JUDGMENT : D. DASH, J. This writ petition has been filed by the borrower and the guarantors challenging the action of the opposite party-Bank in rejecting their application for refund of the amount of Rs.43,00,000/-(rupees forty three lakhs), which had been deposited pursuant to the interim order of this Court dated 12.05.2014, passed in W.P.(C) No. 28345 of 2013 and appropriating of the same towards the outstanding loan dues, with a further prayer to direct the Bank to refund the said deposited amount of Rs. 43,00,000/- with interest to the petitioners. 2. The brief facts of the case is that the petitioner no. 1 as the proprietor of “Maa Santoshi Distributors” had availed working capital term loan and term loan to the limit of Rs.70,00,000/-(rupees seventy lakhs) and Rs.75,00,000/-(rupees seventy five lakhs) respectively in the year 2002. Petitioner no.1 and his mother petitioner no.2 had mortgaged their immovable property with the opposite party-Bank for securing repayment of the loans. The borrower having defaulted in payment of the loans as per the agreed terms and conditions, the loan accounts were declared as Non-Performing Asset (for short ‘NPA’) in the year 2008. Subsequently, the Bank received a sum of Rs. 27,00,000/-(rupees twenty seven lakhs) towards the insurance claim lodged by the petitioners on account of loss and damage to their properties in an accidental break out of fire in the business premises, which was adjusted by the Bank against the outstanding loan dues. On 30.7.2010, the opposite party-Bank issued notice to the petitioners under section 13(2) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short, “the SARFAESI Act”) for recovery of Rs.1,24,00,000/-(rupees one crore and twenty four lakhs). Representation to the same filed by the petitioners having been rejected, notice under section 13 (4) of the SARFAESI Act was issued on 02.11.2010, for taking over possession of the mortgaged property. The petitioners moved this Court in W.P.(C) 19834 of 2010, challenging the said notice of the Bank issued under section 13 (4) of the SARFAESI Act. Representation to the same filed by the petitioners having been rejected, notice under section 13 (4) of the SARFAESI Act was issued on 02.11.2010, for taking over possession of the mortgaged property. The petitioners moved this Court in W.P.(C) 19834 of 2010, challenging the said notice of the Bank issued under section 13 (4) of the SARFAESI Act. This Court by interim order dated 19.11.2010, restrained the Bank from evicting the petitioners from the mortgaged property, subject to deposit of Rs.20,00,000/-(rupees twenty lakhs) with the Bank by 30.11.2010, making it clear that on the failure of the petitioners to deposit the said amount within the stipulated time, the Bank would be free to proceed further in the matter, in accordance with law. The said writ petition was finally disposed of by order dated 13.12.2012, directing the petitioners to deposit further sum of Rs.20,00,000/-(rupees twenty lakhs) with the Bank within a period of ten weeks therefrom. Though the opposite party-Bank was permitted to hold the auction of the mortgaged property in question, it was however restrained from confirming the said sale in favour of the successful bidder. It was further directed that if the petitioners deposit the said amount of Rs.20,00,000/- and make a fresh proposal for settlement of the outstanding loan dues, the opposite party-Bank, taking into account the factum of payment of Rs.40,00,000/-(rupees forty lakhs), would take a final decision in the matter of settlement of the loan account and till a final decision taken, the opposite party-Bank was restrained from evicting the petitioners from the property in question. The petitioners having failed to comply said order dated 13.12.2012, the opposite party-Bank proceeded further in the matter and put the mortgaged property to auction on 06.06.2013. In the said auction, the opposite party no.5 came out successful, offering the highest bid of Rs.43,00,000/-(rupees forty three lakhs). The bid amount having been deposited by the auction purchaser-opposite party no.5, the sale was confirmed and sale certificate was issued in his favour. Consequent upon the same, the physical possession of the land in question was also delivered to the auction purchaser on 12.06.2013. 3. Subsequently, the petitioners filed another writ petition vide W.P.(C) No. 28345 of 2013, challenging the auction sale of the mortgaged property. Consequent upon the same, the physical possession of the land in question was also delivered to the auction purchaser on 12.06.2013. 3. Subsequently, the petitioners filed another writ petition vide W.P.