is there to make out a case that the person has become a threat and menace to the Society so as to disturb the whole tempo of the society and that all social apparatus is in peril disturbing public order at the instance of such person, it cannot be said that the detenue is a person within the meaning of section 2(bbb) of the Act. Except general statements, there is no adequate material on record which shows that the detenue is acting in such a manner, which is dangerous to the public order. 6.1. Further, The essential concept of the preventive detention is that the detention of a person is not to punish him for something he has done but to prevent him from doing it. The basis of detention is the satisfaction of the executive of a reasonable probability of the likelihood of the detenu acting in a manner similar to his past acts and preventing him by detention from doing the same. A criminal conviction on the other hand is for an act already done which can only be possible by a trial and legal evidence. There is no comparison between the prosecution in a Court of law and a detention order under the Act. One is a punitive action and the other is a preventive act. In one case a person is punished to prove on proof of his guilt and the standard is proof beyond the reasonable doubt whereas in the preventive detention a man is prevented from doing something which it is necessary for reasons mentioned in section 3 of the Act to prevent. 7. The power of preventive detention is qualitatively different from punitive detention. The power of preventive detention is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation. It may or may not relate to an offence. It is not a parallel proceeding. It does not over lap with prosecution even if it relies on certain facts for which prosecution may be launched or may have been launched. An order of preventive detention, may be made before or during prosecution. An order of preventive detention may be made with or without prosecution and in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal. The pendency of prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention. An order of preventive detention is also not a bar to prosecution. 8. An order of preventive detention, may be made before or during prosecution. An order of preventive detention may be made with or without prosecution and in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal. The pendency of prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention. An order of preventive detention is also not a bar to prosecution. 8. The Supreme Court on several occasions examined the concepts of "law and order" and "public Order". Immediately after the Constitution came into force, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Brij Bhushan & Another v. The State of Delhi, (1950) SCR 605 dealt with a case pertaining to public order. The court observed that "public order" may well be paraphrased in the context as "public tranquility". 8.1 Another celebrated Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court is in the case of Romesh Thappar v. The State of Madras, (1950) SCR 594. In the case of Romesh Thappar, a printer, publisher and editor of weekly journal in English called Cross Roads printed and published in Bombay was detained under the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949. The detention order was challenged directly in the Supreme Court of India by filing a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. The allegation was that the detenu circulated documents to disturb the public tranquility and to create disturbance of public order and tranquility. The Supreme Court observed:- "... 'Public order' is an expression of wide connotation and signifies that state of tranquillity which prevails among the members of a political society as a result of internal regulations enforced by the Government which they have established.... .it must be taken that 'public safety' is used as a part of the wider concept of public order ..... " 9. The distinction between "public order" and "law and order" has been carefully defined in a Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar & Others, (1966) 1 SCR 709 . In this judgment, His Lordship Hidayatullah, J. by giving various illustrations clearly defined the "public order" and "law and order". Relevant portion of the judgment reads thus: "....Does the expression "public order" take in every kind of disorder or only some? Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar & Others, (1966) 1 SCR 709 . In this judgment, His Lordship Hidayatullah, J. by giving various illustrations clearly defined the "public order" and "law and order". Relevant portion of the judgment reads thus: "....Does the expression "public order" take in every kind of disorder or only some? The answer to this serves to distinguish "public order" from "law and order" because the latter undoubtedly takes in all of them. Public order if disturbed, must lead to public disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When two drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be dealt with under the powers to maintain law and order but cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. Suppose that the two fighters were of rival communities and one of them tried to raise communal passions. The problem is still one of law and order but it raises the apprehension of public disorder. Other examples can be imagined. The contravention of law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Defence of India Act but disturbances which subvert the public order are. A District Magistrate is entitled to take action under Rule 30(l)(b) to prevent subversion of public order but not in aid of maintenance of law and order under ordinary circumstances. It will thus appear that just as "public order" in the rulings of this Court (earlier cited) was said to comprehend disorders of less gravity than those affecting "security of State", "law and order" also comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting "public order". One has to imagine three concentric circles. Law and order represents the largest circle within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents security of State. It is then easy to see that an act may affect law and order but not public order just as an act may affect public order but not security of the State...." 