JUDGMENT : 1. Office has raised an objection with regard to the maintainability of the appeal in view of Section 37(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity). 2. I have heard both the counsels on the above said point. 3. The brief factual matrix of the case are that: The respondents have filed a Petition in No. 171/2012 before this court seeking appointment of an Arbitrator u/s. 11 of the Arbitration Act. This Court, vide order dated 6.9.2017, appointed an Arbitrator to resolve the dispute between the parties. Therefore, the respondents have initiated the Arbitration proceedings for various reliefs that for dissolution of the partnership firm of M/s. K. Ramachandra Nayak and Sons w.e.f. 21.9.2012 and also for holding an enquiry into the accounts of the firm, settlement of accounts, adjustment of liabilities, distribution of assets if any and other related matter arising between the defendants and respondents and directing payment of share of the defendants therein, the property of the firm and further winding up of accounts of the firm in accordance with Section 48 of the Indian Partnership Act and for such other relief as the Tribunal deem fit to grant under the circumstances of the case. After initiation of the proceedings, the Tribunal, has framed various issues. Issue No. 2 was filed in the following manner: “(1) Whether the respondents prove that the reference to Arbitration to the extent of adjudication on the validity of the Will dated 6.1.2007 executed by late K. Suresh Naik is bad in law?” On this particular issue, the petitioners herein have taken up the contention that the Arbitrator has no jurisdiction, the Arbitrator has held that the Arbitrator has jurisdiction and rejected the plea of the appellants against which rejected order, of the plea taken up by the petitioners, the present appeal is preferred. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants strenuously contends that the appeal lies under Section 37 of the Act specifically under Section 37(2)(a) which is the applicable Section for the present proceedings. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants submits before the Court that, Sections 16(2) & (3) of the Act if read in consonance with Section 37(2) of the Act, it clearly discloses that the appellants can take a plea before the Arbitral Tribunal stating that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction and the said plea was raised within time. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants submits before the Court that, Sections 16(2) & (3) of the Act if read in consonance with Section 37(2) of the Act, it clearly discloses that the appellants can take a plea before the Arbitral Tribunal stating that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction and the said plea was raised within time. Accordingly, the appellants have taken such plea. 6. The Arbitrator after hearing the parties has passed an order under Sub-Section (5) of Section 16 of the Act rejecting the plea and ordered for continuation of arbitral proceedings. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the appellants if the Tribunal would have taken the decision otherwise i.e. ‘accepting the plea’ of the appellants then, the Arbitration Proceedings would have been terminated in that event, the appeal lye before this Court. Therefore, he draws the attention of this Court that the order of the Arbitral Tribunal, either accepting or rejecting the plea of the appellants, falls within the categories of appeals as recognized under Section 37(2) (a) of the Act. Therefore, appeal is maintainable. 7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submits that when the legislators have specifically worded in the provision under Section 37(2) (a) of the Act that, when the Arbitral Tribunal ‘accepts’ the plea under Sections 16(2) & (3) of the Act, the proceeding would terminate, then only the appeal can be preferred under Section 37(2)(a) of the Act, otherwise if any order passed by the Arbitrator under sub-section (5) of the Act rejecting the said plea, he can proceed with the arbitral proceedings and pass an award and such order regarding assuming jurisdiction virtually merges with the Award and such order can be challenged while challenging the main award itself even with regard to the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator. Therefore, he contends in view of Section 37(2) (a) of the Act, the appeal is not maintainable before this Court. 8. Section 16 (2) (3) (5) & (6) of the Act, which are necessary for disposal of this appeal, have been carefully perused, which read as follows : Section 16 (2) A plea that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised not later than the submission of the statement of defence; however, a party shall not be precluded from raising such a plea merely because that he has appointed, or participated in the appointment of, an arbitrator. (3) A plea that the arbitral tribunal is exceeding the scope of its authority shall be raised as soon as the matter alleged to be beyond the scope of its authority is raised during the arbitral proceedings. (5) The arbitral tribunal shall decide on a plea referred to in the sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) and where the arbitral tribunal takes a decision rejecting the plea, continue with the arbitral proceedings and make an arbitral award. (6) A party aggrieved by such an arbitral award may make an application for setting aside such an arbitral award in accordance with section 34. (Emphasis supplied) 9. The said provisions are very much clear that under Sub-Section (2) of Section 16 of the Act, if a plea has been taken with regard to the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal, the Tribunal has to pass appropriate orders under Sub-Section (5) of the said provision, either to accept or reject the plea. Under the said provision if the plea of the appellants is accepted and the Tribunal holds that it has no jurisdiction, it totally terminates the arbitral proceedings. For any reason the Arbitrator rejects the application, Sub-Section (5) of the Section 16 of the Act empowers him to pass an award in the said proceedings after continuing the Arbitral proceedings. If such an award is passed, under sub-section (6) of Section 16 of the Act, the said award can be challenged under Section 34 of the Act. Therefore, it goes without saying that whenever an order is passed by the Arbitral Tribunal holding that it has got jurisdiction to proceed with the arbitration proceedings, the said order passed by the Arbitrator merges with the award that may be passed under Sub-Section (5) of Section 16 of the Act. The same order on jurisdiction can also be challenged before the Competent Court under Section 34 of the Act. Therefore, it goes without saying that the Arbitral Tribunal passes an order holding that, it has got jurisdiction cannot be challenged under Section 37(2) (a) of the Act, nevertheless that the order of the Arbitrator can also be challenged while challenging the award under Section 34 of the Act. 10. Therefore, it goes without saying that the Arbitral Tribunal passes an order holding that, it has got jurisdiction cannot be challenged under Section 37(2) (a) of the Act, nevertheless that the order of the Arbitrator can also be challenged while challenging the award under Section 34 of the Act. 10. Now coming to Section 37(2)(a) which reads as follows : (2) An appeal shall also lie to a Court from an order granting of the arbitral tribunal: (a) accepting the plea referred in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of section 16. (Emphasis supplied) 11. A meticulous and proper understanding of the said provision and applying the strict rule of interpretation i.e. the golden rule of interpretation that a Court has to apply the principles of literal interpretation of the plain words used to examine whether the said provision creates any ambiguity in accepting the same? 12. The provision is very clear that an appeal only shall lie to the court from an order of Arbitral Tribunal, accepting the plea referred to in Sub-Sections (2) and (3) of Section 16 of the Act. Therefore, the legislators with all sense have used the words “accepting the plea” in this particular provision and not used the general words like ‘any decision on the plea’ referred to under Sub-Section (2) or (3) or not using the words ‘accepting’ or ‘not accepting the plea’ in Sub-Sections (2) or (3), otherwise it would have altogether made lot of difference. When it is specifically stated in the provision by using the specific words ‘accepting of the plea’ referred to in Sub-Sections (2) and (3) of Section 16 of the Act, clearly mean that if the plea is accepted, it amounts to termination of the total proceedings before the Arbitrator, such orders are made appealable under Section 37(2)(a) of the Act. 13. Therefore, the court cannot, while interpreting the said provision, add or subtract to the provision when there is no ambiguity in the said provision. Therefore, under the said circumstances, office objection raised is proper and correct and the appeal is not maintainable before this Court. 14. However, as noted above, the findings of the Arbitrator with regard to the jurisdiction can also be challenged, while challenging the award under Section 34 of the Act. 15. With these observations, the appeal is dismissed as not maintainable.