State of Kerala v. Poovankarachalil Narayanan (Died) S/o. P. C. Karappan, Perumpadappa
2018-12-07
P.B.SURESH KUMAR
body2018
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : 1. The defendants in the suit are the appellants. They are the State of Kerala, the District Collector, Malappuram and the Tahsildar, Ponnani, respectively. The case set out by the plaintiff in the plaint is that he belongs to 'Paniyan' community, a Scheduled Tribe specified in relation to the State of Kerala in terms of Article 342 of the Constitution of India; that the community certificate issued to him to that effect has been cancelled by the second defendant in terms of Ext.A5 order; that Ext.A5 order has been affirmed by the Government in appeal in terms of Ext.A7 order, and that both Exts.A5 and A7 orders are illegal and unsustainable. The suit was, therefore, for a declaration that the plaintiff belongs to 'Paniyan' community and that he is entitled to the benefits available to 'Paniyan' community. The plaintiff also sought a declaration that Exts.A5 and A7 orders are illegal and unsustainable. The defendants resisted the suit, contending mainly that a suit of the instant nature is not maintainable. On merits, it was contended by the defendants that the plaintiff belongs to 'Paniyar' community and that 'Paniyar' community is not a Scheduled Tribe in terms of Article 342 of the Constitution. The trial court found that the suit, in so far as it relates to the declaration that 'Paniyan' community is a Scheduled Tribe, is not maintainable. The court, however, took the view that the suit is maintainable in so far as it relates to the declaration that the plaintiff is a member of 'Paniyan' community. The court then went on to consider the question as to whether the plaintiff is a member of 'Paniyan" community and found that he is a member of that community. Consequently, the suit was decreed in part declaring that the plaintiff is a member of 'Paniyan' community. The defendants challenged the decision of the trial court in appeal. The plaintiff also challenged the decision of the trial court to the extent it went against him, by way of a cross objection in the appeal preferred by the defendants. The appellate court, on a re-appraisal of the materials on record, affirmed the decision of the trial court and dismissed the appeal as also the cross objection. The defendants are aggrieved by the decisions of the courts below. 2. Heard the learned Government Pleader as also the learned amicus curiae appointed in the matter.
The appellate court, on a re-appraisal of the materials on record, affirmed the decision of the trial court and dismissed the appeal as also the cross objection. The defendants are aggrieved by the decisions of the courts below. 2. Heard the learned Government Pleader as also the learned amicus curiae appointed in the matter. 3. Placing reliance on the reliefs claimed in the suit, the learned Government Pleader asserted that a suit of the instant nature is not maintainable. According to him, the exercise undertaken by the trial Judge in dissecting the essential relief claimed in the suit while considering the maintainability of the suit was unwarranted and uncalled for. It was contended that the maintainability of the suit should have been decided by the court having regard to the essential relief claimed in the suit. According to the learned Government Pleader, had the essential relief claimed in the suit been understood by the courts below in its true sense, there would have been absolutely no difficulty in holding that the suit is not maintainable. The learned amicus curiae supported the said stand of the learned Government Pleader. She has also brought to my notice a number of decisions dealing with identical and similar issues. 4. The following are the reliefs sought in the suit : (I) pass a judgment and decree declaring that order No.SI-32503/82 dtd.12.11.1986 and order No.20772/E2/SCSTDD dtd. 21.12.1989 of the defendants 2 and 1 respectively are illegal, without jurisdiction, arbitrary, null and void and are inoperative and setting aside the same. (ii) Pass a judgment and decree declaring that the plaintiff belongs to “Paniyan” community and is entitled to benefits due to Scheduled Tribes which include “Paniyan” also; (iii) Grant to the plaintiff such further reliefs as may be prayed for by him during the pendency of the suit; and (iv) Grant to the plaintiff the costs in the above suit. Reliefs (iii) and (iv) in the suit are formal and the essential reliefs are reliefs (i) and (ii). Among reliefs (i) and (ii), it is seen that relief (i) is claimed consequential to relief (ii). The suit is, therefore, essentially for relief (ii). Relief (ii), in essence, is for a declaration that the plaintiff belongs to 'Paniyan' community and that the same is a Scheduled Tribe.