10. Law and order represents the largest circle within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents security of State. It is then easy to see that an act may affect law and order but not public order just as an act may affect public order but not security of the State...." 10. In the case of Darpan Kumar Sharma alias Dharban Kumar Sharma v. State of T. N. and others, (2003) AIR SC 971, the Supreme Court made the following observations : "The basis upon which the petitioner has been detained in the instant case is that he robbed one Kumar at the point of knife a sum of Rs. 1000/-. Any disorderly behaviour of a person in the public or commission of a criminal offence is bound, to some extent, affect the peace prevailing in the locality and it may also affect law and order but the same need not affect maintenance of public order. Under the definitions in the Act it is stated that the case of 'Goonda' the acts prejudicial to public order are 'when he is engaged, or is making preparations for engaging, in any of his activities as a goonda which affect adversely, or are likely to affect adversely, the maintenance of public order'. The question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause disturbance of the public order is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society; that a solitary assault on one individual can hardly be said to disturb public peace or place public order in jeopardy so as to bring the case within the purview of the Act providing for preventive detention." 11. The term "habitual" means continual acts. Here, in the present case, except two offences, there was no material before the detaining authority to record a satisfaction that the petitioner is a habitual or continuously involved in the offence. In this connection, it will be relevant to refer to one of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Abdul Rashid Abdul Gani Bukhari, (2014) LawSuit(Guj) 1651, wherein in para 8, the Court has observed as under :- "8. The use of phase 'habitually' connotes repeated or continual acts. In this connection, it will be relevant to refer to one of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Abdul Rashid Abdul Gani Bukhari, (2014) LawSuit(Guj) 1651, wherein in para 8, the Court has observed as under :- "8. The use of phase 'habitually' connotes repeated or continual acts. Learned Single Judge has considered the word 'habitual' as very relevant and we also find that unless a person is found to be habitually committing or attempting to commit or abets in commission of the offence punishable under Section 8 of the Bombay Animal Preservation Act, 1954, he cannot be said to be Cruel Person as defined in Section 2(bbb) of the Act. Therefore such definition itself is not attracted in the facts of the case. The detaining authority, therefore, could be said to have exceeded in its authority, power and jurisdiction in making the order of detention against the petitioner and if such being the case, power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India could very well be exercised against the order of detention at pre-execution stage." 11.1. Yet another decision of this Court rendered in Special Civil Application No. 15562 of 2013 dated 19.12.2013, the Court in para 5 to 8 has observed as under :- 5. No doubt, neither the possibility of launching of a criminal proceedings nor pendency of any criminal proceedings is an absolute bar to an order of preventive detention. But, failure of the detaining authority to consider the possibility of either launching or pendency of criminal proceedings may, in the circumstances of a case, lead to the conclusions that the detaining authority has not applied its mind to the vital question whether it was necessary to make an order of preventive detention. Since there is an allegation that the order of detention is issued in a mechanical manner without keeping in mind whether it was necessary to make such an order when an ordinary criminal proceedings could well serve the purpose. The detaining authority must satisfy the court that the question too was borne in mind before the order of detention was made. The detaining authority must satisfy the court that the question too was borne in mind before the order of detention was made. In the case on hand, the detaining authority failed to satisfy the court that the detaining authority so bore the question in mind and, therefore, the court is justified in drawing the inference that there was no application of mind by detaining authority to the vital question whether it was necessary to preventively detain the detenue. It is also fruitful to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Rekha V/s. State of Tamil Nadu through Secretary to Government and another, (2011) 5 SCC 244 wherein, it is observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court that if a person is liable to be tried, or is actually being tried for a criminal offence but the ordinary criminal law will not be able to deal with the situation, then and only then, preventive detention be taken recourse to. 6. Having regard to the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner, it would be necessary to refer to the definition of "cruel person" as given in Section 2(bbb) of the PASA Act which runs as under: "2(bbb) "cruel person" means a person, who either by himself or as a member or leader of a gang, habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of an offence punishable under Section 8 of the Bombay Animal Preservation Act, 1954 (Bom. LXXXII of 1954)". 