(C) No. 28345 of 2013, challenging the auction sale of the mortgaged property. This Court by order dated 12.5.2014, directed the petitioners to deposit a sum of Rs.43,00,000/-, with the Bank, which is the amount paid by the auction–purchaser so as to compensate him in the event the auction would get annulled. This Court also restrained the parties from creating any interest in favour of third party/parties over the property in question. Pursuant to the said order, the petitioners deposited a sum of Rs.43,00,000/-(rupees forty three lakhs) with the opposite party-Bank. The above noted writ petition filed by the petitioners stood dismissed vide order dated 11.07.2016. While dismissing the writ application, this Court on consideration of the contention of the petitioners for refund of the amount of Rs. 43,00,000/-, deposited in terms of interim order dated 12.05.2014, granted liberty to the petitioners to approach the Bank by filing proper application seeking refund of the same, which shall be considered by the opposite party-Bank strictly in accordance with law. In view of the said order, the petitioners submitted an application before the opposite party-Bank for refund of the said sum of Rs.43,00,000/-, which has been rejected by the Bank on the ground that the same has been appropriated/set-off against the outstanding loan dues of the petitioners, which is now the subject matter of challenge in this writ petition. 4. Mr. G.B. Dash, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the said amount of Rs.43,00,000/- having been deposited by the petitioners pursuant to the interim order dated 12.05.2014, passed by this Court in W.P.(C) No. 28345 of 2013, the opposite party-Bank had no right of lien over the same and therefore, said amount could not have been appropriated towards the outstanding loan dues of the petitioners. He further submitted that in so far as the said deposit made by the petitioners is concerned, the opposite party-Bank cannot have any general or particular lien over the same and the provision of section 171 of the Contract Act, 1872, does not come to the aid of the opposite party-Bank, so as to sustain their impugned action. He further submitted that in so far as the said deposit made by the petitioners is concerned, the opposite party-Bank cannot have any general or particular lien over the same and the provision of section 171 of the Contract Act, 1872, does not come to the aid of the opposite party-Bank, so as to sustain their impugned action. He further submitted that as the petitioners were directed to deposit the auction amount of Rs 43,00,000/- to compensate the auction purchaser in case the auction is set aside, the Bank had no authority in law to appropriate the same towards outstanding loan dues of the petitioners, in exercise of its right to lien/set-off. He accordingly submitted that the action of the opposite party-Bank in appropriating the amount deposited pursuant to the interim order of this Court, towards outstanding loan dues is arbitrary and illegal. It was further submitted that the petitioners having deposited the said amount of Rs.43,00,000/- with the opposite party-Bank to compensate the auction purchaser, in case they succeed in the writ petition and the auction is set aside and subsequently the writ petition having been dismissed, they are entitled to be restituted to the position as it was prior to the date of passing of the interim order. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that as the amount of Rs 43,00,000/- had not come to the hand of Bank under normal banking transaction but had been deposited by the petitioners pursuant to the interim order of this Court, the Bank could not have appropriated the same towards the outstanding loan dues, in exercise of its right of lien and set-off. It was submitted that the impugned action of the action in unilaterally appropriating the deposited amount towards outstanding loan dues offends the established principles of equity and fair play and runs contrary to the legal maxim “Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit”, which means that an act of the Court shall prejudice none. 5. Mr. R.K. Rath, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party-Bank submitted that the amount of Rs 43,00,000/- deposited by the petitioners with the Bank, has been duly adjusted against their outstanding loan dues by way of set-off. It was submitted that even after adjustment of the said deposited amount there is still an outstanding loan dues of about Rs. 83.00 lakhs payable by the petitioners. It was submitted that even after adjustment of the said deposited amount there is still an outstanding loan dues of about Rs. 83.00 lakhs payable by the petitioners. It was submitted that the Bank has appropriated the deposited amount towards outstanding loan dues in exercise of its right of lien and set-off. It was further submitted that this right of lien has been exercised by the Bank as per the provision of section 171 of the Contract Act. It was submitted that the Bank has the right of security over the general balance of the said amount remaining in deposit in the account when further sum is due to the Bank towards outstanding loan dues and therefore, it has the right to retain the said amount. It was accordingly submitted that the Bank having exercised its right of lien and set-off in accordance with law, the action of the Bank in rejecting the application of the petitioners for refund of the deposited amount cannot be faulted. 