JUDGMENT : 1. Heard the parties. 2. This appeal is directed against the Judgment of conviction dated 18.01.2006 and Order of sentence dated 20.01.2006, passed by the Sessions Judge, Sahibganj, in Sessions Case No. 254 of 2001, whereby and where under, the appellant has been held guilty for the offence punishable under section 341, 342 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code and has been sentenced to undergo R.I. for 7 years for the offence punishable under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code but no separate sentence was awarded for the offence punishable under section 341 and 342 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. The case of the prosecution as per the written report submitted by the prosecutrix is that on 19.04.2001, at 12:00 noon while the prosecutrix was going to fetch water from the well, on the way the appellant caught hold of her and took her to the cow shed of Gulzar Mian by forcibly pulling her. After taking the prosecutrix inside the cow shed, the informant closed the door. As the prosecutrix raised alarm, the appellant threatened the prosecutrix to kill her, at the point of dagger and also told that he will solemnize marriage with the prosecutrix and committed rape on the prosecutrix. After some time Gulzar Mian came and pushed the door, then the accused-appellant fled away through the window. After opening the door Gulzar Mian enquired from the prosecutrix as to what she was doing there and the prosecutrix narrated the occurrence to Gulzar Mian. The prosecutrix thereafter came to her house. At the time of the occurrence, the prosecutrix was staying in the house of her uncle (Mausa) for about one month prior to the occurrence. After the Mausa of the informant returned from his work, the prosecutrix disclosed about the occurrence to him. There was a meeting for resolution of the matter in the night of the date of occurrence but no decision could be arrived at. Hence, the prosecutrix lodged the written report. On the basis of the written report submitted by the prosecutrix, Barhait P.S. Case No. 26 of 2001 corresponding to G.R. Case No. 142 of 2001 was registered and the police took up investigation of the case. After completion of investigation, police submitted charge-sheet against the accused–appellant. Hence, the prosecutrix lodged the written report. On the basis of the written report submitted by the prosecutrix, Barhait P.S. Case No. 26 of 2001 corresponding to G.R. Case No. 142 of 2001 was registered and the police took up investigation of the case. After completion of investigation, police submitted charge-sheet against the accused–appellant. After commitment of the case to the court of Sessions, the learned Sessions Judge, Sahibganj, framed charges for the offence punishable under sections 341, 342 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code against the appellant. Upon the accused-appellant pleading not guilty to the charges, he was put to trial. 4. In support of its case, the prosecution altogether examined 6 witnesses besides proving the documents while no evidence was adduced by the defence. Out of the six witnesses examined by the prosecution, P.W.4 – Fazlu Rahman, P.W.5 –Gulzar Mian and P.W.6 –Siddiqui did not support the case of the prosecution and showed their ignorance about the same. These three witnesses were declared hostile. 5. P.W. 2 is the prosecutrix herself. She has stated that the occurrence took place two and a half years prior to her deposing in court. She had come to the house of her grandmother at Village Chhota Kadma under Barhait police station and in that house, her maternal aunt (Mausi) –Jarina Bibi also lives along with her uncle (Mausa). She was living since one month prior to the occurrence in the house of her grandmother. On a Thursday, at about 12:00 noon, she had gone to the well to fetch water with a bucket. On her way back, the accused-appellant forcibly took her to the cow shed (Gohal) of Gulzar Mian and committed rape upon her. After commission of the rape, the accused-appellant told that he will marry her and fled away after breaking the window. P.W.5 – Gulzar Mian came there and the prosecutrix disclosed the occurrence to him and came to the house of her Mausi. Her Mausa came in the evening and she disclosed the entire thing to her Mausa. There was a Panchayati and thereafter the prosecutrix reported the matter to the police after going to the police station. She put her thumb impression on her written report which was written by the Munshi in the police station. At the time of occurrence, the prosecutrix was aged about 14 years. She claimed to identify the accused-appellant. There was a Panchayati and thereafter the prosecutrix reported the matter to the police after going to the police station. She put her thumb impression on her written report which was written by the Munshi in the police station. At the time of occurrence, the prosecutrix was aged about 14 years. She claimed to identify the accused-appellant. In her cross-examination, she has stated that there was nobody at the well at 12:00 noon. The accused-appellant forcibly put the prosecutrix inside the cow shed and laid her on the floor. At the time of occurrence she was putting on Kurta and Paijama. The appellant tore her Paijama. The appellant also assaulted the prosecutrix on her nose and there was bleeding from the nose of the prosecutrix. The accused-appellant married her after he was released on bail but the accused-appellant is not keeping the prosecutrix. It is pertinent to mention here that there is no cross-examination of the P.W.2 regarding her age being 14 years at the time of occurrence. 