7. It is clear from reading of the definition that the person to be branded as a "cruel person" has to be either a member or leader of a gang habitually committing or attempting to commit or abetting the commission of offence punishable under Section 8 of the Bombay Animal Preservation Act, 1954. The term "habitually" examined from any angle, literal or legal, would require presence of an element of repetitiveness. In the instant case, barring one offence registered against the petitioner, there was no material before the detaining authority to record a satisfaction that the petitioner is habitual or repetitively involved in the offences. 8. The term "habitually" examined from any angle, literal or legal, would require presence of an element of repetitiveness. In the instant case, barring one offence registered against the petitioner, there was no material before the detaining authority to record a satisfaction that the petitioner is habitual or repetitively involved in the offences. 8. As a result of hearing and perusal of the record, it appears that the only material that was available with the detaining authority was one criminal case registered against the detenu and on that basis, it cannot be said that the activity of the detenu has become a threat to the maintenance of 'public order' and 'public health'. Mere involvement of the detenu in such activity may not amount to dangerous activity by the detenu and mere mention of them, unless supported by any evidence, cannot be said to be material germane for the purpose of arriving at the subjective satisfaction that the activity of the detenu is prejudicial to the maintenance of 'public order' and 'public health'. In this connection, it will be fruitful to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in Pushker Mukherjee v/s. State of West Bengal, (1970) AIR SC 852, where the distinction between 'law and order' and 'public order' has been clearly laid down. The Court observed as follows: "Does the expression "public order" take in every kind of infraction of order or only some categories thereof? It is manifest that every act of assault or injury to specific persons does not lead to public disorder. When two people quarrel and fight and assault each other inside a house or in a street, it may be said that there is disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. The contravention of any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. In this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest. In this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which will affect public order comes within the scope of the Act." 11.2. Similarly in decision of this Court rendered in Special Civil Application No. 6001 of 2017 dated 26.04.2017, the Court in para 9, 10, 12 and 13 has observed as under :- 9. The order of detention is passed on the basis of what has come to be known as the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority such subjective satisfaction has to be arrived at on two points. Firstly, on the veracity of facts imputed to the person to be detained and secondly, on the prognostication of the detaining authority that the person concerned is likely to indulge again in the same kind of notorious activities. Whereas, normal laws are primarily concerned with the act of commission of the offence, the detention laws are concerned with character of the person who has committed or is likely to commit an offence. The detaining authority has, therefore, to be satisfied that the person sought to be detained is of such a type that he will continue to violate the laws of the land if he is not preventively detained. So, the commission of infraction of law, not done in an organized or systematic manner, may not be sufficient for the detaining authority to justifiably come to the conclusion that there is no alternate but to preventively detain the petitioner. 10. No doubt, neither the possibility of launching of a criminal proceedings nor pendency of any criminal proceedings is an absolute bar to an order of preventive detention. But, failure of the detaining authority to consider the possibility of either launching or pendency of criminal proceedings may, in the circumstances of a case, lead to the conclusions that the detaining authority has not applied its mind to the vital question whether it was necessary to make an order of preventive detention. But, failure of the detaining authority to consider the possibility of either launching or pendency of criminal proceedings may, in the circumstances of a case, lead to the conclusions that the detaining authority has not applied its mind to the vital question whether it was necessary to make an order of preventive detention. Since there is an allegation that the order of detention is issued in a mechanical manner without keeping in mind whether it was necessary to make such an order when an ordinary criminal proceedings could well serve the purpose. The detaining authority must satisfy the court that the question too was borne in mind before the order of detention was made. In the case on hand, the detaining authority failed to satisfy the court that the detaining authority so bore the question in mind and, therefore, the court is justified in drawing the inference that there was non application of mind by detaining authority to the vital question whether it was necessary to preventively detain the detenue. It is also fruitful to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Rekha V/s. State of Tamil Nadu through