6. The rival submissions on the accepted factual settings of the case would stand addressed upon returning the answer to the question that whether, the opposite party-Bank had the lien over the said sum of Rs.43,00,000/- which had been deposited by the petitioners with the Bank pursuant to the interim order of this Court dated 12.05.2014, passed in W.P.(C) No. 28345 of 2013 and appropriate the same towards the outstanding loan dues of the petitioners, by exercising the right to set-off. 7. For returning the answer to the above question, it would be beneficial to consider the definition of the term ‘lien’, as contained in Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol.20, 2nd Edn.P.552, para 695 would be advantageous and it reads as under :- “Lien is in its primary sense is a right in one man to retain that which is in his possession belonging to another until certain demands of the person in possession are satisfied. In this primary sense it is given by law and not by contract.” In Chamers on Bills of Exchange, Thirteenth Edition page 91 the meaning of “Banker’s lien” is given as follows : “A banker’s lien on negotiable securities has been judicially defined as “an implied pledge.” A banker has, in the absence of agreement to the contrary, a lien on all bills received from a customer in the ordinary course of banking business in respect of any balance that may be due from such customer.” In Chitty on Contract, Twenty –sixth Edition, page 389, Paragraph 3032 the Banker’s lien is explained as under : “By mercantile custom the banker has a genera lien over all forms of commercial paper deposited by or on behalf of a customer in the ordinary course of banking business. The custom does not extend to valuables lodged for the purpose of safe custody and may in any event be displaced by either an express contract or circumstances which show an implied agreement inconsistent with the lien…………..The lien is applicable to negotiable instruments which are remitted to the banker from the customer for the purpose of collection. When collection has been made the process may be used by the banker in reduction of the customer’s debit balance unless otherwise earmarked.” In Paget’s Law of Banking, Eighth Edition, Page 498, a passage reads as under : “THE BANKER’S LIEN” Apart from any specific security, the banker can look to his general lien as a protection against loss on loan or overdraft or other credit facility. The general lien of bankers is part of law merchant and judicially recognized as such.” In Brandao v. Barnett (1846) 12 CI & Fin 787 it was stated as under : “Bankers most undoubtedly have a general lien on all securities deposited with them as bankers by a customer, unless there be an express contract, or circumstances that show an implied contract, inconsistent with lien.” The above passages go to show that by mercantile system the Bank has a general lien over all forms of securities or negotiable instruments deposited by or on behalf of the customer in the ordinary course of banking business and that the general lien is valuable right of the banker judicially recognized and in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, a Banker has a general lien over such securities or bills received from a customer in the ordinary course of banking business and has a right to use the proceeds in respect of any balance that may be due from the customer by way of reduction of customer’s debit balance.” (Ref-Syndicate Bank vs. Vijay Kumar; AIR 1992 SC 1066 ) 8. Chapter-IX of the Indian Contract Act deals with the bailment. Section 148 of the Act defines bailment, bailor and bailee. A bailment is the delivery of goods by one person i.e. bailor to another person called bailee for some purpose upon a contract that they shall, when the purpose is accomplished to be returned or otherwise disposed of according to the directions of the person delivering them. The person delivering the goods is called ‘bailor’. Section 171 of the Act, speaks of the general lien of Banker which very much arises for consideration in the present matter and it reads as under :- “171. General lien of bankers, factors, wharfingers, attorneys and policy-brokers-Bankers, factors, wharfingers, attorneys of a High Court and policy-brokers may, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, retain, as a security of a general balance of account any goods bailed to them; but no other persons have a right to retain as a security for such balance goods bailed to them unless there is an express contract to the effect.” 