6. P.W.3- Dr. Subidha Sinha has stated that on 22.04.2001 at 09:00 A.M. she examined the P.W.2 and found one white stained salwar, which P.W.3 handed over to the police. She found the hymen of the prosecutrix ruptured and her vagina was tight of one finger. However, she did not find any spermatozoa or foreign hair on her private part. On being proved by her, the injury report was marked as Ext.1. As per the dental examination, she assessed the age of the girl to be between 15 to 18 years. Perusal of the Ext.1 reveals that in Ext.1 the P.W.3 has mentioned the approximate age of the prosecutrix to be 15-16 years. 7. P.W.1 –Jarina Bibi is the Mausi of the prosecutrix. She has stated that the prosecutrix disclosed her about the accused-appellant committing rape on the prosecutrix at the point of dagger, in the cow shed of Gulzar. P.W.1 also stated about the Panchayati convened in the village but no decision could be arrived at there. Hence, the case has been instituted. In her cross-examination, P.W.1 has stated that after the occurrence, the marriage of the prosecutrix was solemnized with the accused-appellant. After closure of the evidence of the prosecution, the statement under section 313 Cr.P.C. of the accused-appellant was recorded wherein, he denied the circumstances appearing in evidence against him. Hence, the case has been instituted. In her cross-examination, P.W.1 has stated that after the occurrence, the marriage of the prosecutrix was solemnized with the accused-appellant. After closure of the evidence of the prosecution, the statement under section 313 Cr.P.C. of the accused-appellant was recorded wherein, he denied the circumstances appearing in evidence against him. The learned court below considered the evidence in the record and convicted and sentenced the accused-appellant as indicated above. 8. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the learned court below failed to properly appreciate the evidence in the record and convicted the appellant ignoring the contradiction in the testimony of P.Ws. 1, 2 and 5. It was further submitted that the learned court below failed to take note of the fact that the prosecutrix is the wife of the appellant. It is also submitted that the court below failed to take into consideration that the Investigating Officer having not been examined in this case and P.W.5 who is the first post occurrence witness as per the prosecution case, turned hostile and did not support the case of the prosecution hence the appellant deserves acquittal. It is also submitted that the court below failed to take into consideration that the Investigating Officer having not been examined in this case and P.W.5 who is the first post occurrence witness as per the prosecution case, turned hostile and did not support the case of the prosecution hence the appellant deserves acquittal. The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the Judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in the case of Jai Krishna Mandal and Another v. State of Jharkhand, reported in (2010) 14 SCC 534 wherein, in the facts and circumstances of that case where it was the admitted position that there was deep enmity between the family of the prosecutrix and the appellants in connection with the dispute over a piece of land and after going through the statement of the prosecutrix, Hon’ble Court found it to be completely unworthy for acceptance as she stated that she had been moved from village to village over a period of five days and though she had ample opportunity for making a hue and cry, she had not even attempted to do so and where the prosecutrix admitted that she had been wearing the same petticoat and saree during the period of five days after she had been raped but the police had not seized the saree or petticoat and the said statement of the prosecutrix is contrary to the statement of the lady doctor who deposed that she had taken the saree from the prosecutrix and handed it over to the investigating officer and also in that case the doctor did not support the prosecution story by deposing that there was no evidence of rape, no injury on her person and that the prosecutrix was a “multi-persons lady” and where the F.I.R. was recorded three days after returning of the prosecutrix to her village and as in that case, the non-examination of the Investigating Officer caused prejudice to the appellant, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the conviction of the appellant is not sustainable. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that this is a fit case where the appellant be acquitted of the charge for the offence punishable under sections 376, 341 and 342 of the Indian Penal Code by at least giving him the benefit of doubt. 9. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that this is a fit case where the appellant be acquitted of the charge for the offence punishable under sections 376, 341 and 342 of the Indian Penal Code by at least giving him the benefit of doubt. 