Secretary to Government and another, (2011) 5 SCC 244 wherein, it is observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court that if a person is liable to be tried, or is actually being tried for a criminal offence but the ordinary criminal law will not be able to deal with the situation, then and only then, preventive detention be taken recourse to. 12. It appears that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority cannot be said to be legal, valid and in accordance with law inasmuch as the offences alleged in the FIR/s cannot have any bearing on the public order since the laws of the land are sufficient enough to take care of the situation and that the allegations as have been levelled against the detenue cannot be said to be germane for the purpose of bringing the detenue within the meaning of Section 2(bbb) of the Act and unless and until the material is there to make out a case that the person concerned has become a threat and a menace to the society so as to disturb the whole tempo of the society and that the whole social apparatus is in peril disturbing public order at the instance of such person. In view of the allegations alleged in the aforesaid F.I.R/s., the Court is of the opinion that the activities of the detenue cannot be said to be dangerous to the maintenance of public order and at the most fall under the maintenance of "law and order." In this connection, it will be fruitful to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in Pushker Mukherjee v/s. State of West Bengal, (1970) AIR SC 852, where the distinction between 'law and order' and 'public order' has been clearly laid down. The Court observed as follows : "Does the expression "public order" take in every kind of infraction of order or only some categories thereof? It is manifest that every act of assault or injury to specific persons does not lead to public disorder. When two people quarrel and fight and assault each other inside a house or in a street, it may be said that there is disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. The contravention of any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. In this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which will affect public order comes within the scope of the Act." 13. Therefore, it cannot be said that for the aforesaid offence/s registered against the petitioner, the petitioner could be considered to be a "cruel person", whose preventive detention is must for maintenance of public order. Therefore, it cannot be said that for the aforesaid offence/s registered against the petitioner, the petitioner could be considered to be a "cruel person", whose preventive detention is must for maintenance of public order. So, the Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not a "cruel person" and his act, as alleged in the detention order cannot disturb maintenance of public order and, therefore, the instant case would fall within 3rd and 4th grounds namely it is passed for wrong purpose or it is passed on vague, extraneous and irrelevant grounds mentioned in the case of Alka Gadia and, therefore, order of preventive detention at pre-execution stage calls for interference of this Court. As the order of detention has been passed by the detaining authority without having adequate grounds for passing the said order, it cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed and set aside." 11.3. Same view is reflecting in the decision rendered in Special Civil Application No, 6874 of 2016 dated 05.05.2016 and in Special Civil Application No. 10964 of 2017 dated 17.07.2018. 12. Thus, from the various decisions of the Apex Court and this Court referred to above, it could easily be said that the detaining authority has failed to substantiate that the alleged antisocial activities of the detenu affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. It is true that there is a very thin line between the question of law and order situation and a public order situation, and some times, the acts of a person relating to law and order situation can turn into a question of public order situation. What is decisive for determining the connection of ground of detention with the maintenance of public order, the object of detention, is not an intrinsic quality of the act but rather its latent potentiality. Therefore, for determining whether the ground of detention is relevant for the purposes of public order or not, merely an objective test based on the intrinsic quality of an act would not be a safe guide. The potentiality of the act has to be examined in the light of the surrounding circumstances, posterior and anterior. 13. Thus, in the overall view of the matter, I am convinced that the detention of the petitioner is not in accordance with law and the order of detention deserves to be quashed and set aside. The potentiality of the act has to be examined in the light of the surrounding circumstances, posterior and anterior. 13. Thus, in the overall view of the matter, I am convinced that the detention of the petitioner is not in accordance with law and the order of detention deserves to be quashed and set aside. 14. In view of above, I am inclined to allow this petition, because simplicitor registration of FIR/s by itself cannot have any nexus with the breach of maintenance of public order and the authority cannot have recourse under the Act and no other relevant and cogent material exists for invoking power under section 3(2) of the Act. In the result, the present petition is hereby allowed and the impugned order of detention No. PCB/DTN/PASA/450/2018 dated 11.06.2018 passed by the respondent - detaining authority is hereby quashed and set aside. The detenue is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case. 15. Rule is made absolute accordingly. Direct service is permitted.