9. Section 172 of the Act defines pledge, pawner, and pawnee. “The bailment of goods as a security for payment of debit or performance of a terms is called pledge. Section 172 of the Act defines pledge, pawner, and pawnee. “The bailment of goods as a security for payment of debit or performance of a terms is called pledge. The bailor in this case is called ‘pawner’ whereas the bailee is ‘pawnee’. Thus, it is clear that pledge is only a form of bailment and all pledges are bailment but not the vice-versa. The Banker’s lien as contemplated by S.171 of the Act as such is automatically extended to all pledges. Section 174 of the Act, which also comes up for consideration, is being reproduced below: “174. Pawnee not to retain for debt or promise other than that for which goods pledged. Presumption in case of subsequent advances-The pawnee shall not, in the absence of a contract to that effect, retain the goods pledged for any debt or promise for which they are pledged; but such contract, in the absence of anything to the contrary, shall be presumed in regard to subsequent advances made by the pawnee.” 10. Section 174 of the Act provides that in the absence of a contract to the contrary, the pawnee is under an obligation to return the goods pledged for any debt for which the goods were pledged. This is a general provision providing for the relationship of a pawnee and a pawner in respect of a pledged goods. Section 171 of the Act, providing for banker’s lien, is a specific provision, which has an overriding effect on this general provision, as such, the banker’s lien is also extended to the pledged goods.” 11. A conspectus of the aforesaid legal positions shows that the opposite party-Bank’s defence in the present case can sustain, if the money deposited with it can either be found to have been bailed to them or to have so gone to their hands in case of ordinary banking transaction and has remained as security or property in their custody. 12. At this juncture, it is necessary to advert to the interim order dated 12.05.2014, passed by this Court in W.P.(C) No.28345 of 2013, which was the reason for the petitioners to deposit the said amount of Rs.43,00,000/- with the Bank, which reads as under :- “02. 12. At this juncture, it is necessary to advert to the interim order dated 12.05.2014, passed by this Court in W.P.(C) No.28345 of 2013, which was the reason for the petitioners to deposit the said amount of Rs.43,00,000/- with the Bank, which reads as under :- “02. 12.05.2014 Issue notice to the opposite parties subject to the petitioners depositing a sum of Rs.43,00,000/-(Rupees Forty-three Lakhs), which is said to be the auction money, with the Bank so as to compensate the auction purchaser if auction is to be set aside. The deposit will abide by the further orders. The Bank may not take any further steps in the matter till the next date. List again on 30th June, 2014. In the meantime, no third party interest be created on the property. The Bank may inform the auction purchaser about these proceedings.” 13. A careful reading of the above order goes to show that the petitioners were directed to deposit the auction amount of Rs.43,00,000/- as a condition precedent for entertaining the writ petition and issuing notice to the Opp. Parties therein. The Court having directed deposit of the aforesaid amount so as to compensate the auction purchaser, in case the auction of the mortgaged property is set aside and the petitioner having failed in the writ petition, which was subsequently dismissed, the Bank could not have appropriated the deposited amount towards outstanding loan dues of the petitioners, in purported exercise of its right to general lien and set-off. The deposit of the amount having come to the hands of the Bank purely because of fortuitous circumstances, pursuant to the interim order of the Court and not in ordinary course of banking transaction, no right of general lien could have been exercised by the Bank over such deposit. The deposited amount was not a secured asset or a secured debt either, since the borrower had not created any security interest on such deposit. In other words, had it not been for the order of Court, the amount could not have come to be deposited with the Bank. So far as the outstanding loan dues of the petitioners is concerned, there is no dispute that the Bank has the right to recover the same in accordance with law. In other words, had it not been for the order of Court, the amount could not have come to be deposited with the Bank. So far as the outstanding loan dues of the petitioners is concerned, there is no dispute that the Bank has the right to recover the same in accordance with law. However, the Bank cannot be permitted to resort to such unfair means of appropriating the amount so deposited towards the outstanding loan dues, especially when there was no such order or direction of the Court. 