Among reliefs (i) and (ii), it is seen that relief (i) is claimed consequential to relief (ii). The suit is, therefore, essentially for relief (ii). Relief (ii), in essence, is for a declaration that the plaintiff belongs to 'Paniyan' community and that the same is a Scheduled Tribe. The following are, therefore, the substantial questions of law arising for consideration in this matter : “(i) Were the courts below justified in dissecting the essential relief claimed in the suit for the purpose of deciding the maintainability of the suit? (ii) Is the suit for a declaration that the plaintiff belongs to a Scheduled Tribe maintainable?” 5. Questions: Question (ii) formulated for decision is no longer res integra. The question has been considered by the Apex Court on an exactly identical fact situation, in State of T.N. and others v. A.Gurusamy [ (1997) 3 SCC 542 ]. The plaintiff in that case was described in the revenue records as a person belonging to 'Thotti' community. The said community is a Scheduled in terms of Article 341 of the Constitution. During 1970, the plaintiff obtained a provisional certificate from the Revenue Divisional Officer to the effect that he belongs to 'Kattunaicken' community, a Scheduled Tribe in terms of Article 342 of the Constitution. Later, when the plaintiff applied for a permanent certificate, an enquiry was conducted and it was revealed in the said enquiry that he does not belong to 'Kattunaickan' community. The provisional certificate issued to the plaintiff was consequently cancelled. The suit in that case, therefore, was for a declaration that the plaintiff belongs to 'Kattunaickan' community, a Scheduled Tribe. The trial court granted the decree sought by the plaintiff and the appellate Court as also the High Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. The question arose before the Apex Court was as to the maintainability of such a suit. Having regard to the facts aforesaid, the Apex Court held that such a suit is not maintainable, in the light of the provisions contained in Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution. The relevant portion of the judgment reads thus : “3. The only question is whether the suit is maintainable. By operation of Section 9 of CPC, a suit of civil nature cognizance of which is expressly or by implication excluded, cannot be tried by any civil court.
The relevant portion of the judgment reads thus : “3. The only question is whether the suit is maintainable. By operation of Section 9 of CPC, a suit of civil nature cognizance of which is expressly or by implication excluded, cannot be tried by any civil court. The declaration of the President of India, under Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution, with respect of lists of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in relation to a State, that a particular caste or tribe as defined in Article 366(24) or (25) respectively, is conclusive subject to an amendment by Parliament under Articles 341(2) and 342(2) of the Constitution. By necessary implication, the jurisdiction of the civil court to take cognizance of and give a declaration stands prohibited.” It is seen that in Kutty Nanu v. State of Kerala ( 2002(1) KLT 367 ), on identical facts, this Court also held, following Gurusamy (supra) that a suit of the instant nature is not maintainable. That was a case where the plaintiffs sought a declaration that they belong to 'Hindu Mala Araya' community, a Scheduled Tribe in relation to the State of Kerala and they are entitled to the benefits of the said community. One of the arguments raised in the said case was that the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred in terms of Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution only in the matter of granting a declaration that a particular community is a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe as the case may be and that the bar does not apply in the matter of declaring the status of a person belonging to a caste notified as a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in terms of Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution. This court repelled the said contention also in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in Gurusamy (supra). The relevant portion of the judgment in the said case reads thus : “According to the learned counsel appearing for the appellants the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is only in respect of declaring a particular community as belonging to Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes against the provisions of Arts. 341 and 342 of the Constitution and that bar does not apply to declare the status of individuals belonging to Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes as notified by the President.
341 and 342 of the Constitution and that bar does not apply to declare the status of individuals belonging to Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes as notified by the President. In view of the direct decision of the Supreme Court in Gurusamy's case ( 1997 (3) SCC 542 ), it is not possible for this Court to accept this contention.” In the light of the decision of the Apex Court in Gurusamy (supra), I am in complete agreement with the view taken by this Court in Kutty Nanu (supra). Necessarily, it has to be held that the suit for a declaration that the plaintiff therein belongs to a Scheduled Tribe community is not maintainable. The essential relief sought by the plaintiff in the instant case, as noted, is a declaration that he belongs to 'Paniyan' community, which is a community notified as Scheduled Tribe in terms of Article 342 of the Constitution. In other words, the declaration sought by the plaintiff is a declaration that he belongs to a Scheduled Tribe community. Such a suit cannot be held to be maintainable. 6. The next question is as to whether the courts below were justified in dissecting the essential relief claimed in the suit while deciding its maintainability. True, in a case where a larger relief is claimed in the suit and if it is found that the plaintiff is entitled only to a lesser relief, the same shall be granted to the plaintiff and the plaintiff shall not be non- suited merely for the reason that he claimed a larger relief. But that does not mean that the court shall undertake the task of dissecting the reliefs prayed for in the suit for the purpose of granting possible reliefs. It is fundamental that the relief for which the suit is instituted has to be gathered from the tenor and terms of the pleadings read as a whole. What is to be considered by the court is as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to the said relief. The court need not dissect the essential relief claimed in the suit and undertake an adjudication which the plaintiff does not want, for the same would be a futile exercise wasting the precious judicial time.
What is to be considered by the court is as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to the said relief. The court need not dissect the essential relief claimed in the suit and undertake an adjudication which the plaintiff does not want, for the same would be a futile exercise wasting the precious judicial time. The court has to read the pleadings of the parties as also the relief claimed as a whole to understand the purpose of the suit and has to decide the suit as also the issues relating to its maintainability on that basis, for, what is relevant is the substance of the pleadings and relief, and not their form. Coming to the facts of the present case, as noted, the essence of the declaration sought by the plaintiff is that he belongs to a Scheduled Tribe community. The courts should have, in the circumstances, decided whether such a suit is maintainable. The approach made by the court in dissecting the essential relief, according to me, was unwarranted and uncalled for. The issues are answered accordingly. In the result, the second appeal is allowed, the impugned judgments are set aside and O.S.No.60 of 1990 on the file of the Munsiff Magistrate, Ponnani is dismissed.