9. Learned Addl.P.P. on the other hand defended the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence and submitted that the testimony of the prosecutrix that she was aged about 14 years at the time of occurrence has remained unchallenged and the same has to be accepted. It is also in her testimony that after the occurrence, the accused-appellant married her is also not disputed. It is submitted by the learned Addl. P.P. that in this case, the solitary testimony of the prosecutrix which was not shaken in any manner in cross-examination itself is sufficient to prove the case of the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. It is further submitted that there is no evidence of any existence of bad blood between the appellant and the prosecutrix nor there is any defence of any false implication. Drawing attention to section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, the learned Addl. P.P. submitted that the prosecutrix has in explicit manner described the act of penetration of the penis by the appellant and the fact that the prosecutrix is aged 14 years and the testimony of the prosecutrix is corroborated by the evidence of the P.W.3 to the extent that the hymen of the prosecutrix was found ruptured is sufficient to establish the charge for the offence punishable under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code against the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt and the facts of the case of Jai Krishna Mandal and Another v. State of Jharkhand (Supra) is entirely different from the facts of this case on its material particulars except for the handing over of the Paijama of the prosecutrix by the prosecutrix to the doctor who examined her, hence, the ratio of Jai Krishna Mandal and Another v. State of Jharkhand (Supra) is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case and also in this case, the defence has not been prejudiced in any manner by non-examination of the I.O. Hence, it is submitted that the learned court below having rightly convicted and sentenced the accused-appellant, this appeal being without any merit be dismissed. 10. 10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and going through the evidence in record, I find that the testimony of the prosecutrix has not been discredited or demolished in any manner, in her cross-examination. The prosecutrix has well stood the lengthy cross-examination of her. Her testimony that she was aged 14 years at the time of occurrence having remained unchallenged is to be accepted. There is no material in the record to disbelieve the prosecution case about sexual assault being made on the appellant. The factum of alleged marriage between the prosecutrix and the appellant after the occurrence only lends credence to the prosecution of case of sexual assault on the prosecutrix. The evidence of the prosecutrix on record is wholly reliable, trustworthy and inspires confidence. It is a settled principle of law that conviction can be found on the testimony of the prosecutrix alone unless there are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The evidence of prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured witness. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of State of H.P. V. Asha Ram reported in 2006 Crl.L.J 139 : (2005) 13 SCC 766 has held in this respect as under in paragraph - 5. “5. We record our displeasure and dismay, the way the High Court dealt casually with the offence so grave, as in the case at hand, overlooking the alarming and shocking increase of sexual assault on the minor girls. The High Court was swayed by sheer insensitivity totally oblivious of growing menace of sex violence against the minors much less by the father. The High Court also totally overlooked the prosecution evidence, which inspired confidence and merited acceptance. It is now well settled principle of law that conviction can be founded on the testimony of the prosecutrix alone unless there are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The evidence of a prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured witness. The testimony of the victim of sexual assault is vital unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty in acting on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. The testimony of the victim of sexual assault is vital unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty in acting on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. It is also well settled principle of law that corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. The evidence of the prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured witness. Even minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case.(Emphasis Supplied) In the case of Mohd. Imran Khan v. State Government (NCT of Delhi) reported in 2012 Crl. L.J 693, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the law as under in paragraph – 15 and 17: “15. It is a trite law that a woman, who is the victim of sexual assault, is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust. The prosecutrix stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness as she suffers from emotional injury. Therefore, her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter called 'Evidence Act'), nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 of Evidence Act and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence. The court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations. Rape is not merely a physical assault, rather it often distracts the whole personality of the victim. The rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female and, therefore, the testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and in such cases, non-examination even of other witnesses may not be a serious infirmity in the prosecution case, particularly where the witnesses had not seen the commission of the offence. (Vide: State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, AIR 1990 SC 658 : (1990 Cri LJ 889); State of U.P. v. Pappu @Yunus and Anr., AIR 2005 SC 1248 : (2004 AIR SCW 6563); and Vijay @ Chinee v. State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 191 ) : (AIR 2011 SC (Cri) 940 : 2010 AIR SCW 5510). Thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that statement of prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence and reliable, requires no corroboration. The court may convict the accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. 17. Thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that statement of prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence and reliable, requires no corroboration. The court may convict the accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. 17. This view of the Trial Court stands fortified by the judgment of this Court in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh and Ors., AIR 1996 SC 1393 : (1996 AIR SCW 998), wherein this Court observed that "the courts must, while evaluating evidence remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her." Similarly, in Wahid Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 2 SCC 9 : ( AIR 2010 SC 1 : 2009 AIR SCW 7410), it has been observed as under: "It is also a matter of common law that in Indian society any girl or woman would not make such allegations against a person as she is fully aware of the repercussions flowing therefrom. If she is found to be false, she would be looked at by the society with contempt throughout her life. For an unmarried girl, it will be difficult to find a suitable groom. Therefore, unless an offence has really been committed, a girl or a woman would be extremely reluctant even to admit that any such incident had taken place which is likely to reflect on her chastity. She would also be conscious of the danger of being ostracised by the society. It would indeed be difficult for her to survive in Indian society which is, of course, not as forward-looking as the western countries are." (Emphasis Supplied). 11. So far as the contention of the appellant regarding non-examination of the I.O. is concerned, it is a settled principle of law that non-examination of the I.O. per se is not fatal to the case unless the defence is prejudiced by non-examination of the I.O. The effect of non-examination of Investigating Officer has been considered by the Apex Court in various cases. In the case of Ramdeo v. State of U.P., reported in 1995 Supl. (1) SCC, 547, the Apex Court held that it is always desirable for the prosecution to examine the Investigating Officer. In the case of Ramdeo v. State of U.P., reported in 1995 Supl. (1) SCC, 547, the Apex Court held that it is always desirable for the prosecution to examine the Investigating Officer. However, non-examination of the Investigating Officer does not in any way create any dent in the prosecution case; much less affect the credibility or otherwise trustworthy testimony of the eye witness. In the case of Ambika Prasad v. State (Delhi Admn.) AIR 2000 SC 718 , it was held that non examination of Investigating Officer could not be a ground for disbelieving eye witnesses. In the case of Bahadur Naik v. State of Bihar, AIR 2000 SC, 1582, it was held by the Apex Court that non examination of an Investigating Officer was of no consequence when it could not be shown as to what prejudice had been caused to the appellant by such non-examination. In this case there is no cross-examination of the P.Ws. 2 or 1 vis-à-vis; their statements recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C. by the Investigating Officer. There is no cross-examination of the P.W.2 in respect of the place of occurrence. In her testimony, the P.W. 2 has categorically mentioned the place of occurrence being the cow shed (Gohal) of P.W.5. As mentioned above, the learned counsel for the appellant could not show that any prejudice has been caused to the appellant on account of non-examination of the Investigating Officer. Hence, I have no hesitation in holding that non-examination of the I.O. in this case has not prejudiced the defence and thus non examination of the I.O. in this case will not be fatal. 12. So far as the ratio of Jai Krishna Mandal (Supra) is concerned, the facts of this case are significantly different from the facts of Jai Krishna Mandal (Supra) as in the case of Jai Krishna Mandal (Supra), the Hon’ble Court held that the statement of the prosecutrix was completely unworthy for acceptance which is not the case here and secondly, in Jai Krishna Mandal (Supra) it was the admitted position that there was deep enmity between the family of the prosecutrix and the appellants which is not the case in the instant case rather, in this case the accused appellant has said to have solemnized marriage with the prosecutrix after the occurrence. So in the humble opinion of this Court, the ratio of Jai Krishna Mandal (Supra) is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case for the aforesaid reasons. 13. Because of the discussion made above, I have no hesitation in holding that the evidence in the record is sufficient for establishing the charge for the offence punishable under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code against the accused-appellant beyond all reasonable doubt and the sentence imposed appears to be proper. Accordingly, the conviction of the appellant accused- Jamshed Ansari for the offence punishable under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code as made by the learned Sessions Judge, Sahibganj, in the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence, is confirmed and this appeal being without any merit is dismissed. The appellant is on bail. In view of confirmation of his conviction, his bail is cancelled and the appellant is directed to surrender before the court below forthwith, failing which, the court below is directed to take coercive steps for apprehension of the appellant- Jamshed Ansari for undergoing the rest of the sentence. 14. Let the Lower Court Record be sent back along with a copy of this Judgment forthwith. 15. In the result, this appeal is dismissed.