14. Coming to the legal maxim ‘Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit’, which means an act of the Court shall prejudice no man, the same is founded upon justice and good sense affording a safe and certain guide for the administration of the law. Lord Cairns in Alexander Rodger vs. The Comptoir D’escompte De Paris (1869-71) LR 3 PC 465 at page 475 observed thus :- “Now their Lordships are of the opinion, that one of the first and highest duties of all Carts is to take care that the act of the court does not injure to any suitors, and when the expression ‘the act of the Court’ is used, it does not mean merely the act of the Primary Court, or of any intermediate Court of appeal, but the act of the Court as a whole, from the lowest Court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter up to the highest Court which finally disposes of the case. It is the duty of the aggregate of those Tribunals, if I may use the expression, to take care that no act of the Court in the course of the whole of the proceedings does an injury to the suitors in the Court.” There is always an inherent jurisdiction to order restitution a fortiorari where a party has acted on the faith of an order of the Court. A litigant should not go back with the impression that the judicial process so operated as to weaken his position and whatever it did on the faith of the Court’s order operated to its disadvantage. It is the duty of the Court to ensure that no litigant goes back with a feeling that he was prejudiced by an act which he did on the faith of the Court’s order. It is the duty of the Court to ensure that no litigant goes back with a feeling that he was prejudiced by an act which he did on the faith of the Court’s order. Both on principle and authority it becomes the duty of the Court-as much moral as it is legal-to order refund and restitution of the amount to the petitioner since the question of compensating the auction purchaser had never arisen as the auction had not been set aside. It has been held in case of South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. vs. State of M.P.; (2003) 8 SCC 648 :- “28. That no one shall suffer by an act of the court is not a rule confined to an erroneous act of the court; the “act of the court” embraces within its sweep all such acts as to which the court may form an opinion in any legal proceedings that the court would not have so acted had it been correctly apprised of the facts and the law. The factor attracting applicability of restitution is not the act of the court being wrongful or a mistake or error committed by the court; the test is whether on account of an act of the party persuading the court to pass an order held at the end as not sustainable, has resulted in one party gaining an advantage which it would not have otherwise earned, or the other party has suffered an impoverishment which it would not have suffered but for the order of the court and the act of such party. The quantum of restitution, depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case, may take into consideration not only what the party excluded would have made but also what the party under obligation has or might reasonably have made. There is nothing wrong in the parties demanding being placed in the same position in which they would have been had the court not intervened by its interim order when at the end of the proceedings the court pronounces its judicial verdict which does not match with and countenance its own interim verdict. Whenever called upon to adjudicate, the court would act in conjunction with what is real and substantial justice. Whenever called upon to adjudicate, the court would act in conjunction with what is real and substantial justice. The injury, if any, caused by the act of the court shall be undone and the gain which the party would have earned unless it was interdicted by the order of the court would be restored to or conferred on the party by suitably commanding the party liable to do so.” For the reasons as aforestated, we are of the considered view that the action of the opposite party-Bank in appropriating the deposited amount of Rs.43,00,000/- towards the outstanding loan dues of the petitioners in purported exercise of its right to general lien and set-off cannot be sustained and is accordingly set aside. 15. The opposite party-Bank is directed to refund the said amount of Rs.43,00,000/- to the petitioners with admissible interest within a period of four weeks hence. Writ petition is accordingly allowed. No costs.